# YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE—

## The presidential memoirs of HARRY S TRUMAN

"[Truman] has chosen to give a major share of his space to the great decisions and genuinely dynamic programs which checked Soviet imperialism and rallied the free world, aid to Greece and Turkey the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Point IV the defeat of the Berlin blockade, and the Korean War His account is simple, straightforward, and salty Grave situations arose. Something had to be done. He acted promptly often with imagination, and always with courage. If the free world survives without a great war he will surely hold a high place in history"

—Ernest K. Lindley
*Virginia Quarterly Review*

"It will be eagerly read, for it illuminates some of the pivotal events of our century Perhaps the cardinal value of the book lies in its frank depiction of Mr. Truman's mind and character"

—Allan Nevins,
*New York Times*

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# Memoirs by Harry S Truman

*Volume Two*

## YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the writing of my memoirs and the story of a very trying period of history I have received invaluable aid and suggestions from many people. A vast amount of research of my personal papers and documents was necessary in my efforts to achieve a true and accurate picture.

I owe a great debt of gratitude to Mrs. Truman, on whose counsel and judgment I frequently called.

I wish to express my special thanks to many members of my administration who took time to go over with me various phases of the past in which they had a part: Dean Acheson, General of the Army George C. Marshall, Samuel I. Rosenman, John W. Snyder, Rear Admiral Sidney Souers, Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, W. Averell Harriman, General of the Army Omar Bradley, Charles F. Brannan, Charles Sawyer, Philip B. Perlman, Thomas E. Murray, Stanley Woodward, John Steelman, Charles Murphy, Major General Robert B. Landry, as well as Oscar Chapman, Gordon Dean, J. Howard McGrath, Clark Clifford, Edwin W. Pauley, and Judge Caskie Collet.

To Dean Acheson and Samuel I. Rosenman, who painstakingly read and criticized my manuscript, I wish to convey my special gratitude.

During the past two years David M. Noyes and William Hillman were constantly at my side, helping me to assemble and edit this work. With their collaboration this book has been made possible. To Dave and to Bill I can only say a thousand times, thank you.

To Professor Francis E. Heller of Kansas University I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the invaluable service he rendered. Among those who also helped with historical research during some periods was Professor Morton Royse.

A very heavy burden fell on my personal staff during the

writing and rewriting of these memoirs, and I wish to acknowledge with thanks the devoted work of Mr Eugene Bailey Miss Rose Conway and Miss Frances Myers.

I have used some passages from *Mr President* by William Hillman (Farrar Straus & Young) for inclusion in my memoirs as part of the historical record.

H. S. T

# PREFACE

I have often thought in reading the history of our country how much is lost to us because so few of our Presidents have told their own stories. It would have been helpful for us to know more of what was in their minds and what impelled them to do what they did.

The presidency of the United States carries with it a responsibility so personal as to be without parallel.

Very few are ever authorized to speak for the President. No one can make decisions for him. No one can know all the processes and stages of his thinking in making important decisions. Even those closest to him, even members of his immediate family, never know all the reasons why he does certain things and why he comes to certain conclusions. To be President of the United States is to be lonely, very lonely at times of great decisions.

Unfortunately some of our Presidents were prevented from telling all the facts of their administrations because they died in office. Some were physically spent on leaving the White House and could not have undertaken to write even if they had wanted to. Some were embittered by the experience and did not care about living it again in telling about it.

As for myself, I should like to record, before it is too late, as much of the story of my occupancy of the White House as I am able to tell. The events, as I saw them and as I put them down here, I hope may prove helpful in informing some people and in setting others straight on the facts.

No one who has lived through more than seven and a half years as President of the United States in the midst of one world crisis after another can possibly remember every detail of all that happened. For the last two and a half years I have checked my memory against my personal papers, memoranda, and letters and with some of the persons who were present when certain decisions were made, seeking to recapture and record accurately the significant events of my administration.

I have tried to refrain from hindsight and afterthoughts. Any schoolboy's afterthought is worth more than the forethought of the greatest statesman. What I have written here is based upon the circumstances and the facts and my thinking at the time I made the decisions, and not what they might have been as a result of later developments.

# Memoirs by
# Harry S Truman

*Volume Two*

## YEARS
## OF TRIAL
## AND HOPE

That part of the manuscript which could not be physically included in the two volumes of the memoirs, I shall turn over to the Library in Independence, Missouri, where it will be made available to scholars and students of history

For reasons of national security and out of consideration for some people still alive, I have omitted certain material. Some of this material cannot be made available for many years, perhaps for many generations.

In spite of the turmoil and pressure of critical events during the years I was President, the one purpose that dominated me in everything I thought and did was to prevent a third world war One of the events that has cast a shadow over our lives and the lives of peoples everywhere has been termed, inaccurately the "cold war"

What we have been living through is, in fact, a period of nationalistic, social and economic tensions. These tensions were in part brought about by shattered nations trying to recover from the war and by peoples in many places awakening to their right to freedom. More than half of the world's population was subject for centuries to foreign domination and economic slavery The repercussions of the American and French revolutions are just now being felt all around the world.

This was a natural development of events, and the United States did all it could to help and encourage nations and peoples to recovery and to independence.

Unhappily one imperialistic nation, Soviet Russia sought to take advantage of this world situation. It was for this reason, only that we had to make sure of our military strength. We are not a militaristic nation, but we had to meet the world situation with which we were faced.

We knew that there could be no lasting peace so long as there were large populations in the world living under primitive conditions and suffering from starvation, disease, and denial of the advantages of modern science and industry

There is enough in the world for everyone to have plenty to live on happily and to be at peace with his neighbors.

I believe, as I said on January 5 1953 in my last address to the American people before leaving the White House "We have averted World War III up to now and we may have already succeeded in establishing conditions which can keep that war from happening as far ahead as man can see."

H. S. T

*Independence Missouri*

# CHAPTER 1

Within the first few months I discovered that being a President is like riding a tiger. A man has to keep on riding or be swallowed. The fantastically crowded nine months of 1945 taught me that a President either is constantly on top of events or, if he hesitates, events will soon be on top of him. I never felt that I could let up for a single moment.

No one who has not had the responsibility can really understand what it is like to be President, not even his closest aides or members of his immediate family. There is no end to the chain of responsibility that binds him, and he is never allowed to forget that he is President. What kept me going in 1945 was my belief that there is far more good than evil in men and that it is the business of government to make the good prevail.

By nature not given to making snap judgments or easy decisions, I required all available facts and information before coming to a decision. But once a decision was made, I did not worry about it afterward. I had trained myself to look back into history for precedents, because instinctively I sought perspective in the span of history for the decisions I had to make. That is why I read and re-read history. Most of the problems a President has to face have their roots in the past.

Two cruel wars were behind us in which we had seen totalitarian aggressors beaten into unconditional surrender. We had sponsored and helped establish the United Nations Organization, hoping to prevent again the too often recurring plague of humanity—war. I had met with Churchill and Attlee and Stalin at Potsdam, trying to achieve closer co-operation between the three leading powers.

But in spite of these efforts relations with Russia had become strained. Victory had turned a difficult ally in war

great deal of credit for his legislative leadership in the shaping of the atomic program.

On November 30 I sent a memorandum to certain officials on the handling of the atomic program, stating that I thought the May-Johnson bill should be amended to provide for civilian supremacy and at the same time raised with Senator McMahon the necessity for establishing civilian control. The senator agreed to seek amendment of the bill. Within a few days, however, he requested an appointment, suggesting that the Secretaries of War and of the Navy also be present. The military services felt very strongly that the control of atomic development should be under their auspices, if not under their immediate jurisdiction, and they were making strong representations to that effect to the Congress.

The meeting took place in my office on December 4. In addition to Patterson, Forrestal, and Senator McMahon, General Groves was present, along with Dr. Edward U. Condon, Director of the Bureau of Standards, and James R. Newman, counsel of the Atomic Energy Committee.

I asked each member of the group to state his position. Then I stated mine, that the entire program and operation should be under civilian control and that the government should have a monopoly of materials, facilities, and processes.

On December 20 Senator McMahon introduced S. 1717 which, in substance, contained this approach to the subject. On December 27 Secretary Patterson submitted a memorandum giving his views and those of some of his advisers in opposition to the McMahon bill. After the most careful study I replied to the Secretaries of War and of the Navy on January 23 with this memorandum, in which I insisted upon civilian control.

> I have read the Secretary of War's memorandum of December 27th, giving his view together with those of certain members of the Interim Committee, on my proposals for specific amendments to the May Johnson bill.
>
> After careful consideration, it is my judgment that the recommendations contained in my memorandum of November 30th should be adhered to without modification.
>
> I direct your attention to the following items of particular importance
>
> (1) A commission established by the Congress for the control of atomic energy should be exclusively composed of civilians. This is in accord with established American tradition and has found its way into statutory provi-

into an even more troublesome peacetime partner. Russia seemed bent upon taking advantage of war-shattered neighbors for imperialistic ends. The whole balance of power in the Far East had shifted. Most of the countries in Europe were bankrupt, millions of people were homeless and starving, and we were the only nation that could come to their help. We had already taken emergency relief measures, and we were preparing to do everything we could to avert a great human disaster.

The economic and financial burdens confronting us were staggering. But the adjustments from war to peace were being accomplished in a vigilant and orderly manner and our economy kept going in high gear with full peacetime employment at a time when we were demobilizing millions of men. We were witnessing the transformation of the United States into a nation of unprecedented power and growing capacity.

But one event occurred in 1945 of such magnitude that it was to revolutionize our relations with the world and usher in a new era for humanity, the fruits and goals and problems of which we cannot even now fully grasp. It was the atomic bomb. With it came the secret of how to harness nuclear energy. I now had a responsibility without precedent in history. The decisions I had to make and the policies I would recommend to Congress on the use and control of atomic energy could well influence the future course of civilization. This was to be the beginning of the period of hope and many trials.

A bill for the control of atomic energy was before the Congress. This bill was the May-Johnson bill, which had been drawn up in the early days after V-J Day, and its approach was military. Its aim was to set up a kind of permanent "Manhattan District" under military control.

In the message I had sent to Congress on October 3 I strongly emphasized the peacetime uses of atomic energy, and for that reason I felt that it should not be controlled by the military. During the fall months of 1945 legislative action had been delayed by a wrangle among Senate committees as to which should properly handle bills affecting atomic power. Behind this dispute was the basic disagreement on whether the new force was primarily a military weapon or a potential source for peaceful civilian development.

The legislative dispute was finally resolved when the Senate set up a Special Committee on Atomic Energy. The chairman of this committee was Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut, a devoted and talented public servant who deserves a

failing this, that no steps be taken to alter the present status of the bill in the House.

It is my wish, furthermore, that in appearing before Congressional committees or in discussions with Members of Congress relative to atomic energy legislation officials of the Administration present views not inconsistent with the points given in my memorandum of November 30th and reaffirmed herein.

H.S.T

Civilian control of atomic energy faced many obstacles. Proponents of military control had many friends in the Congress, and Senator McMahon had a difficult time gathering support for his measure. On February 1 he spent nearly two hours with me at the White House discussing his difficulties.

In order to support the McMahon bill publicly I gave the senator this letter and had it released for publication

My dear Senator McMahon: February 1 1946

You have requested my views on S. 1717 a bill for the domestic development and control of atomic energy. I wish to give you my thoughts at this time because I consider the subject of paramount importance and urgency both from the standpoint of our welfare at home and that of achieving a durable peace throughout the world.

I appreciate the thorough and impartial manner in which atomic energy hearings have been held before your Committee. I believe that the hearings, in keeping with democratic tradition, have aided the people in obtaining a clearer insight into the problems which such legislation must meet.

You will recall that I sent a special message to the Congress on October 3 1945 calling for legislation to fix a policy for the domestic control of atomic energy. Since then I have given considerable time to the further study of this most difficult subject. I have had the advantage of additional technical information and expressions of public opinion developed at the hearings. With this background I feel prepared to recommend in greater detail than before what I believe to be the essential elements of sound atomic energy legislation. [The letter then set forth in the same order the three points made in the foregoing memorandum to the Secretaries of War and Navy in approximately the same language. It then continued.]

sions which expressly prohibit members of the Armed Forces on active status from serving in other Governmental posts. These provisions the May Johnson bill seeks to modify In my judgment, the problem of atomic energy does not justify the departure.

I agree that in times of national emergency it may be desirable to call upon members of the Armed Forces to serve in administrative posts for which their experience peculiarly fits them. In such event, the Congress may as it has in the past, pass specific enabling legislation. But I believe this to be an unusual step to be invoked by the Congress only when the national interest or safety demands it.

(2) An absolute Government monopoly of ownership, production and processing of all fissionable materials appears to me imperative. *Fissionable* materials are, of course, to be distinguished from *source* materials from which fissionable materials may be derived. By fissionable materials, I mean such as U235 or Plutonium or any substance enriched in these beyond its natural state.

I recognize that administering close controls of fissionable materials may in some respects prove difficult. But the difficulty is small compared to the advantages of government monopoly in dealing with international problems—or compared to the danger of permitting anyone other than the Government to own or produce these crucial substances, the use of which affects the safety of the entire Nation. The benefits of atomic energy are the heritage of the people they should be distributed as widely as possible. Government monopoly alone will assure both the material safety and the maximum utilization of atomic energy for the public welfare.

(3) Consistent with these principles I believe it essential that atomic energy devices be made fully available for private patents, and regulation of royalty fees to insure their reasonableness. These provisions will assure widespread distribution of the benefits of atomic energy while preserving the royalty incentive to maintain the interest of private enterprise.

While I have covered only three of the major points in my memorandum of November 30th I deem adherence to all the recommendations in that memorandum to be essential.

The Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee of the House and the leaders in the House should be advised that the Administration desires recommitment of the May Johnson bill for purposes of amendment or

al Assembly by the British as the host country, was fully supported by our delegation, and was adopted on January 24. It was agreed that the first meeting of the new Commission should be held in New York on June 14, 1946.

While the United Nations deliberated on the establishment of an agency for the discussion of atomic energy controls, a committee appointed by the Secretary of State worked out a plan for such controls which might be placed before the U.N. Commission when it convened.

This committee consisted of five members. The Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was designated as chairman, and with him served John J. McCloy, former Assistant Secretary of War, and three men most directly connected with the development of the bomb, Dr. Vannevar Bush, Dr. James B. Conant, and Major General Leslie R. Groves.

Working with and for the committee was a board of consultants whose job it was to analyze and appraise all facts pertinent to the problem of international control and to formulate proposals. David E. Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was the chairman of this group. The members were Chester I. Barnard, president of the New Jersey Telephone Company; Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer; Dr. Charles Allen Thomas, vice-president and technical director of the Monsanto Chemical Company; and Harry A. Winne, vice-president of the General Electric Company.

This board did an outstanding job. It examined every aspect of the problem thoroughly and conscientiously. Its report was unanimously endorsed by the parent committee. It is usually referred to as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and is a great state paper.

I received the report from Secretary Byrnes on March 21. By that time a number of other developments had taken place that had a bearing on the problem of atomic energy control.

On March 8 Senator McMahon had come to the White House to report that new difficulties were in the offing for the atomic energy bill that he had introduced. Senator Vandenberg was sponsoring an amendment to the bill that would set up a Military Liaison Board which, in effect, would duplicate the proposed Atomic Energy Commission. It would have access to all matters before the Commission, would have the right to insist on consultation with the Commission whenever it desired, and would have the right to appeal to the President any action of the Commission which it believed would "affect the National Defense."

4 In my message of October 3rd, I wrote

"Our science and industry owe their strength to the spirit of free inquiry and the spirit of free enterprise that characterize our country [This] is our best guaranty of maintaining the preeminence in science and industry upon which our national well-being depends.

Legislation in this field must assure genuine freedom to conduct independent research and must guarantee that controls over the dissemination of information will not stifle scientific progress.

Atomic energy legislation should also insure coordination between research activities of the Commission and those of the proposed National Science Foundation, now under consideration by the Congress.

5 Each of the foregoing provisions for domestic control of atomic energy will contribute materially to the achievement of a safe, effective international arrangement making possible the ultimate use of atomic energy for exclusively peaceful and humanitarian ends. The Commission should be in a position to carry out at once any international agreements relating to inspection, control of the production of fissionable materials, dissemination of information, and similar areas of international action.

I feel that it is a matter of urgency that sound domestic legislation on atomic energy be enacted with utmost speed. Domestic and international issues of the first importance wait upon this action.

To your Committee, pioneers in legislation of vast promise for our people and all people, there beckons a place of honor in history

Sincerely
Harry S. Truman

The formulation of a plan for the international control of atomic energy had in the meantime been referred to a special governmental committee which Secretary Byrnes had appointed.

The State of the Union message of January 14 repeated our *desire to develop effective control through the United* Nations. The delegation which I had sent to the first formal session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in London in January was under instructions to work for the establishment of a United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy This was in keeping with the agreements reached at Moscow the preceding month.

The plan for such a commission was put before the Gener

Baruch enjoyed considerable esteem in the Senate. His association with the administration's plan for the control of atomic energy might help remove some of the opposition to the McMahon bill in Congress. Baruch had also succeeded, over the years, in forming many friendships abroad, including that of Winston Churchill, and during a long life he had acquired the prestige of an "elder statesman." I called on him in the expectation that he would also add weight to the proposal we were about to put before the world.

The Baruch appointment was announced on March 18 and was received very favorably by the press. On the same day my regular weekly conference with the "Big Four" leaders of Congress was devoted exclusively to the McMahon bill. I explained the reasons for the bill as originally drafted and said that I would not accept a law without civilian control.

When Byrnes brought me a final draft of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, I sat down at once to study it. By some unauthorized means, however, this report fell into the hands of the press. This upset Baruch, and he asked to see me. When he came, he handed me a letter:

March 26, 1946

My dear Mr. President:

I was, of course, very much gratified that you should have expressed such great confidence in me as to appoint me the United States representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. I do not underestimate either the honor or the responsibility but, as I have become more familiar with the situation, there are certain elements of it which are causing me concern, and which I, therefore, want to discuss with you. As I understand my duties and authority, they consist presently solely of the obligation of representing United States policy on atomic energy as communicated to me by you directly or through the Secretary of State, before the United Nations Organization. I see nowhere any duty or responsibility on me to participate in the formation of that policy.

This situation has been brought very forcibly to my attention by the press announcements of the report rendered by Mr. Acheson's Committee. I do not underestimate the effect of this publication in the United States or in the world at large, and while I have not had an opportunity to examine the report with care and cannot state my own definite views with respect to it, the letter

On March 12 the Senate Atomic Energy Committee had approved this amendment, McMahon being the only senator to vote against it. The following day a slightly changed version was adopted by the same margin, again McMahon casting the sole negative vote.

This amendment would have had the effect of defeating the principle of civilian supremacy and under it the Commission's work would have been subject to the veto of the military The argument for this military veto was based on the premise that the preservation of the national security is primarily the responsibility of the armed forces. But this is a wrong assumption. The preservation of the nation's safety and defense is an organic and sweeping responsibility that extends to all branches and departments of the government and only one of its many phases is assigned to the military departments.

I put it in these words to a press conference on March 14

"I don't think there is a clear understanding by the public, or even in Congress, on what is meant by civilian control of that board. I have tried to make that perfectly clear in my letter of February 2nd. The idea is that the military of course has an important part to play and should be consulted, but it is a mistake to believe that only the military can guard the national security The full responsibility for a balanced and forceful development of atomic energy looking toward the national economic good, national security and a firm, clear position toward other nations and world peace, should rest with the civilian group directly responsible to the President. Now the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the first place and the civilian board under him would in no way hamper the military in their proper function"

On March 16 I conferred with Secretary of State Byrnes on the possibility that Congress might pass an atomic energy law that would undercut our efforts to bring about international co-operation in the field of atomic power We had to be in a position where we could put our plan for international control before the United Nations without being handicapped by a domestic law that would have made it impossible for us to participate.

Byrnes advised me that the committee was ready to report any day He suggested that we appoint a spokesman who would command respect both at home and abroad Bernard M. Baruch seemed to me to be the logical man and for several reasons. Not the least important of these was that

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April 19 1946

Dear B. M.,

Summarizing for the record our discussion of April 18 in which Mr. Hancock and Mr. Searls participated, I have asked you to give me the benefit of your advice when, with the President, I attempt to determine the policy of the United States which is to guide you in your representation of the United States on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

You have pointed out that under the statute you are not called upon to determine policy. The fact is that under the law the President determines the policy and transmits such policy through me to the United States representative on the Commission. However, as a practical matter, I know that the President will ask for my views in determining this policy and I, in turn, will ask for your views. That is why I had asked you to be good enough to fully explore the subject.

I have advised you that I am favorably impressed by the report which has come to be called the State Department report and which was prepared under the direction of Mr. Acheson. I have, however, advised you that I am not of the opinion that it is the last word on the subject and, on the contrary, that I shall give careful consideration to any views that may be presented by you after you consider the problem.

I have suggested that submission of your advice should be informal. I hope that you will give me the benefit of your advice from time to time as your study progresses. I suggest this because from time to time I may be called upon to discuss the matter with the President. I would want to give to him, or have you join me in giving to him, any views we thought might be helpful to him in his consideration of the subject.

There is to be no formal report. The decision as to policy is the President's. You and I will advise him just as I advise him on many other matters. While it is the duty of the President to determine policy, it is my thought that when determined it should not be made public by him but should be transmitted to you and you, as representative of the United States, should announce at the meeting of the Commission what is the policy of this Government. However, that will be for the President to decide.

Once the Commission is in operation, there must be close cooperation between you and the Secretary of State. Matters will arise which cannot be foreseen and

from Secretary Byrnes to me transmitting the report states that it was unanimously recommended by a Committee headed by the Under Secretary of State. This brings the report pretty close to the category of the United States Government policy

I have no doubt that the public feels that I am going to have an important relation to the determination of our atomic energy policy There is no legal basis for this view and now that the Under Secretary of State's Committee Report has been published, the determination of policy will be greatly affected by the contents of this report. Even the superficial and incomplete examination of the subject that I have been able to make in the last few days convinces me that this report is likely to be the subject of considerable and rather violent differences of opinion. Its publication, which I understand to have been unauthorized, does not render the situation any less difficult.

These are the things that have been bothering me, and I wanted to talk them over with you before coming to a final conclusion myself as to whether in the circumstances, I can be useful to you. I will need a little more time to reflect. As it presently st nds, I think that embarrassment all around would be avoided if you would ask Chairman Connally of the Foreign Relations Committee to postpone any action on confirmation of my appointment until I have had a little more time to think things over

Respectfully yours,
Bernard M. Baruch

I explained to Mr Baruch that, in the first place, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report was very plainly marked as a working paper and not as an approved policy document. I also informed him that whatever policy he would be asked to represent before the United Nations would have to be a policy approved by me. I pointed out that, under the law all representatives of the United States at the United Nations were under the supervision of the Secretary of State Of course, I told him, the Secretary of State would probably request his aid in the preparation of a policy proposal for my approval, but I had no intention of placing him in a role different from other delegates to the United Nations.

Mr Baruch then went to see Secretary Byrnes, and Byrnes later informed me that he had given Baruch a letter outlining his duties

notably John Hancock, Ferdinand Eberstadt, and Dr Richard C. Tolman, presented details of the American proposals to the several committees set up by the U.N Commission. Russian and Polish opposition was evident. In substance, what the Russians wanted was a plan that would provide for an agreement not to use atomic weapons, for the cessation of bomb production, and for the destruction of all stockpiles. This amounted to a demand that we destroy our atomic bombs and, if we agreed to all this, then the Russians would be willing to discuss arrangements for the exchange of scientific information and the formation of international controls.

Our plan provided for the setting up of immediate controls over raw materials out of which fissionable materials could be made. Only when such controls were established would we consider disposing of our stockpile of bombs.

If we accepted the Russian position, we would be deprived of everything except their promise to agree to controls. Then, if the Russians should launch an atomic armament race, our present advantage and security gained by our discovery and initiative would be wiped out. As I wrote to Baruch on July 10, "We should not under any circumstances throw away our gun until we are sure the rest of the world can't arm against us.

The United Nations Commission eventually adopted, over the objections of Poland and Russia, what was substantially the American plan. The Commission's report was sent to the Security Council. There, backed by the use of the veto, Russia was able to block all further action.

The possibility that Russia would not co-operate in an international control scheme had been anticipated by us. We were prepared, in any event, to safeguard our own national interest.

At the time the British expressed concern over the McMahon bill. They said that the bill would deprive them of the opportunity to share our knowledge and "know-how" and the advantages derived from the years of wartime collaboration with us on the bomb project. Our Ambassador to London, Averell Harriman, reported to me that Prime Minister Attlee felt that if the McMahon bill passed, Britain would be forced to undertake the development of atomic energy production on her own. Attlee said he feared the McMahon bill would prohibit the disclosure or sharing of atomic secrets with any foreign power, including the British. The British government took the position that, until such a time as U.N control might become effective, the British should either have

you must be given discretion to exercise your judgment as to all such matters, only avoiding positions that would be in conflict with the President's policy

I do not believe that you will have any difficulty about these matters. You will be acting toward me just as I act toward the President. I know what his basic policies are. Knowing that, I do not hesitate to take positions as to matters which could not be anticipated. If they are matters of great importance I try to communicate with him. We have never had any difference in views that was not quickly reconciled. I am sure that will be your experience.

If you need any help from the State Department I am sure it will be granted without question. Should there ever be a question this letter is your authority to call upon the officials of the Department of State for assistance.

I expect to leave Washington Tuesday morning. Good luck to you!

Sincerely yours,
James F Byrnes

Baruch, who is usually referred to as an "adviser to Presidents," had, of course full knowledge of the President's responsibility for national policy His concern, in my opinion, was really whether he would receive public recognition. He had always seen to it that his suggestions and recommendations, not always requested by the President, would be given publicity Most Presidents have received more advice than they can possibly use. But Baruch is the only man to my knowledge who has built a reputation on a self-assumed unofficial status as "adviser

I had asked him to help his government in a capacity of my choosing. I had no intention of having him tell me what his job should be. I made that clear to him, in a very polite way and so did Byrnes, as his letter indicates.

Mr Baruch's principal contribution to the atomic energy program was that he transformed the Acheson-Lilienthal Report from a working paper into a formal systematic proposal and that he added a section that called for sanctions against any nation violating the rules. The American plan was put before the United Nations Commission by Baruch on June 14 Within a matter of hours it became evident that the U.S.S.R. had a proposal of its own, and one that was sharply in conflict with the American suggestion.

In the month that followed, Baruch and his associates,

consider and recommend to us appropriate arrangements for this purpose. END QUOTE.

"I would regret it very much if there should be any misunderstanding by us as to this memorandum.

"I think it is agreed by all of us that during the war under the Quebec Agreement the United States was not obligated to furnish to the United Kingdom in the postwar period the designs and assistance in construction and operation of plants necessary to the building of a plant. Therefore, the question is whether this situation was changed and such an obligation assumed by the United States under the language of the memorandum above quoted.

"The language 'full and effective cooperation' is very general. We must consider what was the intention of those who signed the memorandum. I must say that no one at any time informed me that the memorandum was proposed with the intention of having the United States obligate itself to furnish the engineering and operation assistance necessary for the construction of another atomic energy plant. Had that been done I would not have signed the memorandum.

"That such a change in our obligation was not intended at the time is indicated by the working paper prepared by Sir John Anderson and General Groves, a few hours after the signing of a memorandum by you and me. I admit that I was not aware of the existence of this paper but it shows conclusively that even in the minds of those gentlemen who prepared the agreement we signed, the words 'full and effective cooperation' applied only to the field of basic scientific information and were not intended to require the giving of information as to construction and operation of plants whenever it was requested.

"Paragraph five of that memorandum of intention reads as follows

QUOTE. There shall be full and effective cooperation in the field of basic scientific research among the three countries. In the field of development, design, construction, and operation of plants such cooperation, recognized as desirable in principle, shall be regulated by such ad hoc arrangements as may be approved from time to time by the Combined Policy Committee as mutually advantageous. END QUOTE.

As to our entering at this time into an arrangement to assist the United Kingdom in building an atomic energy plant, I think it would be exceedingly unwise from the standpoint of the United Kingdom as well as the United States.

atomic weapons made available to them or at least be supplied with the data necessary to start their own production.

The Combined Policy Committee, which was the British-American body that handled such questions, came to a complete deadlock on April 15 and on the following day Attlee sent me a long message in which he sought to justify the British stand.

The agreed declaration of November 15 1945 he said, stated that it was our desire that there should be "full and effective cooperation in the field of atomic energy between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada." This, he thought, could not mean less than full interchange of information and a fair division of the material. The declaration, Attlee said, contained nothing about the sharing of information among ourselves and the clear indication was that this was already provided for The wartime arrangements under which the major share of the development work and the construction and operation of full-scale plants were carried out in the United States had naturally meant that technological and engineering information had accumulated in our hands. Now if there was to be full and effective co-operation between us, Attlee declared, it was essential that this information be shared. The British Prime Minister proposed that the Combined Policy Committee should make a further study of the question.

I replied to Attlee on April 20

"The Secretary of State has informed me of the discussion in the Combined Policy Committee with reference to the request of the representatives of the United Kingdom that they be furnished with full information as to the construction and operation of the atomic energy plants in this country in order that they may proceed to construct a plant somewhere in the United Kingdom.

"The Secretary advises me that the request is based upon the construction placed upon the memorandum dated November 16, 1945 signed by Harry S Truman, C R Attlee and Mackenzie King. That memorandum reads as follows

"QUOTE 1 We desire that there should be full and effective cooperation in the field of atomic energy between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada.

"QUOTE 2. We agree that the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined Development Trust should be continued in a suitable form.

"QUOTE 3 We request the Combined Policy Committee to

war came to an end, the British were told that until new arrangements were concluded the supply of information from the United States must stop and for that reason, the Prime Minister said, he had gone to Washington to see that the wartime co-operation be continued.

"I was very much reassured," he said in his message, "when you agreed that this should be so and that the Combined Policy Committee should be asked to recommend arrangements to that end."

Attlee contended that he could find no support in the document drawn up by that policy committee that there was no obligation to exchange information about the construction of large-scale plants. He referred to a draft agreement drawn up by a subcommittee of the Combined Policy Committee providing continuance of full and effective co-operation in the exchange of information. "We made it clear in the discussions that our own program would include the construction of large-scale plants, he added. But when the subcommittee report had been submitted to the Combined Policy Committee, it came as a surprise to him, Attlee went on to say "to find that your government was not prepared to enter into any agreement, not to proceed on the basis of the agreements previously reached between us, nor yet to agree that cooperation should, in fact, continue by administrative action."

Attlee declared he could not agree with the argument that to continue such co-operation would be inconsistent with the public declaration on the control of atomic energy "which you and Mackenzie King and I issued in November. That our three governments stand on a special relationship to one another in this field is a matter of record and was in fact the reason why we took the initiative in issuing the declaration. It is surely not inconsistent with its purpose that the co-operation begun during the war should continue during the peace unless and until it can be replaced by a wider system." The Prime Minister said that in the one important field of joint control of raw materials co-operation was still continuing, adding, "Why then should we abandon all further pooling of information?

"I can see nothing in the Washington declaration," Attlee said, or in the assembly resolution, which requires us to dissolve our partnership either in the exchange of information or in the control of raw materials, until it can be merged in a wider partnership I should be sorry to think that you did not agree with this view." He closed his long cable by

"On November 15 the day prior to the signing of the memorandum first above referred to, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States issued jointly a declaration of our intention to request the United Nations to establish a commission to control the production of atomic energy so as to prevent its use for military purposes. Our action led to the adoption later by the General Assembly of a resolution creating a commission for that purpose. I would not want to have it said that on the morning following the issuance of our declaration to bring about international control we entered into a new agreement, the purpose of which was to have the United States furnish the information as to construction and operation of plants which would enable the United Kingdom to construct another atomic energy plant. No such purpose was suggested by you or thought of by me.

"We were inspired to issue our declaration by the demands of people the world over that there should be some international control of atomic energy Ever since, we have been working toward that goal. "

The British Prime Minister did not answer until June 7 when he cabled that he had delayed his reply in order to discuss the matter with the Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King. It was a long summary of the effort of British scientists who, in 1940 and 1941 had been among the first, Attlee said, to explore the military possibilities of atomic energy In October 1941 President Roosevelt had proposed to Churchill that efforts be co-ordinated. The British had agreed to assist the enterprise in the United States "in the confident belief that the experience and knowledge gained in America would be made freely available," the British Prime Minister said, enabling the British to concentrate on radar and jet propulsion.

Attlee claimed that at Quebec it had been agreed there should be a complete exchange of ideas and information, and because of this the interchange of information in the field of design and construction of large-scale plants was not ruled out. It had been left to the President of the United States, he said, to specify the terms on which any postwar advantages of an industrial or a commercial character should be dealt with as between the United States and Great Britain. Attlee said that British scientists continued their contribution until the atomic bomb was dropped, and at that point the British had considered development of atomic energy at home, expecting to be able to "make use of the experience which had been gained up to that point in the joint enterprise." When

# CHAPTER 2

I have never been able to understand all the fuss some people make about government wanting to do something to improve and protect the health of the people. I usually find that those who are loudest in protesting against medical help by the federal government are those who do not need help. But the fact is that a large portion of our population cannot afford to pay for proper medical and hospital care.

As early as I can remember I have been troubled by seeing so many sick people unable to get the care they need because they and the community lack the means, not only the sick who are so poor that they must depend upon charity but the average American family that cannot afford to pay for the high cost of modern medical care. I saw something of this problem in my first experience in government as a member of the county administration. I saw people turned away from hospitals to die because they had no money for treatment. A little later as head of the county government in Jackson County, Missouri, I helped build a hospital to take care of people who could not get into existing health centers. We know that there has been considerable progress in many cities and towns in taking care of the sick and injured, but even in those communities the patient must prove ability to pay or qualify as a charity patient.

When I became United States senator I supported measures that provided funds for community hospitals to help correct this. And as President I was determined to do something more about it.

I have often been asked what business it is of the federal government to concern itself with the medical and hospital care of the people. Should not this rather be the responsibility of local communities? The answer is simple. Too many local communities have not met this responsibility and cannot meet it without help.

For one thing, diseases and epidemics are no respecters of city and state boundaries. Our experience in the handling of

urging that the continuing co-operation over raw materials be balanced by exchange of information which "will give us, with all proper precautions in regard to security that full information to which we believe that we are entitled, both by the documents and by the history of our common efforts in the past."

In view of developments in Congress I was unable to send an immediate reply to Attlee's message. There was no certainty that the McMahon bill would gain final approval or whether some version of the original May Johnson proposal would pass. It was not possible for me to make any statement on policy to Great Britain until the Congress had acted. But, in any case, it was already apparent that, whatever bill the Congress passed, it would seriously hamper and restrict our co-operation with the British in the atomic field. Congress finally passed the McMahon bill in amended form, and I signed it on August 1 1946. The Atomic Energy Commission, which was established by this bill, took up its duties on January 1 1947 As its first chairman I selected David E. Lilienthal, who had done such an outstanding job as chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority Lilienthal had already acquired knowledge of the problems of atomic energy through his work as chairman of the board of consultants to the Acheson Committee.

The United States was now ready to embark on a program of planned development of atomic energy for the security of the nation until international control became fact, and for the general benefit of all mankind.

Dingell bill, I did not have much hope for its success in getting through Congress. It was too cumbersome and it aimed in too many directions. For that reason, in my twenty-one-point message to Congress on September 6, 1945, I stated that I would soon submit a national health program.

On November 19, 1945, I sent Congress a message recommending national compulsory health insurance through payroll and other deductions. Under the plan, all citizens would be able to get medical and hospital service regardless of ability to pay. The message suggested that this nationwide system of medical care should be decentralized and completely under local jurisdiction. Local administrative units would be set up to provide for local services to meet local needs and conditions.

It was made clear that under such a program people would remain free to choose their own physicians and hospitals and that by removing the financial barriers between patient and doctor there would be greater freedom of choice by the patient in selecting his physician. The doctors would also be free to work through organizations of their own choosing and to decide whether to carry on in an individual practice or to join with other doctors in group practice in hospitals or in clinics. The physician would remain free to accept or reject patients and to conduct his practice as he always has.

The basic points of my proposal called for:

1. Prepayment of medical costs through compulsory insurance premiums and the general revenues.

2. Protection against loss of wages from sickness and disability.

3. Expansion of public health, maternal, and child health services.

4. Federal aid to medical schools and for research purposes.

5. Stepped-up construction of hospitals, clinics, and medical institutions under local administration.

I cautioned the Congress against being *frightened* away from health insurance by the scare words "socialized medicine" which some people were bandying about. I wanted no part of socialized medicine, and I knew the American people did not. Under socialized medicine all doctors would work as employees of the government. I was proposing no such system. I reminded the Congress that, although we were a rich nation and could afford many things, we could not afford ill-health. Our belief in insurance against unnecessary loss had become an American tradition, and what was now offered

polio and other threats to national health has proved that no one community can take care of itself. But the most compelling reason for the need of assistance from the federal government was dramatically revealed in the unfitness of millions of our young men and women for military service. World War II had shown that the health of this nation was far from what it should be, and I decided that the time had come for the federal government to do something about it.

I was shocked by the statistics showing the number of our young people who were physically unfit. By April 1 1945 nearly five million draft registrants between the ages of eighteen and thirty-seven had been examined, and thirty per cent were rejected on grounds of poor health. In addition, about a million and a half men had to be discharged from the Army and Navy for physical or mental disabilities, exclusive of wounds. An equal number had to be treated, while in the armed forces, for diseases that had existed before induction. In fact, thirty-four per cent were unfit. This is a blot and a disgrace for the greatest republic in the history of the world first in everything but the basic responsibility of making healthful individuals—mentally and physically

More than one third of the young women who applied for admission to the Women's Army Corps were rejected for physical or mental reasons.

Altogether nearly eight and a half million young people who should have been in the prime of health were found to be unfit for military service

This is a terrible indictment. I believed that the United States should be the healthiest country in the world and lead in finding and developing new ways to improve the health of every citizen. As soon as I could direct my attention to the most pressing domestic matters, I proposed a national health program. President Roosevelt had set the stage for a health program in his "economic bill of rights, which included "the right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health."

On May 24 1945 a social security plan had been introduced in the Senate by Senators Robert F Wagner of New York and James E. Murray of Montana and in the House of Representatives by John Dingell of Michigan. This measure proposed for the first time in our history that every man, woman, and child be included in a health-insurance plan and was in the form of an amendment to the Hill-Burton Act for hospital construction.

Although I favored the principle of the Wagner-Murray

1947 repeating the recommendations of November 19 1945, and citing once again the urgent need

"The total health program which I have proposed is crucial to our national welfare. The heart of that program is national health insurance. Until it is a part of our national fabric, we shall be wasting our most precious national resource and shall be perpetuating unnecessary misery and human suffering."

In January 1948 the Federal Security Administrator was asked to undertake a comprehensive study of the possibilities for raising the level of the nation's health and to report to me on feasible goals that might be realized in the next ten years. The study completed in September of the same year made it plain that unless federal actions were taken, serious shortages of doctors, dentists, nurses, hospitals, and other medical facilities would continue to grow. With these facts in hand, I transmitted to the Congress in April 1949 four recommendations, asking for (1) legislation providing for national health insurance, (2) legislation to help medical schools expand, (3) increased aid for the construction of hospitals and other medical facilities, and (4) an increase in the amount of federal grants to aid local governments in preventing and controlling disease, to promote maternal and child-care services, services for crippled children, and general public health activities. The final recommendation included a request for additional funds for medical research in the form of fellowships and grants to both private and non-profit agencies.

This program, the message said, would save a great deal more than it would cost. Already four per cent of the national income was being spent for health care. An infinitesimal portion of this expenditure was for the prevention of disease A national health program, I stressed, would save untold millions in productive working hours alone although its real value could never be estimated in dollars and cents.

This was essentially the same program I had proposed in 1945 The opposition was still the same—political opponents of my administration, reactionaries, and leaders of "organized medicine. The same false charge of "socialized medicine" was used to discredit the program and to confuse and mislead the people.

In a move to offset the propaganda of the opposition an Executive Order was issued on December 29 1951 creating the President's Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation, with the intention of setting up a completely non-political and unbiased commission of doctors, labor leaders,

was a workable plan for insurance against loss of one of our most priceless possessions—health.

Many but not all, of the essential points outlined in my health-insurance plan were in the Wagner Murray Dingell bill, on which congressional discussion was centered. This bill also covered a number of other subjects and was therefore needlessly complicated. The long hearings on this bill in 1946 gave the opposition time to organize a well-financed campaign not only against this bill but against the whole idea of federal action to improve the nation's health. The Wagner Murray Dingell bill proposed a three-per-cent payroll tax on salaries up to thirty-six hundred dollars to be shared equally by employees and employer and contained many of the points outlined in my health-insurance plan, but not all. At the same time, this bill broadened the areas of social security coverage and unemployment insurance. Partly as a result of this, when the Wagner Murray Dingell bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Education and Labor it became highly controversial and unnecessarily confused the main issue. As the hearings progressed, opposition mounted. This opposition came primarily from the traditional foes of progressive government and from the hierarchy of organized medicine in the United States.

I believed, and still do, that the majority of practicing physicians—the rank and file of the medical profession—understand and approve the desire of the public for health security· and I felt that the views of the medical profession of the country were not expressed fairly by a small group of men who professed to speak for them and who promoted lobbying by medical organizations to further their own interests.

The leaders of the American Medical Association have always insisted that they could provide a satisfactory solution to the nation's problems in medicine and health. The fact is that at no time during my administration did the American Medical Association ever offer anything workable as a substitute for the proposal of compulsory health insurance. This opposition from the American Medical Association was not new The A.M.A. had fought against public health departments, against proposals for county and community hospitals, and against the Hill-Burton Act for constructing hospitals and clinics throughout the country

The Wagner Murray-Dingell bill was killed in the second session of the Seventy-ninth Congress. I renewed the fight for national health legislation in a special message on May 19

1. A broad extension of prepayment plans, to operate through large use of group practice and through community health-hospital centers.

2. Federal grants-in-aid, which would be matched by the states, to bolster prepayment insurance plans.

3. Creation of a post of Health and Security in the Cabinet.

4. Creation by Congress of a twelve- to eighteen-member permanent Federal Health Commission to make a continuing study of the nation's health status, with an annual report to the President and Congress.

5. Federal grants for aid to medical education, medical research, local health services, for hospital construction, and for pilot studies in organizing medical services on a regional basis.

What the Commission was recommending basically represented a compromise between the compulsory national health insurance program, requested in 1945 and throughout my administration, and the current system of private payment to the doctor for each separate service rendered. It suggested that efforts be made to extend voluntary insurance to millions of people not covered, and that the federal and state governments pay the premiums for those who could not afford to pay them. The cost of the program would be an estimated one billion dollars a year in addition to the one billion which the government was already spending for health.

While the insurance program was not the same as the one I had proposed earlier, I felt that the Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation had accomplished a monumental task and that a workable outline for raising our national health standards was now available. It was a thoroughly sound and democratic approach to an urgent domestic problem.

A statement released simultaneously with the publishing of the report urged the continuation of the fight toward maintaining and improving our people's health.

"I, of course, cannot say what the next administration will do in carrying on the work we have undertaken in the health field. It is my hope that careful consideration will be given to the Commission's findings and recommendations. This report deserves the attention of every American. It would be most unfortunate if the same emotionalism which has prevented open-minded study of major health proposals advanced during the past few years were to hinder the proper evaluation which this report merits."

farm leaders, educators, and industrialists who would be able to investigate all aspects of the national health situation and to make recommendations based on facts.

I chose Dr Paul B Magnuson, former medical director of the Veterans Administration to head up the Commission. He selected fourteen representatives from all parts of the country to serve on the Commission and the critical study of the country's total health requirements began.

*In a statement published on January 3 1952, I made clear* the reason for the work of the Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation, as follows

"The purpose of the Commission is to study the facts and to give us the recommendations of high-caliber professional and lay persons. Their findings will help the public to get rid of the confusion that has grown up as a result of the bitter attacks upon any constructive measures I have supported to bring adequate health care to all our people. The fact that we lost over 500 million man-days of work due to illness in the last fiscal year is evidence enough that we must keep fighting the drain on our strength due to sickness and disease."

After twelve months of painstaking research public hearings, panel discussions of experts held in all parts of the country interviews and meetings, the Commission presented the findings and recommendations to me on December 18, 1952, in the form of a report entitled "Building America's Health."

The Commission reported that the present system of financing personal health services through voluntary prepayment plans was inadequate to the needs of the people. It ascertained the fact that a serious shortage of doctors existed and predicted that by 1960 the United States would need from twenty-two thousand to forty-five thousand more doctors. It found a shocking deficit in total expenditures for medical research, observing that more money was spent during the preceding year for tombstones and monuments than for research It discovered that hospitals were shamefully overcrowded and many of them obsolete. At least 230,000 new general-hospital beds were needed, the report stated, plus 330,000 more for mental cases.

The Commission made positive recommendations regarding the financing of personal health services, the creation of more doctors and medical personnel, provisions for increased facilities and research, organization of health services and perpetuation of the work of the Commission itself The principal recommendations of the report were

I have had some stormy times as President and have engaged in some vigorous controversies. Democracy thrives on debate and political differences. But I had no patience with the reactionary selfish people and politicians who fought year after year every proposal we made to improve the people's health. I have had some bitter disappointments as President, but the one that has troubled me most, in a personal way has been the failure to defeat the organized opposition to a national compulsory health-insurance program. But this opposition has only delayed and cannot stop the adoption of an indispensable federal health insurance plan.

In the nation's capital, as was shown in the case of the compulsory health-insurance proposal, a small well-organized group can succeed in making itself heard and heeded. The vast majority of the people have no such organized voice speaking for them. It is only the President who is responsible to all the people. He alone has no sectional no occupational, no economic ties. If anyone is to speak for the people, it has to be the President.

In 1946 I signed a legislative reorganization act, which, among other things, provided that lobbyists had to register and disclose the sources of their income and their expenditures. Although this provision was helpful, the real problem of pressures and influences in the legislature cannot be altogether solved in this way

My service in the Senate has taught me that in some instances the representatives of special-interest groups can be useful around Capitol Hill. At times they provide congressional committees with facts and figures that otherwise might be hard to get. The experienced legislator knows how to use the "good" lobbyist and how to avoid the "bad" ones.

Lobbyists played an important role in hampering our efforts to keep prices from skyrocketing during the period of reconversion. Their pressure on Congress made our work very difficult. In spite of my repeated requests and the veto of an earlier bill, the price-control law which Congress had passed in July 1946 did not protect the interests of the consumer In commodities where there was no control, prices began to climb. The price-control bill which Congress passed contained a provision for the dropping of price controls on meat and stipulating that controls could not be restored before August 20 In the first day of free trade at the Chicago stockyards prime beef, which had been under an OPA ceiling of $18 per hundredweight, jumped to $22, and hogs moved from the controlled price of $14.85 to $18.50. During July and Au-

just prices of the relatively short supply of livestock went to unprecedented heights and resulted in a crisis in the fall of 1946 which was called a meat shortage. The fact was that the scarcity of meat during September and October was due in large part to the extraordinarily large slaughter in July and August to take advantage of uncontrolled high prices. The large killings of meat animals were gobbled up immediately by the meat-hungry people and created more shortage.

On August 20 the Price Decontrol Board, set up by the law restored controls on meat after a hearing showing the necessity for price ceilings. But almost two months had gone by in which meat had remained free from all price regulation. During this period unfattened cattle had been rushed to the slaughterhouses in order to make high profits. If, as I recommended, price control had not been allowed to lapse by Congress, this wasteful slaughter of unfattened cattle would not have taken place.

The real blame lay at the door of a reckless group of selfish men—some of them inside the Congress, some outside—who were encouraging sellers to gamble on the destruction of price control.

The meat situation became so acute that I addressed the American people in a nationwide radio talk on October 14 pointing out that a brief price-control holiday had been considered but that in the long run it would be bad for the country because a famine in meat would surely follow the temporary feast. Another proposed remedy was to order a further price increase on livestock, but that this would be ineffective because the livestock would still be held back in the expectation of the lifting of controls and even higher prices.

Many people had suggested that the government seize the packing houses, but this was no real solution because the seizing of empty packing houses would avail us nothing without the livestock. Some had even suggested that the government adopt the drastic measure of going out on the farms and ranges and seizing the cattle for slaughter but I rejected this use of extreme wartime emergency power of government. Importation of meat was not the answer because of the unavailability of foreign meat in the amounts that would supply our needs. Besides, the people of other countries were depending upon exportable dressed meat for their own survival.

I announced, therefore, that there was nothing else to be done but to lift controls on meat and that I was directing the

Secretary of Agriculture and the Price Administrator to remove all price controls on livestock and livestock products.

Controls had already been lifted on thousands of smaller items where that could be done without great risk. I warned that restraint and common sense would have to be exercised, not only in the meat industry but in all others, if inflation was to be avoided and adequate production achieved. Black marketeering, hoarding, unlawful strikes, and other such selfish tactics would be an invitation to disaster I said, and could be avoided only if labor industry government, and the people used the same kind of teamwork that had always carried us through all our problems. Emil Schram, president of the New York Stock Exchange, wrote congratulating me on my speech and expressing the opinion that the release of all controls just as soon as possible was the only solution to the problem of increased production. I replied

October 18 1946

Dear Emil

It is my opinion that we can't possibly release controls hurriedly—the meat situation was a special one, brought about by the inability of the Congress to make up its mind on price control in time.

From the looks of things, the meat situation is going to be a very difficult one to solve next year—they are now rushing half fat cattle to market again because of the outrageous prices that are now prevailing. That, of course, will require a whole year's growth to catch up with normal supply and demand. The price people will have to pay for this meat on the east and west coasts is going to be outrageous, and nobody is going to be happy with it.

It would have been much better if Congress had extended the Price Control Act, as requested nine months before its expiration, and have allowed us to gradually decontrol items as the supply caught up with the demand.

It would not surprise me at all if there are not other inventory strikes in such necessities as clothing and building materials. Should the lid come off building materials and rents, we would be in for a boom that would make the Florida boom look like a Sunday school picnic.

Greed seems to be the keynote nowadays, and I suppose we will just have to face it for what it is worth.

I am not going to be in any hurry releasing these

controls if we will get a Congress that will go along and use a little judgment.

With the speeding up of price decontrol on basic commodities during the fall of 1946, it soon became apparent that the time had come when it could serve no useful purpose to continue the remaining controls. I never believed in controls for their own sake and felt that the general control of both prices and wages was justifiable only so long as it was an effective instrument against inflation.

On November 9 1946, I removed by Executive Order all controls on wages and prices and stated that the larger problem was now the withholding of goods from the market. This was becoming so serious as to threaten key segments of the economy with paralysis, and the blame lay largely on the unworkable price-control law which the Congress had passed.

An important organizational change was made on December 12 with the creation of the Office of Temporary Controls for the purpose of consolidating agencies which had been carrying on the work of reconversion. Centralized in this one administrative body were the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, the OPA, the Civilian Production Administration, and the Office of Economic Stabilization. At the same time John R. Steelman was appointed assistant to the President to help me in co-ordinating federal agency programs and policies.

A statement issued in connection with the Executive Order setting up the Office of Temporary Controls said that it would be responsible for carrying out the continuing responsibilities of the OPA and the CPA, plus certain activities of the OWMR. The decontrol of prices and wages and the elimination of rationing from most items had largely ended the functions of the office of Economic Stabilization.

A Republican-controlled Congress, the Eightieth, had been elected in November. The State of the Union message to the new Congress on January 6, 1947 forecast recommendations for the repeal of some of the emergency statutes and warned of existing dangers to the economy and the ever-present possibility of rising prices. I also called upon industry to hold the line on prices, and upon labor to refrain from pressing for unjustified wage increases that would force a rise in the price level.

On January 31 I asked the Congress to extend once more the Second War Powers Act beyond March 31, when it was due to expire, pointing out that manpower and wage controls

and most price ceilings had been removed by November 1946 and that only a few controls coming under the Second War Powers Act would be needed. One of these was in connection with foods still in critically short supply throughout the world. The principal powers still needed were contained in Title III of the act, which related to priorities and allocation powers.

Another message to the Congress on February 19 recommended the repeal of certain temporary statutes still in effect by virtue of emergencies proclaimed by President Roosevelt in 1939 and 1941 and the repeal of some twenty-four statutes or portions of laws and others which should be temporarily extended or should remain in force. This was proposed as an additional step toward freeing the economy of wartime controls.

The result of this was what was known as the "First Decontrol Act of 1947" which the Congress sent up for my signature on March 31 This legislation effectively ended all emergency controls and war powers but extended for three months certain limited authority essential to maintain some materials controls in order to prevent harm to our own economy and to give concrete support to our foreign policy

After all agencies of the executive branch had re-examined their needs, a second extension of the Decontrol Act in limited form was requested in order to retain control over the export and import of commodities which had a direct bearing on our foreign relations. This Second Decontrol Act of 1947 was approved on July 15 with the statement that I wished it had not been necessary to request a continuation of the controls contained in the bill but that the world shortages had not been dispelled and the threat of inflation still had not been dissipated. It was made plain that our purpose was the removal of interference with world trade and that the government would use these controls sparingly and dispense with them as soon as conditions permitted.

The relaxing of controls in an orderly and cautious manner was effectuated further by a congressional resolution repealing many of the temporary emergency and war statutes, which I approved on July 25 In a statement accompanying this action, I said that this was part of a sound and systematic program for removing all emergency powers. I explained, however that the emergencies declared by President Roosevelt on September 8 1939 and May 27 1941 and the state of war continued to exist, and it was not

possible at that time to provide for the termination of all war and emergency powers.

Unfortunately Congress did not act on other recommendations for legislation relating to the control powers and for the prevention of inflation. So it was necessary to convene a special session of the Congress on November 17 1947. The message on the opening day of the session pointed out how prices had been rising and called attention to the effects on the economy resulting from price inflation.

I urged specific legislation to prevent excessive speculation on the commodity exchanges; to authorize the allocation of scarce commodities and extend authority to allocate transportation services; continuation and strengthening of export controls; and authority to impose price ceilings on vital commodities in short supply that basically affected the cost of living. I also recommended extension and strengthening of rent control. The joint resolution of Congress, approved December 28, 1946, was supposed to embody these recommendations. In fact, it failed to include the key measures essential to an effective anti-inflation program, and I said on signing it that it would not reduce the high cost of living and would not keep prices from going even higher.

The issue between the Congress and the President was now completely clear, and on July 15, 1948, in accepting the nomination for President at the Democratic convention in Philadelphia, I strongly criticized this Eightieth Congress for its failure to enact the program recommended to the special session in November 1947, particularly its failure to provide stand-by controls. The Republican convention, held before the Democratic convention, had adopted a platform calling for some of the measures asked of the Eightieth Congress. So in calling the "Turnip Day Special Session" for July 26th,[1] I suggested that they show good faith and implement their platform. I told the Congress that the people were demanding legislative action by their government to check inflation and the rising cost of living and to help in meeting the acute housing shortage. I said that it would be reckless folly if we failed to act against inflation.

This was followed by a public statement on August 5 once more challenging the Eightieth Congress to take further action, as it had failed so far to discharge the tasks for which it

[1] July 26 is considered the proper day to sow turnips in Missouri.
On the twenty-sixth of July
Sow turnips, wet or dry

had been called into special session. Again the only response was a feeble measure which was a far cry from the strong, positive action needed to relieve the country from the hardships of exorbitant prices. The Eightieth Congress, instead of occupying itself with consideration of active measures for coping with the situation, contented itself with following a course which served the ends of special privilege rather than the welfare of the whole nation.

On labor legislation, also, there was a wide gap between the Congress and the President. When the Case bill, designed to strip labor of its rights, reached my desk in 1946, I vetoed that repressive measure. But anti-labor sentiment, inflamed by John L. Lewis's defiance of the government in the fall of 1946, was gaining new strength, and labor legislation became a prime issue in 1947

On January 6 1947 in the State of the Union message, I had urged legislation to deal with the basic causes of labor management difficulties. Specifically warning against punitive legislation under the stress of emotions created by the recent strife in which not only labor and management but the government and the public had been embroiled, I proposed a four-point program

1 The early enactment of legislation to prevent certain unjustifiable practices, such as jurisdictional strikes, secondary boycotts, and the use of economic forces by either labor or management to decide issues arising out of existing contracts.

2. The extension of the facilities within the Department of Labor for assisting collective bargaining—integration of governmental machinery to provide the successive steps of mediation, voluntary arbitration, and ascertainment of the facts.

3 A broadening of the program of social legislation to alleviate the causes of workers insecurity—extension of social security better housing, a national health program, and provision for a fair minimum wage.

4 The appointment of a Temporary Joint Commission to inquire into the field of labor-management relations.

This program offered a sound approach to the nation's industrial problems. But the Eightieth Congress began to hammer out the wrong kind of legislation.

Representative Fred Hartley Jr., of New Jersey chairman of the House Labor Committee, introduced a bill which was passed by the House in April. This drastic strike-curb bill, while it contained some good points, was an extremist measure which would abolish the National Labor Relations Board

and substitute a Labor Management Relations Board, make illegal industry-wide strikes, the closed shop, jurisdictional and sympathy strikes, mass picketing, all strikes by government workers, deprive violating unions of their bargaining rights for one year deprive unlawful strikers of their right to get their jobs back, make unions suable, require unions to make financial reports, and empower the President to obtain injunctions against strikes in interstate transportation, communications, or public utilities.

A similar bill was being formulated in the Senate by the Labor Committee headed by Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. In May a ten-man Senate-House conference committee began combining the Taft bill with the Hartley bill.

The amended Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 better known as the Taft-Hartley Act, was sent to the White House for my signature on June 18. Two days later I vetoed the act. The veto message listed the objections to it. The bill was completely contrary to our national policy of economic freedom because it would result in more or less government intervention into the collective-bargaining process. Because of its legal complexities the act would become a source of time-consuming litigation which would encourage distrust and bitterness between labor and management. The bill was neither workable nor fair. The Taft-Hartley bill would go far toward weakening our trade-union movement by injecting political considerations into normal economic decisions. I reminded the members of the Congress of the recommendation for a step-by-step approach to the subject of labor legislation in my message on the state of the Union and had suggested the specific problems which we should treat immediately. What had been laid before me was a bill proposing drastic changes in our national labor policy first, before making a careful, non-partisan investigation of the entire field of labor-management relations.

The recommendations I had submitted in January still constituted an adequate basis for legislation which would be moderate in spirit and which related to known abuses, and I urged that appropriate action be taken in that direction.

On the evening following the veto message I spoke over the radio about what this type of legislation would do to the progress made through the years in the area of labor relations, saying that this bill did not resemble the labor legislation recommended to the Congress by the administration, and warning that if it became the law it would create conflicts

and discord without correcting the abuses or furthering advances in labor-management relations.

The Senate overruled my veto on June 23 and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 became the law of the land. I had done all within my power to prevent an injustice against the laboring men and women of the United States.

# CHAPTER 3

The federal budget is one of the most talked-about activities of government and one of the least understood. Naturally the budget deals with the money needed to meet the obligations of government. But the obligations of the federal government have become so enormous in volume and so complex in scope that the budget has become difficult to grasp except for those who work on it from day to day.

Every household has to work with some kind of budget which sets the normal limit of expenses against the expected income. Very often expenses run beyond expectation because of emergencies such as an illness, or income is reduced by business conditions, or extraordinary expenditures such as the purchase of a home or a car. In that case the householder must cut expenses or borrow and pay out of future income, hoping to achieve a balanced budget at some future date.

Multiplied many million times, this oversimplified illustration is how the federal government makes out a budget for itself. But the budget of the federal government involves many special considerations beyond the requirements of our own people. They arise out of our new position and responsibilities in the world. The United States, during several years of my administration, after the war had achieved a balanced budget. In fact, in three of these years—fiscal 1947, 1948 and 1951—a net surplus resulted. The international crisis, gravely aggravated by the invasion of South Korea, prevented a further reduction of the national debt. The improved budgetary position was due to careful fiscal planning, with the help of the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget assisting me capably to achieve our aims.

The Bureau of the Budget was set up under the law of 1921. The Director of the Budget Bureau is appointed by the President and is directly responsible to him. In general the function of the Director of the Budget is to "assemble, correlate, revise, reduce or increase the estimates of the several departments and establishments," and to make de-

talled studies to determine any changes for purposes of economy and increased efficiency The completed budget and its recommendations are transmitted by the President to the Congress at the convening of the regular January session each year

Of course it cannot be expected that a President can personally do more than take part in the final stages of preparing the budget and then concern himself with only the major items. But I have always taken an intense personal interest in all stages of the preparation of the budget and devoted considerable time to its study and details.

My interest in public finance goes back to 1923 when I first served on the Jackson County Court. This administrative body supervised all the business operations of the county and here I gained much valuable experience in handling receipts, supervising expenditures, levying taxes, and assessing real and personal property for tax purposes. And in performing these tasks I soon learned that everybody wants the other fellow to pay for the support of the government.

When I became presiding judge of the county court, I had direct charge of making out the budget and of enforcing its operations. Before I left the court on December 31 1934, all the county's old indebtedness had been refinanced at more favorable rates, and Jackson County's finances were in excellent condition.

As a United States senator I served for ten years on the Senate Appropriations Committee. Here I became familiar with the complex financial structure of the federal government and learned what the figures in the national budget meant. I helped to make out ten budgets while on the committee, and I studied in detail every appropriation recommended by President Roosevelt or introduced in the Congress during those years.

Because of that experience I devoted considerable time and effort as President, and the Secretary of the Treasury worked closely with me on the preparation of the budget. I always had firsthand knowledge of all the items that went into the budget. The law requires that the Chief Executive submit annually a recommended budget to the Congress. The United States Government operates, however on a legislative—and not an executive—budget. The executive budget amounts to a sort of blueprint from which the Congress builds the final and actual budget. The Congress then votes on this budget as it does on any other legislative proposal. Because we have a legislative budget, the President's proposed appropriations for

various purposes may be reduced, increased, or not passed at all. This is constitutional, the Constitution says that taxes and appropriations shall be in the control of Congress.

The budget which is produced on the basis of the President's recommendations to Congress each year is always presented a year and a half in advance of its final operations—that is, it is presented to the Congress in January for the fiscal year which begins on July 1 and ends on June 30 of the following calendar year. For example, when I took office in April 1945 the 1946 budget had already been approved by the Congress, and this covered expenditures from July 1 1945 to June 30, 1946. Consequently the first budget which I was in a position to submit was not sent to Congress until January 20, 1946, and was for the fiscal year beginning July 1 1946, and ending June 30 1947

President Roosevelt had removed the budget operation from the Treasury Department during his administration and had moved it into the Executive Office of the President, under the supervision of a Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Before I began to work on my first budget, however I decided to make a change, and with this in mind I called in Budget Director Harold Smith.

"I want this to be a tripod," I told him, "with the Secretary of the Treasury assisting you and me in building up the budget."

And that is the way it was done in all eight budgets I made out as President.

Harold Smith, for reasons of failing health, resigned within the first year of my presidency and I appointed James E. Webb to succeed him. Thereafter I would periodically meet with Director Webb and with Secretary Snyder, and together we would go over the broad concept of the budget plan. Furthermore, I followed the same practice with Webb's successors, Frank Pace and Frederick J. Lawton.

The Budget Director called on Cabinet members and heads of government agencies and discussed with them their requirements. The Defense Department, which was the biggest spender was the first department on which the Director called. Then came the State Department with its foreign-aid program, and so on down the line. I then built up, after consultations with Secretary Snyder a composite picture of what the gross income would be to meet the requirements of the expenditure program submitted to the Director by the departments and agencies.

The Budget Director would come to my office at least

twice every week during the formative period. I gave instructions that he was to have free access to me at all times. I put in twice as much time on the preparation of the budget as any former President ever did, constantly seeking the proper relation between the long-range integrity of our debt management, the basic and pressing economic and social needs of the people of the United States, and the needs of our allies. In all this there was comparatively little friction between departments, because they all felt that they were having a fair hearing in the consideration of their requirements. Now and again all-day sessions in my office made it possible to get at the real needs, after these discussions I gave positive directives to the departments—directives which I expected them to carry out. I did what I conscientiously thought was right, and then stuck to it.

It was inevitable many pressures were brought to get me to approve larger appropriations. This was particularly true of the military. The military frequently brought pressure to force me to alter the budget which had been carefully worked out to achieve balance with the other needs of the government and our economy as a whole.

If for example, the three departments of the military establishment were allocated a total of nine billion dollars, the Army the Air Force, and the Navy would usually ask for an equal three billion no matter what their actual needs might be. Such an arbitrary distribution obviously did not make sense. I therefore insisted that each service justify its demands and prove why it was entitled to an equal division. The services were unable to do this and soon began to break away from the old practice that everything had to be divided into three equal parts. I compelled the three branches to be specific and exact about the requirements they considered essential. Every single item in the military budget had to be justified to me and the Secretary of the Treasury.

All of them made excessive demands, but the Navy was the worst offender. At one time the Navy had built up a regular hoard in copper and steel plate. We had to put a stop to that, and ultimately each branch of the service was required to state specifically what was needed for each fiscal year. In that way we began to get realism into the military budget. It must be remembered that in addition to immediate needs there had to be included in the military budget such items as the payment for past emergencies and soldiers pension funds.

Soon after I became President I began to consider the

problem of budgeting for the postwar period. V-E Day had been swiftly followed by V-J Day. Both confronted us with the task of financing the government in a conversion from a wartime to a peacetime economy while seeking to maintain a high level of production, consumption, and employment in the country.

We had been forced to build up a tremendous war economy—as near to an all-out production as had ever been attempted in our history—only to be suddenly faced with the tremendous task of converting our great production plant to civilian needs and, at the same time, of maintaining a high demand for labor, goods, and services.

Twelve million men and women were in the armed forces and were distributed around the world. Millions more had been drawn from civilian jobs into war production. Many billions of dollars in war contracts were outstanding to enable American industry to schedule the production required to win the war.

The 1946 budget called for enormous expenditures for arms, munitions, Lend-Lease, and other operations of war, but the sudden collapse of Germany and the imminent defeat of Japan made it necessary for me to order drastic reorganizations in the budget. Beginning in the early part of May I ordered a review of all estimates. I also had all contractual obligations checked to see where cancellations could be made without interfering with the war effort.

I was able to inform the Congress that some sixty billion dollars in war contracts could be canceled. This was a huge sum, but it still left us with a large volume of war expenditures for the battle of Japan.

As the year 1945 proceeded, another and final war loan—the Victory Loan—was completed to provide the funds needed for concluding war operations and financing the demobilization.

The great difficulty that most people have in understanding the federal fiscal program seems to be in confusing the authorized budget with the cash budget. The authorized budget comes out of the Congress as much as eighteen months before the money is actually spent. The cash budget represents the month-by-month spending by the government of moneys previously appropriated or approved in the authorized budget. The authorized budget can be accepted by the public as a fair estimate of future spending needs, but the cash budget frequently comes in for bitter criticism because it is tied to the actual cash balances of the government.

Whenever there are complaints and dissatisfaction over government spending, it is almost invariably based on the amount of money that has gone out through the cash budget. This, I think, is due partly to human nature and partly to a lack of information or discernment. The public very often acts like the housewife who is pleased with the year's budget which her husband makes out in January but who does not think it looks so good after she sees the money going out for the agreed purchases payday after payday. It is the difference between saying you are going to spend it and actually spending it.

During my administration there was a continuing audit on the part of the Budget Director in all departments. I had people checking all programs to see how they were shaping up within the framework that had been established. Wherever there were unexpected balances I insisted that they be transferred to other programs or to the Treasury to be applied against the national debt. Department heads had to explain to me their reasons for holding onto unused appropriations where they occurred. The Budget Bureau was continually surveying to see that appropriations, as made and budgeted, were carried out in accordance with the projected plan and, where there were changes, to get a reasonable explanation for them.

The attitude of some congressmen and senators was sometimes a problem. They were interested only in local and sectional problems and projects. I had to watch them all the time. They would make legislative amendments that had the effect of padding appropriations bills, and often these legislators had little understanding of the over-all budgetary requirements of the nation. They were simply after political support from their own areas or were seeking headlines.

It was my feeling that not only the Chief Executive needed to understand the technicalities of the budget but also that everyone who had anything to do with it should have a clear understanding of it. I was especially anxious for the newspaper reporters to have simple, straightforward explanations of the operations of the budget so that they would be qualified to write on the subject with accuracy and understanding, thus conveying a clear picture to the people all over the country.

For that reason it was my practice to hold special press conferences, known as "budget seminars," once a year in the White House. These were conducted for the sole purpose of going over the entire budget in detail to answer clearly any questions the newsmen might have. Each correspondent was

provided with a complete copy of the document, and when they had assembled I went over it page by page with them, very much like a teacher in a classroom. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Budget Director drew up special charts and graphs for use at these meetings, and we called into the seminars any government officials who were in a position to assist me in explaining to the press whatever they wanted to know about the budget or whatever I thought they ought to understand more clearly. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Budget Director were invaluable at these meetings, which were by far the longest of the press conferences. They sometimes lasted between two and three hours, and of all the 324 press and radio conferences that were held during my years in the White House, these seminars pleased me most.

The federal budget was one of my more serious hobbies, but it was also much more than that. In fact, I regarded it as one of the most serious of the responsibilities of the President—a responsibility that never failed to prove thoroughly fascinating.

The management of the public debt during my administration can be summarized in three time periods:

1. From April 12, 1945, to June 30, 1946, we were completing the financing of World War II and, at the same time, grappling with the tremendous problems of reconversion.

During the fiscal year from July 1, 1945, to June 30, 1946, there was a budget deficit of $20,700,000,000, reflecting the carry-over of wartime spending. The public debt rose from $234,100,000,000 on April 12, 1945, to a peak of $279,200,000,000 in February of 1946. Thereafter the debt declined to $269,400,000,000 on June 30, 1946.

2. The second period, from a financial point of view, extended from July 1, 1946, until the Korean conflict in 1950. Readjustment was being made without upsetting the economy. During these four fiscal years we were in a period of generally high employment and rising national income. We had completed our reconversion, the wartime armed forces had been largely demobilized, and most of the war contracts had been liquidated. Toward the close of this period, however, the danger of new aggression recurred, and rearmament once again became an expenditure factor with which we had to reckon.

The net budget surplus for these four years amounted to $4,300,000,000. By applying this surplus and some of the war

time cash balance to debt reduction, the public debt was reduced substantially reaching a low point of $251,200,000,000 in June 1949 although it was up again to $257 400,000,000 by June 30, 1950

This was a good record, although it should have been better I recommended frequently during this period that our surpluses be larger and our debt reduction greater but the untimely and unfair tax reduction of 1948 passed by the Eightieth Congress over my veto, prevented this.

3 Beginning with the fiscal year 1951 we entered the period that followed the Communist aggression in Korea. Our defense expenditures were sharply increased, and the Congress increased taxes markedly but not as much as I recommended. During the first two fiscal years following the invasion of Korea we came very close to following the pay-as-you-go policy I recommended. For the two fiscal years 1951 and 1952 we had a net budget deficit of about one half billion dollars, and the public debt rose less than two billion dollars.

From June 30 1946, to June 30 1952, we had a net income for the government of three billions over expenditures. That is what I would consider good financing.

After June 1952, as defense expenditures continued to rise, we began to depart seriously from the pay-as-you-go policy An estimated deficit of $5,900 000 000 was anticipated for the fiscal year of 1953 and $9,900 000 000 for that of 1954, unless changes were made in the tax laws. I cautioned against departing from my policies of paying for defense expenditures as we went along, particularly during a time of high employment and rising national income.

I had reduced the public debt by $28 000,000,000 from the postwar peak. My goal was to bring the total down to $200 000 000 000 but the Congress did not want the political risk of levying sufficient taxes to accomplish this.

In the fiscal year 1947 I had a balanced budget, and this after a devastating world war and a war economy We had a surplus in the Treasury in 1947 and we had a surplus in 1948 and again in the fiscal year 1951 For the whole six years from July 1 1946, to June 30, 1952, we took in more money than we paid out. There was no deficit financing while I was President until after June 30 1952, and there would not have been any then if the Congress had approved my tax program.

Thus the policy followed during the first two years was aimed at reducing the public debt while still carrying out

other programs to maintain a high level of production and consumption. Tax reductions, therefore, seemed unjustifiable during that period. For the middle four years of my administration I worked for a balanced budget and a surplus to reduce the national debt, and accomplished both. Tax increases were reasonable during that prosperous period. The program for the last two years was on a pay-as-you-go basis to offset as far as practicable the expenses of war foreign aid, and the terrible national debt which still remained on our hands from World War II.

Toward the end of the administration I was faced with two courses to follow in the few months in office remaining after the 1952 election. One was a policy which would drain the Treasury's cash position to rock bottom. We could apply the balance toward a reduction of the debt and leave a lot better picture as to the size of the debt when we went out of office. Or we could do what was best for the country by leaving a comfortable balance in the Treasury and arranging it so that there would be no necessity for the new administration to do any new financing for at least six months, which would give it a chance to get on its feet.

Of course we could have walked out in January and let the new administration shift for itself. That would have been the cold political approach. But the public interest, and not political considerations, was paramount in my mind, and I therefore instructed all departments to work out a briefing program so that the financing and management of the entire government would move along smoothly

"Go ahead and do the right thing, I told Secretary Snyder

"You mean by the right thing that you want the incoming administration to have a smooth transition?" Snyder asked.

"That's exactly what I mean, I replied.

We invited the successors to come in in advance, and we gave them office space in the Treasury so there would be no interruption in the management of the monetary program of the government.

In spite of the opportunity we had to reduce the national debt by five billion dollars, which would have looked good for the record of the Democratic administration, I thought that this sum should be made available to the new administration so as to get it off to a good start.

The Republican Eightieth Congress had passed a bill providing that three billion dollars of that year's budget surplus be applied to the budget of the next year They were thinking that the next President would be a Republican, and in that

manner they would be able to take credit for the three billion dollars which had been saved during the Democratic administration. This bookkeeping transaction was not in the province of Congress, and I paid no attention to it.

This Congress also tried to set aside government trust funds. This was like saying, "I am going to publish a financial statement, but I won't show the bills to be paid because they don't have to be paid until next year."

Those trust funds, which were made up of moneys of Social Security old-age pensions, workmen's compensation, and railroad retirement are held in the Treasury and invested in government bonds. They thus form part of the liability of the government and the record should make that clear.

I think it would be a good thing if all the assets of government were shown. I often thought that if the government were to make an inventory of its assets—assets such as TVA, Grand Coulee, Hoover and Bonneville dams, harbors, buildings, and public lands—the total would exceed by far the entire national debt. This as everyone knows, is the kind of balance sheet a business firm keeps, and in the case of the government such a balance sheet would show it well "in the black." And, in addition to this I have always thought that so long as the income of the people runs from one and a half times to twice as much as the national debt there is not much need to worry about our ability to support that debt or about the soundness of the country's financial position.

The national debt can represent either investment by the government for the welfare of the people or it may be war expenditures forced upon us, which is a total human and economic waste. The first is a justifiable obligation which should be borne by the government. It stands for something tangible in terms of high living standards good health, military security national progress and prosperity. War expenditures, on the other hand, destroy and exhaust and consume the resources of manpower and materials which make up the wealth of the nation. In the eight budgets I made out as President I have felt that the only real waste ever recorded was that for war expenditures thrust upon us.

I think that the virtues of a "balanced budget" can at times be exaggerated. Andrew Jackson paid off the national debt entirely and the budget was balanced when the unprecedented Panic of 1837 struck. Even the depression following the crash of 1929 overtook a government which was operating in the black.

Government must act quickly in emergencies, such as the

depression of the 1930's or the Communist aggression in Korea in 1950. And quick action usually calls for emergency appropriations, like the WPA appropriations of the 1930's, which may well have averted a bloody rebellion in this country. And it is the responsibility of the federal government to undertake these expenditures for the public welfare and security when such action is needed.

Government is an instrument of the people, and unless the people want to support measures, and controls necessary for effective and efficient government, representative government will not mean much.

The way the federal bookkeeping system is set up is a matter of fundamental importance in government. In fact, I believe it is at the root of the basic differences between the philosophies of the Republican and Democratic parties. The Republicans have a materialistic approach to government and to the budget—a hard-down, income-against-outgo sort of attitude, even if it sometimes means the ruining of a whole segment of the population.

I have always felt that the Democratic party stands for a government that encourages a fairer distribution of the nation's prosperity so that every segment of the population will have some access to the good things of life. I was interested always in balancing the figures of the budget, as the record indicates; but I was even more concerned over the balancing of the human budget in this country.

Here is the basic thinking that guided me in my tax and financing program. My objectives were to bring the budget down as soon as possible to around thirty-five billion dollars and, at the same time, keep our taxes at a level that would enable us to reduce the national debt while conditions of prosperity existed.

The Roosevelt administration, in order to meet the cost of reconstruction and the needs for World War II, had to seek revenues wherever they could be found. As a result, the tax structure which I inherited was a bulky patchwork affair. It was my hope that the Congress would co-operate with me in working out a tax system that would yield us adequate revenues and yet be free of inequities.

As county judge, senator and President, I consistently kept in mind the same sort of tax philosophy. It was a pay-as-you-go program, except in emergency conditions involving the welfare of the people, at which times I considered it the responsibility of government to act quickly in raising funds for the necessary relief. There is nothing sacred about the

pay-as-you-go idea so far as I am concerned, except that it represents the soundest principle of financing that I know

Taxation, in my opinion, should be used for revenue purposes only. While I fought for a more equal distribution of the nation's prosperity among all its citizens, I never advocated taxing the rich to pay the poor. The rate of taxation, to be fair, must be based upon ability to pay. Every social reform which I sponsored was presented in the form of specific legislation, and never in the guise of taxation.

On tax matters, the Treasury Department usually supplied the framework. But the Ways and Means Committee of the House was very jealous of its authority in this field, and I had to work closely with both groups and keep serious conflicts in policy from disturbing the over-all tax structure.

My chief obstacle was getting the Congress to vote for tax levies to finance the total government program on a pay-as-you-go basis. I do not believe there is any safer way to finance private or public affairs than to make provision for keeping receipts even with expenditures. The Congress would vote in favor of a certain appropriation but then would sometimes refuse to pass legislation that would pay for the new expenditures through additional tax revenues. I had no patience with such practices by Congress, because if a measure deserves an appropriation it is obviously worth the levy to pay for it.

Too many congressmen during my administration heeded the traditional slogan of cynical politics "Never vote against an appropriation, and never vote for a tax increase." It might be one way to get re-elected, but it is also a sure way of getting the country into financial difficulties.

If it had not been for the Republican Eightieth Congress, my program for ironing out the inequities in the tax system could have gone through without any impediment. However eager to please the special interests which its majority represented, the Eightieth Congress voted across-the-board tax cuts which were entirely unjustified at that time of high-level incomes and almost full employment. Just half of that amount of tax cut would have permitted my administration to eliminate many of the inequities of the tax structure.

As we got the tax program better in hand, we could have realized practically every goal set up in our original fiscal plan if Korea had not erupted at the time it did. The exemptions could have been raised and broader incentives offered while still keeping the level of production and consumption on an unprecedentedly high plane.

In the pay-as-you-go program there was always the idea that it must be tempered by realities for the purpose of maintaining the economy on a high level. Such a policy is essential to the economic and human well-being of the nation. Of course we did take calculated risks in certain situations which we anticipated much earlier than we were ever given credit for. We saw, for example, that the growth of our population of two and a half million people a year was the same as adding each year a whole new state as large as Florida or Iowa or Louisiana, with all that means to the growth of our market. A growing population is a challenge to a nation's economy, and when the two keep pace with one another stagnation is impossible.

We encouraged a continued high-level economy because we knew we could absorb it with the new population. But a sudden grandstand play to tighten up financially, simply to show that we can balance the budget, can put our whole economy in reverse gear, resulting in tight money and unemployment. There is a political conception that has always seemed to discourage a President from going before the Congress to ask for revenues until he can show that the money has already been spent. It was good politics—I knew. But I also knew it was good financing—and that was my job.

There are more misinformation and plain demagoguery that go into the Congressional Record on taxes and the budget than on all other subjects put together. Most senators and representatives actually know very little about taxes or the budget. On the Appropriations Committee and on the Ways and Means Committee of the House and the Finance Committee of the Senate there have always been some able and conscientious men who have understood government finances. But there have also always been able and conscientious men in both Houses of Congress who spend their time appealing to special interests both on taxes and appropriations.

The Treasury is the business end of the government. Every dime spent in the government has to flow through the Treasury. There is not a thing that happens in the government that does not affect the Treasury, and there must be a stable, sound credit base or else the rest of the government would crack up. The Treasury and the budget are the mechanisms that enable the government to operate; they represent the practical operation of the government.

The Treasury Department of the United States is one of the largest organizations in the executive branch of the gov

ernment, and the need for tight controls and for efficient operation on a day-to-day basis is crucial to the total operations of government. I was particularly fortunate in having a Secretary of the Treasury who understood the problems of national and international finance thoroughly and who administered the affairs of the Treasury for more than six years with rare skill and wisdom.

John W Snyder was actually my third Secretary of the Treasury but he served during the major portion of my administration. Secretary Morgenthau s resignation occurred within three months after I became President, and because I appointed Vinson to the Supreme Court, his secretaryship was of short duration. My selection of Snyder in June 1946 as chief fiscal officer of the government was based on a long association which had existed between us. I had known him when I was presiding judge of the Jackson County Court and he was a bank official in St. Louis, and we had been together in military reserve training. I knew him as a banker who understood the relation of good banking practice to the community and during my years in the Senate our mutual confidence and friendship had continued to grow

With Snyder in the Treasury I was able to bring about some long-needed reforms in the Treasury Department. One of the big accomplishments was a complete revision of the government accounting system. Working with a team made up of the Budget Bureau the Treasury and the Government Accounting Office, we were able to set up a uniform accounting procedure throughout the whole government. Where it formerly took from three to six months to get a composite financial statement, it now requires from three to six weeks only

The most sweeping reorganization was that of the Bureau of Internal Revenue which was planned and initiated in January 1952. This was part of a long investigation and study to insure proper conduct and greater efficiency in the public service and to protect the government from insidious influence peddlers and favor seekers. Some persons in the Bureau of Internal Revenue had betrayed the public trust, and as soon as the facts were ascertained they were prosecuted.

The following major changes were made in this reorganization of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (1) The offices of the sixty-four collectors of Internal Revenue were abolished. (2) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue was the o

officer to be appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate. All other positions were to be filled thereafter through Civil Service. (3) The complex system under which more than two hundred separate field officers handled the tax matters in various federal districts was ended, and substituted for them were not more than twenty-five district commissioners who were alone responsible to the Commissioner in Washington. (4) A strong, independent inspection service was established to keep the system under scrutiny at all times. (5) The operations of the Bureau headquarters in Washington were simplified. (6) The salaries to be paid to officials in the Bureau of Internal Revenue were raised in order to obtain the services of the best-qualified people in this highly intricate and technical field of government.

The new streamlined Revenue Service resulted in clear direct channels of responsibility and supervision from the lowest field office to the Commissioner. It was organized for thorough inspection and control from top to bottom to assure integrity and fidelity in its operations.

Although it was recommended by the Hoover Commission that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation be placed in the Treasury Department, Snyder and I both felt that the Treasury should not be in the banking and loan business. We believed that the RFC should be preserved as an agency on a skeleton basis so as to be able to expand in time of need. With the tremendous, dynamic economy such as we have in the United States, the threat of a recession or a depression could be materially lessened if the RFC were kept available for immediate credit expansion in an emergency and for its immediate contraction when the emergency no longer existed.

One of the problems that arose in the monetary field at the outset of the Korean action involved the Federal Reserve Board. It was my position that until we could determine the extent of the defense requirements that might result we should maintain a stable position in reference to money rates that affected the management of the public debt.

Under the statutes, the fixing of money rates (discount and interest) is handled by the Federal Reserve Board, which is not part of any of the departments of the government. Therefore, the Treasury could not directly control the money rates that would apply to its debt obligations. It did not seem appropriate to me that we should enter into a period of deficit financing on a rising money-rate pattern. I also felt strongly that in the moment of impending crisis we should not take

ernment, and the need for tight controls and for efficient operation on a day-to-day basis is crucial to the total operations of government. I was particularly fortunate in having a Secretary of the Treasury who understood the problems of national and international finance thoroughly and who administered the affairs of the Treasury for more than six years with rare skill and wisdom.

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## CHAPTER 4

One of the strongest convictions which I brought to the office of President was that the antiquated defense setup of the United States had to be reorganized quickly as a step toward insuring our future safety and preserving world peace. From the beginning of my administration I began to push hard for unification of the military establishment into a single department of the armed forces.

The idea of unifying and integrating the Army and Navy into a single department of national defense evolved slowly and against powerful opposition. I had been vitally interested in our military organization since World War I and had studied every plan that had been suggested through the years for its improvement.

In my younger days, having been something of a student of military history I decided to join the "militia" referred to in Washington's message of 1790. The militia had become the National Guard of the United States.

The experience I had in the National Guard and as a colonel in the Reserve Corps after the war gave me some very definite ideas on what the military department of a republic like ours should be. My experience in the volunteer forces and later on in the Senate was very helpful when I became Commander in Chief.

It had been evident to me, from the record of the Pearl Harbor hearings, that the tragedy was as much the result of the inadequate military system which provided for no unified command, either in the field or in Washington, as it was any personal failure of Army or Navy commanders.

I had not fully realized the extent of the waste and inefficiency existing as a result of the operation of two separate and un-co-ordinated military departments until I became chairman of the special Senate committee created in 1941 to check up on the national defense program. I had long believed that a co-ordinated defense organization was an absolute necessity. The duplications of time, material, and

deliberate steps that could possibly disturb public confidence in the nation's financing.

As the head of the government I felt I had a duty as well as a right to use every available resource to make sure of the success of the defense program. For that reason I invited the members of the Federal Reserve Board to visit with me. At this conference I asked them to give the Treasury their full support for its financing program, just as they had done during World War II.

The Treasury, of course, did not have to have Federal Reserve approval of its security issues, but the practice was to have full consultation with and to expect full co-operation by the Board.

I was given assurance at this meeting that the Federal Reserve Board would support the Treasury's plans for the financing of the action in Korea. This assurance was given entirely voluntarily. At no time during the conference did I attempt to dictate to the Board or tell them what specific steps they ought to take. I explained to them the problems that faced me as Chief Executive, and when they left I firmly believed that I had their agreement to co-operate in our financing program. I was taken by surprise when subsequently they failed to support the program.

Eventually an agreement was reached, but not until the differences of opinion between the Treasury and the Board had caused considerable worry to the President and much added expense to the taxpayers. These problems of discount rates and bond issues are not matters that are likely to make the headlines (except, of course, in the financial publications), yet on their settlement can depend the financial soundness of the government and the prosperity of countless individuals. My approach to all these financial questions always was that it was my duty to keep the financial capital of the United States in Washington. This is where it belongs—but to keep it there is not always an easy task.

In the plan I outlined, procurement of personnel and supplies would be centralized, and the land, sea, and air forces would plan and operate together as one team instead of three. Direct control would be by a *General* Staff, and not a Joint Chiefs of Staff such as had existed on an improvised, non-statutory basis during World War II to co-ordinate strategy and operations.

My first opportunity to begin work, as President, on the reorganization of the military structure came in the summer of 1945 when Secretary of the Navy Forrestal suggested legislation increasing the permanent strength of the regular Navy and Marine Corps. The time had come to put an end to piecemeal legislation and separate planning for the services. I wrote Admiral Leahy on August 21 requesting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff review the Navy's proposed legislation from the standpoint of the combined requirements of the armed forces. I suggested that this review should consider our international commitments for the postwar world, the development of new weapons, and the relative position of the services in connection with these factors. As a result of this action, the Joint Chiefs undertook a study of the postwar manpower requirements of the Army and Navy. The Army was directed to produce estimates of its own postwar needs, and the War Department appointed a committee headed by Brigadier General W. W. Bessell, to make this study.

The Bessell Committee reported in September that because of the absence of high-level guidance on political considerations, and pending a decision on Army-Navy co-ordination, it was impossible to estimate manpower needs accurately. It recommended approval by the Joint Chiefs of the report of its special committee, which had recommended, by a vote of three to one, unification of the Army and Navy in a single department. Agreement could not be reached by the Joint Chiefs, however, and on October 16 the report was sent to me, together with the views of General Marshall, General Arnold, Admiral King, and Admiral Leahy.

In brief, the two generals supported unification, and the two admirals opposed it. Thus I was faced with a direct split of opinion between the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff on the fundamental principle of a unified military establishment.

In the meantime, the Navy had been preparing its own plan for postwar national security. This program, which was submitted to me on October 18, continued to oppose unification with the Army but suggested that the admittedly serious defects in co-ordination be cured by more effective joint

manpower resulting from independent Army and Navy operations which were paraded before my committee intensified this conviction.

As a member of the Appropriations and Military Affairs Committees of the Senate and as chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, I was certain that unless something could be done to co-ordinate the activities of the Army and the Navy we would finally end up with two departments of defense and eventually three when the Air Force succeeded in obtaining its special committee in the House and Senate.

The chairmen of the Military and Naval Affairs Committees, especially in the House, where appropriations originate, tended to become Secretaries of War and Navy. There were a couple of House members, chairmen of the Military Appropriations Subcommittee and Naval Affairs Committee, who had to have seventeen-gun salutes, parades, etc., as often as they could find excuses to visit Army posts and naval bases. These gentlemen were the principal stumbling blocks to unification. This was particularly true of the Naval Affairs chairman in the House.

In my various investigations, I ran into numerous unnecessary duplications by the Army and the Navy. For example, I found immense air installations located side by side at various points in this country and Panama where the Navy could not land on the Army's airfield, and vice versa. A silly procedure, if I ever saw one. At Pearl Harbor the air bases were as far apart as if they had been on different continents —yet they were practically side by side. Then the Navy had its own "little army that talks Navy" and is known as the Marine Corps. It also had an air force of its own, and the Army in turn, had its own little navy both freshwater and salt.

It was my opinion that the Commander in Chief ought to have a co-ordinated and co-operative defense department that would work in peace and in war. Most field commanders who had experience in World War II, whether in the Army or the Navy were for a unified defense department, and less than a year before I assumed the presidency an article of mine openly advocating the consolidation of the Army and Navy was published in a magazine. Listing examples of appalling waste which had been uncovered by the Truman Committee, I urged a new defense organization in which every element of the nation's defense would be unified in one department under one authoritative head.

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branches should constitute an advisory body to the Secretary and to the President.

In addition to these points, I also explained that the key staff positions in the new department should be filled with officers drawn from all the services, and the post of Chief of Staff should be rotated among the several services in order that the thinking of the department would not be dominated by any one or two of the services.

I stated that the unification plan which I offered would provide for: an integrated military program and budget; greater economies through unified control of supply and service functions; improved co-ordination between the military and the rest of the government; the strongest means for civilian control of the military; creation of a parity for air power; systematic allocation of the limited resources for scientific research and development; and consistent and equitable personnel policies.

The Senate Military Affairs Committee appointed a subcommittee late in December to carry on the effort to obtain a unification bill acceptable to both the Army and the Navy. After eight drafts had been rejected, the Thomas-Hill-Austin bill was introduced in the Seventy-ninth Congress on April 8, 1946. The subcommittee had worked hard to achieve a workable bill and still meet the requirements of my message to the Congress, but the final product was unanimously opposed by all Navy witnesses at the subsequent hearings on the bill.

On May 13, 1946, I called Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal to a conference at the White House. At this conference I urged the necessity of the Army and Navy getting together on the problem of unification. I knew it would work out better if I did not order the two branches of the service to reach an agreement, and I therefore suggested that they sit down together and work out their points of agreement and disagreement and submit the list to me.

On May 31 the two Secretaries submitted a joint letter outlining areas of agreement and disagreement. They were not able to agree on four vital points: a single military establishment; setting up of three co-ordinate branches of the service; control of aviation; and administration of the Marine Corps.

These four points were the basic issues which had always been the cause of conflict between the Army and the Navy. I was deeply disappointed that no substantial progress had been made toward resolving this traditional conflict, and I decided

committees. The principal thesis of the Navy's proposal was that military policy must be tied in with national policy through the establishment of high-level agencies. I endorsed fully the Navy's emphasis on the need for some means of more effectively meshing military planning with our foreign policy and agreed also that we needed to provide long range plans for industrial mobilization consistent with the civilian economy In other words, it was clear to me that a national defense program involved not just reorganization of the armed forces but actual co-ordination of the entire military economic, and political aspects of security and defense.

In the meantime, two unification bills had been introduced in the Congress—one by Senator Lister Hill of Alabama and another by Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado. Hearings were opened by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on October 17 and these dragged along until December 17 without any agreement being reached between Army and Navy representatives.

Seeing the need for presidential intervention, I sent to the Congress on December 19 1945 a message recommending a reorganization of the armed services into a single department along the following broad lines

1 There should be a single Department of National Defense charged with the full responsibility for armed national security

2. The head of this department should be a civilian, a member of the President's Cabinet, to be designated as the Secretary of National Defense. Under him there should be a civilian Under Secretary and several civilian Assistant Secretaries.

3 There should be three co-ordinated branches of the Department of National Defense one for the land forces, one for the naval forces, and one for the air forces, each under an Assistant Secretary The Navy should retain its own carrier or water-based aviation, and the Marine Corps should be continued as an integral part of the Navy

4 The President and the Secretary should be provided with authority to establish central co-ordinating and service organizations, both military and civilian, where these were found to be necessary

5 There should be a Chief of Staff of the Department of National Defense, and a commander for each of the three component branches—Army Navy and Air

6. The Chief of Staff and the commanders of the three

desired legislation and, on the following day informed the Congress that a unification bill was being drafted for its consideration.

This development marked the culmination of the long, hard battle to bring the services together. All that remained was to work out the details of the bill. I had appealed to the Eightieth Congress, in my State of the Union message, to give wise and careful consideration to the forthcoming legislation as the one certain way by which we could cut costs and at the same time enhance our national security.

On February 26, 1947 I was able to transmit to the Speaker of the House and Senator Vandenberg a bill which, upon amendment and passage, was to become the National Security Act of 1947. The bill, as finally passed on July 25 was not as strong as the original proposal sent to Congress, since it included concessions on both sides for the sake of bringing together the Army and the Navy. But it put an end to the long and costly arguments over the principle of unification, and for the first time in the history of the nation an over-all military establishment was created.

The new "National Military Establishment" consisted of a Secretary of Defense, to be assisted by three civilian special assistants. His authority over other civilian personnel was restricted to those in his own department, and he had no authority over civilian personnel of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

The act established executive departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, with Secretaries provided for each. For the first time the existence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was recognized by law.

Within the Military Establishment the act created a Munitions Board to co-ordinate procurement, production, and distribution plans of the services and to plan the military aspects of industrial mobilization; and a Research and Development Board to co-ordinate scientific research relating to the whole national security.

The act also provided for a National Security Council composed of the President and the heads of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air, Munitions Board, Research and Development Board, and National Security Resources Board. The Council was charged with appraising the national security of the United States and dealing with national security problems of common interest to all segments of the government.

The other valuable agencies created by the act were a Central Intelligence Agency under the Security Council, to

then that the only way in which unification could move forward was for me to settle personally each of the four points of difference between the services. On June 15 after long and deliberate study I made the decision in a letter to the Secretaries and to the heads of the congressional committees dealing with naval and military matters.

In this decision I supported the War Department's view that a single Department of National Defense was necessary to effective unification. I also supported the War Department's opinion that a separate Air Force should be established, and that the Air Force should take over all land-based aviation, including naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine patrol, and protection of shipping. It seemed to me that no one could give a valid reason for continuing the expensive duplication of land-based air services then existing.

I took the Navy's view that the function of the Marine Corps should continue undisturbed. I felt that if a Marine Corps were necessary efforts to draw a hard and fast line as to the extent of its participation in amphibious operations and land fighting would be futile. I saw much justification in the Navy's position that the Marine Corps should be permitted to do those things essential to the success of a particular naval campaign.

In addition to the foregoing decisions, I approved the establishment of a Council of Common Defense, a National Security Resources Board, a Central Intelligence Agency a Procurement and Supply Agency a Research Agency a Military Education and Training Agency and the statutory establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I urged passage of legislation which would make possible a unification of the services at the earliest possible date, and continued my efforts to get the Army and Navy to agree on the form of such legislation.

Despite the Navy's distaste for some of the basic features of my unification decision, Secretary Forrestal worked hard to attempt to iron out the existing differences. On January 16 1947 he and Secretary Patterson advised me by a joint letter that a compromise unification plan had been worked out which they both could support.

I was extremely gratified, as it represented a step in the right direction. Unification depended as much upon individual co-operation as upon legislation.

On receiving the news of the agreement I issued a public statement in which a proposed Executive Order set forth in full the responsibilities of each branch of the service under

leveled insinuations of improper conduct against almost every one who favored unification policies that in any way restricted the Navy.

The battle took on the aspects of a revolt of the entire Navy. Secretary John L. Sullivan of the Navy resigned in protest of Johnson's cancellation of the carrier contract, and it finally became necessary for me to replace Admiral Louis E. Denfeld as Chief of Naval Operations in a move to restore discipline. Finally agreement was reached on the necessary revisions, and on August 10, 1949, I signed into law the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, thus moving a step nearer true unification of the armed forces. To me, the passage of the National Security Act and its strengthening amendments represented one of the outstanding achievements of my administration.

To my regret, Congress did not take the other basic step in the field of military legislation which I have always considered of paramount importance to our security. And that was legislation aimed at providing a fair and adequate universal training program. I had asked for this first in the fall of 1945, but no action was forthcoming.

In December 1946, however, I appointed an Advisory Commission on Universal Military Training to study the basic needs as well as the various plans for universal training in relation to over-all planning for national security. I asked the committee[1] to meet with me on December 20, and I took occasion at that time to tell them what my thoughts were on the subject.

"I don't like to think of it," I said, "as a universal military training program. I want it to be a universal training program, giving our young people a background in the disciplinary approach of getting along with one another, informing them of their physical make-up, and what it means to take care of this temple which God gave us. If we get that instilled into them, and then instill into them a responsibility

[1] The committee consisted of the following members: Dr. Karl T. Compton, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, chairman; Dr. Harold W. Dodds, president of Princeton University; Joseph E. Davies, former Ambassador to Russia; Truman K. Gibson, Jr., former civilian aide to the Secretary of War; Dr. Daniel Poling, editor of the *Christian Herald*; Mrs. Anna Rosenberg, public and industrial relations consultant; Samuel I. Rosenman, former special counsel to the President; the Reverend Edmund A. Walsh, vice-president of Georgetown University; and Charles E. Wilson, president of the General Electric Corporation.

correlate and evaluate intelligence activities and data, and a National Security Resources Board to co-ordinate military, civilian, and industrial agencies.

I appointed James V Forrestal as our first Secretary of Defense, and on September 17 1947 he was sworn in.

Getting the idea of unification legally approved was only part of the fight for a consolidated military program. Making it work efficiently during the early months occupied a good deal of my time and attention. Secretary Forrestal labored unceasingly to overcome the long-standing rivalries that could not be swept away by an act of Congress. His chief problem was that of defining specific roles and missions of each branch of the service and in determining budgetary allocations to carry out those functions. After a series of conferences within the Defense Department he submitted a new definition of functions to me and recommended that the new statement be substituted for the Executive Order which I had issued at the time the law was enacted. After studying his recommendations, I rescinded my original order and approved on March 27 1948 the promulgation of the new statement of functions with minor modifications.

During the first year of operation of the National Military Establishment it became apparent to me that the Secretary of Defense needed additional authority to meet his responsibilities. It was clear that the act should be amended to define and strengthen the authority of the Secretary· to authorize an Under Secretary of Defense to provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a chairman to remove the service Secretaries from the National Security Council, leaving the Secretary of Defense the sole representative of the military· and to correct numerous administrative inefficiencies that a year's experience had revealed.

I sent a message to the Congress on March 5 1949 proposing these revisions in the National Security Act. On the whole, the recommendations I made progressed smoothly through the processes of legislation, but in the weeks that followed a wide-open battle developed in the press between elements of the Navy and the Air Force.

The conflict resulted from an action by the new Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson, who had succeeded Secretary Forrestal in March. Secretary Johnson canceled the construction of the Navy's new supercarrier Dispute also arose over anonymous charges alleging irregularities in the Air Force's procurement of the B-36 and the questioning of its combat effectiveness. Some newspapers and the radio were used to

been rejected as draftees and volunteers on the grounds of physical defects. I was sure that a large number of that thirty-four per cent could be made physically fit and self supporting citizens if they had the right sort of treatment.

I am morally certain that if Congress had enacted this program in 1945 when I first recommended it, we would have had a pool of basically trained men, which would have caused the Soviets to hesitate and perhaps not bring on the Berlin crisis or the Korean aggression.

Time was when the United States could be content with a small force of professional soldiers. Unfortunately that day is past. Military strength is now a vital factor in political policy and both diplomatic and strategic considerations must be heeded with care if the nation's policy is to be effective in maintaining the peace.

A President has to know what is going on all around the world in order to be ready to act when action is needed. The President must have all the facts that may affect the foreign policy or the military policy of the United States. Of course he must know what is going on at home, because the attitude of the people of the United States, who, in the final analysis, are the government, must be favorable to any action he takes.

Before 1946 such information as the President needed was being collected in several different places in the government. The War Department had an Intelligence Division—G-2—and the Navy had an intelligence setup of its own—the ONI. The Department of State, on the one hand, got its information through diplomatic channels, while the Treasury and the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture each had channels for gathering information from different parts of the world—on monetary, economic, and agricultural matters.

During World War II the Federal Bureau of Investigation had some operations abroad, and in addition the Office of Strategic Services, which was set up by President Roosevelt during the war and placed under the direction of General William J. Donovan, operated abroad to gather information.

This scattered method of getting information for the various departments of the government first struck me as being badly organized when I was in the Senate. Our Senate committees, hearing witnesses from the executive departments, were often struck by the fact that different agencies of the government came up with different and conflicting facts on similar subjects. It was not at first apparent that this was due to the un-co-ordinated methods of obtaining information.

which begins in the township, in the city ward, the first thing you know we will have sold our Republic to the coming generations as Madison and Hamilton and Jefferson sold it in the first place."

After nearly six months of intensive study and a series of hearings in which more than two hundred witnesses were interviewed, the Commission reported its findings to me in June 1947 The members, as a result of their investigation, had arrived at the unanimous conclusion that universal training was an essential element in an integrated program of national security designed to safeguard the United States and to enable it to fulfill its responsibilities to the cause of world peace and the success of the United Nations.

The 445-page report listed three reasons for this conclusion

1 One of the deterrents to the effectiveness of the United Nations was the belief of other nations that the United States was stripping itself of the strength necessary to support its moral leadership and was thus encouraging other powers to plan campaigns of aggression.

2. Universal training offered the only method through which we could insure a sufficient number and dispersal of trained military manpower without overburdening the country's economy through the maintenance of a huge standing Army Navy Air Force and Marine Corps.

3 By making war universal, devastating, and immediate in its impact, the atomic bomb and new developments in warfare had created a need for trained men in every city and town who would be available at once in an emergency

The Commission recommended the adoption of universal training for every qualified male citizen for a period of not less than six months. Every feature of the program was carefully detailed as to the military educational, physical, moral, and spiritual training needed.

The plan submitted by the Commission in its report was a thoroughly studied elaboration of the views which I had expressed to my Cabinet almost two years before. I had hoped that publication of this report by a group of distinguished and representative Americans would move Congress to action, but again I was to be disappointed.

Three years after the Commission submitted its report I was still trying to get *Congress to pass* universal training legislation. One of the compelling reasons that kept me urging a training program was the need to do something about the thirty-four per cent of our young men who had

tion should be responsible to the Secretary of State and advised me that he should be in control of all intelligence. The Army and the Navy on the other hand, strongly objected. They maintained that every department required its own intelligence but that there was a great need for a central organization to gather together all information that had to do with over-all national policy. Under such an organization there would be a pool of information, and each agency would contribute to it. This pool would make it possible for those who were responsible for establishing policies in foreign political and military fields to draw on authoritative intelligence for their guidance.

In January 1946 I held a series of meetings in my office to examine the various plans suggested for a centralized intelligence authority. My inclination was to favor the plan worked out by the Army and the Navy with the aid of Admiral Souers, and I was ready to put it into effect. Harold Smith, Director of the Budget, however urged postponement so that the people in his Bureau could make a thorough analysis of it.

"Do you mean from a budgetary standpoint?" asked Judge Rosenman, who was present at the meeting.

"No," Smith replied. "The intelligence aspects."

"Harold," I said, turning to Smith, "I know you have expert intelligence men in your office, but I like this plan. If your people can make it better that's all right. But I have been waiting to do this for a long time. So you appoint your men and meet in Admiral Leahy's office with Admiral Souers, get the people from the Department of Justice, and let's get it done."

It was only natural that there were some minor disagreements. The Justice Department, for instance, raised certain objections on behalf of Director J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI, but there were no major differences of opinion, and substantial agreement was soon reached.

On January 20, 1946, I issued an Executive Order setting up the Central Intelligence Group. I placed it under the supervision of a National Intelligence Authority which was made up of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy and my personal representative, Admiral Leahy. I also appointed a Director of Central Intelligence, naming Rear Admiral Souers.

Before issuing the Executive Order setting up the new agency I ordered the Office of Strategic Services dissolved.

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government to concern itself with advising the President on high policy decisions concerning the security of the nation. And such a setup was provided by the National Security Act of 1947 which created the National Security Council and also renamed the Central Intelligence Group the Central Intelligence Agency, placing it under the supervision of the NSC.

The creation of the National Security Council added a badly needed new facility to the government. This was now the place in the government where military, diplomatic, and resources problems could be studied and continually appraised. This new organization gave us a running balance and a perpetual inventory of where we stood and where we were going on all strategic questions affecting the national security.

The National Security Council originally was set up with seven members. Besides the President, there were the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board. The original members of the Council, in addition to myself, were Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan, and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board, Arthur M. Hill.

In 1949 I asked the Congress to make a change in the membership of the Council, and it has since been composed of the President, the Vice-President (added to the list by the Senate), the Secretaries of State and Defense, the chairman of the NSRB, and the President has now statutory authority to add such other heads of executive departments as he may want there.

There was a tendency at first for the members to bring along a needlessly large number of advisers and assistants. It became necessary for me to order in July 1950 that the number of persons in attendance should be held down to those designated by law and only such others as were approved by me as necessary for a particular discussion.

I was gratified that Congress acted on my recommendation to provide a central place in the Executive Department for the study of policy problems. I used the National Security Council only as a place for recommendations to be worked out. Like the Cabinet, the Council does not make decisions. The

policy itself has to come down from the President, as all final decisions have to be made by him.

A "vote" in the National Security Council is merely a procedural step It never decides policy That can be done only with the President's approval and expression of approval to make it an official policy of the United States. Even when the President sits as chairman in a meeting of the National Security Council and indicates agreement nothing is final until the Council formally submits a document to the President. The document states that the Council met and recommended such-and-such an action, "which met with your approval. When the President signs this document, the recommendation then becomes a part of the policy of the government.

The National Security Council built a small but highly competent permanent staff which was selected for its objectivity and lack of political ties. It was our plan that the staff should serve as a continuing organization regardless of what administration was in power for it is vitally important to the national security program that the staff working on the program should be continuous.

Tied in with the National Security Council staff, as an adjunct, is the Central Intelligence Agency which operates in this way Each time the Council is about to consider a certain policy—let us say a policy having to do with Southeast Asia—it immediately calls upon the CIA to present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to have. The Director of the CIA sits with the staff of the National Security Council and continually informs as they go along. The estimates he submits represent the judgment of the CIA and a cross section of the judgments of all the advisory councils of the CIA. These are G 2, A 2, the ONI, the State Department, the FBI, and the Director of Intelligence of the AEC. The Secretary of State then makes the final recommendation of policy and the President makes the final decision.

There were times during the early days of the National Security Council when one or two of its members tried to change it into an operating super-cabinet on the British model. Secretary Forrestal and Secretary Johnson, for instance, would at times put pressure on the Executive Secretary What they wanted him to do was to assume the authority of supervising other agencies of the government and see that the approved decisions of the Council were carried out. The Executive Secretary very properly declined to do this, stating that if it had been the intention of the Congress for him to have that power it would have been specified in the act.

As a matter of fact, the draft of the law had called for a "director," and to preclude any misunderstanding, that title had been changed to "executive secretary" by Congress.

Secretary of Defense Forrestal for some time had been advocating our using the British Cabinet system as a model in the operation of the government. There is much to this idea—in some ways a Cabinet government is more efficient—but under the British system there is a group responsibility of the Cabinet. Under our system the responsibility rests on one man—the President. To change it, we would have to change the Constitution, and I think we have been doing very well under our Constitution. We will do well to stay with it.

# CHAPTER 5

Americans have always had friendly feelings toward Chinese. American missionaries, American doctors, and American teachers have spent many years in China, and their Christian and humanitarian efforts were long supported with real fervor by the people at home. Furthermore, within the memory of many Americans, China had shaken off the yoke of monarchy and had begun to wrest herself free from the medieval institutions that were so deeply rooted in that ancient land. This struggle however had not yet attained success when in 1931 the Japanese began their long program of aggression which, as the years went by brought ever more extensive areas of the once great kingdom under Japanese control.

The fall of 1945 had brought the United States face to face with the serious complications which had been building up in China over the years. Few realized the depth of the split within China, the tenuous hold of the National Government over outlying areas, and the lack of popular participation in the country's government.

We in America always think of China as a nation. But the truth is that in 1945 China was only a geographical expression. Not since the Manchu Empire broke up in 1911 had there been in China a central government with authority over all the land. This was the state of China when V J Day came. Chiang Kai-shek's authority was confined to the southwest corner with the rest of South China and East China occupied by the Japanese. North China was controlled by the Communists and Manchuria by the Russians. There had been no roots of any kind of central Chinese government north of the Yangtze River

The task of creating a new nation was colossal. President Roosevelt had built up the idea that China was a great power because he looked to the future and wanted to encourage the Chinese people. In reality it would be only with the greatest difficulty that Chiang Kai-shek could even reoccupy South

China. To get to North China he would need an agreement with the Communists, and he could never move into Manchuria without an agreement with the Communists and the Russians. It was impossible for Chiang to occupy Northeast China and South Central China with the Communists in between the rail lines. It was perfectly clear to us that if we told the Japanese to lay down their arms immediately and march to the seaboard the entire country would be taken over by the Communists. We therefore had to take the step of using the enemy as a garrison until we could airlift Chinese Nationalist troops to South China and send marines to guard the seaports. So the Japanese were instructed to hold their places and maintain order. In due course Chinese troops under Chiang Kai-shek would appear, the Japanese would surrender to them, march to the seaports, and we would send them back to Japan. This operation of using the Japanese to hold off the Communists was a joint decision of the State and Defense Departments which I approved.

Just before Ambassador Hurley returned to Washington in the fall of 1945, he sent a message which included a summary of our wartime approach to China.

"On his return from China in the summer of 1944," Ambassador Hurley wrote, "Vice President Wallace advised President Roosevelt that in his opinion the National Government of the Republic of China would soon collapse. Subsequently two United States Senators [Brewster and Chandler] predicted that nothing short of a miracle could prevent collapse of the government of China. These opinions were quite generally held by American and Chinese civil and military officials. It was with a full realization of this situation that President Roosevelt sent me to China as his personal representative. President Roosevelt's directives to me were principally as follows:

"1. Prevent the collapse of the National Government of China.

"2. Keep the Chinese armies in the war.

"3. Harmonize the relations between the Chinese and American military establishment.

"4. Unify the anti-Japanese forces of China.

"It may be broadly stated ... that during the war the objectives of the American policy in China were military. Even economic directives had military objectives. ..."

Hurley and General Wedemeyer, as chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek, had done much to give effect to the first three points. The critical one, however, was the fourth one.

The problem of Communism in China differed considerably from political problems elsewhere. Chiang Kai-shek was not confronted by a militant political minority scattered throughout the population but by a rival government that controlled a definite portion of the territory, with about one fourth of the total population.

Our position in China offered us little choice. We could not simply wash our hands of the situation. There were still nearly three million Japanese in China, over one million of them military. Unless we made certain that this force was eliminated, the Japanese, even in defeat, might gain control of China simply by their ability to tip the scales in the contest for power.

The other alternative was equally impracticable. That would have been to throw into China unlimited resources and large armies of American soldiers to defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese from the mainland, and compel Russian withdrawal from Manchuria by force. The American people would never stand for such an undertaking.

We decided, therefore, that the only course of action open to us was to assist in every way in the preservation of peace in China, to support the Generalissimo politically, economically and, within limits, militarily. But we could not become involved in a fratricidal war in China.

General Wedemeyer described the situation in the final days of the war against the Japanese in these words:

"Unquestionably the Chinese people have many grievances concerning their treatment by warlords and unscrupulous, incompetent officials. However, a satisfactory solution to the China problem or world order will never be accomplished by civil war in this area.

"Based on limited knowledge, neither the Chinese Communist Party nor the Kuomintang is democratic in spirit, or intentions. China is not prepared for a democratic form of government with 95 per cent of her people illiterate and for many other cogent reasons. The inarticulate masses of China desire peace and are not particularly interested in or aware of the various ideologies represented. An opportunity to work, to obtain food and clothing for their families and a happy peaceful environment are their primary concern.

*"Conditions here could best be handled by a benevolent despot or a military dictator, whether such dictator be a Communist or a Kuomintang matters very little. From my observation practically all Chinese officials are interested in their selfish aggrandizement. I retain the impression that the*

*Generalissimo's leadership offers best opportunity at this time for mobilization in the area, political and economic."* (Italics added.)

Throughout the war the United States had demonstrated her friendship for China in more than one way. Appropriations for military and economic aid, for example, had exceeded one and a half billion dollars. We had given strong diplomatic support to China while T. V. Soong negotiated with Stalin in Moscow. Out of these talks came the Treaty of Friendship between China and the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Hurley was engaged in an effort to get the Chinese Communists and the government of Chiang Kai-shek to sit down together and solve their differences peacefully. The Ambassador had sent me a series of long cables in which he gave me his views on the situation. He had gone to China at first not as our diplomatic representative but as President Roosevelt's personal representative. He was critical of the State Department, and in many of the cables and reports that I received from him he questioned the judgment and ability of the career diplomats. He felt very strongly, as I did, that America ought to be the champion of anti-imperialism in Asia. Hurley complained that the State Department did not give his reports and recommendations the priority he thought they deserved.

Finally on September 10, 1945, he restated once again, as he had done on several previous occasions, what he understood to have been President Roosevelt's long-range aims in Asia. He recited what he had done to further these aims and quoted instances of decisions made in Washington which he thought differed in their aims from what he thought the wisest course. Then he asked for permission to return to Washington. "I would like," he cabled to the Secretary of State, "to have an opportunity to discuss the American Asiatic policy with you, sir, and the President."

After he had come back, Hurley called at the White House with Secretary Byrnes, and a week later both Hurley and Wedemeyer came in for a more extended discussion. I made it clear to them that it would be our policy to support Chiang Kai-shek but that we would not be driven into fighting China's battles for him.

General Hurley reported to me that, in spite of all weaknesses which he and Wedemeyer recognized, the prospects for peaceful development in China were favorable. Economically China's potential was not substantially different from the situation just before 1937. The main problem ahead

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principal representative of the Communists in Chungking, left for Yenan, and the next day his first deputy followed him. By now there were reports of armed clashes. I discussed the seriousness of the situation with Hurley at the White House on November 27 and we agreed that it would be best if he returned to Chungking without delay. He assured me that he would only wind up a few personal matters and then return to China.

This conversation took place about 11:30 A.M., but less than two hours later, while the members of the Cabinet were with me for the weekly Cabinet luncheon, I was called to the telephone. One of the White House correspondents called from the National Press Club and, to my astonishment, told me that Ambassador Hurley, in a talk with newspapermen, had attacked the administration, the State Department, our foreign policy, and me personally.

To me, this was an utterly inexplicable about-face, and what had caused it I cannot imagine even yet. I realized, however, that Hurley would have to go, and the Cabinet concurred. The same day I learned to my surprise that a "letter of resignation" from Hurley was given by him to the press; but he would have been out, with or without that letter.

Hurley was an impetuous sort of person. A few weeks later—in January 1946—he made a special effort to see my press secretary, Charlie Ross. He explained to Ross that he was anxious to serve me anywhere and at any time, and he wanted Ross to tell me that nothing he had said at the time of his resignation had been intended as a personal criticism of me.

"He begged me to believe," Ross reported to me, "that he was 'in your corner.'"

Hurley went on to say to Ross, "Byrnes is a smart enough man . . . but he hasn't been given sufficient information by the 'flagpole sitters' in the State Department. . . . There is no reason for Byrnes's agitation over Chinese-Russian relations because they are all spelled out in the agreement by the Chinese and the Russians signed last July or August. . . ." The reason Byrnes had no need to worry was that, according to Hurley, "Stalin keeps his word."

China appeared now to be headed for more trouble. We could not send in the kind of military force that could assure that Chiang Kai-shek would prevail. The only thing we could do was to exert whatever influence we might have to prevent civil war. The man for this job would have to possess unique

seemed to be not production but distribution. Financially our continued aid had placed China in a better position than she had known in years, and politically General Hurley had just succeeded in bringing the Communist leader Mao Tse-tung, to Chungking for direct discussion with the National Government leaders. Out of these discussions there came an agreement between the Chinese leaders which was published on October 11 just two days before Hurley first called at the White House At that moment there was reason to hope that China's problems might be solved.

Hurley had witnessed the preliminary signing of this agreement, and he told me that it promised to lead to true peace in China. The agreement called for a constitutional convention, a national assembly that would write a new constitution, and included provisions that would enable all political parties to take part. Chiang Kai-shek, apparently would have the strongest voice in this convention since more of his followers would be seated than Communists.

An interim council of forty appointed by Chiang Kai-shek but with not more than half from his party would run affairs until the new constitution could come into force. Chiang Kai-shek would have a veto over any of the council's decisions, although three fifths of the council could override such vetoes.

This was a good agreement, and I congratulated Hurley on the fine work that had made it possible. However the agreement never bore results.

Chiang Kai-shek's forces were moving into areas held by the Japanese, with a large part of his troops being ferried north by our Air Force transports We had also landed fifty thousand of our marines at several important ports so that, through these ports, the removal of the Japanese could be carried on. The Communists wanted the National Government to stop these troop movements, for they believed that Chiang was taking advantage of the situation to strengthen his positions against them. Nor were they passive about it. They cut the rail lines wherever they could, and the Chungking government soon began receiving reports that the Chinese Communists, contrary to the agreement were moving into Manchuria. Resentment was rising on both sides as the charges and countercharges increased.

On November 4 our embassy in Chungking reported that civil war seemed to be threatening and the Political Consultative Conference which was scheduled to convene November 20, failed to meet. On November 25 Chou En-lai the

principal representative of the Communists in Chungking, left for Yenan, and the next day his first deputy followed him. By now there were reports of armed clashes. I discussed the seriousness of the situation with Hurley at the White House on November 27, and we agreed that it would be best if he returned to Chungking without delay. He assured me that he would only wind up a few personal matters and then return to China.

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qualifications and rare skill. At the Cabinet luncheon on the day of Hurley's Press Club speech the name of General Marshall was brought up He had just turned over his duties as Chief of Staff of the Army to General Eisenhower. No man probably had more fully deserved an honorable and restful retirement than Marshall. Yet I could think of no one who would be better qualified for a difficult mission to China.

I went to the telephone in the Red Room of the White House and called the general at his home in Leesburg. Without any preparation I told him "General I want you to go to China for me." Marshall said only "Yes, Mr President," and hung up abruptly

When General Marshall came to the White House two days later to discuss his mission with Byrnes and me, I asked him why he had hung up on me without asking any questions. The reason, he explained to me, was that Mrs. Marshall and he had just driven up to the house, and he had been in the process of unloading some of their belongings when the phone rang. He had not wanted Mrs. Marshall, who was concerned about his health, to know how short-lived their retirement would be, and so he had hung up before she might hear any part of the conversation. He expected to break the news to her gradually but when he turned on the radio a few minutes later the very first thing she heard was the news flash announcing the general's mission.

"There was the devil to pay" he confessed.

I went over the Chinese situation with Marshall and Byrnes at great length that afternoon. At Marshall's request, I told him to go ahead and work out with the State Department a set of instructions based on our discussions that would constitute my directive to him on his mission.

These instructions were drafted between Marshall and the State Department, and on December 11 I reviewed them in detail in another conference with Byrnes and Marshall. The final document was handed to Marshall by me, in the presence of Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and here are the exact instructions that document contained

Washington, December 15 1945

My dear General Marshall

On the eve of your departure for China I want to repeat to you my appreciation of your willingness to undertake this difficult mission.

I have the utmost confidence in your ability to handle the task before you but, to guide you in so far as you

may find it helpful. I will give you some of the thoughts, ideas and objectives which Secretary Byrnes and I have in mind with regard to your mission.

I attach several documents which I desire should be considered as part of this letter. One is a statement of U.S. policy toward China which was, I understand, prepared after consultation with you and with officials of the Department. The second is a memorandum from the Secretary of State to the War Department in regard to China. And the third is a copy of my press release on policy in China. I understand that these documents have been shown to you and received your approval.

The fact that I have asked you to go to China is the clearest evidence of my very real concern with regard to the situation there. Secretary Byrnes and I are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible. It is my desire that you, as my Special Representative, bring to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States to this end.

Specifically, I desire that you endeavor to persuade the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in North China.

It is my understanding that there is now in session in Chungking a People's Consultative Council made up of representatives of the various political elements, including the Chinese Communists. The meeting of this Council should furnish you with a convenient opportunity for discussions with the various political leaders.

Upon the success of your efforts, as outlined above, will depend largely, of course, the success of our plans for evacuating Japanese troops from China, particularly North China, and for the subsequent withdrawal of our own armed forces from China. I am particularly desirous that both be accomplished as soon as possible.

I am anxious that you keep Secretary Byrnes and me currently informed of the progress of your negotiations and of obstacles you may encounter. You will have our full support and we shall endeavor at all times to be as helpful to you as possible.

The first of the documents attached was entitled "U.S. Policy Toward China."

"The Government of the U.S.," it read, "holds that peace

and prosperity of the world in this new unexplored era shall depend upon the ability of the sovereign nations to combine for collective security in the United Nations organization.

"It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations organization and for world peace. A China disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future. The U.S. Government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of the sovereign nations. Events in this country however, would indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire world. It is thus in the most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by means of peaceful negotiations.

"The Government of the U.S. believes it essential

"(1) That a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the National Government and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective Chinese control, including the immediate evacuation of the Japanese forces. The U.S. is prepared, if so requested by the National Government of China, to assist in arranging for necessary pledges and to request the Governments of the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. to join in this effort.

"(2) That a national conference of representatives of major political elements be arranged to develop an early solution to the present internal strife—a solution which will bring about the unification of China.

"The U.S. and the other United Nations have recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government in China. It is the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China.

"The U.S. and the U.K. in the Cairo Declaration in 1943 and the U.S.S.R., by adhering to the Potsdam Declaration of last July and by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of August 1945 are all committed to the liberation of China, including the return of Manchuria to Chinese control. These agreements were made with the National Government of the Republic of China.

"In continuation of the constant and close collaboration

with the National Government of the Republic of China in the prosecution of this war. In consonance with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove possibility of Japanese influence remaining in China, the U.S. has assumed a definite obligation in the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese troops. Accordingly the U.S. has been assisting and will continue to assist the National Government of the Republic of China in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese troops in the liberated areas. The U.S. Marines are in North China for that purpose. For the same reason, the U.S. will continue to furnish military supplies and to assist the Chinese National Government in the further transportation of Chinese troops so that it can re-establish control over the liberated areas of China, including Manchuria.

"To facilitate arrangements for cessation of hostilities and pending provisional agreement in the proposed national conference, National Government troops will not be transported by the U.S. into areas, such as North China, when their introduction would prejudice the objectives of the military truce and the political negotiations.

"The U.S. recognizes and will continue to recognize the National Government of China and cooperate with it in international affairs and specifically in eliminating Japanese influence from China. The U.S. is convinced that a prompt arrangement for the cessation of hostilities is essential to the effective achievement of this end. Incidental effects of U.S. assistance upon any dissident Chinese elements will be avoided in so far as possible. Beyond these incidental effects U.S. support will not extend to U.S. military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.

"The U.S. is cognizant that the present National Government of China is a 'one-party government' and believes that peace, unity and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country. Hence, the U.S. strongly advocates that the national conference of representatives of major political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government. It is recognized that this would require modification of the one-party 'political tutelage' established as an interim arrangement in the progress of the nation toward democracy by the father of the Chinese Republic, Doctor Sun Yat-sen.

"The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army is inconsistent with, and actually makes

impossible, political unity in China. With the institution of a broadly representative government, autonomous armies should be eliminated as such and all armed forces in China integrated effectively into the Chinese National Army

"In line with its often expressed views regarding self-determination, the U.S. Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate. The U.S. Government feels, however that China has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace—a responsibility which is shared by the National Government and all Chinese political and military groups. It is to assist the Chinese in the discharge of its responsibility that the U.S. Government is willing to participate and to request U.K. and U.S.S.R. participation in arranging the necessary pledges to assure the prompt cessation of such armed conflict.

"As China moves toward peace and unity along the lines described above, the U.S. would be prepared to assist the National Government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country improve the agrarian and industrial economy and establish a military organization capable of discharging Chinese national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order Specifically the U.S. would be prepared to grant a Chinese request for an American military advisory group in China, to dispatch such other advisers in the economic and financial fields as the Chinese Government might require and which this Government can supply and to give favorable consideration to Chinese requests for credits and loans under reasonable conditions for projects which contribute towards the development of a healthy economy in China and healthy trade relations between China and the U.S.

"It must be clearly recognized that the attainment of the objectives herein stated will call for an expenditure of resources by the U.S. and the maintenance for the time being of United States military and naval forces in China. These expenditures, however will be minute in comparison to those which this nation has already been compelled to make in the restoration of the peace which was broken by German and Japanese aggression. They will be infinitesimal by comparison to a recurrence of global warfare in which the new and terrible weapons that now exist would certainly be employed.

The purpose for which the United States made a tremendous sacrifice of treasure and life must not be jeopardized."

The second document attached was a memorandum for the War Department which read as follows

"The President and the Secretary of State are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible.

At a public hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on December 7 the Secretary of State said.

'During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to promote a military union of the several factions in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy Japan. Our longer-range goal, then as now and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development of a strong, united and democratic China.

'To achieve this longer-range goal, it is essential that the Central Government of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well-organized groups who are now without any voice in the government of China.

'This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience and restraint. It will not be solved by the Chinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our influence is a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Government, by the so-called communists, and by the other factions.'

"The President has asked General Marshall to go to China as his Special Representative for the purpose of bringing to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States for the achievement of the ends set forth above. Specifically General Marshall will endeavor to influence the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in North China.

"In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating that:

"(1) He may put into effect the arrangements to assist the Chinese National Government in transporting troops to Manchurian ports, including the logistical support for such troops;

"(2) He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped-up arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese troops from the China theater.

"(3) Pending the outcome of General Marshall's discussions with Chinese leaders in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of representatives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities, further transportation of Chinese troops to North China, except as North China ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will be held in abeyance.

"(4) Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into North China ports may be immediately perfected, but not communicated to the Chinese government. Such arrangements will be executed when General Marshall determines either (a) that the movement of Chinese troops to North China can be carried out consistently with his negotiations, or (b) that the negotiations between the Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the circumstances are such as to make the movement necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to secure the long-term interests of the United States in the maintenance of international peace."

The third enclosure to the letter of instructions was a copy of the press release which was essentially the same as the statement of policy in Enclosure 1.

Marshall left Washington the next day, December 15, by air. He arrived in China on December 20 and began at once to study the situation. His messages, sent to me through War Department facilities, unfolded a story that, although told in simple words, had all the elements of the historic drama of Chinese history.

General Marshall began his work in China with caution. He spent several days merely listening to people. He talked at length to Chiang Kai-shek, who had little to say about the Communists but showed much concern over the continued presence of the Russians in Manchuria. Marshall also interviewed party leaders of all shadings, including Communists, spoke to numerous officials of Chiang Kai-shek's government, our own embassy people, correspondents, and other Americans on the spot.

He found everyone favoring a united China but no one

with practical answers as to how this ideal might be attained. Marshall pointed out this was precisely the problem on which work needed to be done, and he was able to instigate indirectly a meeting between Kuomintang and Communist leaders.

At this meeting the Communists came forward with a proposal for the cessation of hostilities. The Central Government's reaction to this proposal was entirely uncompromising at first but, following a suggestion from General Marshall, a counterproposal was made. This called for immediate cessation of hostilities, the appointment of representatives to consult with Marshall about methods of enforcing the armistice, and the selection of a commission by the Political Consultative Council to make recommendations regarding disputed areas.

Marshall had already made plans for machinery to enforce the cease-fire. He planned to organize teams consisting of government and Communist representatives, each with an American observer, to give an impartial authority to such field action as might be necessary.

By January 8, 1946, negotiations between representatives of the National Government and the Communist party had progressed to the point where an agreement was almost reached. However, the National Government insisted that they should be permitted to continue their troops' movements into the provinces of Jehol and Chahar to occupy places vacated or to be vacated by Soviet troops. The Communists, on the other hand, claimed that the key points had already been taken over by them.

The cease-fire order was scheduled to be read at the opening of the Political Consultative Council at ten o'clock on the morning of January 10. The preceding evening Marshall had been able to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to issue an order without reference to Jehol and Chahar, although the final agreement was not reached until the morning of the tenth, a matter of minutes before the time set for the announcement.

As soon as the cease-fire order was issued, Marshall set into motion the plans for the so-called executive headquarters, which was to be located in Peiping. Some delay was encountered, however, because the Communists found it difficult to bring enough officers to Peiping from their scattered units. However, the machinery proved workable when called into action during these initial days.

Marshall now began to work on the next step, the consoli-

dation of the armed forces in China. Again a tripartite committee setup was agreed on, with Marshall in the role of the adviser

Throughout these events Marshall did everything he could to avoid any semblance of pressure or dictation. He always waited for the Chinese (of both sides) to ask him to join their talks otherwise, he talked to them only as one individual to another This, of course, was a drawn-out process, full of frustrations.

Chiang Kai-shek, for instance, requested Marshall to persuade the Communists to accept the proposals of the Central Government in the Political Consultative Council. Marshall countered this by telling the Generalissimo that he could not see that either side had produced any definite programs or proposed actions. He offered Chiang Kai-shek a draft of a bill which would convert the Central Government from an agency of the Kuomintang (which it then legally was) to a coalition, basing its existence on the national sovereignty of all China. This draft also contained a brief bill of rights.

Marshall decided wisely at this point to remain aloof from the political discussions even though he might officially be asked by both sides to act as mediator His correct view of his mission was that he was to bring the fighting to an end, if possible. He took pains to avoid matters that were wholly political in nature.

In the military field, however he took a most active part. He acted as chairman of the Committee of Three to supervise the cease-fire, and he acted as adviser to the committee working on the reorganization of the armies in China.

In the early stages the Communist representatives appeared more tractable to Marshall than the leaders of the Central Government, and it was his impression that the Communists felt that they could win their battle on political grounds more easily than on tactical fighting grounds because they had a more tightly held organization, whereas on the Nationalist side there were many contentious elements. And it was also his impression that the Communists were more ready to take their chances in a struggle conducted in the political arena than were the Nationalists. The Nationalists, so it seemed to Marshall, appeared to be determined to pursue a policy of force which he believed would be their undoing.

On February 4 Marshall could report to me that "affairs are progressing rather favorably" The Political Consultative Council appeared on the way to adopting a path toward

democratic reform, and agreement on the reorganization of these armies appeared imminent.

At least once a week and sometimes two and three times a week Marshall would send me a long cable report. He had left instructions that these were to be transmitted to me without delay, and I had charged Dean Acheson, the Under Secretary of State, with the specific responsibility of seeing that every communication from the general to the Department of State was acknowledged or answered within twenty-four hours.

The Marshall messages from China enabled me to follow every step as the story unfolded. The general wrote coldly factual reports that included every detail. I could not have asked for a closer view without being a participant myself.

# CHAPTER 6

Early in February 1946 Russia began to make trouble in Manchuria. It was apparent, according to reports reaching me, that the Russians intended to use their promised withdrawal from Manchuria as a lever to gain sweeping privileges in that strategic area.

The treaty of mutual defense concluded between Russia and China in August 1945 had recognized that Manchuria was properly part of China with the reservation of some rights, such as rail transit, to the Russians. All of Manchuria had been occupied by Russian forces after Russia's entry into the war against Japan The Russians, in a later agreement with the Chinese government, had promised to withdraw their troops, setting February 1 1946 as the latest date of withdrawal.

On February 9 1946 Marshall wrote me that Manchuria was a "festering situation and he went on to report that he told the Chinese Foreign Minister "China must proceed with her projected unification at the fastest possible pace so as to eliminate her present vulnerability to Soviet undercover attack, which exists so long as there remains a separate Communist government and a separate Communist army in China.

"Secondly" Marshall wrote me, "I told him that I believed he should make no commitment formal or informal, with the Soviet which would recognize her claims that war booty consisted of the kind of economic concessions she is demanding.

"I told Wang it was my belief that time was running against the Soviet, since the longer her troops remain in Manchuria the more clearly she becomes a deliberate treaty violator in the eyes of the world

Marshall told me that he was reporting to me in great detail "because I feel that it not only involved me in matters beyond my mission but is perhaps more dangerous to world accord than any other present issue. "

"I believe that our Government must shortly do more for China in this matter than give advice.

"We must clear our hands out here as quickly as possible in order to avoid the inevitable Russian recriminations similar to those today regarding the British troops in Greece. I mean by this, we must terminate the China Theater of Operations and in its place quickly develop the military advisory group. (Wedemeyer on my urging is actually but unofficially organizing this group in Nanking.) Also in this connection, we must move all of the Marines out of China but some reconnaissance and transportation and some housekeeping and local guard units. The timing of this last move requires a critical decision. I am not prepared to advise this action now but I hope I will be ready to do so in another month. Meanwhile I have agreed to considerable reductions in Marine strength. China should announce her intention to send troops into Japan.

"China would then be ready to carry the Manchuria issue to the Far Eastern Commission, with definite evidence of unification, with the embarrassment of the presence of American combat troops removed, and with her status dignified by the fact of her troops having joined the Allied Occupation Forces in Japan."

On February 1, I answered Marshall.

My dear General Marshall:

I approve the tentative course of action you outline.

With regard to a military advisory group for China, a revised J.C.S. paper on the subject is expected soon and their recommendations will be sent to you for comment.

I am much interested in your suggestion with respect to deactivation of the China theater and should be glad to have your views as to the timing of such deactivation. General Wedemeyer's recent reports indicate that under his present plans movement of Chinese armies to Manchuria will not be completed until September 1, 1946, and that logistical support for these Chinese forces will not be discontinued until October 31, 1946.

Inasmuch as the movement of Chinese forces into north China is dependent on the development of your mission, I realize that no information on possible timing of this phase of theater activity is yet available and am hopeful that the success of your mission will render this activity unnecessary.

I shall await with interest your further recommenda-

tions with regard to the withdrawal of the Marines from north China.

Current developments in connection with the presence of British troops in Indonesia and Greece, to which you refer increase my anxiety to get American armed forces out of China just as soon as they are no longer essential to implement our policy in China.

With regard to your references to the Far Eastern Commission in relation to the Manchurian issue, I believe that the only practicable consideration that the Commission could give to the situation in Manchuria would be in connection with reparations that is, disposition of Japanese external assets in Manchuria. I assume that you have the same idea. It is our idea that the Far Eastern Commission shall limit itself to consideration of problems and policies directly connected with the surrender disarmament and control of Japan and that its scope of activity should not be extended to consideration of Far Eastern problems of a more general character

With renewed assurance of my confidence and high regard.

I had hoped, as did Marshall, that the tripartite committees he set up would quickly put an end to the civil war in China. These committees were cease-fire teams and were each made of one Nationalist officer one Communist officer and one American officer from General Marshal's executive headquarters.

To lend the strength of his influence to the cease-fire agreement between the two Chinese armies, Marshall undertook a three-thousand-mile flight through northern China all the way to the borders of Inner Mongolia. He talked to all the principal commanders in the field and reported to me that he had been able to promote a general understanding throughout the region of the purposes of the cease-fire and of the machinery that had been set up to enforce it. While in Yenan he talked with Mao Tse-tung.

Difficulties had been numerous, and many still existed. Nevertheless, Marshall now felt that the first stage of his work had been completed. The two Chinese parties had been brought to a cease-fire agreement, and there was a slight lessening of mutual suspicion in the atmosphere. Marshall now asked to return to Washington for personal consultation with me and to work out a program of help to China with

the various departments of government. I was anxious to see him and approved his suggestion.

In advance of his return he had sent me a detailed report on the situation as he saw it and after his arrival in Washington on March 15 I had several long talks with him.

He told me that, just before he left China, Chiang Kai-shek had at last consented to the entry of cease-fire teams into Manchuria, which he had previously opposed. In fact, it was this event that had led Marshall to believe he could be spared in China in order to take up in Washington several matters which he believed would be of assistance in solving the problems of China. After Marshall's departure from China, however, Chiang Kai-shek had put such severe restrictions on the powers of the cease-fire teams that were to go into Manchuria that they were unable to function. As a result, fighting had broken out again in several areas of Manchuria and had spread from there.

On April 6, for instance, General Gillem, Marshall's deputy, reported that the government authorities were detaining Communist cease-fire team members at Mukden and had arrested others in Peiping. Furthermore, Chinese air force planes had "buzzed" the Communist center of Yenan. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, occupied key localities in Manchuria just as the Russians departed. In some instances, where Central Government forces were already on the ground, Communist forces attacked them and forced them out.

General Marshall devoted his brief stay in Washington to talks with government officials regarding loans for China and aid in the form of shipping and surplus property. He was able to reach agreements to facilitate the transfer of surplus-property stocks then in China and to assure China of some small coastwise and river shipping. I instructed the Treasury Department to co-operate with him in every way and an agreement was reached for an immediate loan to China of $500,000,000. Unfortunately when nothing but the Chinese signature was lacking on this document, Chiang Kai-shek's representative, the Chinese Ambassador in Washington, insisted on changes before he would sign. And to complicate the matter further the Generalissimo on that same day made a speech in China that was in effect a call to arms. It is no wonder that the Treasury experts felt that it would not be in line with our policy to make a loan of political settlement was not forthcoming in China. They were correct.

General Marshall returned to China on April 18, and

almost as soon as he arrived he was confronted with a Communist charge that American planes had strafed their units in Szepingkai. Marshall's headquarters was able to prove that the plane involved, though of American make, belonged to the National Government.

I kept receiving reports of Communist successes in Manchuria during April and May They captured Changchun, the capital city after tense fighting and occupied Harbin, an industrial center of northern Manchuria, without opposition from the government garrison. Chiang Kai-shek rejected an offer of the Communists for a truce in Manchuria in spite of the fact that he was obviously unable to contain them. Hostilities spread into China proper around Hankow and in the vicinity of Nanking.

Marshall's truce terms were rushed out into areas of conflagration to stem the tide, and cease-fire orders were put into effect in some important provinces. In fact, the situation improved until Marshall found it possible to cable me in the latter part of May that there were signs that the promise of peace in China could be revived. Chiang Kai-shek seemed to accept Communist occupation of most of Manchuria at this stage He was no longer insisting on the recapture of the cities that had been lost, and he seemed to consider as a possible compromise the idea of letting Changchun be managed by a tripartite team from Marshall's executive headquarters. The Communists, of course, were reluctant to give up that key city even to a neutral agency

This apparent change in policy was only momentary however after Chiang Kai-shek consulted his generals in Mukden and other key locations, he returned to his earlier formula. He wanted the Communists to show their good faith first by restoring communications in North China, which they had cut in many places He also raised the question of whether Marshall, as an individual was prepared to guarantee the good faith of the Communists.

For the first time Marshall sounded a discouraging note. "I am working against time" he cabled "otherwise I would be quite hopeful. As it is success depends on the developments in the field more than on the problems of negotiation."

It was only through Marshall's insistence that some basis for peaceful settlement had to be found that at last a temporary cease-fire was arranged for Manchuria On June 7 both parties consented to a fifteen-day truce and a small team,

headed by Marshall's chief of Staff, General Byroade went to Changchun to supervise the cessation of hostilities.

Marshall had written me that it was his hope that, during the temporary truce, agreement might be reached on a more permanent settlement. But both sides seemed most unwilling to commit themselves. The government commander in Manchuria announced repeatedly that he was ready to resume his advance on the Communist position as soon as the fifteen days had ended. The Communists, on the other hand, rejected the government plans as entirely too demanding. Unfortunately one of Chiang's proposals was that the American members of truce teams should be given the deciding votes whenever the two Chinese were unable to agree. The Communists, of course, saw in this move merely a corroboration of their charge that America was taking the Kuomintang's side, and they would not hear of the plan.

The Communists also objected to the government's demand that, in addition to Manchuria, the Communists should withdraw from certain areas in North China. When the government announced that it was sending two new armies into those areas, Marshall concluded that "at the present moment we have reached an impasse.

There were then a number of Central Government leaders who felt confident that the Communists could be defeated in battle, an estimate that Marshall, from his observations on the ground, considered highly erroneous. He believed that not only would it be impossible for the Generalissimo's forces to win a quick victory but also that, failing such immediate success, they would find themselves confronted by a Communist force backed and supported by the Soviets. In the long run, this could mean only defeat for Chiang—or American full-scale intervention.

But Marshall's patient persistence brought Communist acceptance of the government proposal to give the deciding vote on truce teams to the American member and, with this obstacle out of the way negotiations once again appeared to take a more promising turn. The temporary truce was extended eight days to allow more time for talks.

At this moment Marshall was seriously handicapped by various proposals that had been introduced in the Congress and appeared slated for passage—proposals that would have extended Lend-Lease and other aid to the government of Chiang Kai-shek without laying down a condition that he work with General Marshall. This was heartbreaking and contributed greatly to General Marshall's troubles. Of course

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liberals, Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on freedom of action in the military field—all these seemed to indicate that the Central Government was turning its back on my effort to preserve the peace in China.

As I interpreted Marshall's reports, there were elements on both sides, among the Kuomintang and among the Communists, who were willing to work together on a peaceful solution. But on each side there were also extremists who wanted no part of negotiations and were determined to settle the fate of their country by force. The Generalissimo himself seemed to take a position between these two groups. In the spring, the influence of the moderates around him must have prevailed, and he agreed to concessions, although with a show of reluctance. Now, however, it appeared that the extreme military cliques had won out and that he was no longer willing to listen to Marshall's counsel.

I decided, with Marshall's approval, to appeal to Chiang Kai-shek in person. On August 10 I asked the Chinese Ambassador to transmit the following message to Chiang:

"Since I sent General Marshall to you as my special envoy I have followed closely the situation in China. It is with deep regret that I am forced to the conclusion that his efforts have apparently proved unavailing.

"I am certain that General Marshall, in his discussions with you, has reflected accurately the overall attitude and policy of the American Government and of *informed* American public opinion.

"During recent months the rapidly deteriorating political situation in China has been a cause of grave concern to the American people. While it is the continued hope of the United States that a strong and democratic China can yet be achieved under your leadership, I would be less than honest if I did not point out that recent developments have forced me to the conclusion that the selfish interests of extremist elements, equally in the Kuomintang as in the Communist Party, are hindering the aspirations of the Chinese people.

"The Agreements reached by the Political Consultative Conference on January 31st were greeted in the United States as a far-sighted step toward the achievement of national unity and democracy. American disappointment over the failure to implement these agreements by concrete measures is becoming an important factor in our outlook with regard to China.

"There exists in the United States an increasing body of opinion which holds that our entire policy toward China must be reexamined in the light of spreading strife, and especially

I could not stop this sort of talk in Congress. In other words, as was to happen again and again in later years, the Chinese government sought to gain advantages from our government by applying pressures from other directions.

Every time someone in Washington or elsewhere in this country made a speech calling for "all-out aid" to China, the "die hards" in China gained new confidence and sabotaged Marshall's efforts to bring about peace. In turn, the Communists, of course, would point to reports of such statements as evidence of American duplicity. Marshall's delicate task was made infinitely more difficult by the uncritical acts of some in this country who claimed to be friends of the Chinese people but who were only helping the "die-hards."

In China, anti-American propaganda, mass meetings, and demonstrations were increasing. They were instigated alike by the Communists and by the extremists in the Kuomintang.

In July I appointed Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, the distinguished American president of Yenching University in Peiping, as American Ambassador to China. Dr. Stuart was born in China and had spent most of his adult life there. Few men possessed a better knowledge of China, and few Westerners commanded more respect among the Chinese. I knew he would be of considerable help to Marshall. His fluency in the Chinese language, of course, made discussions with the various leaders much easier.

But July also brought the outbreak of intense and widespread fighting. As Marshall reported it, "The Nationalists blamed the Communists for starting fighting in the Kiangsu and Tatung regions, while the Communists blamed the Nationalists in Kiangsu, Shantung and Hupeh. At the same time, the Central Government began a sharp drive against liberal elements of the population. The secret police put many of them under close surveillance and in Kunming two professors who were members of the Democratic League were assassinated.

The Generalissimo's reaction was one of counseling patience. He told Marshall, in effect, that all would end well. The Communists, however, were unwilling to resume talks as long as fighting continued. Their own control over their troops was apparently being relaxed, and on July 29 a group of armed Communists attacked a small element of American marines, killing three and wounding several others.

The turn of events in China troubled me. The anti-American demonstrations by the Nationalist student groups in such places as Nanking, the new policy of harshness against the

Chiang Kai-shek's reply to my letter placed all blame squarely on the Communists:

"I wish to thank you cordially for your message of August 10th, expressing your genuine concern for the welfare of my country.

"Since General George Marshall's arrival in China, he has labored most unsparingly to achieve our common objective, namely peace and democracy in China. I, too, have done my utmost despite all obstacles to cooperate with him in his endeavor.

"But the desire for peace has to be mutual, and for the Communists, it must mean that they give up their policy to use armed force to seize political power, to overthrow the Government and to install a totalitarian regime such as those which are now spreading over Eastern Europe. The abandonment of such a policy is the minimum requirement for the preservation of peace in our country. After the conclusion of the January Agreement, the Communists attacked and captured Changchun in Manchuria and attacked and captured Tehchow in Shantung. During the cease fire period in June, they attacked Hsuchow in Northern Kiangsu and Tatung and Taiyuan in Shansi. In the last few days, they have opened a wide offensive on the Lunghai Railway with Hsuchow and Kaifeng as their objectives.

"Of course, mistakes have also been made by some subordinates on the Government side, but they are minor in scale compared to the flagrant violations on the part of the Communists. Whenever any mistake occurs on our Government side, we deal sternly with the offender.

"On August 14th in my V J Day message, I announced the firm policy of the Government to broaden speedily the basis of the Government by the inclusion of all parties and non-partisans, amounting to putting into effect the programme of peaceful reconstruction as adopted by the Political Consultation Conference on January 30th. I sincerely hope that the Chinese Communist Party will accept our views. The Government on its part will do the utmost to make peace and democracy a reality in this country in the shortest possible time.

"In implementing that policy which has as its aim our mutually declared objective, I am cooperating with General Marshall with all my power. Our success must depend upon the sincerity of the Communists in responding to our appeals.

by evidence of the increasing tendency to oppress freedom of the press as well as the expression of liberal views among intellectuals. The recent assassinations of distinguished Chinese liberals at Kunming have not gone unnoticed. Regardless of where responsibility for these cruel murders may lie, the end result has been to focus American attention on the situation in China, and there is a growing conviction that an attempt is being made to settle major social issues by resort to force, military or secret police, rather than by democratic processes.

"Our faith in the peaceful and democratic aspirations of the people of China has been shaken by recent events, but not destroyed. It is still the firm desire of this Government and of the people of the United States to assist China to achieve lasting peace and a stable economy under a truly democratic government. There is a growing feeling, however, that the aspirations of the Chinese people are being thwarted by militarists and a small group of reactionaries, who, failing to comprehend the liberal trend of the times, are obstructing the advancement of the general good of the nation. Such a state of affairs is violently repugnant to the American people.

"Unless convincing proof is shortly forthcoming that genuine progress is made toward a peaceful settlement of China's internal problems, it must be expected that American opinion will not continue in its generous attitude towards your nation. It will, furthermore, be necessary for me to redefine and explain the position of the United States to the American people.

"It is my earnest hope that I may in the future receive some encouraging word from you which will facilitate the accomplishment of our mutually declared objectives."

When Chiang received this message, he asked Marshall to join him at his summer residence. There, without mentioning my letter he told the general that he was convinced that the Communists had decided to embark upon a policy of violence. He denied that there had been anything in the conduct of the government that would suggest that its policy was one of force, even before the change in the Communists attitude.

Marshall reported that "at the present moment the Generalissimo seems clearly inclined to a policy of force as the only acceptable solution." He also said that he had again urged on the Generalissimo the importance of stopping the fighting to clear the air for political negotiations. Only the Communists, Marshall pointed out, would gain if a general conflagration were allowed to develop.

for the National Assembly which was to convene in November telling Marshall that he wanted to announce the names at the first formal meeting of the State Council, which he expected would be held on October 10. In other words, he was prepared to have the fighting continue at least until that date.

The Communists, on the other hand, would not proceed with the planning for the State Council unless they were given assurances that the cessation of hostilities would also be taken up. While Chiang Kai-shek had asked Marshall in May if he could guarantee the good faith of the Communists, now in August Chou En-lai wanted Marshall and Stuart to guarantee the good faith of Chiang and his government.

On September 13 Marshall reported that "Dr. Stuart and I are stymied." Their only hope seemed to be that Chou En-lai and the Communists might decide that the fighting was running against them and that they might therefore best yield to the demands of the Generalissimo.

On October 2 Marshall sent three messages, the substance of which was that he considered his mission at a complete impasse. He had in vain pleaded with Chou En-lai to return from his self-imposed exile in Shanghai. He had no success in getting any concessions from Chiang Kai-shek, who had now openly announced that he would seek to occupy the city of Kalgan. The Communists responded with a declaration that an attack on Kalgan would be taken as a symbol of the government's intention to launch unrestricted civil war. Kalgan had been one of the sites which the government had in June agreed to leave in Communist hands.

Marshall reported to me that he had found it necessary to submit a plain-spoken memorandum to the Generalissimo. In this he had stated clearly that he was in disagreement with both the Communists and the Nationalists. Furthermore, he enumerated the points on which he disagreed with each and had then concluded by advising the Generalissimo that unless some basis for agreement on the termination of hostilities could be reached without delay he would request that his mission in China be ended. Earlier Marshall had informed the Communists with equal bluntness that he would withdraw from the task of mediation unless they ceased the personal attacks on him in their press and in their propaganda.

At this stage I was prepared to ask Marshall to come home.

Chiang Kai-shek was persuaded to make a proposal to the Communists, although it was not what we hoped it might be.

I am counting on your continued support in the attainment of our objective."

In my acknowledgment of Chiang Kai-shek's message I welcomed the indications of further efforts toward the settlement of China's problems and expressed the hope that armed strife would soon cease and that we would then be able to assist China in its tasks of reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Chiang Kai-shek did, in fact, consent to another effort at political settlement. However contrary to Marshall's judgment, he wanted to see a political agreement concluded before he would agree to a termination of the fighting. The Communists in the meanwhile, had issued a manifesto for the mobilizing of all available manpower in their areas. According to the Communists, this was a defense measure. According to Chiang, it was clear evidence of the Communists aggressive intentions.

The stalemate seemed complete. Each side accused the other of having started the fighting, and neither would agree to a cessation until the other had given up any and all advantages gained in the interim.

Marshall now asked the two sides to sit down with Dr. Stuart in an attempt to break the stalemate. The aim was to bring about the creation of the State Council of forty members, which would be the next step forward on the road to political integration.

The Generalissimo set a number of conditions which, he said, the Communists would have to meet before he would agree to a cessation of hostilities, and, in Marshall's opinion, the government forces were in a position to score some immediate successes that might impel the Communists to accept these demands. Marshall believed that the Communists realized this and therefore were trying to get whatever advantages they could gain from local successes.

"There are leading military participants on both sides," he reported to me on August 30 "who confidentially take a somewhat Chinese view that several months of fighting will be a necessary procedure looking to an acceptable adjustment. What happens in the meantime to the hundreds of millions of oppressed people is ignored. Also what happens in the way of Soviet intervention overt or covert is also ignored or not mentioned."

Chiang Kai-shek himself seemed to expect the fighting to continue into the fall. He made it a condition of any cease-fire that the Communists should name their slate of delegates

dor Stuart had held a number of interviews with representatives of the small groups that formed the middle ground between the Kuomintang and the Communists, some of which, like the Democratic League, were in alliance with the Communists, while others, such as the Chinese Youth Party were striving to be independent. These minority parties now entered into the picture as a temporary focus for the efforts at mediation. Marshall and Dr. Stuart kept themselves aloof from these negotiations. The Third Parties group, however did report to them what progress was being made.

Chou En-lai, at the persuasion of the mediators, came to Nanking, but this visit unfortunately coincided with a long-planned trip of the Generalissimo to Formosa, a move which the Communists interpreted as an intentional dodge. The Central Government's operations against Antung, in Manchuria, and against Chefoo, in the province of Shantung, heightened the suspicions of the Communists and served as well to discourage the Third Parties group. Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek, when he returned from Formosa, reiterated his previous demands, while the Communists repeated their previous rejections.

At the same time, the Generalissimo responded to the urging of the Third Parties and granted a three-day postponement of the convening date of the National Assembly. This body did, in the end, assemble on November 15 but with only a few non-Kuomintang members present.

The Communists considered this the final breach. It was their view that the agreements concluded in January in the Political Consultative Conference made it necessary that, before the National Assembly could be convened, the State Council should be organized and the powers of government transferred to it. The determination of the Central Government to go ahead with the National Assembly consequently was taken by the Communists as the final destruction of the January agreements.

Chou En-lai returned to Yenan, leaving only a rump delegation behind, but before he left, he told General Marshall that he expected the Chiang government to initiate shortly a major military campaign to capture Yenan. This, Chou En-lai said to Marshall, would mean the end of all hope for peace by negotiation.

The Communists had thus turned their backs on the negotiations. Chiang Kai-shek seemed confident that his forces could subdue them. In this Marshall disagreed, and he did not hesitate to point out to the Generalissimo that the

Indeed, it was rather plain that Chiang Kai-shek was willing to take this step merely in an effort to prevent Marshall from openly proclaiming the collapse of the mediation efforts. The Communists, however would not hear of any of the Generalissimo's plans until they received assurances that the advance on Kalgan would be called off, and they also wanted assurances that the relative military position would be restored as it had existed at the time of the original cease-fire agreement in January This, of course, would have meant the giving up by the Nationalists of all advantages they had gained in the interval, a condition the Generalissimo would not accept.

Marshall now wrote me that he had concluded that the Government of the United States could not be involved in a controversy in which the parties were dealing with each other at the point of a gun, and he insisted again that no talks could promise success unless there was first an end to the fighting. On October 5 he reported that in his view his usefulness in China had ceased and that his recall was therefore appropriate.

When the Generalissimo learned that Marshall had recommended the end of the mediation mission, he came forward with the suggestion of a ten-day truce in the operations against Kalgan while discussions on the political and military problems were brought under way Marshall, always anxious to pass up no opportunity that might lead to a cessation of hostilities, agreed to pass this proposal on to the Communists.

The Communists' reply was that they would agree to a conference provided there was no prior limitation of the subjects to be discussed—a position that Marshall was unable to shake, for the Communist negotiators criticized American policy as partial to the Nationalists and implied that Marshall himself was partial.

On October 9 Marshall traveled to Shanghai to appeal to Chou En-lai in person, but the Communist leader was completely adamant. He was clearly unwilling to concede anything, was suspicious of anything that came from Chiang Kai-shek, and at last told Marshall that he considered American assistance to the Chinese government improper and that he thought Marshall's timing of a public release on the latest proposal was such as to distort the picture to the disadvantage of the Communists. This charge brought from Marshall the reply that since he was no longer respected as impartial he would at once withdraw from any negotiations.

The events in China now moved into a new phase in which General Marshall was only an interested observer Ambassa-

dor Stuart had held a number of interviews with representatives of the small groups that formed the middle ground between the Kuomintang and the Communists, some of which, like the Democratic League, were in alliance with the Communists, while others, such as the Chinese Youth Party were striving to be independent. These minority parties now entered into the picture as a temporary focus for the efforts at mediation. Marshall and Dr Stuart kept themselves aloof from these negotiations. The Third Parties group however did report to them what progress was being made.

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Communists could fight a war of attrition, cutting the Nationalist supply lines and communications at will while Chiang's forces sought to maintain the occupation of cities.

Marshall reminded the Generalissimo that, if Russian aid were given to the Communists, their supply line would be much shorter than his own and much more immune from attack. By every means at his command be sought to convince Chiang Kai-shek that in a purely military conflict, however much the odds appeared in his favor at the moment, he would not be able to secure lasting control of the country.

Despite this warning, the Generalissimo remained unconvinced. He was certain that the Communists had never had any intention of cooperating and that only their military defeat would settle the issue. Nor did he take other important matters into consideration. For example, he dismissed Marshall's references to China's precarious economic condition by saying, in effect, that China was accustomed to that.

In spite of these open disagreements over the prospects in view the Generalissimo asked General Marshall to remain in China as adviser to the government, an offer Marshall declined because he thought the strong anti-American sentiment whipped up by the extremists in the Kuomintang and their predominant position in the government would make the position of any American adviser difficult.

On December 28 General Marshall suggested to me that, if a next effort at negotiations which was then being planned failed, he should be recalled to Washington. It was plain from his reports, too that this effort was doomed to failure even before it was ever undertaken. I decided not to await this event. On January 3 I instructed the Secretary of State to recall Marshall for consultation on China and "other matters."

The "other matters" were to consist of no less than the entire scope of State Department activities. For while Marshall was still on his way across the Pacific I announced that he would become Secretary of State.

I had sent General Marshall to China to try to end the fighting and to help put into effect the agreement between the Nationalists and the Communists to form a coalition government. He set up an executive headquarters and the fighting stopped, temporarily. The Chinese began these endless, oriental negotiations between themselves and only an expert chess player can follow them. This is the way it goes. Someone makes a proposal which is accepted by the other side, with

three qualifications. They are then accepted by the other side with three qualifications to each of the first three qualifications. It was an old Chinese way to be sure nothing would happen. Well, fighting broke out again in 1946, and Chiang Kai-shek then decided he was going to occupy North China and Manchuria. General Marshall argued against it, and General Wedemeyer argued against it, but he went ahead. We furnished him equipment, money and a water-lift to Manchuria, and he sent the best divisions he had, well trained and well armed, to Mukden. They stayed there until finally the whole thing disintegrated, and they surrendered. They would make a series of extended movements into the country in North China and take up a position in a walled city. Chiang's commanders were very poor. They had a walled-city complex. They thought the open country was dangerous. Open country was the one place in which they should have been. But they thought a walled city was fine; they could see people coming. Of course no one came, and they stayed in the city. The Communists cut their communication lines and broke up their single track railroad so it was no good to them. At the beginning of 1947 General Marshall threw in the towel. He said that both parties were unwilling to carry out their agreements. Chiang Kai-shek would not heed the advice of one of the greatest military strategists in history and lost to the Communists.

There is no question that Marshall's mission failed to yield the results he and I had hoped for. Fighting soon enveloped all of China, and it did not end until the Communists were masters of the land and Chiang Kai-shek, with the remnants of his army, sought refuge on Formosa.

The Marshall mission had been unable to produce results because the government of Chiang Kai-shek did not command the respect and support of the Chinese people. The Generalissimo's attitude and actions were those of an old-fashioned warlord, and, as with the warlords, there was no love for him among the people. There is no doubt in my mind that if Chiang Kai-shek had been only a little more conciliatory an understanding could have been reached. I am not one to believe in the value of hindsight. Whether or not I was right in sending General Marshall to China does not depend on what some think they know today. It depends only on what we were able to know in 1945. At that time the belief was general that the various elements in China could be persuaded to unify the country. Of course the struggle for

power would continue, but there was no reason why the National Government could not be successful in this struggle as non-Communist governments had been in Europe, if it attended to the fundamental needs of the people and the country. It seemed then that it was the only practical course. Hurley and Wedemeyer led me to think that they believed so, and so did our military and diplomatic experts. Some of these experts believed, however that America could force unity on China—that, in effect, we could "ram it down their throats." Those who took this attitude, of course, would have been the wrong men for the job. Marshall, in my belief, was the right man because he was deeply steeped in democracy and sincerely believed in letting the people determine their own fate. He was a firm believer in the principle of civilian supremacy over the military as a principle that not only applied in the United States but was essential to the welfare of any nation.

I knew General Marshall very well. In the days of the Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program we had regular weekly conferences, and out of these continuous contacts grew my high regard for him as a man and as a soldier. He understood clearly what I hoped to accomplish in China, and he acted entirely in accord with the policy I outlined to him on the eve of his departure.

Neither Marshall nor I was ever taken in by the talk about the Chinese Communists being just "agrarian reformers." The general knew he was dealing with Communists, and he knew what their aims were. When he was back in Washington in March, he told me that their chief negotiator Chou En-lai had very frankly declared that, as a Communist, he believed firmly in the teachings of Marx and Lenin and the eventual victory of the proletariat. Marshall's messages from China show also, that he fully assumed that the Chinese Communists would, in the end be able to count on Russian support.

Neither had I been taken in by Stalin's declaration at Potsdam that the Chinese Communists were not really "proper" Communists, nor by his later statement to Harriman that he thought the civil war in China would be foolish. I realized that the Communists had been engaged in a struggle for the power in China for nearly twenty years. What I hoped to achieve was to see China made into a country in which Communism would lose its appeal to the masses because the needs of the people and the voice of the people would have been answered.

I knew that peace in the world would not be achieved

fighting more wars. Most of all, I was always aware that there were two enormous land masses that no western army of modern times had ever been able to conquer: Russia and China. It would have been folly, and it would be folly today to attempt to impose our way of life on these huge areas by force!

In 1945 and 1946, of all years, such thoughts would have been rejected by the American people before they were even expressed. That was the time when congressmen in Washington joined in the call to "get the boys back home," and our influence throughout the world, as well as China, waned as the millions of American soldiers were processed through the discharge centers.

Our only hope was that we might be given an opportunity to bring to China the kind of economic aid that might restore that country's health and that, in doing so, we would be able to weaken the Communists' appeal. But such aid could not be sent until tranquillity had been restored in the nation, nor would it be effective until the government commanded enough respect to be able to make certain that none of this aid would be diverted into the pockets of warlords and profiteers.

In the end, of course, Chiang was defeated by loss of support among his own people and by American arms, as many of his own generals took their armies, equipped through our aid, into the enemy camp. It was when that sort of surrender began to occur on a large scale that I decided to cut off further shipments to China.

Yet while Marshall was in China it was the Central Government and not the Communists who scored important military gains, although Marshall analyzed them as spurious gains and accurately forecast the eventual failure of the Generalissimo's military campaign. But that failure, in my opinion, and the defeat of the National Government of China were due primarily to their refusal to heed Marshall's advice.

It is important to repeat that Marshall was advising, not dictating. I had sent him to China not to intervene in the affairs of that country but to render whatever aid we could to the cause of peace there. He was not sent to do Chiang Kai-shek's job for him. If General Marshall returned from his mission without results, it was because neither of the parties really wanted to live up to the agreement to form a coalition government to unite China.

The solution I tried to reach through Marshall was the only one by way of which Chiang Kai-shek might have saved himself without full-scale military intervention by the United

States. To achieve a proper and fair appraisal of Marshall's mission, it is important to bear in mind that even before he left for China there already existed a formal agreement in writing between the Central Government and the Communists to work toward national unity. This is the agreement that was brought about previously with the assistance of Ambassador Hurley when he headed our diplomatic mission to China, and had this not already been in existence I would not have sent Marshall to China. My sole purpose in sending him was to help carry out a program willingly subscribed to by the Chinese leaders. In no sense was it our intention to impose our will upon the Chinese people.

# CHAPTER 7

In early 1946 Russian activities in Iran threatened the peace of the world.

Russia and Britain had concluded an agreement with Iran in 1942 which allowed Russian and British troops to be stationed on Iranian soil for a period ending six months after the termination of hostilities. At the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in September 1945 Bevin and Molotov had agreed that this meant that all foreign troops would be withdrawn from Iran not later than March 2, 1946.

However, during the month of November the State Department received reliable reports that instead of preparing for withdrawal the Russians were adding to their forces. It was also reported that the Russians were interfering with efforts by the government in Teheran to suppress rebellious elements in the northern part of the country and especially in the province of Azerbaijan.

On November 23 I had Secretary Byrnes bring up the matter before the Cabinet. Byrnes suggested at that time that we speed up the departure of American troops in Iran. We had used Iran as a supply route to Russia by arrangement with the British, the Russians, and the Teheran government. This meant that we maintained a few thousand service troops in the country. While this involved only a relatively small force, we intended to set the example of withdrawal and then ask the Russians to agree that all foreign troops would be out of that country by January 1.

The approach to Russia was made on this basis, but on December 3 the Russians rejected the proposal. A few days later the Moscow radio informed the world that a revolutionary government had been set up in Azerbaijan. The Iranian government at once charged that this rebel government owed its existence to the Russians and was supported by Russian military forces.

When Byrnes was in Moscow for the conference of Foreign Ministers later in December, the Russians refused even

as a fellow member of the United Nations, expresses the earnest hope that the Government of the Soviet Union will do its part, by withdrawing immediately all Soviet forces from the territory of Iran, to promote the international confidence which is necessary for peaceful progress among the peoples of all nations.

There was no official reply to this note. Russian press reports, however, said that the State Department was "mistaken," that there were no Russian troop movements in Iran. Then the Kremlin shifted tactics and began hammering away at Winston Churchill for his Fulton, Missouri, speech and at me for sponsoring the speech. It was at Westminster College in Fulton that Churchill first referred to the "iron curtain" publicly. The Russians had resorted to the old game of kicking up the dust when you do not want the other fellow to see too well.

But our intelligence continued to report the presence of Russian troops in Iran. The Iranians, moving into areas from which the Russians had said they had pulled out, found the roads blocked by Russian troop units. Three major Russian columns were reported on the march, one toward the capital city of Teheran, another swinging toward the Turko-Iranian border. The signs were plain that Russia was determined to have her way and that she intended to ignore the U.S. and the U.N. alike.

As I saw it, three things were involved. One was the security of Turkey. Russia had been pressing Turkey for special privileges and for territorial concessions for several months. The Turks had resisted all these demands, but their position would be infinitely more difficult if Russia, or a Russian puppet state, were able to outflank her in the east.

The second problem was the control of Iran's oil reserves. That Russia had an eye on these vast deposits seemed beyond question. If the Russians were to control Iran's oil, either directly or indirectly, the raw-material balance of the world would undergo a serious change, and it would be a serious loss for the economy of the Western world.

What perturbed me most, however, was Russia's callous disregard of the rights of a small nation and of her own solemn promises. International co-operation was impossible if national obligations could be ignored and the U.N. bypassed as if it did not exist.

I talked over all these points with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy. Then I told Byrnes to send a blunt message to Premier Stalin. On March 24 Moscow announced that all

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sent to the Soviets—who made no reply—and to the British, who followed with a similar statement to the Turkish government.

Meanwhile, however, the Russians, in addition to their efforts to outflank Turkey through Iran, were beginning to exert pressure on Turkey for territorial concessions. In July 1946, Moscow sent a note to Ankara proposing a new regime for the Dardanelles that would have excluded all nations except the Black Sea powers. In other words, both we and the British would have been eliminated from any future agreement, and Turkey would have been faced by a combination of three Communist states, Russia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The second and far more ominous part of the Soviet proposal was that the straits should be put under joint Turkish-Russian defense.

This was indeed an open bid to obtain control of Turkey. If Russian troops entered Turkey with the ostensible purposes of enforcing joint control of the straits, it would only be a short time before these troops would be used for the control of all of Turkey. We had learned from the experience of the past two years that Soviet intervention inevitably meant Soviet occupation and control. To allow Russia to set up bases in the Dardanelles or to bring troops into Turkey, ostensibly for the defense of the straits, would, in the natural course of events, result in Greece and the whole Near and Middle East falling under Soviet control.

The Turkish government sought our advice, and Acting Secretary of State Acheson placed the matter before me. I directed the State, War and Navy Departments to make a careful study of the situation. The Secretaries of the three departments, with the Chiefs of Staff, moved with speed and brought me a unanimous recommendation that we take a strong position. I met with the Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff and discussed the development thoroughly around a map on my desk to evaluate the situation in the Middle East. I approved the recommendations submitted. We co-ordinated our views with those of our allies, taking a strong position, which was at once communicated to the Turkish government. At the same time, the Turkish government received similar views and support from the British and French.

In addition, I told the Acting Secretary to have our Ambassador in Ankara tell the Turkish leaders orally that, in the language of diplomats, "the reply was formulated only after full consideration had been given to the matter at the highest levels." Without making specific commitments, our envoy was

Cabinet succeeded cabinet, none of them able to offer a solution to the country's ills. The EAM withdrew to the hill areas of the north, refused to surrender its weapons, and was soon openly defying the government. The government, in turn, seemed to encourage irresponsible rightist groups. Violence flared up in numerous sections, and economic recovery made little, if any, headway.

The Communists, of course, thrived on the continuing conditions of misery, starvation, and economic ruin. Moscow and the Balkan satellite countries were now rendering open support to the EAM. Intelligence reports which I received stated that many of the insurgents had been trained, indoctrinated, armed, and equipped at various camps beyond the Greek borders. Under Soviet direction, the reports said, Greece's northern neighbors—Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania—were conducting a drive to establish a Communist Greece.

What little stability and order could be found in Greece was due primarily to the presence there of forty thousand British troops and to the counsel and support given to the Greek government by the British. But as early as the fall of 1945 the British had suggested to us that they would like our assistance in Greece, especially financial help to the Greek government.

I had authorized the State Department to enter into discussions with the British on terms of economic aid to Greece, but we were also anxious to assure that conditions in Greece would justify any loans which might be granted. For that reason I approved the sending of a note to Greece in January 1946 which urged the government of that country to apply itself to a program of economic stabilization. We offered to aid in such a program with both advisers and funds.

Little progress was made, however, as the cleavage between the extremes of Right and Left in Greece seemed to become wider and wider. The return of the King only added fuel to the flames. At last, in December 1946, the Greek government complained to the Security Council of the United Nations that outside assistance was being received by the insurgent groups. A United Nations mission was dispatched to Greece to investigate the situation. At about the same time, the Greek government accepted our long-standing offer of technical advice on their economic problems, and I sent Paul Porter, former Administrator for the OPA, as the head of an economic mission.

However, before Porter was in a position to draw any

conclusion from his inspections on the spot, events forced a decision that made Porter's mission—and our earlier approach to the problems of Greece—outdated.

On February 3 a cable to the State Department from Ambassador MacVeagh in Athens reported rumors that the British would withdraw their troops from Greece, or at least a sizable part of them. On February 12 Secretary of State Marshall brought me a dispatch from MacVeagh urging that we give immediate consideration to supplying aid to Greece. The British, the Ambassador reported, were not able to keep up even the little they were doing.

On February 18 Mark Ethridge of the U.S. Investigating Commission cabled that all the signs pointed to an impending move by the Communists to seize the country. On February 20 our embassy in London reported that the British Treasury was opposing any further aid to Greece because of the precarious financial condition in which Britain found herself.

But the crisis came sooner than we expected. In the late afternoon on Friday, February 21, the British Ambassador asked to see General Marshall. However, he was out of town, attending the bicentennial celebration of Princeton University. An appointment was made for Monday, and the State Department obtained from the British Embassy a copy of the official note which the Ambassador would deliver to the Secretary. The note informed us that Britain would have to pull out of Greece no later than April 1. Acheson telephoned me immediately about the contents of the note, and I asked him to go to work on a study of the situation with which we were faced. Acheson alerted the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, and over the weekend they prepared a memorandum of recommendations of what ought to be done.

On Monday, February 24, Secretary Marshall brought me the official copy of the note which he had received formally that morning from the British Ambassador. This note set forth the difficulties confronting the United Kingdom in the fulfillment of her overseas commitments and advised us that as of March 30, 1947, it would be necessary for the United Kingdom to withdraw all support to Greece.

General Marshall and I discussed the impending crisis with Secretaries Forrestal and Patterson, and the three departments pressed their study of all aspects of the situation. In his talk with the British Ambassador, Secretary Marshall learned that the British were planning to take their troops out of Greece as soon as this could be conveniently done.

The urgency of the situation was emphasized by dispatches from our representatives in Athens and Moscow. General Smith recorded his belief that only the presence of British troops had so far saved Greece from being swallowed into the Soviet orbit. From Athens, Ambassador MacVeagh sent a picture of deep depression and even resignation among Greek leaders: their feeling seemed to be that only aid given at once would be of use. Time, MacVeagh urged, was of the essence.

At three o'clock on Wednesday, February 26, Marshall and Acheson brought me the result of the studies of our experts. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee had met that morning in an extended session and had agreed on a general policy recommendation. General Eisenhower furnished a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff supporting the conclusion reached from a military point of view.

Under Secretary Acheson made the presentation of the study, and I listened to it with great care. The diplomatic and military experts had drawn the picture in greater detail, but essentially their conclusions were the same as those to which I had come in the weeks just passed as the messages and reports went across my desk.

Greece needed aid, and needed it quickly and in substantial amounts. The alternative was the loss of Greece and the extension of the iron curtain across the eastern Mediterranean. If Greece was lost, Turkey would become an untenable outpost in a sea of Communism. Similarly, if Turkey yielded to Soviet demands, the position of Greece would be extremely endangered.

But the situation had even wider implications. Poland, Rumania, and the other satellite nations of eastern Europe had been turned into Communist camps because, in the course of the war, they had been occupied by the Russian Army. We had tried, vainly, to persuade the Soviets to permit political freedom in these countries, but we had no means to compel them to relinquish their control, unless we were prepared to wage war.

Greece and Turkey were still free countries being challenged by Communist threats both from within and without. These free peoples were now engaged in a valiant struggle to preserve their liberties and their independence.

America could not, and should not, let these free countries stand unaided. To do so would carry the clearest implications in the Middle East and in Italy, Germany, and France. The ideals and the traditions of our nation demanded that we come to the aid of Greece and Turkey and that we put the

world on notice that it would be our policy to support the cause of freedom wherever it was threatened.

The risks which such a course might entail were risks which a great nation had to take if it cherished freedom at all. The studies which Marshall and Acheson brought to me and which we examined together made it plain that serious risks would be involved. But the alternative would be disastrous to our security and to the security of free nations everywhere.

What course the free world should take in the face of the threat of Russian totalitarianism was a subject I had discussed with my foreign policy advisers on many occasions in the year just passed. To foster our thinking in long-range terms I had approved the establishment in the State Department of a Policy Planning Staff. George F Kennan one of our foremost experts on Russia, was to head the group.

A President has little enough time to meditate, but whenever such moments occurred I was more than likely to turn my thoughts toward this key problem that confronted our nation.

We had fought a long and costly war to crush the totalitarianism of Hitler the insolence of Mussolini, and the arrogance of the warlords of Japan Yet the new menace facing us seemed every bit as grave as Nazi Germany and her allies had been.

I could never quite forget the strong hold which isolationism had gained over our country after World War I. Throughout my years in the Senate I listened each year as one of the senators would read Washington's Farewell Address. It served little purpose to point out to the isolationists that Washington had advised a method suitable under the conditions of *his* day to achieve the great end of preserving the nation, and that although conditions and our international position had changed, the objectives of our policy—peace and security—were still the same For the isolationists this address was like a biblical text. The America First organization of 1940-41 the Ku Klux Klan Pelley and his Silver Shirts—they all quoted the first President in support of their assorted aims.

I had a very good picture of what a revival of American isolationism would mean for the world. After World War II it was clear that without American participation there was no power capable of meeting Russia as an equal. If we were to turn our back on the world, areas such as Greece weakened and divided as a result of the war would fall into the Soviet

able without much effort on the part of the Russians. The success of Russia in such areas and our avowed lack of interest would lead to the growth of domestic Communist parties in such European countries as France and Italy where they were already significant threats. Inaction, withdrawal, "Fortress America" notions could only result in handing to the Russians vast areas of the globe now denied to them.

This was the time to align the United States of America clearly on the side, and at the head, of the free world. I knew George Washington's spirit would be invoked against me, and Henry Clay's, and all the other patron saints of the isolationists. But I was convinced that the policy I was about to proclaim was indeed as much required by the conditions of my day as was Washington's by the situation in his era and Monroe's doctrine by the circumstances which he then faced.

There are a great many men who labor diligently behind the scenes before a policy statement can be announced. The President, of course, can neither speak nor listen to each and every one of them. But their work ends where the President's work begins, for then he has to make the decision. And where they have spent days, perhaps months, in the study of just one situation, the President faces a multitude of decisions every day. To illustrate, this is what was happening. At the time that I was weighing the problem of aid to Greece and Turkey, Ernest Bevin had just made a public statement about our Palestine policy that cast a dark shadow over our relations with Britain; the economy bloc in the new Eightieth Congress was threatening to cut some vital government programs out of the budget, including our overseas information services; Secretary Marshall was getting ready to attend his first Foreign Ministers' conference; there were events in Argentina, in Indonesia, in China that called for decisions; Senator McKellar was blocking the atomic energy program by his stubborn opposition to the confirmation of David Lilienthal as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission; the bill for the unification of the services was at last ready for Congress; the press wanted me to announce my plans for 1948. Amidst all these demands on his time, the President must be ready to perform the necessary functions of a head of state, whether they be ceremonial or informal, and he can, of course, never close his doors to the public and, even less so, to the press.

Yet decisions like these cannot be made in a hurry, and I never did make momentous decisions without hard prepara-

tory work, study and much thought. I always made it a point to listen to as many people as I could. And after that first sad experience with the Lend Lease termination, I never put my initials of approval on a piece of paper without reading it with care.

The vital decision that I was about to make was complicated by the fact that Congress was no longer controlled by the Democratic party. While expecting the help of such fine supporters of the idea of bipartisanship in foreign affairs as Senator Vandenberg and Congressman Eaton of New Jersey, I realized the situation was more precarious than it would have been with a preponderantly Democratic Congress. It seemed desirable, therefore, to advise the congressional leadership as soon as possible of the gravity of the situation and of the nature of the decision which I had to make. I asked Secretary Marshall and Acheson to return the following day at ten, when I would have the congressional leaders present. At ten o'clock on the morning of February 27 Senators Bridges, Vandenberg, Barkley and Connally, Speaker Martin, and Representatives Eaton, Bloom, and Rayburn took their seats in my office. Congressman Taber had been invited but was not able to be present. He called later in the day and I discussed the situation with him.

I explained to them the position in which the British note on Greece had placed us. The decision of the British Cabinet to withdraw from Greece had not yet been made public, and none of the legislators knew, therefore, how serious a crisis we were suddenly facing. I told the group that I had decided to extend aid to Greece and Turkey and that I hoped Congress would provide the means to make this aid timely and sufficient.

General Marshall then reviewed the diplomatic exchanges and the details of the situation. He made it quite plain that our choice was either to act or to lose by default, and I expressed my emphatic agreement to this. I answered congressional questions and finally explained to them what course we had to take.

The congressional leaders appeared deeply impressed. Some in the group were men who would have preferred to avoid spending funds on any aid program abroad. Some had, not so long ago, been outspoken isolationists. But at this meeting in my office there was no voice of dissent when I stated the position which I was convinced our country had to take.

During the days that followed, State Department experts

busied themselves with different aspects of the situation. The economic officers sought to estimate how much aid the Greek economy would need and could effectively use. The political officers were engaging in consultations with British, Greek, and Turkish representatives. The legal officers were preparing drafts of the necessary legislation. Other departments, too, were giving top-level attention to the Greek problem. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, in particular participated actively and had several lengthy conversations with Dean Acheson. It was the latter however as Under Secretary of State who co-ordinated the planning being done. General Marshall was due to leave for Moscow shortly and was concentrating on plans for the Foreign Ministers conference there.

I had to absent myself from Washington for several days on a state visit—the first one ever undertaken by an American President—to our neighboring republic of Mexico

On my return to the capital in the late hours of March 6 I received a full report of all developments, including those affecting the Greek situation. The Greek government had formally asked for American aid. Both our embassy and the Porter mission asked for urgent consideration of the request.

I had planned to spend a few days in Key West to get away from the daily round of callers and get some work done without interruption, but decided to remain in Washington and go before Congress at the earliest moment to ask for the aid which Greece—and Turkey—so desperately needed.

There was much to be done and little time to do it. One of the first things was to place the matter before the Cabinet. A meeting was scheduled for March 7 and the greater part of it I devoted to a review of the Greek situation. I told the Cabinet of the decision to send aid to Greece and asked their advice on the best way to do it. Acheson outlined the problem that confronted us. He reviewed the role the British had played and what their withdrawal would mean. He informed the Cabinet, however that the British had agreed to continue some support of the Greek government for another three months.

I explained the proposed request to Congress for the sum of $250,000,000 for Greece and $150,000,000 for Turkey but that I realized that this would be only the beginning.

There was general agreement. Secretary of Labor Schwellenbach had some misgivings of a political nature: He suspected that anti-British elements at home might charge that we were "again pulling British chestnuts out of the fire. Several members of the Cabinet stressed the need for govern-

mental reform in Greece. There was considerable discussion on the best method to apprise the American people of the issues involved.

On this last point I asked Secretary of the Treasury Snyder to head a committee to make recommendations to me. This group, with Acheson, Forrestal, Harriman, Patterson, Clinton Anderson, Schwellenbach, and John Steelman as members, met the next day. The committee recommended that, in order to emphasize the gravity of the situation, I appear in person before a joint session of the Congress.

I had already invited a group of congressional leaders to meet in my office on March 10. This group was larger than the one which had met with me on February 27. It included Senators Barkley, Connally, Taft, Vandenberg, and White, Speaker Martin, and Representatives Bloom, Cannon, Eaton, Halleck, McCormack, Rayburn, Short, and Taber. Dean Acheson was also present, and for two hours he and I discussed the Greek situation with the lawmakers. Vandenberg expressed his complete agreement with me. I answered questions by the congressmen similar to those asked at the first meeting. There was no opposition to what had to be done.

The drafting of the actual message which I would deliver to the Congress had meanwhile been started in the State Department. The first version was not at all to my liking. The writers had filled the speech with all sorts of background data and statistical figures about Greece and made the whole thing sound like an investment prospectus. I returned this draft to Acheson with a note asking for more emphasis on a declaration of general policy. The department's draftsmen then rewrote the speech to include a general policy statement, but it seemed to me half-hearted. The key sentence, for instance, read, "I believe that it should be the policy of the United States . . ." I took my pencil, scratched out "should" and wrote in "must." In several other places I did the same thing. I wanted no hedging in this speech. This was America's answer to the surge of expansion of Communist tyranny. It had to be clear and free of hesitation or double talk.

On Wednesday, March 12, 1947, at one o'clock in the afternoon, I stepped to the rostrum in the hall of the House of Representatives and addressed a joint session of the Congress. I had asked the senators and representatives to meet together so that I might place before them what I believed was an extremely critical situation.

To cope with this situation, I recommended immediate

action by the Congress. But I also wished to state for all the world to know what the position of the United States was in the face of the new totalitarian challenge. This declaration of policy soon began to be referred to as the "Truman Doctrine." This was, I believe, the turning point in America's foreign policy which now declared that wherever aggression, direct or indirect, threatened the peace, the security of the United States was involved.

"I believe," I said to the Congress and to a nationwide radio audience, "that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

"I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

"I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes."

After I delivered the speech, the world reaction to it proved that this approach had been the right one. All over the world, voices of approval made themselves heard, while Communists and their fellow travelers struck out at me savagely. The line had been drawn sharply. In my address I had said that every nation was now faced with a choice between alternative ways of life.

"One way of life," I said, "is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

"The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

"The seeds of totalitarian regimes," I said in closing, "are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life ahead has died.

"We must keep that hope alive.

"The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

"If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation."

When I ended my address, the congressmen rose as one man and applauded. Vito Marcantonio, the American Labor

party representative from New York, was the only person in the hall who remained seated. Congress began the following day to work on legislation to put the program into effect. Meanwhile members of my official family were busy rushing such aid and encouragement to Greece as I could provide without special congressional approval. Secretary Forrestal, on my instructions, dispatched the aircraft carrier *Leyte* and nine other vessels on a visit to Greece as a token of our intention, hoping to persuade the British to stay on, at least until our aid to Greece became effective.

Ambassador to Greece MacVeagh, the Ambassador to Turkey Edwin C. Wilson, and Paul Porter were called back to Washington to give the benefit of their on-the-spot observations and their advice.

On April 5 on the occasion of the annual Jefferson Day Dinner I added further emphasis to the ideas I had expressed in the address to Congress.

"We know" I said, "that as long as we remain free, the spirit of Thomas Jefferson lives in America. His spirit is the spirit of freedom. We are heartened by the knowledge that the light he kindled a century and a half ago shines today in the United States. It shines even more strongly and steadily than in his time. What was then an untried faith is now a living reality

"But we know that no class, no party no nation, has a monopoly on Jefferson's principles. Out of the silence of oppressed peoples, out of the despair of those who have lost freedom, there comes to us an expression of longing. Repeated again and again in many tongues, from many directions, it is a plea of men women and children for the freedom that Thomas Jefferson proclaimed as an inalienable right.

"When we hear the cry of freedom arising from the shores beyond our own, we can take heart from the words of Thomas Jefferson. In his letter to President Monroe, urging the adoption of what we now know as the Monroe Doctrine, he wrote

" 'Nor is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition offers of declaring our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations by the interference of any one in the internal affairs of another

"We, like Jefferson, have witnessed atrocious violations of the rights of nations.

"We, too, have regarded them as occasions not to be slighted.

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the broadest possible terms rather than in narrowly nationalistic, or even partisan, focus. Indeed, by the time this problem came to beset us in Greece, General Marshall had already made his famous Harvard speech, out of which grew the Marshall Plan.

were supporting the uprising against the Greek government. The vote in the Commission was 8 to 2, Russia and Poland, of course, were the "nays" France abstained. Early in June the situation in northern Greece turned increasingly worse for the government forces. On June 9 our embassy reported "marked deterioration" on the sixteenth the Greek government appealed for speed in the shipment of aid it also asked that a larger proportion of the aid to be given be devoted to military equipment.

On July 9 the British Foreign Office told our Ambassador in London that their experts were extremely concerned over the Greek situation and thought that all prospects were gloomy On July 16 General Marshall sent me a memorandum on the situation in Greece that began with the words, "The Greek situation has taken a serious turn in the last three days." Sizable guerrilla units had crossed the frontier from Albania. It appeared that they were aiming at the occupation of some larger communities that could serve as centers for a "people's republic."

I called the Secretary of the Navy and asked him how large a part of our Mediterranean fleet he might be able to move to Greek ports. Secretary Forrestal informed me that it would be entirely practicable to have a large part of the Mediterranean squadron shifted on short order He expressed a belief that such a visit would have some deterrent effect on the activities of the Communist guerrillas but was unwilling to estimate how the American public might react.

Meanwhile, Dwight P Griswold, former governor of Nebraska, whom I had named to be the administrator of our aid program in Greece had arrived there. He was vigorously starting to build up a staff and to make arrangements for the reception and distribution of aid supplies. The Greek government, however continued to show itself mostly concerned with military matters. The Greeks wanted equipment, advisers, money to expand their army and would have given all our aid to the military if we had let them do it. Both Ambassador MacVeagh and Griswold worked steadily to induce the government to broaden its base and to seek the widest possible popular support.

Thus, even as we undertook to bolster the economy of Greece to help her combat Communist agitation, we were faced with her desire to use our aid to further partisan political, rather than national, aims. The overriding task that seemed to confront American policy in Europe was to provide an incentive for the Europeans to look at the situation in

former enemies. In contrast, the Russians, wherever they could, stripped the countries they occupied, whether friends or enemies of everything that could be carried off. Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia are shining examples of the rewards that come for helping the ungrateful Russians.

The assistance we gave, which averted stark tragedy and started progress toward recovery in many areas of the world, was in keeping both with the American character and with America's new historic responsibility. To help peoples in distress was not only a tradition of our country but was also essential to our security. By rebuilding Europe and Asia, we would help to establish that healthy economic balance which is essential to the peace of the world.

By 1947, however, after two years of substantial, though piecemeal, emergency assistance, it was apparent that an even larger and more comprehensive program was needed to achieve the rebuilding of the economy of Europe. Speed was essential, because the West now faced the increasing pressure of Communist imperialism. And at the same time I felt that no amount of American aid would lead Europe to lasting recovery unless the nations of Europe themselves could also help cure some of their own chronic economic ills. With this thought in mind, I was looking for some method that would encourage the peoples of Europe to embark upon some joint undertaking that would eventually lead to effective self-help.

In the fall of 1946 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was asked to join in this study and to submit recommendations for action. It seemed to me now that our experience with the Greek-Turkish aid program gave us a basis for an approach to a plan of economic assistance to our ailing allies.

On March 12, 1947, I made a policy speech in which I sought to outline the position the United States would take wherever there were active threats to the independence and stability of free nations.

A few days earlier, at Baylor University in Waco, Texas, I had expressed my belief that free world trade was an inseparable part of the peaceful world.

I said, "Our foreign relations, political and economic, are indivisible. We cannot say that we are willing to cooperate in the one field and are unwilling to cooperate in the other." I cited the economic war of the 'thirties, when nations strangled normal trade, depositors lost their savings, and farmers lost their lands. The lesson in history, I said, was plain. Freedom of international trade would provide the atmosphere

# CHAPTER 8

Never before in history has one nation faced so vast an undertaking as that confronting the United States of repairing and salvaging the victors as well as the vanquished. The complete surrender of the Axis powers did not bring any relaxation or rest for our people. They had to face and were ready to make whatever new sacrifices were necessary to insure the peace. This was the most destructive of all wars. There were no battle fronts, and civilian populations were unhappily military targets as much as were the armed forces because they were part of the industrial and economic centers involved in a total war

Attacks on industrial communities, the bombing of transportation, utilities, and other facilities strained to the breaking point the economic life already drained by the voracious needs of the armed forces.

Nations, if not continents, had to be raised from the wreckage. Unless the economic life of these nations could be restored, peace in the world could not be re-established.

In the first two years that followed V J Day the United States provided more than *fifteen billion dollars* in loans and grants for the relief of the victims of war We did everything humanly possible to prevent starvation, disease, and suffering. We provided substantial aid to help restore transportation and communications, and we helped rebuild wrecked economic systems in one major country after another

For the first time in the history of the world a victor was willing to restore the vanquished as well as to help its allies. This was the attitude of the United States. But one of our allies took the conqueror's approach to victory

The Russians wanted twenty billion dollars in reparations, and I told them at Potsdam that we did not intend to pay the reparations bill as we had so largely done after World War I. That was the only way they could collect these reparations now because the vanquished were prostrate. We would rather make grants for rehabilitation to our allies and even to

d blunt truths from you, particularly about myself." Dean cheson replied, "Do you, General?" "Yes," Marshall said. have no feelings except a few which I reserve for Mrs. Marshall.

What Marshall perceived in the plans which his State Department staff laid before him was the importance of the economic unity of Europe. If the nations of Europe could be induced to develop their own solution of Europe's economic problems, viewed as a whole and tackled co-operatively rather than as separate national problems, United States aid would be more effective and the strength of a recovered Europe would be better sustained.

This was precisely the approach I had in mind. Marshall and I were in perfect agreement. It was my feeling that, beyond economic considerations, the idea of co-operation would stimulate new hope and confidence among the nations of Europe and thus provide a realistic argument against the communists' counsel of despair.

This idea, as an approach to the European problem, was first expressed in public at Cleveland, Mississippi, on May 8, 1947 when Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered what might be called the prologue to the Marshall Plan. Originally it had been planned for me to speak at this meeting, but I had other commitments and asked Dean Acheson to fill the engagement. The Acheson speech contained the same elements of the proposal which was given full development and expression a month later by Marshall.

The key point of the Acheson speech was his emphasis that the reconstruction of Europe would have to be dealt with as one problem. He stressed the interrelation of food and freedom. "The war," he said, "will not be over until the people of the world can again feed and clothe themselves and face the future with some degree of confidence." He then went on to offer a balance sheet of our past relief efforts and pointed out that further more comprehensive financing would be necessary. Such use of our economic and financial resources would help preserve our own freedoms and democratic institutions because it would contribute to the security of our nation to widen the economic margins on which human dignity and free institutions abroad were struggling to survive.

Acheson's speech did not receive the attention it deserved at the time, although it contained the beginning of the proposal later made at Harvard by Secretary Marshall. On June 5, 1947 the Secretary of State outlined to a commencement

necessary to the preservation of peace. My advisers were already at work seeking further practical ways to strengthen international co-operation in economic matters.

We had sent food to Europe, but millions there still did not have enough to eat. We had made loans to the countries of Europe, but the war had so disrupted the patterns of trade and industry there that the amounts we loaned were far less effective than we had hoped. I was disturbed because the loan to Britain had failed to accomplish what we thought it would.

Detailed reports came to my office daily from our government agencies about conditions abroad. A steady stream of appeals poured in from representative leaders of many foreign nations, virtually all of whom expressed the gravest concern over the economic situation and over the gains which Communism might score if there were no improvement. On April 26, when Secretary Marshall returned from the Moscow conference of Foreign Ministers, he arrived in a pessimistic mood. He had gone to Moscow with the hope that he could persuade the Russians that the United States was working for peace. The Russians, however were interested only in their own plans and were coldly determined to exploit the helpless condition of Europe to further Communism rather than cooperate with the rest of the world.

Marshall's report confirmed my conviction that there was no time to lose in finding a method for the revival of Europe. General Marshall is one of the most astute and profound men I have ever known. Whenever any problem was brought before him, he seemed to be able to put his finger at once on the very basic approach that later would usually be proposed by the staff as the best solution. He talked very little but listened carefully to everything that was said. Sometimes he would sit for an hour with little or no expression on his face, but when he had heard enough, he would come up with a statement of his own that invariably cut to the very bone of the matter under discussion.

As Secretary of State, Marshall had to listen to more staff talk than when he was Chief of Staff He would listen for a long time without comment, but when the debates between members of his staff seemed destined to go on interminably and he could stand it no longer he would say "Gentlemen, don't fight the problem decide it." Dean Acheson told me a characteristic story about Marshall when he first took over as Secretary of State Marshall had asked Dean Acheson to stay on as Under Secretary and said, "I want the most complete

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necessary to the preservation of peace. My advisers were already at work seeking further practical ways to strengthen international co-operation in economic matters.

We had sent food to Europe, but millions there still did not have enough to eat. We had made loans to the countries of Europe, but the war had so disrupted the patterns of trade and industry there that the amounts we loaned were far less effective than we had hoped. I was disturbed because the loan to Britain had failed to accomplish what we thought it would.

Detailed reports came to my office daily from our government agencies about conditions abroad. A steady stream of appeals poured in from representative leaders of many foreign nations, virtually all of whom expressed the gravest concern over the economic situation and over the gains which Communism might score if there were no improvement. On April 26, when Secretary Marshall returned from the Moscow conference of Foreign Ministers, he arrived in a pessimistic mood. He had gone to Moscow with the hope that he could persuade the Russians that the United States was working for peace. The Russians, however were interested only in their own plans and were coldly determined to exploit the helpless condition of Europe to further Communism rather than cooperate with the rest of the world.

Marshall's report confirmed my conviction that there was no time to lose in finding a method for the revival of Europe. General Marshall is one of the most astute and profound men I have ever known. Whenever any problem was brought before him, he seemed to be able to put his finger at once on the very basic approach that later would usually be proposed by the staff as the best solution. He talked very little but listened carefully to everything that was said. Sometimes he would sit for an hour with little or no expression on his face but when he had heard enough, he would come up with a statement of his own that invariably cut to the very bone of the matter under discussion.

As Secretary of State, Marshall had to listen to more staff talk than when he was Chief of Staff. He would listen for a long time without comment, but when the debates between members of his staff seemed destined to go on interminably and he could stand it no longer he would say "Gentlemen, don't fight the problem decide it." Dean Acheson told me a characteristic story about Marshall when he first took over as Secretary of State. Marshall had asked Dean Acheson to stay on as Under Secretary and said, "I want the most complete

I had referred to the idea as the "Marshall Plan" when it as discussed in staff meetings, because I wanted General Marshall to get full credit for his brilliant contributions to e measure which he helped formulate. And it was Marshall who had envisioned the full scope of this approach. He had ensured the motivational as well as the economic value of e proposal. History rightly will always associate his name ith this program, which helped save Europe from economic disaster and lifted it from the shadow of enslavement by ussian Communism. Almost immediately following his enunciation of the idea in his Harvard speech, the term "Marshall Plan" became commonplace in the press and radio of e United States and other countries around the world, and I was glad to see his name identified with the plan. I believe e fact that a man of Marshall's world standing made the renewal of this policy helped greatly in its eventual adoption.

He was one of the very few men in the government who had rved in intimate contact with the day-by-day developments of this country's wartime operations in both hemispheres. Both as military strategist and diplomat, he was known and respected abroad as few men have been in the history of the United States. And at home he enjoyed the confidence and esteem of the average citizen regardless of political preferences, as well as the admiration of congressional leaders. Marshall's entire personality inspired confidence. I recall the worried months of early 1944 just before the Normandy invasion. There were many men in the Congress who harbored doubts and misgivings about the cross-Channel attack that was then generally expected, but General Marshall came to Capitol Hill and spoke to about four hundred and fifty of the members of Congress, and his quiet, determined manner and his complete command of all the facts of the situation quieted whatever fears anyone may have had. Most notably too, everyone present respected the secrecy which the general asked us to observe. This was typical of the manner in which the man affected those who knew him. It is not surprising that all his recent detractors are men who never knew the measure of responsibility that was Marshall's, nor the manner in which he discharged that responsibility.

His many years in wartime Washington had endowed Marshall with a thorough knowledge and appreciation of the role of Congress. As head of the vast Army of World War II, he had dealt with administrative problems of unprecedented magnitude. These experiences proved invaluable when he

audience a course of action for the United States in dealing with the European crisis.

This was a speech that was typical of the man. It was matter-of fact and without oratorical flourishes, compact and to the point, and the Secretary began it with a brief review of the economic condition of Europe.

Then he went on to set out a course of action. "It is logical," he said, "that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. *Its purpose should be the revival of a* working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States."

Then came the key section of the plan. "It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirement of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by the government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program *so far as it may* be practical for us to do so."

This was our proposal, that the countries of Europe agree on a cooperative plan in order to utilize the full productive resources of the continent, supported by whatever material assistance we could render to make the plan successful.

I had referred to the idea as the "Marshall Plan" when it was discussed in staff meetings, because I wanted General Marshall to get full credit for his brilliant contributions to the measure which he helped formulate. And it was Marshall who had envisioned the full scope of this approach. He had perceived the inspirational as well as the economic value of the proposal. History rightly will always associate his name with this program, which helped save Europe from economic disaster and lifted it from the shadow of enslavement by Russian Communism. Almost immediately following his enunciation of the idea in his Harvard speech, the term "Marshall Plan" became commonplace in the press and radio of the United States and other countries around the world, and I was glad to see his name identified with the plan. I believe the fact that a man of Marshall's world standing made the proposal of this policy helped greatly in its eventual adoption. He was one of the very few men in the government who had lived in intimate contact with the day-by-day developments of this country's wartime operations in both hemispheres. Both as military strategist and diplomat, he was known and respected abroad as few men have been in the history of the United States. And at home he enjoyed the confidence and esteem of the average citizen regardless of political preferences, as well as the admiration of congressional leaders. Marshall's entire personality inspired confidence. I recall the worried months of early 1944 just before the Normandy invasion. There were many men in the Congress who harbored doubts and misgivings about the cross-Channel attack that was then generally expected, but General Marshall came to Capitol Hill and spoke to about four hundred and fifty of the members of Congress, and his quiet, determined manner and his complete command of all the facts of the situation quieted whatever fears anyone may have had. Most notably too, everyone present respected the secrecy which the general asked us to observe. This was typical of the manner in which the man affected those who knew him. It is not surprising that all his recent detractors are men who never knew the measure of responsibility that was Marshall's, nor the manner in which he discharged that responsibility.

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addressed himself to the practical implementation of the plan which his Harvard University speech had set in motion.

The response to Marshall's speech was immediate, electrifying the free world. Ernest Bevin, Great Britain's Foreign Secretary assuming the lead and quickly followed by French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, informed Secretary Marshall that they were ready to take the kind of initiative he had suggested. Invitations went out from London and Paris to every European nation except Spain for a conference to attempt to draw up a comprehensive recovery program.

Russia's reaction was also immediate For a short while it appeared as if Marshall's proposal might not only result in economic reconstruction but also in a lifting of the Iron curtain. A little surprisingly Mr Molotov agreed to come to a preliminary meeting at which Bevin and Bidault proposed to lay out the agenda and procedure for the plenary meeting of the conference. However Ambassador Bedell Smith correctly advised us from Moscow that Molotov had no intention of taking part in any constructive undertaking. What he was trying to do was to exploit the situation for Russia's own propaganda purposes. He sought to have Bevin and Bidault ask the United States for a dollar-and-cents figure of the total aid that Europe might expect Of course the State Department would have been compelled to reply that we could not make a commitment in such a form and the Soviets could have proclaimed to the world that we were hedging on our proposal.

As a French diplomatic observer put it "The Soviets want to put the United States in a position where it must either shell out dollars before there is a real plan or refuse outright to advance any credits" French Foreign Minister Bidault told our Ambassador that "Molotov clearly does not wish this business to succeed but on the other hand his hungry satellites are smacking their lips in expectation of getting some of your money He is obviously embarrassed"

Indeed, Czechoslovakia accepted the invitation to the conference and Poland was also evidently eager to participate. In a dramatic move however the Kremlin ordered them to withdraw their acceptances and Molotov departed from Paris with a blast against capitalism and the United States

Sixteen nations were represented in Paris for the opening of this conference on July 12 1947 Austria Belgium Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway Portugal Sweden Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. And although Western

many was not formally represented, its requirements as well as its ability to contribute to any general plan were considered by the conference.

The report of this conference was transmitted to Secretary Marshall on September 22, and two days later the Secretary placed it, and a number of related papers, on my desk for study. The report described the economic situation of Europe and the extent to which the participating countries thought they could solve their problems by individual or joint efforts. After taking into account these recovery efforts, the report then estimated the extent to which the sixteen countries would be able to pay for the imports they had to have.

I now made public a report of the studies by three separate committees which I had named to investigate the state of our own natural resources, as well as the impact on our economy of aid to other countries, and the character and quantities of resources available for aid to foreign countries.

I also asked a number of congressional and administration leaders to meet in my office on Monday, September 29, to discuss plans for determining what action we should now take. Those invited to attend were the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State (Robert A. Lovett had succeeded Dean Acheson on July 1), the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce, and the following members of Congress: from the Senate, Bridges, Connally, Lucas, Vandenberg, and White; from the House, Arends, Bloom, Eaton, Halleck, Rayburn, and Wolcott.

I informed the congressmen of the details of the report and told them that it appeared that it would require $580,000,000 to take care of immediate European needs until March 31 of the following year, the earliest date on which the proposed plan could be made effective. I asked the chairman of the Senate and House committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs and on Appropriations to give earnest consideration to the need for speedy aid to western Europe, and we also discussed the possibility of calling Congress back into session to cope with the problem.

On October 1 letters went to the appropriate committee chairmen asking them to consider this a most urgent matter, especially in the light of the steady deterioration of the situation in France and Italy. A special session of Congress was called to meet on November 17. On October 23 I met with the congressional leaders and told them that I had taken this action partly so that Congress might take steps to halt the

rising price spiral within our own nation but mostly to me[illegible] the crisis in western Europe.

On the following night I delivered a radio talk from th[e] White House. I said that while we were considering a lo[ng-] range program to aid European recovery we would have t[o] help some nations through an immediate crisis. "The mo[st] imminent danger exists in France and in Italy If the econ[o]mies of these countries collapse and the people succumb t[o] totalitarian pressures, there will be no opportunity for the[m] or for us to look forward to their recovery so essential t[o] world peace."

Speaking in a similar vein when the special session of th[e] Congress convened I stressed that stopgap aid could be n[o] substitute for a comprehensive long-range plan but that w[e] needed to extend this immediate aid if we did not wish to s[ee] the very basis of our program destroyed before it could b[e] put in operation.

On December 19 1947 I sent a message to Congre[ss] setting forth the part the United States should play in [a] comprehensive plan for the recovery of Europe.

"In developing this program, certain basic consideratio[ns] have been kept in mind

"First, the program is designed to make genuine recover[y] possible within a definite period of time, and not merely t[o] continue relief indefinitely

"Second, the program is designed to insure that the fun[ds] and goods which we furnish will be used most effectively fo[r] European recovery

"Third, the program is designed to minimize the financi[al] cost to the United States, but at the same time to avoi[d] imposing on the European countries crushing financial bur[-] dens which they could not carry in the long run.

"Fourth, the program is designed with due regard fo[r] conserving the physical resources of the United States an[d] minimizing the impact on our economy of furnishing aid t[o] Europe.

"Fifth the program is designed to be consistent with othe[r] international relationships and responsibilities of the Unit[ed] States.

"Sixth, the administration of the program is designed t[o] carry out wisely and efficiently this great enterprise of ou[r] foreign policy"

This whole thing was to be done, I advised the Congre[ss] in the expectation that European recovery could be substa[n]tially completed in about four years. The total cost over th[e]

four years had been calculated at $17,000,000,000. I asked the Congress to authorize the appropriation of this amount and to provide $6,800,000,000 of this amount by April 1, 1948 to cover the initial—and most critical—period of fifteen months, to June 30, 1949.

Seventeen billion dollars sounded like a huge sum, and of course it is. But compared to the financial cost alone of World War II, it seemed small. The money to be invested in the rebuilding of decent standards of living in Europe would amount to only five per cent of the sums we had expended to defeat the Axis. It would represent less than three per cent of our total national income during the time that the program would be in effect. The estimates of the experts showed that it was well within the capacity of the American people to undertake.

I had not lost sight of the United Nations and our obligation to it. "Our support of European recovery," I said in my message to Congress, "is in full accord with our support of the United Nations. The success of the United Nations depends upon the independent strength of its members and their determination and ability to adhere to the ideals and principles embodied in the Charter. The purposes of the European recovery program are in complete harmony with the purposes of the Charter—to insure a peaceful world through the joint efforts of free nations. Attempts by any nation to prevent or sabotage European recovery for selfish ends are clearly contrary to these purposes.

"It is not feasible to carry out the recovery program exclusively through the United Nations. Five of the participating countries are not yet members of the United Nations. Furthermore, some European members are not participating in the program. United States support of the European recovery program will enable the free nations of Europe to devote their great energies to the reconstruction of their economies. On this depend the restoration of a decent standard of living for their peoples, the development of a sound world economy and continued support for the ideals of individual liberty and justice.

"This joint undertaking of the United States and a group of European nations, in devotion to the principles of the United Nations, is proof that free men can effectively join together to defend their free institutions against totalitarian pressures, and to promote better standards of life for all their peoples."

Congress acted on my request as quickly as it was possible for it to act. The lawmakers did not accept the full amount

proposed. Three and one half months later on April 3 1948, I signed the European Recovery Act passed by Congress. Two days later I announced the appointment of Paul G. Hoffman as Economic Cooperation Administrator with Cabinet rank.

Credit is due to Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg and to Republican Representative Charles A. Eaton, the chairmen, respectively of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. In a Congress dedicated to tax reduction and the pruning of governmental expenditures, they championed this program in a truly bi-partisan manner. A subsequent Congress changed the administrative structure of the plan and merged it with military assistance programs into a Mutual Security Administration.

The job of economic rehabilitation was successfully accomplished at far less cost than had been anticipated. I had told the congressional leaders that I thought seventeen billions of dollars over a four year period would do the job of economic rehabilitation successfully. Thirteen billions did it.

The Marshall Plan will go down in history as one of America's greatest contributions to the peace of the world. I think the world now realizes that without the Marshall Plan it would have been difficult for western Europe to remain free from the tyranny of Communism.

## CHAPTER 9

Russia was caught off guard by the Marshall Plan. Moscow quickly realized that when the Marshall Plan began to function, the opportunity to communize western Europe by exploiting her economic miseries would be lost. Failing to prevent Allied co-operation for European recovery, Russia sought to retaliate by two moves. The first move was to set up a counterpart of a Marshall Plan under Russian auspices for her satellites. This was designed to cut off whatever flow of trade and commerce had been resumed between eastern and western Europe. This would also retard the restoration of the normal, prewar flow of commerce so essential to these countries in Europe.

The second and even more provocative move was to risk a military incident in Berlin designed to test our firmness and our patience. The British, French, and American forces were in close quarters with the Russians in Berlin. Each occupied separate zones in the former capital, which was surrounded entirely by German territory held by the Russians, and all movement of American, British, and French personnel and supplies to our areas in Berlin was through a narrow corridor controlled by the Russians. Under the provisions of the agreement between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, the military government to rule Germany was to be jointly directed from Berlin.

There has been a lot of discussion over the origin of the East-West division of Germany. Our military experts had been fully aware of the fact that Russia's power would enable her, once our invading forces had drawn German strength from the Eastern Front, to drive deep into Germany. Therefore, boundaries that were agreed on long before the fighting came to an end reflected the expectations of the Allied military planners as to where their troops might find themselves at the war's end.

For the first year after the war the British and Americans made every effort to make a joint control succeed. The

Russians, however with a good assist from the French, defeated these efforts. The French were fearful of Germany Of course three German invasions in seventy years had given them ample grounds to fear the Germans. But their desire to see Germany dismembered led them to obstruct a number of joint-control measures at a time when such co-operation might still have been possible.

The Russians, on their part, seemed determined to treat their zone of Germany virtually as if it were Soviet conquered territory They sealed off all contacts between their part of Germany and the areas occupied by us, the British, and the French, and this left little choice to the officials of the three governments in the western part of Germany Arrangements had to be made for some restoration of normal economic activity and in order to facilitate it, "bi-zonal" machinery was set up to cover both the British and American zones. Later the French joined in the arrangements.

Of the many reports I received on conditions in Germany one of the summaries was given me by W Averell Harriman, who was Secretary of Commerce at the time. Late in the summer of 1947 after a visit to Germany Harriman said, "We are putting in too little too late. As a result, we have lost a considerable part of the expenditures made so far The German economy has been living on its reserves, both human and material, and it is still on the decline. We will have to increase our current expenditures in order to reduce the total cost over the years. Material reserves are being rapidly consumed. There is inadequate fertilization for agriculture. Industry is using up its spare parts and stocks. Transportation has cannibalized bad-order locomotives and freight cars to keep others running We shall face one crisis after another unless steps are taken promptly to turn the downward trend upward. We cannot attain our basic objectives unless we are ready to move rapidly to reconstruct German life from its present pitiful and chaotic condition The recovery of Germany in feeding and in industrial production has lagged far behind western Europe. We cannot revive a self-supporting western European economy without a healthy Germany playing its part as a producing and consuming unit."

This was the lowest point in German postwar conditions. Increased appropriations soon became available West German needs were included in Marshall Plan estimates and the bi-zonal organization helped to restore some measure of industrial activity

The Russians, meanwhile, became less and less tractable

and on March 20, 1948 their representative finally walked out of the Allied Control Council. For most of Germany this act merely formalized what had been an obvious fact for some time: namely that the four-power control machinery had become unworkable. For the city of Berlin, however this was the curtain-raiser for a major crisis.

On March 31 the deputy military governor of the Soviet Union, General Dratvin, notified our military government in Berlin that in two days, beginning April 1 the Russians would check all U.S. personnel passing through their zone for identification and would inspect all freight shipments and all except personal baggage.

Our military government authorities rejected these conditions. They pointed out that we had been assured free access to Berlin at the time our troops withdrew from Saxony and Thuringia into their own zones. The Russians claimed that no such agreement had been made. They declared that they had the full right to control all traffic in their zone. They began to stop our trains at the zonal border and turn them back when the train commanders, under orders, refused to submit to inspection. Between April 1 and July 1 Russian orders sealed off all highway, rail, and river traffic into and out of Berlin. "Technical difficulties" was given as the reason by the Russians.

The nature of these "difficulties" soon became apparent. On June 18 the British, French, and Americans announced that the three western zones would immediately set up a new type of currency. The Russians had plates of the currency in use at the beginning of the occupation and had been able to flood the western zone with money printed in the east zone, thus deliberately adding to the inflation which threatened to block Germany's effort at recovery. In due course we changed the plates, but Russia continued to manipulate the east mark. Our currency reform was designed to give Germany a sound mark to use in the west. And of course the good western currency was preferred by all Germans. The Russians opposed our currency reform because it exposed the basic unsoundness of their own currency. And it became one of the major points of contention during the discussions on the Berlin blockade. The importance the Russians attached to our move was soon obvious. They offered to reopen the approaches to the city of Berlin if the Western powers would call off the currency change-over.

What the Russians were trying to do was to get us out of Berlin. At first they took the position that we never had a

legal right to be in Berlin. Later they said we had had the right but that we had forfeited it.

The entire setup of the four powers in Berlin, involving our withdrawal from areas intended for Russian occupation, had been negotiated as a military matter by the generals in the field. General Lucius Clay later blamed himself for not having insisted on a confirmation of the agreement in writing. It is my opinion that it would have made very little difference to the Russians whether or not there was an agreement in writing. What was at stake in Berlin was not a contest over legal rights, although our position was entirely sound in international law but a struggle over Germany and, in a larger sense, over Europe. In the face of our launching of the Marshall Plan, the Kremlin tried to mislead the people of Europe into believing that our interest and support would not extend beyond economic matters and that we would back away from any military risks.

I brought up the situation at the Cabinet meeting of June 25 Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall maintained constant touch with General Clay in Germany and reported that a serious situation was developing. I asked Royall to inquire from General Clay whether the situation was serious enough to consider the removal of the families of our personnel in Berlin. Clay thought it unwise to do so for the psychological effect the move might have. Clay was forced to make emergency arrangements to have essential supplies flown into the city since Berlin by now was effectively blockaded by the Russians both by land and by water

On June 26 the day after I discussed the Berlin crisis with the Cabinet, I directed that this improvised "airlift" be put on a full-scale organized basis and that every plane available to our European Command be impressed into service. In this way we hoped that we might be able to feed Berlin until the diplomatic deadlock could be broken.

Negotiations had been transferred to Moscow where on July 6 the representatives of the three Western powers, with our Ambassador W Bedell Smith acting as spokesman, put their case before the Russians. The Soviet reply given on July 14 dropped all pretenses of "technical difficulties" and made it abundantly clear that the blockading of Berlin by the Russians was a major political and propaganda move The Soviets refused, at this time, to talk about Berlin except as part of discussions covering the entire subject of Germany They rejected our condition that the blockade be lifted before any talks could start.

I issued instructions to have General Clay and his State Department adviser Robert Murphy called to Washington to make a report.

The Russians were obviously determined to force us out of Berlin. They had suffered setbacks recently in Italy, in France, and in Finland. Their strongest satellite, Yugoslavia, had suddenly developed a taste for independent action, and the European Recovery Program was beginning to succeed. The blockade of Berlin was international Communism's counterattack. The Kremlin had chosen perhaps the most sensitive objective in Europe—Berlin, the old capital of Germany, which was and is a symbol to the Germans. If we failed to maintain our position there, Communism would gain great strength among the Germans. Our position in Berlin was precarious. If we wished to remain there, we would have to make a show of strength. But there was always the risk that Russian reaction might lead to war. We had to face the possibility that Russia might deliberately choose to make Berlin the pretext for war, but a more immediate danger was the risk that a trigger-happy Russian pilot or hotheaded Communist tank commander might create an incident that could ignite the powder keg.

General Clay came to the White House on July 22, 1948, to attend the meeting that day of the National Security Council, and I asked him to report on the situation in Germany.

Here, in substance, is what he said. The abandonment of Berlin would have a disastrous effect upon our plans for Western Germany. It would also slow down European recovery, the success of which depended upon more production, particularly from Western Germany. The Germans in general were more concerned than the Allies about the possibility of our leaving Berlin. We should be prepared to go to any lengths to find a peaceful solution to the situation, but we had to remain in Berlin.

The attitude of the German people, Clay added, was in some respects unbelievable. The party leaders in Berlin who made up the City Magistrate, with headquarters in the Soviet zone, had absolutely refused to accept Soviet control. The people of Berlin were determined to stand firm even if it required undergoing additional hardships.

He reported that the airlift had been averaging about 2400 to 2500 tons per day, which was more than enough to handle food requirements but was inadequate to include the necessary amounts of coal. The minimum required to sustain Berlin

without extreme hardship was estimated to be 4,500 tons per day. For the summer 3,500 tons per day might suffice, but additional tonnage would be required during the winter.

At the moment, the airlift operation involved fifty-two C-54's and eighty C-47's. Two round trips were made each day, involving more than 250 landings. Seventy-five additional C-47 planes would enable us to bring in 3,500 tons daily.

I asked the Air Force Chief of Staff what problems would be involved in making these additional planes available and was told by General Vandenberg that if we put more planes on the Berlin airlift the Military Air Transport Service would become disrupted. We would also find that we would need at last one more major airfield inside Berlin to handle the traffic and at least one major maintenance depot at the other end.

In answer to a question by Secretary Marshall, General Vandenberg said that the maximum airlift would involve using planes which are intended for emergency use, many of which might be destroyed in case of hostilities. This would adversely affect our capabilities to wage strategic warfare. If the majority of our planes were caught and destroyed, this would delay our ability to supply our forces and hold outlying bases. General Vandenberg also pointed out that the air lanes to Berlin belonged to the Russians as well as us and that if we increased our traffic to the point where they could claim that they were forced out, international incidents might result.

I then asked General Clay what risks would be involved if we tried to supply Berlin by means of armed convoys. The general said he thought the initial reaction of the Russians would be to set up road blocks. Our engineers would be able to clear such obstacles, provided there was no Russian interference, but the next step the Russians would take, General Clay thought, would be to meet the convoys with armed force.

Robert Lovett, who was in attendance with Secretary Marshall, asked Clay if he thought the Russians might try to block our airplanes with fighter patrols or by other methods. General Clay said he felt that the Russians would not attack our planes unless they had made the decision to go to war.

I asked General Clay if there were any indications known to him that the Russians would go to war. He said he did not think so. What they seemed to be aiming at was to score a major victory by forcing us out of Berlin, either now or after fall and winter weather forced us to curtail the airlift, with-

out, however extending the conflict.

We discussed the kind of assistance that we might expect from our allies if the conflict became more intense. I stated it as my judgment that if we moved out of Berlin we would be losing everything we were fighting for. The main question was, How could we remain in Berlin without risking all-out war?

General Vandenberg said again that he felt the concentration of aircraft necessary to provide Berlin with all its supplies by air would mean reducing our air strength elsewhere both in planes and in personnel. An emergency would find us more exposed than we might be able to afford.

I did not agree with the Air Force Chief of Staff. I asked him if he would prefer to have us attempt to supply Berlin by ground convoy. Then, if the Russians resisted that effort and plunged the world into war, would not the Air Force have to contribute its share to the defense of the nation? I answered my own question. The airlift involved less risks than armed road convoys. Therefore, I directed the Air Force to furnish the fullest support possible to the problem of supplying Berlin.

General Vandenberg interjected that that would not be possible unless additional airfield facilities were constructed in Berlin. General Clay pointed out that he had already selected a site for an additional field and that construction, using German manpower, could begin at once. General Vandenberg then assured me that the Air Force would devote its entire energy to the carrying out of my order.

I was compelled to leave the meeting at this point, but the Council continued to discuss various phases of the problem, such as the number of planes that could be put on the airlift at once and the number of dependents to be retained in Berlin.

We had to be prepared to expand the airlift to a maximum while continuing talks with the Russians to see if the blockade could not be removed by agreement. On July 30 Ambassador Smith and his French and British colleagues handed the Russian Foreign Ministry the Allied reply to the Russian note of July 14. We declared that the Russian reply had offered no constructive suggestion. The situation was full of dangers to world peace, and for that reason the three ambassadors requested a conference with Stalin and Molotov.

This interview with Stalin and Molotov took place on August 2 at nine o'clock in the evening. Stalin, as was so often the case, appeared more open to argument than his sub-

ordinates had been, and the meeting resulted in a more relaxed atmosphere. Stalin indicated that he was willing to have the transport restrictions lifted, provided arrangements were made to have both the eastern and western types of German currency circulate in all of Berlin. He no longer insisted that there had to be a conference on all-German problems before the blockade was lifted, but he wished it recorded that it was the "insistent wish" of the Soviet government that the Allies postpone the next steps planned in the integration of the western zones.

However when Ambassador Smith and his colleagues sat down with Molotov to put this understanding into a formal statement, the Russian position once again turned uncompromising and hard. Four lengthy meetings produced no agreement. Our representatives objected to the inclusion in the Russian draft of a sentence that, in substance, would have had us admit that we were being readmitted to Berlin by sufferance only. Molotov rejected the Western draft because it asserted that we were in Berlin as a matter of established right. The Russian version said that transportation restrictions imposed after the date of the currency reform would be lifted, but since the currency reform did not come into effect until late in June, such an undertaking would not have included a great many of the prior restrictions. What was more important, if we signed this statement, we would have agreed to the Russian contention that the blockade was a "defense" against our currency measure. In addition, the Russian draft would have vested the control of both currencies in use in Berlin in one bank, completely controlled by them, and would have given a Russian-controlled agency supervision over all of Berlin's external trade.

These drafting sessions with Molotov proved so futile that we instructed Smith to ask for another personal conference with Premier Stalin. This meeting took place on August 23 and again Stalin appeared much more interested in reaching a basis for understanding than Molotov had been. On the matter of how far back the lifting of restrictions should extend, Molotov again insisted that the statement should promise only the lifting of those restrictions that had been imposed after June 18. Stalin however thought it would be better to have the statement read "the restrictions lately imposed" and to have it understood that if any restrictions had been imposed prior to June 18 they would also be lifted. Stalin also agreed that the Soviet bank that was to control the

into Berlin currencies would, in turn, be under four-power control.

But Molotov again proved difficult when the drafts were called upon to draw up a communiqué and a set of instructions for the four military governors in Berlin who, it had been agreed, would work out the details. In the end, in fact, it was impossible to issue even an interim communiqué to inform the public that technical questions had been referred to Berlin, because Molotov refused to agree to any text except in his terms.

The discussions among the four military governors never got out of the stage of frustration. Marshal Sokolovsky, the Soviet representative, at once took a position diametrically opposed to the explicit assurances which Stalin had given the ambassadors, declaring that he would not even consider the removal of any of the restrictions imposed before June 18. Indeed, he tried to put new restrictions on, this time on air traffic. He also stated categorically that control by the four powers of the bank issuing the currency certificates was out of the question. The work of technical discussions in Berlin proved even more futile than the month of negotiations in Moscow.

The airlift, meanwhile, steadily expanded. On August 20 Secretary of the Army Royall reported to the National Security Council that the combined British-American lift had averaged 3,300 tons daily and that the maximum for any one day's lift had now reached 4,575 tons. Of this tonnage, the British, using everything they had available by way of transport planes, had flown in about one third. The stockpiles in Berlin were slowly growing; there was now a 25-day reserve of coal and a 30-day reserve of food in that city. On September 9 Secretary of the Air Force Symington informed the National Security Council that since early August the daily average lift had been increased to 4,000 tons and that it was likely that 5,000 tons a day could be reached if additional cargo planes were allocated.

At the September 9 meeting of the NSC we discussed at length the implications of the apparent failure of the negotiations with the Russians. Marshall and Lovett reviewed the diplomatic events of the past month and concluded that apparently we would have no alternative but to put the case before the United Nations. Under Secretary Lovett called attention to the fact that the Soviets had announced that they would hold air maneuvers in a general area that included the

Soviet action as a pressure device to secure political objectives.

The Soviet government took the position that there would have been no blockade if the Western powers had acceded to the Russian position. Furthermore, so Mr. Vishinsky argued in the Security Council of the United Nations, there was no blockade in the sense of traditional international law and, therefore, there could be no real threat to peace. The Soviet Union, Vishinsky said, would not take part in any discussion of the blockade before the Security Council.

Our spokesman before the Security Council throughout the dispute was Professor Philip Jessup of Columbia University. Jessup was one of the leading authorities on international law and he gained the respect of the world for the statesmanlike manner in which he represented the case for the Western powers before the U.N.

The battle of diplomacy was overshadowed, however, by the drama of the aerial convoys that day after day winged their way into Berlin. By mid-October General Clay could state as a proven conclusion that the airlift was no longer an experiment. Even adverse weather could not keep our supply planes from making their runs from the western zones into the blockaded former capital of Germany.

General Clay made this report at another meeting of the National Security Council on October 22, 1948, when he placed before us an account not only of the technical achievement of the airlift but also of the effect our action in Berlin had had on the German people. They had closed ranks and applied themselves to the tasks of reconstruction with new vigor. It had turned them sharply against Communism. Germany, which had been waiting passively to see where it should cast its lot for the future, was veering toward the side of the Western nations.

The Soviet leaders made further attempts toward the end of the year to induce the Berliners to weaken in their determination to stick with the West. On November 30 Soviet intrigues led to the splitting up of the Berlin city council, and the city was thus, *for all* practical purposes, split in two. The Russians also introduced a new identification system that made contacts between the eastern and western portions of the city almost impossible, and they changed the system of distribution for electric power, virtually disrupting the transport setup.

Meanwhile, the Security Council of the United Nations had a technical committee working on recommendations for

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as this omission of any significance? Mr. Malik said he did t know but that he would ask. Exactly one month later he d an answer: The omission was not accidental. This is an ample of how difficult it was to do business with the ussians on a straightforward basis.

The Russians were still insistent that we call off our actions create a West German government. But they were no nger insistent that this had to be done first before they ould call off the blockade. They were now willing to agree at all restrictions on traffic in and out of Berlin imposed by ther side after March 1, 1948 would be lifted, and that en the Council of Foreign Ministers should be convened to scuss "matters arising out of the situation in Berlin, and atters affecting Germany as a whole." Thus the Russians ere ready to retreat. On May 4 a communiqué announced at the four governments concerned—the United States, reat Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R.—had agreed. The ockade of Berlin would end on May 12.

More than fourteen months had passed since the first re- rictions had been imposed by the Russians. A little over a ar had elapsed during which Berlin had been supplied by eans of the airlift.

This achievement by the Air Force deserves much praise. echnically it was an extremely difficult job—so difficult at even the Air Force chiefs themselves at first had serious oubts that it could be done. It proved a beacon light of hope r the peoples of Europe.

When we refused to be forced out of the city of Berlin, we emonstrated to the people of Europe that with their co-op- ration we would act, and act resolutely, when their freedom as threatened. Politically it brought the peoples of western urope more closely to us.

The Berlin blockade was a move to test our capacity and ill to resist. This action and the previous attempts to take ver Greece and Turkey were part of a Russian plan to robe for soft spots in the Western Allies' positions all around heir own perimeter.

# CHAPTER 10

The fate of the Jewish victims of Hitlerism was a matter of deep personal concern to me. I have always been disturbed by the tragedy of people who have been made victims of intolerance and fanaticism because of their race, color or religion. These things should not be possible in a civilized society. Russia and Poland in recent history had been terrible persecutors of the Jews, and east of the Rhine ghettos were the rule, some of them going back to the Middle Ages. But the organized brutality of the Nazis against the Jews in Germany was one of the most shocking crimes of all times. The plight of the victims who had survived the mad genocide of Hitler's Germany was a challenge to Western civilization, and as President I undertook to do something about it. One of the solutions being proposed was a national Jewish home.

The question of Palestine as a Jewish homeland goes back to the solemn promise that had been made to them by the British in the Balfour Declaration of 1917—a promise which had stirred the hopes and the dreams of these oppressed people. This promise, I felt, should be kept, just as all promises made by responsible, civilized governments should be kept.

My first official contact with the problem took place within a few days of the time I became President, when Secretary Stettinius had sent me a letter offering to "brief" me on Palestine before I might be approached by any interested parties. It was likely, he said, that efforts would soon be made by some of the Zionist leaders to obtain from me some commitments in favor of the Zionist program, which was aimed at unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment there of a Jewish state.

Stettinius said, "There is continual tenseness in the situation in the Near East largely as a result of the Palestine question, and as we have interests in that area which are vital to the United States, we feel that this whole subject is one that

should be handled with the greatest care and with a view to the long-range interests of this country.

Two weeks later Joseph C. Grew, who in Stettinius' absence was the Acting Secretary of State, sent me a further memorandum on the subject, informing me that "although President Roosevelt at times gave expression to views sympathetic to certain Zionist aims, he also gave certain assurances to the Arabs which they regard as definite commitments on our part. On a number of occasions within the past few years, he authorized the Department to assure the heads of the different Near Eastern Governments in his behalf that 'in the view of this Government there should be no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.' In his meeting with King Ibn Saud early in 1945, Mr. Roosevelt promised the king that as regards Palestine he would make no move hostile to the Arab people and would not assist the Jews as against the Arabs.

"I am attaching a copy of a memorandum summarizing the conversation between Ibn Saud and Mr. Roosevelt, of which the original is presumably with Mr. Roosevelt's papers. After the meeting, this memorandum was approved by both the President and the King, so that it may be regarded as completely authentic. On April 5, only a week before his death, the President signed a letter to Ibn Saud in which he repeated the assurances which he had made to the King during the meeting. A copy of this letter is also attached.

"The Arabs, not only in Palestine but throughout the whole Near East, have made no secret of their hostility to Zionism and their Governments say that it would be impossible to restrain them from rallying with arms, in defense of what they consider to be an Arab country. We know that President Roosevelt understood this clearly, for as recently as March 3, after his trip to the Near East, he told an officer of the Department that, in his opinion, a Jewish state in Palestine (the ultimate Zionist aim) could be established and maintained only by military force.

"I should be glad to furnish you with any additional background material."

I was fully aware of the Arabs' hostility to Jewish settlement in Palestine, but, like many Americans, I was troubled by the plight of the Jewish people in Europe. The Balfour Declaration, promising the Jews the opportunity to re-establish a homeland in Palestine, had always seemed to me to go hand in hand with the noble policies of Woodrow Wilson, especially the principle of self-determination. When I was in

the Senate I had told my colleagues Senator Wagner of New York and Senator Taft of Ohio, that I would go along on a resolution putting the Senate on record in favor of the speedy achievement of the Jewish homeland.

But the State Department s concern was mainly with the question of how the Arabs would react and that this was the wrong time to raise the Palestine question. In another memorandum on June 16 1945 the Acting Secretary of State said the State Department s view was that Palestine was one of the problems which should come up for settlement after the war through the United Nations Organization, and that in any event no decision regarding it should be taken without full consultation with both the Arabs and Jews. The memorandum closed with this well-intended advice on the subject of the likely call on me by Zionist leaders It does not seem therefore, that you need go any further unless you care to do so, than to thank the Zionist leaders for any materials which they may give you and to assure them their views will be given your careful consideration "

The Arab states presented their reasons for opposing a Jewish state and increased immigration to Palestine in letters to the State Department. The Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha, wrote me directly

" It is greatly to be regretted that persecutions of the Jews in certain European countries during the past half century and more, and especially their greatly intensified sufferings since the rise of Nazism, should have been seized upon by certain political elements to advance the politico-racial theories of Zionism and to appeal to the world at large for the support of their program. Unfortunately the brunt of their effort has concentrated on Palestine where the Arabs, who, throughout their history have shown great tolerance and even hospitality toward the Jews are the innocent victims of propagandas, pressures and deprivations which they are quite unable to bear Why from a perfectly objective point of view one small nation of 1 000 000 people living in a very small territory should be forced to accept in 25 years immigrants of an alien race up to nearly 50 per cent of their own number is hard to understand The difficulties of absorbing such large numbers of aliens have been so great that the Arabs are firmly resolved to oppose any further increase in immigration. This principle has already been approved by a British White Paper But this has not been the most serious aspect. Now the guests at the Arab s table are declaring that in any case they are going to bring in large numbers of their

masters, take over all of its lands, and rule to suit themselves. It is this program of setting up a Jewish State in which the Arabs will be either reduced to the inferior status of a minority or else have to leave their homes that arouses their firm determination to resist at all costs."

This was my reply to the Egyptian Prime Minister:

"I wish to assure you that the views set forth in the memorandum have received my careful attention. I am fully aware of the deep interest of the Arab countries in reaching an equitable solution of the Palestine question, and I wish to renew the assurances which your Government has previously received to the effect that in the view of the Government of the United States no decision should be taken regarding the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews."

Similar replies were given to the heads of government of other Arab states who wrote in the same vein. It was my position that the principle of self-determination required that Arabs as well as Jews be consulted. To assure the Arabs that they would be consulted was by no means inconsistent with my generally sympathetic attitude toward Jewish aspirations.

It was my belief that world peace would, in the long run, be best served by a solution that would accord justice to the needs and the wants of the Jewish people who had so long been persecuted. The acts of extremists in Palestine, whether Jewish or Arab, I condemned and deplored, but I also felt that it was important that some encouragement be given to the Jews who wanted to further their cause by accepted democratic methods.

I had already decided that Palestine would be one of the subjects I would want to bring up in discussion with Churchill at the Potsdam meeting, and on July 24 I sent the following memorandum to him inviting him to discuss the subject with me:

"There is a great interest in America in the Palestine problem. The drastic restrictions imposed on Jewish immigration by the British White Paper of May 1939 continue to provoke passionate protest from Americans most interested in Palestine and in the Jewish problem. They fervently urge the lifting of these restrictions which deny to Jews who have been so cruelly uprooted by ruthless Nazi persecutions, entrance into the land which represents for so many of them their only hope of survival.

"Knowing your deep and sympathetic interest in Jewish settlement in Palestine, I venture to express to you the hope

that the British government may find it possible without delay to lift the restrictions of the White Paper on Jewish immigration into Palestine.

"While I realize the difficulties of reaching a definite and satisfactory settlement of the Palestine problem, and that we cannot expect to discuss these difficulties at any length at our present meeting, I have some doubt whether these difficulties will be lessened by prolonged delay. I hope, therefore, that you can arrange at your early convenience to let me have your ideas on the settlement of the Palestine problem, so that we can at a later but not too distant date discuss the problem in concrete terms."

Before Churchill could reply to this note, however he was succeeded by Clement Attlee as Prime Minister. From Attlee there came, on July 31, a brief note acknowledging my memorandum to Churchill and promising that it would receive attention.

When I returned from Potsdam and held my first press conference, a reporter asked me what position the Government of the United States had taken at Berlin with regard to Palestine. Of course there had been no official discussion of Palestine at the conference, but there were private talks. I stated my position to the press in these words:

"The American view on Palestine is that we want to let as many of the Jews into Palestine as it is possible to let into that country. Then the matter will have to be worked out diplomatically with the British and the Arabs, so that if a state can be set up there they may be able to set it up on a peaceful basis. I have no desire to send 500,000 American soldiers there to make peace in Palestine."

The State Department continued to feel that we should stay out of any activity that might offend the Arabs, and the department's Division of Near Eastern Affairs prepared a memorandum on the subject in September 1945.

The memorandum dealt only with the question of further immigration into Palestine. In 1939 the British had issued a White Paper that sought to strike a medium between the Zionists' desire to have the country opened for Jewish immigrants and the Arab resistance to any addition to the Jewish element of Palestine. The White Paper had promised a stated number of immigration "certificates" to the Jews but had also promised that no more than that number would be issued.

With the end of the fighting in Europe, the demand for certificates increased sharply, and it immediately became clear that the early fall of 1945 would see the limit reached.

Unless the Arabs agreed, there would be no further Jewish immigration. Since it was hardly conceivable, the memorandum said, that formal Arab acquiescence could be secured, the British would be faced with a difficult decision whether to abide by the White Paper policy and thus, in effect, terminate Jewish immigration into Palestine, or to establish a new interim policy whereby Jewish immigration would continue, at least for the time being, until the Palestine mandate was revised and brought under the United Nations. The memorandum added that Zionists were demanding that one million Jews be admitted into Palestine as rapidly as possible.

The memorandum went on to say:

"No government should advocate a policy of mass immigration unless it is prepared to assist in making available the necessary security forces, shipping, housing, unemployment guarantees. . . . In view of the foregoing, the United States should refrain from supporting a policy of large-scale immigration into Palestine during the interim period. The United States could support a Palestine immigration policy during the interim period which would carry restrictions as to numbers and categories, taking into account humanitarian considerations, the economic welfare of Palestine and political conditions therein. The British Government, as the mandatory power, should assume primary responsibility for the policy and be responsible for carrying it out."

As I studied these conclusions, however, it did not seem to me that such an approach would solve the basic human problem. The fate of the thousands of Jews in Europe—really only a fraction of the millions whom Hitler had doomed to death—was a primary concern. Among the millions who had been displaced by the war, they had suffered more and longer than any other group, yet their condition had barely improved since the fighting had ended.

In June 1945 I had sent Earl G. Harrison, the dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, on a mission to Europe to investigate the conditions of those displaced persons called "non-repatriables," and his report was submitted in late August. It showed that these people—and a great many of them were Jews—were still housed in camps, still without hope for their future. And it also pointed out that very few among the Jews wished to return to the countries from which they had come originally.

"If there is any genuine sympathy for what these survivors have endured," he wrote, "some reasonable extension or modification of the British White Paper of 1939 ought to be

possible without too serious repercussions. For some of the European Jews, there is no acceptable or even decent solution for their future other than Palestine. This is said on a purely humanitarian basis with no reference to ideological or political considerations so far as Palestine is concerned.

"It is my understanding, based upon reliable information, that certificates for immigration to Palestine will be practically exhausted by the end of the current month [August, 1945]. What is the future to be? To anyone who has visited the concentration camps and who has talked with the despairing survivors, it is nothing short of calamitous to contemplate that the gates of Palestine should be soon closed.

"The Jewish Agency of Palestine has submitted to the British Government a petition that one hundred thousand additional immigration certificates be made available. A memorandum accompanying the petition makes a persuasive showing with respect to the immediate absorptive capacity of Palestine and the current, actual man-power shortages there.

"While there may be room for difference of opinion as to the precise number of such certificates which might under the circumstances be considered reasonable, there is no question but that the request thus made would, if granted, contribute much to the sound solution for the future of Jews still in Germany and Austria and even other displaced Jews, who do not wish either to remain there or to return to their countries of nationality

"No other single matter is, therefore, so important from the viewpoint of Jews in Germany and Austria and those elsewhere who have known the horrors of concentration camps as is the disposition of the Palestine question."

The Harrison report was a moving document. The misery it depicted could not be allowed to continue, and I sent a message to General Eisenhower asking him to do what he could about improving conditions in the camps. I also wrote on August 31 1945 the following long letter to Attlee about the Palestine problem

"Because of the natural interest of this Government in the present condition and future fate of those displaced persons in Germany who may prove to be stateless or non-repatriable, we recently sent Mr Earl G Harrison to inquire into the situation.

"Mr Harrison was formerly the United States Commissioner of Immigration and is now the Representative of this Government on the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees. The United Kingdom and the United States, as you

know have taken an active interest in the work of the Committee.

"Instructions were given to Mr. Harrison to inquire particularly into the problems and needs of the Jewish refugees among the displaced persons.

"Mr. Harrison visited not only the American zone in Germany but spent some time also in the British zone where he was extended every courtesy by the 21st Army Group.

"I have now received his report. In view of our conversations at Potsdam I am sure that you will find certain portions of the report interesting. I am, therefore, sending you a copy.

"I should like to call your attention to the conclusions and recommendations appearing on page 8 and the following pages—especially the references to Palestine. It appears that the available certificates for immigration to Palestine will be exhausted in the near future. It is suggested that the granting of an additional one hundred thousand of such certificates would contribute greatly to a sound solution for the future of Jews still in Germany and Austria, and for other Jewish refugees who do not wish to remain where they are or who for understandable reasons do not desire to return to their countries of origin.

"On the basis of this and other information which has come to me I concur in the belief that no other single matter is so important for those who have known the horrors of concentration camps for over a decade as is the future of immigration possibilities into Palestine. The number of such persons who wish immigration to Palestine or who would qualify for admission there is, unfortunately, no longer as large as it was before the Nazis began their extermination program. As I said to you in Potsdam, the American people, as a whole, firmly believe that immigration into Palestine should not be closed and that a reasonable number of Europe's persecuted Jews should, in accordance with their wishes, be permitted to resettle there.

"I know you are in agreement on the proposition that future peace in Europe depends in large measure upon our finding sound solutions of problems confronting the displaced and formerly persecuted groups of people. No claim is more meritorious than that of the groups who for so many years have known persecution and enslavement.

"The main solution appears to lie in the quick evacuation of as many as possible of the non-repatriable Jews, who wish it, to Palestine. If it is to be effective, such action should not be long delayed."

The British plan was that the committee should in the first place visit British- and American-occupied Europe in order to inform themselves of the character and magnitude of the problem created by the war Having done so, it was to turn its attention to countries that might be in a position to accept them. In the light of the committee's investigations it would then make recommendations to the two governments for dealing with the problem in the interim until such time as a permanent solution could be submitted to the United Nations.

The question of Jewish immigration into Palestine would be only one of a number of things to be considered by the committee. The British note went on to say that the terms of the mandate required them to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage settlement by Jews on the land, while insuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population were not prejudiced thereby This dual obligation, to the Jews on the one side and to the Arabs on the other, the note said, had been the main cause of the trouble which had been experienced in Palestine during the past twenty-six years. Every effort, it added, had been made by the British to devise some arrangement that would enable Arabs and Jews to live together in peace and co-operate for the welfare of the country but all such efforts had been unavailing. Any arrangement acceptable to one party had been rejected as unacceptable to the other

"The fact has to be faced," the British note read, "that there is no common ground between the Arabs and the Jews. They differ in religion and in language their cultural and social life, their ways of thought and conduct, are as difficult to reconcile as are their national aspirations. These last are the greatest bar to peace. Both communities lay claim to Palestine' the one on the ground of a millennium of occupation the other on the ground of historic association and of an undertaking given to it during the first World War The antithesis is thus complete. "

The British suggested that the committee would, in the course of its investigation, make an examination on the spot of the political, economic, and agricultural conditions which were at that time held to restrict immigration into Palestine. The British expected to deal with the Palestine issue in three stages. First they would consult the Arabs with a view to an arrangement that might insure that for the time being there would be no interruption of Jewish immigration at the then current monthly rate. Then they would explore, with the parties primarily concerned, the possibility of devising other

temporary arrangements for dealing with the Palestine problem until a permanent solution of it could be reached. And, third, they would prepare a permanent solution for submission to the United Nations. For the immediate future, however, the British government had decided that the only practicable course was to maintain the present arrangement for immigration. They feared, they said, that "any violent departures decided upon in the face of Arab opposition would not only afford ground for a charge of breach of faith against His Majesty's government but would probably cause serious disturbances throughout the Middle East, involving a large military commitment, and would arouse widespread anxiety in India."

I instructed Secretary Byrnes to prepare a reply which would indicate that we were willing to take part in the proposed committee inquiry but that we wanted to concentrate on speedy results. Furthermore, I suggested that Palestine should be the focus of the inquiry and not just one of many points. I wanted it made plain that I was not going to retreat from the position which I had taken in my letter to Attlee on August 31. I did not want the United States to become a party to any dilatory tactics.

The British were none too happy with our reaction. Bevin wrote to Byrnes, insisting that the inquiry should extend to places other than Palestine as potential settlement areas for European Jews. We held to our point of view, however, lest the inquiry result in drawing things out interminably, and when the proposed meeting was held, this point of view prevailed.

## CHAPTER 11

The fact that there had been an exchange of messages between Washington and London in contemplation of an Anglo-American investigation into the problem of homeless Jews in Europe soon became public. On October 30 I received this wire from Zionist spokesmen, which said, in part:

> From press reports we now learn that a proposal is under consideration by the governments of Great Britain and of the United States to establish a joint commission which is to study once more, the situation of Jews in Europe and their emigration needs, and which, in the teeth of the Harrison report, is again to determine how many of them want to go to Palestine and how many can be placed elsewhere.
>
> What is called for is a policy not a further inquiry Based upon bitter experience over many years, we venture to affirm that the setting up of the proposed commission will bring the solution not one step nearer It will on the contrary further complicate the situation, make for interminable delays and lead to confusion worse confounded.
>
> Within the last seven years, three major intergovernmental conferences and committees in addition to our own War Refugee Board appointed in 1944 and already dissolved, have sought to deal with the question of Jewish refugees and of Jewish immigration. They comprised the International Conference on Refugees, called by President Roosevelt at Evian in 1937 the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, established as a result of that conference, and the Bermuda Conference on Refugees, called in 1943 Each of these efforts ended in dismal failure, stemming from the central assumption that doors of Palestine unlawfully barred to Jewish immigration by the British government under the terms of its White Paper of 1939 must remain barred. They concentrate their attention on the possibility of immigration to other countries but none of these countries were

in fact willing to admit Jewish refugees in substantial numbers. On the other hand, had the doors of Palestine been kept open, hundreds of thousands of Jews, now dead, might have been alive today.

We beg of you not to countenance further commissions and inquiries at a continued cost in human life and human misery which can only ascertain facts already well known.

What is urgently needed, is not another roving expedition or a further time-consuming investigation but immediate concrete measures in conformity with a policy long established and clearly defined by valid international agreements. We therefore respectfully submit that what is called for immediately is:

1. The immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine, as requested by you, Mr. President. This is an urgent necessity which can and should be met without affecting the [illegible] situation.

2. The abandonment or revocation forthwith by the British government of the White Paper of 1939. Its promulgation was a unilateral act of the British government in violation of the mandate, in defiance of the express opinion of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, and without the approval of the United States. Its abrogation is a responsibility which rests upon the British government alone.

3. A joint pronouncement by the British and American governments indicating their intention to support and pursue a Palestine policy consonant with the original purpose and underlying intent of the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine mandate.

4. Following such joint pronouncement, it would be most useful to constitute a joint commission to explore ways and means by which both countries may cooperate in the implementation of the announced policy in the light of their respective interests and responsibilities. We hope, too, that the United States may find it possible to cooperate in such economic projects as would be of benefit not only to the people of Palestine and to the possibilities of Jewish settlement there, but to the peoples of the entire Middle East, whose countries are poverty-ridden and underdeveloped.

In conclusion, we would like to stress as forcibly as we can the dangers of further postponement and evasion of the central, inescapable issue. That issue is the fulfillment of the international pledges given to the Jewish people, based on their historical connection with Palestine, to facilitate their settlement in that country and the

re-establishment there of their national home. It is evident that commissions are no substitute for action clearly indicated.

We appeal to our government again to employ all its moral and political influence that justice and humanity may triumph.

We send you, Mr President, expression of our highest esteem.

Stephen S. Wise, Abba Hillel Silver,
Co-Chairmen,
American Zionist Emergency Council

One of our main problems was that Palestine was not ours to dispose of. It had been legally entrusted to the British by action of the League of Nations—to which we did not belong—and the British were, in fact, in possession of Palestine.

In my own mind the aims and goals of the Zionists at this stage to set up a Jewish state were secondary to the more immediate problem of finding means to relieve the human misery of the displaced persons.

Since the diplomats were having so much trouble in agreeing on the scope and purpose of the proposed committee of inquiry the matter was not taken up again until Attlee came to Washington in mid-November Out of these talks with Attlee there came an understanding with regard to Palestine. The British, finding that I was unwilling to change my earlier position, accepted the scope of inquiry which the State Department had worked out for the Anglo-American Committee. I announced the agreement on November 13 and at the same time, released the text of my letter to Attlee of August 31 when I had asked him to provide for the entry into Palestine of one hundred thousand Jews.

On December 10 I announced the names of the American members of this joint committee, a group made up of Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, a highly respected federal judge from Texas, who was designated the American chairman Dr Frank Aydelotte, former president of Swarthmore College and then the director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton Frank W Buxton, editor of the Boston *Herald*; William Phillips, a veteran of our diplomatic service James G McDonald, who had been the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and O Max Gardner former governor of North Carolina. Mr Gardner was unable to accept the appointment, and I appointed in his place Bartley C. Crum, a California attorney The committee began its work with public hearings in Washington on J 4 1946.

and then traveled to Europe and the Near East to study the situation on the spot. Its report was presented to me on April 22, 1946, by the American chairman, Judge Hutcheson. The committee recommended unanimously that one hundred thousand certificates be issued for immigration into Palestine and that actual immigration be pushed forward as rapidly as possible.

As for Palestine, the committee urged that it be made into a land in which neither Jew nor Arab would dominate. They suggested the adoption of these three principles

"I. That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine.

"II. That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state.

"III. That the form of government ultimately to be established shall, under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths.

The committee concluded, however that the relations of Jews and Arabs were at the present so strained that any attempt to establish independence or nationhood would only result in civil strife. For that reason they recommended that the mandate be continued, that eventually there should be a trusteeship agreement with the United Nations, and that the terms of the trusteeship agreement should aim at bringing Arabs and Jews closer together

The recommendations of the committee included the proposal that full Jewish immigration be made possible and the land laws protecting the Arabs without giving equality of protection to the Jews be repealed or changed.

The committee's report was careful and complete. Judge Hutcheson and his colleagues had done a notably conscientious job, and I felt that the committee was pointing in the right direction. On April 30 I issued a statement in which I expressed my agreement with the substance of their proposal. However it remained now to persuade the British to take action on the report. I studied it further and having consulted with Dean Acheson and other advisers (Byrnes was in Paris) I sent this message to Attlee

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER ATTLEE: May 8, 1946

I have been considering the next steps which should be taken with regard to Palestine and believe that the first thing to be done is to initiate the consultations with

short and that a month would be better. He added that some provision should be made to study the ultimate findings with reference to the financial and military liabilities which would be involved.

Meanwhile, we had heard from the Arab countries. In a body the diplomatic representatives of the Arab states in Washington called on Acting Secretary of State Acheson to voice their protest against the committee's recommendations.

I could appreciate Attlee's problems, even though I was unwilling to admit the necessity for further delay. I decided, therefore, that I would accede to his wish to delay the communications to the Arabs and Jews until May 20, but then I wanted to see the entire problem pushed forward with dispatch. On May 16 I held a long conference with Dean Acheson about the Palestine matter, following which I sent this message to Attlee:

"I have given careful consideration to your two messages concerning Palestine and am pleased to note that you and your colleagues share our feeling regarding close collaboration between our two governments. We are proceeding with arrangements for consultations with Arabs and Jews so that the communication to them may be made on May 20. I hope that this will be agreeable to you and that your government will take concurrent action. I am still most anxious to have these consultations completed as early as possible but in view of your feeling that two weeks would be too short I am agreeable to extending the period to one month. We are drawing up a covering memorandum to be handed to Arab and Jewish representatives at the time their views on the Committee's report are requested and we will furnish your government with an advance copy of this memorandum. We assume the British government will let us have an advance copy of any covering memorandum it may decide to use.

As regards question of studies to be made by experts of the two governments with respect to certain matters arising out of the report, we are proceeding to organize an appropriate group from among officials of this government. However, as the British embassy has already been informed by the Department of State, we do not believe it would be advisable to have these discussions between experts of the two governments precede the requests for the views of Arabs and Jews. It is our belief that the latter (i.e. the consultations) might serve to clarify issues involved and narrow the field in which expert discussions would take place. At the same time, however, we believe at least preliminary expert discussions can be

Jews and Arabs to which both our governments are committed. I believe the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry offers a basis for such consultations and I contemplate the adoption of the following procedure, on which I should welcome your comments

The report will be brought by this government in the immediate future to the attention of the Jewish and Arab organizations specified below as well as the government of Arab states with which this government maintains relations with the request that they transmit their views on it within a certain period, say two weeks. On receipt of their views this government will consult the British government and then proceed to determine its attitude toward the report as a whole and to issue a public statement as to the extent to which it is prepared to accept the report as the basis for its Palestine policy

I imagine that the British government will wish to take concurrent action and should be glad to know if this assumption is correct. In view of the urgency surrounding the question of admission to Palestine of the 100 000 Jews whose entry is recommended by the Committee, I sincerely hope that it will be possible to initiate and complete the consultations with Arabs and Jews at the earliest possible moment.

The organizations and groups in question would be American Zionist Emergency Council, American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Conference, American Council for Judaism American Jewish Congress, Institute for Arab American Affairs, Agudas Israel of America, New Zionist Organization of America, Jewish Agency League of Arab States, Arab Higher Committee, Governments of Iraq Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Attlee replied at once, asking for time to discuss the matter with his Foreign Secretary Bevin, who like Byrnes, was in Paris and two days later there followed a more extensive message from the Prime Minister The British wanted as many of the foreseeable difficulties as possible ironed out before any policy was announced. In his second message on May 10 1946 Attlee said that the British were agreeable that consultations with the Jews and Arabs be initiated as quickly as possible. He pointed out, however that Britain was at that moment engaged in important and delicate negotiations with Egypt and suggested a postponement until May 20 or later Attlee said also that a period of two weeks for the Jews and the Arabs to prepare for the conference was too

also said that large-scale immigration into Palestine would not be resumed until the illegal Jewish armed units were eliminated.

The British press, in the weeks to follow, set a tone that was decidedly unfriendly. Many of the newspapers said or implied what Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, later said in a speech on June 1 —that our interest in helping the Jews enter Palestine was due to our desire not to have them in the United States.

I realized that it would be difficult to get action from the British, but while there was much clamor in the United States that something be done, the country was neither disposed nor prepared to assume risks and obligations that might require us to use military force. Nevertheless, I wanted to have a full appraisal of the military factors involved and asked Dean Acheson to get an opinion from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that no U.S. armed forces be involved in carrying out the committee's findings. They recommended that in implementing the report the guiding principle should be that no action should be taken that would cause repercussions in Palestine which would be beyond the capabilities of British troops to control. The Chiefs of Staff also noted that if the question of using any U.S. forces should arise, only very limited forces could be spared from tasks in which we were already engaged. Such forces might be of a size to help pacify the situation in *Palestine*, but they believed that the political shock attending the reappearance of U.S. armed forces in the Middle East would unnecessarily risk serious disturbances throughout the area far out of proportion to any local Palestine difficulties.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were also of the opinion that carrying out the findings of the report by force would prejudice British and U.S. interests in much of the Middle East. And if this were to happen, they suggested that the U.S.S.R. might replace the United States and Britain in influence and power throughout the Middle East. To this they added that control of oil in the Middle East was a very serious consideration, and they concluded, therefore, that no action should be taken that would commit U.S. armed forces or turn the peoples of the Middle East *away from* the Western powers, since we had a vital security interest there.

This report put our military leaders on record. They were primarily concerned about Middle East oil and in long-range terms about the danger that the Arabs, antagonized by Western action in Palestine, would make common cause with

initiated as soon as the views have been requested. In this connection it would be of the greatest usefulness if we might have as soon as possible some indication of the subjects which your government thinks should form the basis of these discussions, as well as any further detailed suggestions.

"We have noted your proposal for an eventual conference which would include Jewish and Arab representatives. We believe that this is something which our two governments should have in mind during the consultations with interested parties and that it is at least possible such a conference might be convened at a suitable time if results of consultations with Arabs and Jews indicate that a conference would be helpful. For the moment I do not feel able to give you a more definite reply on this point."

To the heads of the Arab states who had backed up their ministers by personal telegrams to me, there went individual messages similar to this one to the Regent of Iraq:

May 17, 1946

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS
PRINCE ABDUL ILAH
REGENT OF THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of May 9, 1946, and have taken careful note of your government's views with respect to the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry as set forth therein.

You will recall that on a number of occasions the government of the United States has informed the Arab governments that in its view no change should be made in the basic situation in Palestine without prior consultation with both Arab and Jewish leaders.

You may rest assured therefore that no decision regarding the Committee's report will be made without prior consultation with the government of Iraq.

I desire also at this time to send Your Highness my personal greetings and best wishes for the welfare of your people.

Harry S. Truman

The official reaction in England to the report of the Anglo-American Committee was not encouraging. As soon as it was published, Clement Attlee told the House of Commons that, before taking any action on the report, his government would ask the United States to share the additional military and financial responsibilities that he thought would arise. He

that were being committed in Palestine. There were armed groups of extremists who were guilty of numerous outrages. On June 16 eight bridges were blown up near the Trans-Jordan border and two other explosions were set off in Haifa. The following day there was a pitched battle between Jews and British troops in Haifa, after explosions had started a fire and caused great damage in the rail yards there. British officers were kidnaped. Others were shot at from passing automobiles. Explosions took place in ever-increasing numbers, and the British uncovered a plot by one extremist group to kidnap the British commander in chief in Palestine.

The British government then decided to take drastic action, and Attlee advised me of the plans in advance in a personal message on June 28. He said that the High Commissioner had been authorized to take such steps as he thought necessary to break up illegal organizations, including the arrest of any individual against whom there was clear evidence of responsibility for the current campaign of violence. He regretted, he wrote, that such action should have become necessary while we were engaged in discussing the report of the Anglo-American Committee, but his government had been forced to conclude that they "could no longer, without abdication of our responsibility as the *Mandatory Government*, tolerate such open defiance and that, while discussions regarding the future of Palestine are proceeding, law and order must be maintained."

I replied to Attlee on July 2, 1946:

"Replying to your message of June 28, I join with you in regretting that drastic action is considered necessary by the mandatory government while discussions of the report of the Anglo-American Committee are in progress. I also join with you in a hope that law and order will be maintained by the inhabitants of Palestine while efforts are being made toward a solution of the long term policy."

The British, because of the violence in Palestine, were anxious to get the discussions of the joint committee under way as soon as possible. I accommodated Attlee in this matter by sending Grady and his group over on July 10, a week earlier than had been planned, and by making the presidential plane available to get them there.

During the two weeks that followed, this Joint Cabinet committee sat and deliberated in London. Because both Attlee and I knew how sensitive the Jews and Arabs were on the issues involved, it had been agreed to observe strict secrecy until agreement could be announced. However leaks

Russia. The second argument in particular was one that I had not lost sight of at any time. The pressure against Turkey and the incidents in Iran all pointed only too clearly to the fact that the Russians would be ready to welcome the Arabs into their camp.

The British Prime Minister cabled me on May 27, sending me a catalog of subjects which he thought should be taken up when the experts of our two governments sat down together. Out of the ten recommendations of the committee, the British had built up no less than forty-three "subjects" which they felt needed discussion by the experts. My reaction was that this procedure would only serve to postpone any relief for the hundred thousand homeless Jews we still wanted to see admitted into Palestine. I replied, therefore, that that problem should be taken up without delay even before the experts might be ready to go into the other subjects listed by the British. I offered the assistance of the United States with transportation and temporary housing for these immigrants and I repeated that it was my primary concern to relieve suffering by the admission of these hundred thousand to the land they wanted to make their home.

The Prime Minister's reply to my proposal was negative. The British did not want to discuss the matter of the hundred thousand immigrants without talking about all aspects of the Palestine problem. In my answer I told Attlee that I could appreciate his point of view but that I saw no reason why it should not be possible to make all arrangements for the admission of the hundred thousand at once so that there would be no further delay once the experts had reached agreement on the more general questions. Attlee then cabled that on June 14 he had designated a British delegation to discuss with our delegation the findings of the committee.

Meanwhile, I had instructed the Secretaries of State, War, and the Treasury to form a Cabinet committee, with alternates, on Palestine to consult with the British. Henry F. Grady who had returned from Greece where he headed the American observers at the national elections, was named chairman of the alternates.

These alternates made a careful study of all points raised by the British in their list of subjects to be discussed. By late June, Attlee wrote that he was ready for the joint talks to get under way

My efforts to persuade the British to relax immigration restrictions in Palestine might have fallen on more receptive ears if it had not been for the increasing acts of terrorism

destroy a hundred thousand lives so that another hundred thousand could be saved.

My purpose was then and later to help bring about the redemption of the pledge of the Balfour Declaration and the rescue of at least some of the victims of Nazism. I was not committed to any particular formula of statehood in Palestine or to any particular time schedule for its accomplishment. The American policy was designed to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of the promised Jewish homeland and easy access to it for the displaced Jews of Europe.

Many Jews, however chose to believe that our Palestine policy was the same as the Zionist program for the State of Israel. Whenever it failed to conform, they would charge that we had turned pro-Arab. The Arabs, of course, looked at our attitude in an even more partisan and hostile light.

The simple fact is that our policy was an American policy rather than an Arab or Jewish policy. It was American because it aimed at the peaceful solution of a world trouble spot. It was American because it was based on the desire to see promises kept and human misery relieved.

But the issue was embroiled in politics, not only with us but abroad too. The Jews were for partition—but not all the Jews. The Arabs were against partition—but could not agree how completely they were against it. The British, at least, seemed of one mind. They were determined to wash their hands of the whole matter

It was a discouraging prospect indeed. As I wrote to one of my assistants, "I surely wish God Almighty would give the Children of Israel an Isaiah, the Christians a St. Paul, and the Sons of Ishmael a peep at the Golden Rule.

But the matter had been placed in the hands of the United Nations, and, true to my conviction that the United Nations had to be made to work, I had confidence that a solution would be found there.

This was my reply to all who appealed to me in those days. The General Assembly of the United Nations was debating the matter and its decision would reflect the will of the nations of the world. I spoke in this vein to Dr Chaim Weizmann, the venerable leader of the world Zionists, when he called on me on November 19 and a few days later I received a letter from him which reveals some of the problems of the day:

New York, November 27 1947

Dear Mr President:

## CHAPTER 12

I was of the opinion that the proposed partition of Palestine could open the way for peaceful collaboration between the Arabs and the Jews. Although it was difficult under the present circumstances to bring the Arabs and the Jews together I could foresee that under the proposed plan of the United Nations, calling for an economic union of the partitioned areas, the Jews and the Arabs might eventually work side by side as neighbors.

For many years I have been interested in the history of that great region. I knew that it had once been the seat of great world powers and had supported many millions of people. The empires of Nebuchadnezzar and Darius the Great, like the kingdom of Rameses II in the valley of the Nile, had made full use of the riches of the area. But after those great empires had gone their way there had been divisions and internal warfare and a general decline Except for a short period the Arabs had never brought the area back to the position of influence and power it had once had, although certain potentials were still there I felt that a development program could be worked out so that a great industrial system could be set up under the Jews, and the productive potential of this region could be used to the mutual benefit of the Jews and Arabs. The whole region waits to be developed and if it were handled the way we developed the Tennessee River basin, it could support from twenty to thirty million people more To open the door to this kind of future would indeed be a constructive and humanitarian thing to do, and it would also redeem the pledges that were given at the time of World War I

These were the thoughts I had about the future of the area and the partition proposal impressed me as the most practicable way to make progress in that direction. It was always my hope that a solution could be worked out without bloodshed. Certainly little could be said for a solution that would

voter in the General Assembly. I have never approved of the practice of the strong imposing their will on the weak, whether among men or among nations. We had aided Greece. We had, in fact, fathered the independence of the Philippines. But that did not make satellites of these nations or compel them to vote with us on the partitioning of Palestine or any other matter. No American policy worthy of the name will ever treat any other nation as a satellite. It is basic to the way of life of democratic peoples that they respect the opinion of others—whether they happen to be weak or strong, rich or poor. The kind of direct approach some of my correspondents had been making could never gain my approval.

The General Assembly passed the partition plan on November 29, 1947, although it did not actually put partition into effect. Instead, it merely gave its approval to the majority recommendations of the Special Committee (UNSCOP) and asked the Security Council to see that they were carried out. Consequently, a committee was set up to channel the change-over in peaceful ways. The General Assembly, however, did not prescribe a detailed procedure for the carrying out of the recommendations.

I point this out because the impression was spread by many of our newspapers that the General Assembly had approved a specific blue-print, whereas it had merely accepted a principle. The way in which this principle might be translated into action had yet to be found. It was my constant hope that it would be a peaceful way.

The hopes for an adjustment without bloodshed, however, were very slim. The British, who had said all along that they would "accept" the U.N. decision but would enforce it only if both Jews and Arabs agreed, now announced, on December 3, that they would consider their mandate at an end as of May 15, 1948. The Arabs, on the same day, served notice on the world that they would defend their "rights."

Every day now brought reports of new violence in the Holy Land. On January 15, 1948, the Jewish Agency advised the United Nations that an international police force would be required to put partition into effect. But no such police force existed, and to set up one would require more agreement than existed among the powers at the time. The United Nations Commission on Palestine agreed, however, that a police force would be needed, and Trygve Lie, the Secretary General of the United Nations, began laborious discussions to get one started.

> The gracious manner in which you received me on Wednesday November 19th, emboldens me to address you in this critical hour which is one of suspense and anguish for me. I am disturbed to hear from unimpeachable sources that two unwarranted rumours are afloat which do us injustice and possible damage.
>
> It is freely rumoured in Washington that our people have exerted undue and excessive pressure on certain delegations and have thus "over-played" their hand. I cannot speak for unauthorized persons, but I am in a position to assure you, my dear Mr President, that there is no substance in this charge as far as our representatives are concerned. They have had a very limited number of contacts with all delegations and have endeavoured to lay the situation squarely before them. At no time have they gone beyond the limits of legitimate and moderate persuasion. With some delegations such as those of Greece and Liberia, we have had no more than one conversation throughout the present Assembly.
>
> Fears are also expressed that our project in Palestine may in some way be used as a channel for the infiltration of Communist ideas in the Middle East. Nothing is further from the truth. Our immigrants from Eastern Europe are precisely those who are leaving the Communist scene with which they do not wish to be integrated. Otherwise, they would not leave at all. Had there been a serious attempt by the Soviets to introduce Communist influences through our immigration they could easily have done so in previous decades. Every election and all observation in Palestine testifies to the trivial hold which Communism has achieved in our community. An educated peasantry and a skilled industrial class living on high standards, will never accept Communism. The danger lies amongst illiterate and impoverished communities bearing no resemblance to our own.

Unfortunately Dr Weizmann was correct only to the extent that his immediate associates were concerned. The facts were that not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike anything that had been seen there before but that the White House too was subjected to a constant barrage. *I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders—actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats—disturbed and annoyed me. Some were even suggesting that we pressure sovereign nations into favorable*

hardship cases that he happened to know about, but he did this rarely. On March 13 he called at the White House.

I was always glad to see him. Not only had we shared so much in the past, but I have always had the warmest feelings toward him. It would be hard to find a truer friend. Eddie said that he wanted to talk about Palestine. I told him that I would rather he did not and that I wanted to let the matter run its course in the United Nations.

I do not believe that in all our thirty years of friendship a sharp word had ever passed between Eddie and me, and I was sorry that Eddie had brought up the subject.

Eddie was becoming self-conscious, but he kept on talking. He asked me to bear in mind that some of the pro-Zionists who had approached me were only individuals and did not speak for any responsible leadership.

I told him that I respected Dr. Weizmann, but if I saw him, it would only result in more wrong interpretations.

Eddie waved toward a small replica of an Andrew Jackson statue that was in my office.

"He's been your hero all your life, hasn't he?" he said. "You have probably read every book there is on Andrew Jackson. I remember when we had the store that you were always reading books and pamphlets, and a lot of them were about Jackson. You put this statue in front of the Jackson County Courthouse in Kansas City when you built it."

I did not know what he was leading up to, but he went on.

"I have never met the man who has been my hero all my life," he continued. "But I have studied his past as you have studied Jackson's. He is the greatest Jew alive, perhaps the greatest Jew who ever lived. You yourself have told me that he is a great statesman and a fine gentleman. I am talking about Dr. Chaim Weizmann. He is an old man and a very sick man. He has traveled thousands of miles to see you, and now you are putting off seeing him. That isn't like you."

When Eddie left I gave instructions to have Dr. Weizmann come to the White House as soon as it could be arranged. However, the visit was to be entirely off the record. Dr. Weizmann, by my specific instructions, was to be brought in through the East Gate. There was to be no press coverage of his visit and no public announcement.

Dr. Weizmann came on March 18, and we talked for almost three quarters of an hour. He talked about the possibilities of development in Palestine, about the scientific work that he and his assistants had done that would someday be

The Jews, realizing that there was little chance to get international enforcement, announced that they would establish a Jewish militia force. The British said they would not permit this as long as they were in control. The Arabs, meanwhile, were making plans for a national administration for all of Palestine, and the military forces of the Arab states that adjoin Palestine more and more openly began to enter that country. On February 13 it was reported to me from our diplomatic missions in the area that the Arabs were expected to start full-scale military operations in late March.

I published an appeal to the Arab leaders to preserve the peace and practice moderation. They rejected it flatly, charging that the United States had contributed to the unrest in the Near East by supporting the Zionist cause. That was on February 17, 1948. I gave my approval to a State Department proposal that the full conciliatory powers of the Security Council be invoked. A serious threat to the world's peace was developing in Palestine, with neither side willing to be swayed. We wanted a peaceful settlement and were trying hopefully to get it.

The Jewish pressure on the White House did not diminish in the days following the partition vote in the U.N. Individuals and groups asked me, usually in rather quarrelsome and emotional ways, to stop the Arabs, to keep the British from supporting the Arabs, to furnish American soldiers, to do this, that, and the other. I think I can say that I kept my faith in the rightness of my policy in spite of some of the Jews. When I say "the Jews," I mean, of course, the extreme Zionists. I know that most Americans of Jewish faith, while they hoped for the restoration of Jewish homeland, are and always have been Americans first and foremost.

As the pressure mounted, I found it necessary to give instructions that I did not want to be approached by any more spokesmen for the extreme Zionist cause. I was even so disturbed that I put off seeing Dr. Chaim Weizmann, who had returned to the United States and had asked for an interview with me. My old friend, Eddie Jacobson, called on me at the White House and urged me to receive Dr. Weizmann at the earliest possible moment. Eddie, who had been with me through the hard days of World War I, had never been a Zionist. In all my years in Washington he had never asked me for anything for himself. He was of the Jewish faith and was deeply moved by the sufferings of the Jewish people abroad. He had spoken to me on occasion, both before and after I became President, about some specific

about the danger that hostile Arabs might deny us access to he petroleum treasures of their countries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on several occasions, submitted memoranda to show that we could not afford to send more than a token force to the area.

The Department of State's specialists on the Near East were, almost without exception, unfriendly to the idea of a Jewish state. Their thinking went along this line: Great Britain has maintained her position in the area by cultivating the Arabs; now that she seems no longer able to hold this position, the United States must take over and it must be done by exactly the same formula. If the Arabs are antagonized, they will go over into the Soviet camp.

I was never convinced by these arguments of the diplomats. I want to say however that in these differences of opinion between the White House and the State Department on the business of Palestine there was never any question as to who made the decisions and whose policy would be followed. Where some of our diplomats, and especially the gentlemen on the Near Eastern desks, differed was on the speed with which we should progress, not on the direction of the movement.

I had agreed in February that efforts should be made to have the U.N. restore peaceful conditions in Palestine. Accordingly our delegation at Lake Success proposed on February 25 that conversations be held among the five permanent members of the Security Council to determine how serious a threat to world peace we faced in Palestine.

The British remained aloof from these discussions, but the other four delegations conferred and noted that the day of British withdrawal—May 15—would find Palestine without effective authority and the United Nations unprepared to step into the gap. In effect, it seemed difficult, if not impossible, to find any basis for reconciliation between the parties. The Jews fervently wanted partition, the Arabs opposed it hotly and the British were determined to free themselves of the entire entanglement.

Under these conditions, and faced with the evidence of mounting violence inside Palestine, the Security Council was to decide whether or not it would accept the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, as the basis for a Palestine solution. That is the reason that our State Department proposed, on March 19, 1948, that unless a peaceful transition to the partitioned status could be found the forme

translated into industrial activity in the Jewish state that he envisaged He spoke of the need for land if the future immigrants were to be cared for and he impressed on me the importance of the Negeb area in the south to any future Jewish state.

Dr Weizmann was a man of remarkable achievements and personality His life had been dedicated to two ideals, that of science and that of the Zionist movement. He was past seventy now and in ill-health. He had known many disappointments and had grown patient and wise in them.

I told him, as plainly as I could, why I had at first put off seeing him. He understood. I explained to him what the basis of my interest in the Jewish problem was and that my primary concern was to see justice done without bloodshed And when he left my office I felt that he had reached a full understanding of my policy and that I knew what it was he wanted.

That this was so was shown the following day That day our representative in the United Nations, Ambassador Austin, announced to the Security Council that the United States Government would favor a temporary trusteeship for Palestine pending a decision on Palestine's permanent status. Some Zionist spokesmen branded this as a reversal of American policy Dr Weizmann however was one of the few prominent Zionists who did not choose this opportunity to castigate American policy He knew I am sure, what the direction of American policy really was The following morning Judge Rosenman called to see me on another matter As he was leaving, I asked him to see Dr Weizmann and tell him that there was not and would not be any change in the long policy he and I had talked about

I was always aware of the fact that not all my advisers looked at the Palestine problem in the same manner I did. This was nothing unusual, of course. It is the job of the military planners to consider all matters first and always in the light of military considerations. The diplomat's approach is—or in any case should be—determined by considerations of our relations to other nations. The Secretary of the Treasury thinks in terms of budget and taxes. Except for the members of his personal staff each presidential adviser has and should have a departmental outlook.

In the Palestine situation the military kept talking about two things our inability to send troops to Palestine if trouble should break out there and, secondly the oil resources of the Middle East. Secretary Forrestal spoke to me repeatedly

United Nations. In the Senate he had been one of the most effective of its leaders. He was not one to talk much for the headlines, but behind the scenes he knew how to make his influence felt and to bring factions to agree. I have always considered myself very fortunate that I could find a man of his high qualifications for appointment to the ticklish U.N. job.

On May 14 I was informed that the Provisional Government of Israel was planning to proclaim a Jewish state at midnight that day, Palestine time, which was when the British mandate came to an end. I had often talked with my advisers about the course of action we would take once partition had come about, and it was always understood that eventually we would recognize any responsible government the Jews might set up. Partition was not taking place in exactly the peaceful manner I had hoped, to be sure, but the fact was that the Jews were controlling the area in which their people lived and that they were ready to administer and to defend it. On the other hand, I was well aware that some of the State Department "experts" would want to block recognition of a Jewish state.

Now that the Jews were ready to proclaim the State of Israel, however, I decided to move at once and give American recognition to the new nation. I instructed a member of my staff to communicate my decision to the State Department and prepare it for transmission to Ambassador Austin at the United Nations in New York. About thirty minutes later, exactly eleven minutes after Israel had been proclaimed a state, Charlie Ross, my press secretary, handed the press the announcement of the *de facto* recognition by the United States of the provisional government of Israel.

I was told that to some of the career men of the State Department this announcement came as a surprise. It should not have been if these men had faithfully supported my policy.

The difficulty with many career officials in the government is that they regard themselves as the men who really make policy and run the government. They look upon the elected officials as just temporary occupants. Every President in our history has been faced with this problem: how to prevent career men from circumventing presidential policy. Too often career men seek to impose their own views instead of carrying out the established policy of the administration. Sometimes they achieve this by influencing the key men appointed by the President to put his policies into operation.

British mandate should be placed under the United Nations Trusteeship Council This was not a rejection of partition but rather an effort to postpone its effective date until proper conditions for the establishment of self government in the two parts might be established.

My policy with regard to Palestine was not a commitment to any set of dates or circumstances it was dedication to the twin ideal of international obligations and the relieving of human misery In this sense, the State Department's trusteeship proposal was not contrary to my policy

On the other hand, anybody in the State Department should have known—and I am sure that some individual officials actually expected—that the Jews would read the proposal as a complete abandonment of the partition plan on which they so heavily counted and that the Arabs would also believe that, like them, we had come to oppose the solution approved by the General Assembly In this sense, the trusteeship idea was at odds with my attitude and the policy I had laid down.

There were, however some tactical advantages to a shift of the debate from the Security Council with its veto to the Trusteeship Council, where decisions were made by majority vote In addition, it was only a matter of weeks before the British would leave Palestine and thus change the entire situation There was always a chance that the United Nations might find a solution to forestall the inevitable outbreak of violence, so it seemed worth while to allow that proposal to be discussed in the meanwhile

The suggestion that the mandate be continued as a trusteeship under the U.N was not a bad idea at the time. However, there were strong suspicions voiced by many that the diplomats thought of it as a way to prevent partition and the establishment of the Jewish homeland.

There were some men in the State Department who held the view that the Balfour Declaration could not be carried out without offense to the Arabs. Like most of the British diplomats, some of our diplomats also thought that the Arabs, on account of their numbers and because of the fact that they controlled such immense oil resources, should be appeased. I am sorry to say that there were some among them who were also inclined to be anti-Semitic.

Secretary Marshall and Under Secretary Lovett saw eye to eye with me, as did Ambassador Austin at the United Nations. Austin had had long experience on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and believed firmly in the ideal of the

Nations mediator there might come a solution that would give the Jews a homeland in which they might safely build their future. What that homeland was to be was defined, so far as I was concerned, by the partition resolution of November 1947. The platform of the Democratic party for the 1948 campaign contained a statement on Israel that expressed clearly what I had in mind.

"We approve the claims of the State of Israel," this statement read, "to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations resolution of November 29 and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel. ... We continue to support, within the framework of the United Nations, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the holy places in Palestine." This statement had been drawn up with the concurrence of the State Department. It represented my deep conviction that not only the general promise of the Balfour Declaration should be kept but also the specific promise of the U.N. resolution. I had assured Dr. Weizmann that these promises would be kept. The Jewish homeland was not to be just a matter of form; it had to be given the space and the opportunity to prove itself.

The U.N. mediator, the Swedish Count Bernadotte, then proposed in September that there should be a different kind of partition. He would give West Galilee in the north to Israel but let the Negeb in the south go to the Arabs. I did not like this change. It looked to me like a fast reshuffle that gave to the Arabs the Negeb area, which still remained to be fully settled. If, however, one looked only at the map and how the two partition proposals appeared there, the Bernadotte plan may have seemed an improvement. It seemed to reduce the number of friction points along a long frontier between the Jews and the Arabs. In any case, Secretary Marshall informed the United Nations that it seemed to him that it was a fair and sound proposal.

Zionists, who saw a pro-Arab behind every State Department desk, at once claimed that this was another reversal of United States policy. Some even went so far as to claim that the Bernadotte plan had been drawn up originally in our State Department. It was not only the Zionists who objected; the Arabs also opposed the Bernadotte proposal because it would have recognized a Jewish state called Israel.

I conferred with members of my staff on September 28, after the news of Marshall's comment on this new proposal. We were in Oklahoma City at the time, aboard my special

It has often happened in the War and Navy Departments that the generals and the admirals, instead of working for and under the Secretaries, succeeded in having the Secretaries act for and under them. And it has happened in the Department of State.

Some Presidents have handled this situation by setting up what amounted to a little State Department of their own. President Roosevelt did this and carried on direct communications with Churchill and Stalin. I did not feel that I wanted to follow this method, because the State Department is set up for the purpose of handling foreign policy operations, and the State Department ought to take care of them. But I wanted to make it plain that the President of the United States, and not the second or third echelon in the State Department, is responsible for making foreign policy and, furthermore, that no one in any department can sabotage the President's policy. The civil servant, the general or admiral, the foreign service officer has no authority to make policy. They act only as servants of the government, and therefore they must remain in line with the government policy that is established by those who have been chosen by the people to set that policy.

In the Palestine situation, as Secretary Lovett said to me after the announcement of the recognition of Israel, "They almost put it over on you."

The new State of Israel at once began to organize its machinery of government, and on January 25 1949 held its first democratic elections. Following this, the United States on January 31 1949 extended *de jure* recognition.

The Arab reaction to the establishment of Israel was violent. The Egyptian government advised the Secretary General of the United Nations formally on May 15 that its troops were crossing the Palestinian border in order "to restore order." This was, of course no more than the Arab League following through on its threat to prevent by any means the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine but the United Nations at once took action to prevent the spread of the hostilities. A mediator was dispatched to Palestine and succeeded in getting the Jews and the Arabs to agree to a temporary truce of four weeks, and later to another truce period. This kept the general fighting in check but did not prevent more localized conflict, when some of the younger leaders of the new state of Israel proved themselves to be as belligerent as the heads of the Arab League.

It was my hope that out of the efforts of the United

In closing, I want to tell you how happy and impressed I have been at the remarkable progress made by the new State of Israel. What you have received at the hands of the world has been far less than was your due. But you have more than made the most of what you have received, and I admire you for it. I trust that the present uncertainty with its terribly burdensome consequences, will soon be eliminated. We will do all we can to help by encouraging direct negotiations between the parties looking toward a prompt peace settlement.

Very sincerely yours,

Harry S. Truman

been abandoned by the so-called realistic experts to our supposedly *forlorn* lost cause. Yet we both kept pressing for what we were sure was right—and we were both proven to be right. My feeling of elation on the morning of November 3rd must have approximated your own feelings one year ago today and on May 14th and on several occasions since then.

However it does not take long for bitter and resourceful opponents to regroup their forces after they have been shattered. You in Israel have already been confronted with that situation and I expect to be all too soon. So I understand very well your concern to prevent the undermining of your well-earned victories.

I remember well our conversations about the Negeb, to which you referred in your letter I agree fully with your estimate of the importance of the area to Israel, and I deplore any attempt to take it away from Israel. I had thought that my position would have been clear to all the world, particularly in the light of the specific wording of the Democratic Party platform. But there were those who did not take this seriously regarding it as "just another campaign promise" to be forgotten after the election. I believe they have recently realized their error I have interpreted my re-election as a mandate from the American people to carry out the Democratic platform—including, of course, the plank on Israel. I intend to do so

Since your letter was written we have announced in the General Assembly our firm intention to oppose any territorial changes in the November 9th Resolution which are not acceptable to the State of Israel I am confident that the General Assembly will support us in this basic position.

We have already expressed our willingness to help develop the new State through financial and economic measures. As you know the Export Import Bank is actively considering a substantial long term loan to Israel on a project basis. I understand that your Government is now in process of preparing the details of such projects for submission to the Bank Personally I would like to go even further by expanding such financial and economic assistance on a large scale to the entire Middle East, contingent upon effective mutual cooperation

Thank you so much for your warm congratulations and good wishes on my re-election. I was pleased to learn that the first Israeli elections have been scheduled for January 25th. That enables us to set a definite target date for extending de jure recognition.

In closing, I want to tell you how happy and impressed I have been at the remarkable progress made by the new State of Israel. What you have received at the hands of the world has been far less than was your due. But you have more than made the most of what you have received, and I admire you for it. I trust that the present uncertainty with its terribly burdensome consequences, will soon be eliminated. We will do all we can to help by encouraging direct negotiations between the parties looking toward a prompt peace settlement.

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## CHAPTER 13

If I had heeded the desire of my family I would have made plans to leave the White House at the end of my first term. I took no steps and made no moves at any time to discourage anyone from seeking nomination to succeed me. From a personal standpoint, I had no desire, just as I had none in 1944 to undertake a national political campaign merely for the sake of gratifying private ambitions. I had already been President of the United States for more than three and a half years.

The compelling motive in my decision to run for the presidency in 1948 was the same as it had been in 1944. There was still "unfinished business" confronting the most successful fifteen years of Democratic administration in the history of the country. The hard-earned reforms of the years since 1933 which insured a better life for more people in every walk of American life were taking permanent root in the 1940's. These benefits were still vulnerable to political attack by reactionaries and could be lost if not safeguarded by a vigilant Democratic administration.

I never wanted to fight for myself or to oppose others just for the sake of elevating myself to a higher office. I would have been happy to continue serving my community as a county judge. I would have been even happier as a senator and would have been content to stay entirely clear of the White House. I had accepted the nomination as Vice-President not with a sense of triumph but with a feeling of regret at having to give up an active role in the Senate.

I have been asked how I could have had a part in a campaign for a fourth term for Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944 against my conviction that no President should serve more than two terms.

The answer is simple—I knew what would have happened in 1944 if Roosevelt and his ideals were not allowed to continue through those extremely critical times. If the forces of reaction could gain control during the emergency when

both domestic and foreign affairs were in a dangerously volatile condition. I knew that within a matter of months the postwar period would witness the repeal or nullification of much of the enlightened social program for which Roosevelt and the Democrats had fought so hard since 1933. Even though the President was physically not as strong, he was a sure winner for the forces of liberalism, and I wanted to do all I could to help.

Again in 1948 there was no doubt as to the course I had to take. The world was undergoing a major readjustment, with revolution stalking most of the "have-not" nations. Communism was making the most of this opportunity, thriving on misery as it always does. The course of freedom was being challenged again—this time from a new and powerful quarter, Soviet Russia.

I had learned from my negotiations with the intransigent Russian diplomats that there was only one way to avoid a third world war, and that was to lead from strength. We had to rearm ourselves and our allies and, at the same time, deal with the Russians in a manner they could never interpret as weakness.

Within our own nation I had seen many well-meaning groups who campaigned for "peace at any price" while apologizing for the aggressive acts of the Russians as merely a reflection of Russian reaction to our own tough policy. Many respectable Americans espoused such ideas without realizing the danger to which they were subjecting our national security and the freedoms for which we had fought so hard.

In 1948 I felt that just as my years in the Senate had prepared me for the presidency, the years I spent serving out the term of Roosevelt prepared me to carry out our proposed program of domestic development and foreign security. I also felt, without undue ego, that this was no time for a new and inexperienced hand to take over the government and risk the interruption of our domestic program and put a dangerous strain on our delicately balanced foreign policy.

I had ample demonstration—in the functioning of the Eightieth Congress—of what could happen to a forward-looking administration program. The destructive and reactionary attitude of the Eightieth Congress convinced me of the urgent need for more liberalism in government rather than less. I felt it my duty to get into the fight and help stem the tide of reaction if I could until the remaining basic aims of the New Deal and the Fair Deal could be adopted, tried, and proved.

The Jacksonian era of progressive enlightenment, which began in 1829, was cut off in 1840 with the election of William Henry Harrison and John Tyler. Whig-Republican conservatism settled over the land for a lengthy siege, and although Abraham Lincoln had a genuine sympathy and a dedicated heart for the common man, it was not until 1885 that liberal policies in government were once again given an opportunity to work for the people. This opportunity disappeared in the years of the so-called "good old days" of Benjamin Harrison and William McKinley. I believe that William Jennings Bryan had the same vision that Jefferson and Jackson had demonstrated, especially when he led the revolt of the South and the West against the moneyed interests of the conservative East in 1896, but Republican conservatism had grown too strong for him.

One outstanding Republican President, Theodore Roosevelt, contributed to the perpetuation of progressivism in American life. Under his administration the country made great strides, particularly in the conservation of natural resources. After the best policies of Theodore Roosevelt's seven years in office disintegrated during the Taft administration and the federal government was again recaptured by the reactionary backward-looking Republicans of that day, it was up to Woodrow Wilson to introduce the "New Freedom"—a period of truly liberal Democratic progress.

In 1916 Wilson had to face the decision of staying with the job he had started in the interests of all the people or giving up the gains which had been made since 1913. By accepting the challenge, the Democrats were able to bring about changes which are recognized today as some of the most valuable contributions to our way of life, even though many of them were canceled out from 19 1 to 1933 when control of the affairs of the nation was once more in the hands of the special interests.

What happened in 1933 and the years following is recent history. I was privileged to be on the scene during the national rebirth of a system of government under Franklin Roosevelt which was dedicated to making the country's wealth and privileges available to all the people rather than to just a few. I saw him building an international diplomacy which put America in the position of world leadership. With a Democratic Congress, he wove the thread of liberal progressivism back into the fabric of American government and made it stronger than ever before.

Down through the history of the presidency of the United

States a succession of strong liberal Presidents had fought the fight for liberalism and for a better life for the common man Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt. With such a heritage handed down to me, I could not reject lightly the opportunity and the responsibility which were mine in 1948. I had to make a fight for its continuation. If I could keep the thread unbroken, I thought it my duty to try to by participating in a presidential campaign, I saw no reason for considering any other course of action.

What I wanted to do personally for my own comfort and benefit was not important. What I could do to contribute to the welfare of the country was important. I had to enter the 1948 campaign for the presidency

It seemed to me that the only possible argument the opposition could advance in asking the voters to turn the Executive Department over to them in 1948 was a desire for a change after fifteen years of control of the government by the Democrats. But the voters' action in 1946 had put a Republican Congress in legislative control, and in my coming campaign to persuade the voters that the time for a change had not yet come, it was obvious that the Eightieth Congress would stick out like a sore thumb It was my Exhibit A.

Agriculture had been hurt by the Eightieth Congress, for it had denied farmers a flexible system of price supports and rejected my recommendations for programs to assure adequate consumption of farm products and a more stable future for the farmers.

The threat of inflation, which should have been overcome in 1946, had been renewed by the failure of the Republican Eightieth Congress to restore price controls at a special session which I called in November 1947 It chose to think of the few for whom ever increasing prices meant ever-increasing profits, rather than of the needs of the many for whom the one tested weapon which would prevent excessive prices without hampering production was price control.

Over my veto, the Eightieth Congress passed a Republican tax bill in the spring of 1948 which gave forty per cent of its tax relief to the less than five per cent of the taxpayers with net incomes of more than five thousand dollars a year It also advocated the withdrawal of the federal government from the field of inheritance taxation to encourage the creation of tax free havens, where persons of great wealth could establish fictitious residences in order to escape the just taxation of their estates.

By enacting the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 the Eightieth Congress attempted to shackle American labor and to give overwhelming power to employers. The Republican majority ripped apart the Department of Labor crippling the functions of that department and making it extremely difficult for the department to carry out its mission of fostering, promoting, and developing the welfare of the wage earners.

After the United States had offered a home in this country to the United Nations, the Eightieth Congress failed to follow up immediately with enabling legislation. This cast a damper over our relations with other countries throughout the world who were struggling together for peace. It was a typical gesture of isolationism, as was the reluctance—almost the refusal—of the Congress to support the European Recovery Program and cutting down to one year the request to continue the Trade Agreements Program for three years.

The Republican Eightieth Congress, in control of national legislation for the first time in fourteen years, had managed to reverse the sound democratic policies of collective bargaining, social security rent controls, price controls, and other instruments of government designed to insure equality of privilege for the great majority of people. Instead, the Congress had ignored the repeated recommendations of the President and had yielded to the pressures and lobbies of special privilege in housing, in prices, in taxes, in agriculture, in labor and industrial relations, in foreign trade, and in virtually every other major field of national and international policy.

The Eightieth Congress, in short, had shown that the Republican party had always been, and continued to be, the party of special privilege. This is why I made it clear in every one of my campaign speeches that in reality there was just one issue for the people to vote on—the choice between special interests and the public welfare.

I was sure that the American people would agree with me if they had all the facts. I knew however that the Republican-controlled press and radio would be against me, and my only remaining hope of communicating with the people was to get the message to the people in a personal way.

The communications facilities of the country represented another issue in the 1948 campaign. The figures showed that approximately ninety per cent of the press and radio opposed me and supported the other candidates. This was to be expected, as most were owned, operated, or subsidized by the same private interests that always benefited from Republican economic policies. Even the segments of the press and radio

which were not directly controlled by anti-administration interests depended to a great extent upon the advertising revenue which came from the wealthy and often selfish private groups. The power companies, for instance, purchased millions of dollars worth of newspaper and magazine space in which to attack the public utility program of the federal government. Other lobbies and pressure groups, like the National Association of Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce, were constant contributors to press and radio in the guise of advertisers and sponsors.

My chief objection was not to the space and time which were purchased by the Republicans, because the same were for sale to the Democrats. I did resent, however the commonplace practice of distorted editorials and slanted headlines in the press and of outright misrepresentation in the daily offerings of the columnists and commentators. The worst offense of all was the editing and distorting of the facts in the news.

If the facts were presented in the news columns of the press and in the newscasts over the air I was satisfied and paid no attention to expressions of opinion or character assassinations by certain columnists and commentators. But the danger which I saw was the confusion of fact with mere speculation, by which readers and listeners were undoubtedly misguided and intentionally deceived. The attempts of the gossip and scandal columnists and commentators were usually obvious and therefore of no consequence but when the serious analysts and "ivory tower" critics strayed from the facts—as they frequently did—the public was in danger of being misled by those in whom it had placed some degree of credence and confidence It is common knowledge that the mere fact that a statement appears in print makes it credible to many people.

It was my conviction that the major media of communication had failed in their responsibility to present facts as facts and opinion as opinion. It seemed to me that many owners, publishers, and columnists of the press and radio were deliberately irresponsible during a time of extreme importance to the people of the United States and that they were not living up to the responsibilities attached to the constitutional privileges of freedom of the press and freedom of speech. As far as I was concerned, they had sold out to the special interests, and that is why I referred to them in my campaign speeches as the "kept press and paid radio."

Too many candidates have lived in fear o ress and

radio and have courted their good will as if the outcome of the election depended upon it. But I had learned the error of this idea in my own political life. In my own state I always faced the overwhelming majority of press opposition. I overcame it at every turn and never had any respect for the so-called political influence of the press. My opinion has not changed over the years. Any good politician with nerve and a program that is right can win in the face of the stiffest opposition.

My familiarity with the history of past presidential campaigns was another factor that kept me from worrying about the press opposition I faced in 1948. Since the election of Jefferson in 1800 there had been thirty-six presidential campaigns in which the press had supposedly played an important part. In eighteen of these campaigns the press had supported the losing candidate, and in the other eighteen it had been behind the winner. This was the clearest proof I needed that I had nothing to fear regarding the influence of the newspapers and the newer medium of radio.

This was the prospect that faced me in the summer of 1948. The opposing party, which had gained strength in the off-year elections, had already expressed its intention—through the Eightieth Congress—of tearing down the structure which the Democrats had built over a period of sixteen years for the purpose of improving the welfare and security of the people. Coupled with this threat was the influence of a hostile press which promoted the policies of the Republican party and did all it could to discredit and sabotage the policies of my administration.

It was not an encouraging situation that confronted me, but I was not brought up to run away from a fight when the fight is for what is right. Supposedly scientific predictions that I could not win did not worry me one bit.

Public-opinion polls had reached their peak as an American institution during the summer of 1948. Several of these, such as those conducted by George Gallup and Elmo Roper had established reputations for accuracy that were quite impressive, and many politicians, newspapermen, businessmen, and labor leaders began to look to these surveys as a guide to their actions.

Almost unanimously the polls taken before the 1948 Democratic convention showed my popularity with the American people to have hit an all-time low. This was a condition that resulted from the efforts made by the American press to misrepresent me and to make my program, policies, and staff

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nullify any efforts to develop federal safeguards against racial discrimination. It was this movement which culminated in the bolt of part of the southern bloc in 1948 under the misleading name of States' Rights Democrats.

The Fair Employment Practices Committee had been established by an Executive Order of President Roosevelt on June 25, 1941, "to encourage full participation in the national defense program by all citizens . . . regardless of race, creed, color or national origin." The committee was continued until June 30, 1946, under the National War Agency Appropriations Act and was terminated at that time against my wishes. The FEPC had shown that, in the majority of wartime cases, discriminatory practices by employers and unions could be reduced or eliminated by simple negotiation when the work of the negotiator was backed by a firm national policy.

Nevertheless, there were many unresolved cases handled by the FEPC which indicated to me that executive authority was not enough to insure compliance in the face of organized opposition. I saw that legislative authority would be required to put an end to such un-American practices. The Committee on Civil Rights was set un-American practices. The Committee widely as possible the need for legislation.

In the Executive Order creating the committee, I pointed out that the nation was losing ground in civil rights and that the preservation of the liberties was the duty of every branch of government and every public official—state, federal, and local. The constitutional guarantees of individual liberties and of equal protection under the law clearly place on the federal government the duty to act when state or local authorities abridge or fail to uphold these guarantees. I felt that the federal government was hampered, however, by inadequate civil-rights statutes and that the Department of Justice lacked the tools to enforce such statutes as there were. This was a condition that I wanted to see corrected.

Speaking to the fifteen members of the Committee on Civil Rights at the White House on January 15, 1947, I said: "I want our Bill of Rights implemented in fact. We have been trying to do this for 150 years. We are making progress, but we are not making progress fast enough. This country could very easily be faced with a situation similar to the one with which it was faced in 1922." I was referring, of course, to the revival of terrorism in that year by the Ku Klux Klan.

Six months later I restated the motives of my civil-rights program in an address to the annual convention of the Na-

Society of Newspaper Editors in April, I decided to talk "off the cuff" on American relations with Russia. When I finished my remarks about thirty minutes later I was surprised to get the most enthusiastic applause that I had ever received from a group made up mainly of Republicans.

On May 14 I again tried my hand at speaking without a manuscript when I addressed a rally of the Young Democrats in Washington. A New York newspaper called the speech a "fighting one in the new Truman manner." I decided that if speaking without a prepared copy or getting away from reading a prepared text was more effective in getting my ideas and feelings across, I would use that method on the trainside talks which I planned to make in the future. It was a style which I was to follow in my acceptance speech at the Democratic convention and in most of the speeches which I was to deliver in the campaign from Labor Day up to the November election.

One aspect of the political situation in 1948 which dismayed most of my supporters and advisers was the threat of a split within the Democratic party over the issue of civil rights. The defection by some of the southern states, notably South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi, was something I had anticipated, however since I first took a stand as President on this greatly misunderstood and misrepresented subject. From the early days of my administration I insisted on a workable fair employment practices program and on the enforcement of civil rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.

The beginning of this splinter opposition dated all the way back to December 5 1946 when I had appointed a committee to investigate and report on the status of civil rights in America. I took this action because of the repeated anti-minority incidents immediately after the war in which homes were invaded, property was destroyed, and a number of innocent lives were taken I wanted to get the facts behind these incidents of disregard for individual and group rights which were reported in the news with alarming regularity, and to see that the law was strengthened, if necessary so as to offer adequate protection and fair treatment to all of our citizens.

I directed that the committee's survey should not be confined to the problem of any one minority group but should extend to all areas of racial and religious discrimination. It was a simple approach to one of the oldest problems of a democratic society yet the leaders of "white supremacy" began at once their campaign of demagoguery to attempt to

of technique, ignoring the only basis upon which a political campaign can be logically conducted.

I was one of those who had helped write the Democratic party platform in my own state during the 1934, 1938 and 1942 campaigns and the national platform in 1936, 1940, and 1944. I believed in the principles these platforms advanced, and when I was elected President, I tried to carry out the platform promises that had been made. The basic principle in all of those platforms was the benefit of the average man who has no pull in Washington. To me, party platforms are contracts with the people, and I always looked upon them as agreements that had to be carried out. That is why I was perfectly willing to risk defeat in 1948 by sticking to the civil-rights plank in my platform.

There were people around me, of course, who were anxious to prevent any sort of split in the Democratic party and efforts were made to soften the approach to the civil-rights issue. I would not stand for any double talk on this vital principle, however and insisted on plain language being used. Members of the Cabinet and others warned me that I was riding to a defeat if I stuck to my FEPC orders and if I did not let up on the battle for civil-rights legislation. But I wanted to win the fight by standing on my platform, or lose it the same way.

I was reasonably sure, far in advance of the convention, that there would be a splintering off of the South or at least a portion of it. The attitude which had been taken by Southerners toward the policy of integration in the armed forces was well known. Practically all of the training camps in World War II were located in the South because of climate conditions, and the idea of integration, therefore, encountered strong resistance. The Southerners were especially bothered by integration among construction workers, who were employed without discrimination as to race for the purpose of building the government's training camps, and they were not happy over the orders on fair employment. I expected trouble, and it developed promptly at the 1948 convention.

The military establishment—particularly the Navy—had been strongly opposed to my policy of integration in the armed services, but I had forced it into practice. Then they discovered that no difficulty resulted from integration after all. Integration is the best way to create an effective combat organization in which the men will stand together and fight. Experience on the front has proved that the morale of troops is strengthened where Jim Crow practices are not imposed.

tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People on June 29 1947 "As Americans," I asserted, "we believe that every man should be free to live his life as he wishes. He should be limited only by his responsibility to his fellow countrymen. If this freedom is to be more than a dream, each man must be guaranteed equality of opportunity. The only limit to an American's achievement should be his ability, his industry and his character"

In October of the same year the Civil Rights Committee delivered its report, which showed that a positive need existed for legislation to secure the rights of American minority groups. The report listed ten important recommendations, as follows

(1) Establishing a permanent Commission on Civil Rights, a joint Congressional Committee on Civil Rights, and a Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice. (2) Strengthening existing civil-rights statutes. (3) Providing federal protection against lynching. (4) Protecting more adequately the right to vote. (5) Establishing a Fair Employment Practice Commission to prevent unfair discrimination in employment. (6) The modification of the federal naturalization laws to permit the granting of citizenship without regard to the race, color or national origin of applicants. (7) Providing home rule and suffrage in presidential elections for the residents of the District of Columbia. (8) Providing statehood for Hawaii and Alaska and a greater measure of self-government for our island possessions. (9) Equalizing the opportunities for residents of the United Sates to become naturalized citizens. (10) Settling the evacuation claims of Japanese Americans.

I asked for specific civil rights legislation in my message to the Congress on February 2, 1948 to enact these recommendations into law At the same time I urged the abolition of segregation and discrimination in the use of transportation facilities by both public officers and the employees of private companies throughout the country And later I incorporated these recommendations into the 1948 platform of the Democratic party

The platform of a political party is a promise to the public. Unless a man can run on his party's platform—and try to carry it out, if elected—he is not an honest man. All campaign oratory that is not based on principles and issues represented in a definite platform is sheer demagoguery When a party has no principles and issues on which to stand, it invariably turns to personalities and to the use of the "big

technique, ignoring the only basis upon which a political paign can be logically conducted.

was one of those who had helped write the Democratic ty platform in my own state during the 1934, 1938 and 12 campaigns and the national platform in 1936, 1940 and 44. I believed in the principles these platforms advanced, d when I was elected President, I tried to carry out the tform promises that had been made. The basic principle in of those platforms was the benefit of the average man who s no pull in Washington. To me, party platforms are ntracts with the people, and I always looked upon them as reements that had to be carried out. That is why I was rfectly willing to risk defeat in 1948 by sticking to the il-rights plank in my platform.

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twenty-five years ago, and the prejudice has now become much less apparent, although it has yet to be overcome. Hitler's persecution of the Jews did much to awaken Americans to the dangerous extremes to which prejudice can be carried if allowed to control government actions.

I never did believe that the great mass of Southerners had the same viewpoint as the minority Dixiecrat contingent. I was raised amidst some violently prejudiced Southerners myself, and I believe the vast majority of good Southerners understand that the blind prejudices of past generations cannot continue in a free republic. Much progress in civil rights has been made voluntarily by the South itself, and it was to help and to speed this progress that my program was designed. It was because they understood this that the remaining seven of the eleven states that had once formed the Confederacy did not withdraw from the Democratic convention and join with the splinter party.

I did not discount the handicap which the loss of a "Solid South" presented as far as my chances of winning the election were concerned. I knew that it might mean the difference between victory and defeat in November. I knew, too, that if I deserted the civil-liberties plank of the Democratic party platform I could heal the breach, but I have never traded principles for votes, and I did not intend to start the practice in 1948 regardless of how it might affect the election.

I was confident that the voters would see that the Dixiecrats were trying in vain to build a platform on an issue that was not a reality but a fiction. With this confidence—which few of those around me seemed to share—I was willing to take the risk imposed on my chances of being elected President in my own right.

Although many candidates for the presidency have had to cope with splits within their parties, the situation which I faced in 1948 was without a comparable precedent in the history of American politics. I was confronted not with one major defection in the Democratic party but with two bolts of sizable proportions. In addition to the faction which was preparing to withdraw its support from me and to pick an alternate candidate on the platform of States' Rights Democrats, there were the so-called Progressives under the leadership of another Democrat, Henry Wallace.

Under President Roosevelt, Wallace had served as one of the best Secretaries of Agriculture this country ever had, and he enjoyed considerable personal prestige as Vice-President

ping the spring into a full-fledged boom for General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Among the chief agitators who claimed that I was not representing the New Deal policies of President Roosevelt were the late President's sons, James and Elliott, former Cabinet members James F. Byrnes and Harold Ickes, and Senator Claude Pepper of Florida. There were many others who felt that because the press and the polls made it appear that my chances of success in the campaign were falling away to almost nothing someone else should get the Democratic party nomination.

General Eisenhower, who was at the peak of his popularity after his brilliant military accomplishments of World War II, seemed to be the logical choice for those who sought a dark-horse candidate to oppose me for the nomination. The professional liberals who were attempting to promote him as the Democratic nominee showed, however, that they were not familiar with the history and procedure of political conventions. When the President is sitting in the White House, the National Convention of his party has never gone against his recommendations in the choice of a candidate or in the formation of a platform on which that convention is to operate.

The President is traditionally the leader of his party. He has great influence with the National Committee, and usually the party will nominate a chairman of the convention who is friendly to the President and who meets the approval of the Chief Executive. And no matter how many detractors there may be, the chairman controls the organization of the convention. The convention will operate in the manner in which the chairman and the President want it to.

Even Theodore Roosevelt, with his tremendous popularity could not take the nomination in 1912 from the incumbent President Taft, who had more than half of his own party against him. Consequently all Teddy Roosevelt could do was to bolt the Republican party and run on the unsuccessful Bull Moose ticket. In 1908, though, when Theodore Roosevelt was in the White House, he could pick the party candidate just as Taft could reserve the nomination for himself in 1912. The same was true of Wilson in 1916.

In 1948 I was in a position to control the nomination. When I had made up my mind to run, those in the party who worked against me could do nothing to prevent it. For this reason, Thurmond and Wallace had to bolt the Democratic party and stir up their own following. If Eisenhower had

e defections of the Progressives and the States Righters
uld cut into my voting strength on Election Day. But I
ew that it was my duty to carry forward the program that
d taken the nation from the depths of the depression to
osperity and world leadership, and I was convinced that the
merican people would want to have it carried forward if
they were given the facts. And these I was determined
give them.

the credentials committee has reported and the rules committee has reported on the procedure by which the convention will be governed, the next important task is the adoption of a platform. This takes place whenever the resolutions committee, which writes the platform, is ready to make its report to the convention.

If the resolutions committee disagrees on some paragraphs of the platform, a minority report will bring the issue to the convention for decision. It was the civil-rights paragraph, of course, which precipitated the biggest fight for the 1948 Democratic convention and which on the third day prompted sixty-five delegates from the southern states to walk out to organize the States' Rights Democratic movement.

When the platform is adopted, the nominations for President are in order. These are always accompanied by much oratory and speechmaking, many parades and great outbursts of enthusiasm. After each state and territory has been given an opportunity to make nominations, *the roll call* begins for the voting. If no nominee has a majority of course another ballot is taken, and the balloting continues until one candidate has a majority. The simple majority was introduced in 1936, at which time the old two-thirds rule, long required for nomination in Democratic conventions, was abolished.

As soon as the President is nominated, the convention proceeds to the nomination of a Vice-President. With that, the convention adjourns, and the party is ready to go out and fight for election.

There was some question as to who the vice-presidential candidate would be at the 1948 Democratic National Convention. J. Howard McGrath, chairman of the National Committee, called me from Philadelphia and advised me that the key members of the convention could not decide on a candidate, though he said that most of them wanted Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. McGrath asked me to try to persuade Douglas to accept the nomination.

I had tried once before to interest Douglas in politics when I had asked him in February 1946 to take the place of Secretary of the Interior Ickes. Douglas said then that if I insisted he would accept, but that he had decided to make the Supreme Court his career. He said, "When President Roosevelt appointed me to the Court I was at first not too happy but after a year I had gotten to like it and it seemed to fit me and my temperament, and I had decided to make it my career for life." Douglas told me he wanted to discuss the matter with Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone. "The Chief Justice

said he was concerned that I might take the post," Douglas told me later "just when we were in the middle term of the Court." That day the Chief Justice came to see me and, speaking in that gentle tone of his, said "Please quit disturbing my court." I answered just as gently "You ought to let Bill make that decision." A week later Justice Douglas came to the White House to tell me that after talking it over with the Chief Justice he had decided to remain on the Court.

As he was leaving Justice Douglas said "Did you know that you were my candidate to replace Wallace as Vice-President on the ticket with Roosevelt in 1944?" "Did you know who my candidate was?" I asked him. Douglas answered, "Yes, it was Jimmy Byrnes. I think my judgment on that was better than yours."

After the message from McGrath, requesting me to name a candidate for Vice-President, I put through a telephone call to Justice Douglas at a camp sixteen miles from Lostine, Oregon, where he was vacationing. I told Douglas I wanted him on the ticket with me as Vice-President. The telephone connection was bad and all I could make out clearly was that he wanted to talk it over with his family and friends and that he would telephone me from Portland, Oregon, the next day. The following day which was a Saturday Douglas telephoned me from the Benson Hotel in Portland, Oregon. We talked for about ten minutes, and Douglas asked if he could not give his final answer on Monday He said, "I would like to do it, though I had made up my mind, as I said two years ago, to remain on the Supreme Court." I told him I would wait until Monday On Monday Douglas called me and said "I am very sorry but I have decided not to get into politics. I do not think I should use the Court as a steppingstone." I replied "I am disappointed. That's too bad." Justice Douglas later called on me to say "Unfair and vicious reports were circulated that I kept you, Mr President, dangling for an answer That was not true. I had a devil of a decision to make. All my sentimental intentions were to do it. My only reason for refusing was my desire to stay on the Court, as I had decided at the time when you asked me to join your Cabinet as Secretary of the Interior"

At about the time I received Douglas refusal to run on the ticket, the Senate minority leader Senator Barkley called me from Philadelphia. Leslie Biffle, the Secretary of the Senate, was on the phone with Barkley but it was the senator from Kentucky himself who asked me if I would object if

he tried to be named for Vice-President. Biffle then added that he felt sure Barkley could be nominated if I agreed.

"Why didn't you tell me you wanted to be Vice President?" I said to Barkley. "It's all right with me." It was after this conversation that the two of them went to work, and when the time came, the convention nominated Barkley.

My approval of Barkley as a running mate was not a matter of sudden impulse. I had long respected him as one of the ablest *debaters on* the floor of the Senate. He was a hard-working, honest politician and one of the most popular men in the Democratic Party. As a thoroughly acceptable candidate to the South, Barkley made an ideal partner to run with me in 1948.

On July 14 I boarded the presidential train with my family and members of the White House staff. Over the radio, while en route to Philadelphia, I heard Governor Donnelly as he nominated me with a magnificent speech, and after arriving in Philadelphia and having dinner on the train, I left with members of my party for Convention Hall.

When I arrived, the convention was locked in last-minute argument, and the voting had not yet begun. Barkley and I were ushered into a special suite on the floor beneath the convention. It was a small group of rooms used as dressing rooms for show performers, and there was a balcony overlooking the city of Philadelphia. Off in the distance lay the Delaware River but the yards of the Pennsylvania Railroad formed the immediate foreground, with the city spreading everywhere beyond.

It was a hot, clammy night, though it was pleasant on the balcony. And as I sat there, waiting for the final business of the convention to come to a close and for the signal that would call me to appear to accept the nomination, I let my mind run back, as I frequently do, over America's century and a half of political life. I reflected on the experiences of some of the thirty-one men who had preceded me in office and on the conventions and campaigns that had loomed as large in their lives as this one now did in my own. I was forced to wait for four long hours on that balcony and so had time for reflection. Furthermore, the setting was strangely quiet, and I seemed far removed from the turmoil and the hubbub of the convention within the crowded hall. I clearly recall the thoughts that passed through my mind.

I was not impatient, and as I waited for the long-delayed signal that would eventually call me to the great convention hall inside, I was thinking of the early period of our coun-

said he was concerned that I might take the post, Douglas told me later, "just when we were in the middle term of the Court." That day the Chief Justice came to see me and, speaking in that gentle tone of his, said "Please quit disturbing my court." I answered just as gently "You ought to let Bill make that decision." A week later Justice Douglas came to the White House to tell me that after talking it over with the Chief Justice he had decided to remain on the Court.

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try's history when there were no political parties and no nominating conventions at all. As I sat there on that balcony, I was looking toward Philadelphia's city hall, its tall tower topped by the great statue of William Penn. And that made me think of the historical events which had taken place in this "City of Brotherly Love" which William Penn had founded and of Independence Hall farther east on Chestnut Street.

George Washington was far ahead of his contemporaries as a leader because of his military contribution during the Revolutionary War. But after the war and before he became President, he presided over the Constitutional Convention here in Philadelphia and so played an important part in establishing our form of government. Thus in two ways he could be said to be "the father of his country," which may explain why there was practically no partisan feeling toward him, at least during the earlier years of his administration. To the people of his day as well as of ours this great American was in a class by himself. He was not a professional soldier but a citizen-soldier in the best sense. He worked his way from the bottom to the very top in the volunteer forces.

As my thoughts turned to Washington and the early days of the Republic, I recalled how the people began to experience the workings of the Constitution as an instrument of the people instead of for special privilege. Under the administration of the second President, John Adams, the trend was to interpret the Constitution more and more in favor of those who controlled the land and the banks. But Thomas Jefferson, largely through individual correspondence, aroused a wave of public opinion which resulted in his election in 1800 after a lengthy and involved tie vote with Aaron Burr.

After Jefferson became President he continued to use his organizational talents and was soon in a position to control the Congress through the committee chairmanships and through the people of greatest influence in both Houses. He was a master politician, and this helped make him a great leader. A President has to be a politician in order to get the majority to go along with him on his program.

When Jefferson retired James Madison continued his policies. Then Monroe followed with the era of good feeling, when there were no political parties to speak of because for a period of about twenty-four years the Democrats—who were then called Republicans because they were for a repub-

"man of the people"—an advocate of the liberal interpretation of democracy as practiced by Jefferson. Adams ran for re-election with the support of the people who controlled the United States Bank and who opposed the settlement of the new West without the supervision of private interests. Adams was also supported by the anti-Masons. He always claimed that Jackson won in 1828 with the support of the Masons. Adams a bitter anti Mason for the rest of his life.

One thing I always liked about Jackson was that he brought the basic issues into clear focus. People knew what he stood for and what he was against, and "the friends of General Jackson"—as his supporters called themselves—always knew that he represented the interests of the common people of the United States. He carried out his platform pledges after his triumph over Adams in the election. He caused the destruction of the United States Bank and ruined the Federalist party completely. It is said a number of Federalist leaders, including Daniel Webster were on the bank's payroll.

With Jackson's election in 1828 and again in 1832, the nominating convention was established as a permanent method of selecting presidential candidates. Also, the general election day for all the states had its beginning during that time. There were a great many splinter parties which came into being with the introduction of the mass convention method, such as the Anti Masons, the Know-Nothings, the Equal Righters, and others. But most important, the Democratic party became completely revitalized under Jackson, and its liberal ideals were put into effect for the benefit of the people.

Meanwhile, the Whig party came to life to oppose what the Democratic party represented. Their candidate in 1836 was William Henry Harrison but Jackson called on a national convention of Democrats in Baltimore to nominate his choice for the presidency Martin Van Buren, and the "Little Magician" was nominated and elected largely on the strength of Jackson's influence.

I recalled the election of 1840 which was preceded by one of the strangest campaigns in the history of our country. The Whigs ran Harrison again, and they had no platform at all. It was nothing more than a ballyhoo campaign based on slogans, the principal one of which was "Hard Cider and Log Cabins," even though Harrison had never lived in a log cabin. He was the son of a wealthy family in Virginia and personally took almost no part in the campaign. Van Buren,

no difference whether the press and the special interests like what he does, or what they have to say about him. I have always believed that the vast majority of people want to do what is right and that if the President is right and can get through to the people he can always persuade them. In my own case, communication through a press which was ninety per cent hostile was a real problem, so I had to make many long trips in order to get my message through to the people.

A President cannot always be popular. He has to be able to say yes and no, and more often no to most of the propositions that are put up to him by partisan groups and special interests who are always pulling at the White House for one thing or another. If a President is easily influenced and interested in keeping in line with the press and the polls, he is a complete washout. Every great President in our history had a policy of his own, which eventually won the people's support.

James Buchanan, who was a compromise candidate in a time of compromises. Six years earlier the Compromise of 1850 had been offered as an effort to keep the South and the North from going to war over the slavery question, but it was only a postponement of the problem. The Democrats had split up over the Kansas-Nebraska Bill of Senator Stephen A. Douglas. Buchanan, who had been in England during most of the controversy, was the most "available" candidate by 1856 because he was not associated in the minds of the people with either side.

This was the campaign that saw the birth of the Republican party. The Whigs had disbanded and their remnants were revitalized along united anti-slavery lines in the new party which held its first nominating convention in Philadelphia and chose John C. Frémont as its candidate for President. The campaign which the Republicans put on in the fall of 1856 based on "free soil, free speech, and Frémont," was similar to the circus-like performance of the "Hard Cider and Log Cabin," "Tippecanoe and Tyler Too" campaign of the Whigs in 1840. The new party only narrowly lost the election to the Democrats, but it was gathering strength for the victory of 1860, when Abraham Lincoln was the nominee.

It seemed an odd coincidence to me, as I sat there waiting for the call from the convention, that perhaps the closest parallel to the political situation which confronted me at that moment in 1948, with the Dixiecrats and Progressives in revolt, was the split of the Democratic party in 1860. At that time, however, after fifty-seven ballots, the convention at

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Charleston, South Carolina, failed to agree on a candidate and adjourned. The southern Democrats withdrew and, at a convention of their own, nominated John C. Breckinridge. The northern and western Democrats reconvened at Baltimore and eventually chose Stephen A. Douglas as their candidate. There was a minor splinter party among the conservatives called the Constitutional Union party with John Bell as the nominee, but the Republicans easily rode through the breach, and Lincoln was elected by a large majority of the electoral vote but by a minority of the popular vote.

Thus the two-party system broke down during the latter part of the 1850's. The South seceded, and the Republican party during and after the Civil War maintained control of the government from 1860 to 1884. The war years were difficult for Lincoln. If it had not been for victories by the Union armies in 1864 he might very well have lost to the Democratic candidate, General George B. McClellan, who was running on a "stop the war" platform. But Lincoln was re-elected. His running mate, Andrew Johnson, became President when Lincoln was assassinated, a short time after the inauguration in March. Johnson was more of a Democrat than a Republican but he had run on Lincoln's "National Union" ticket at Lincoln's suggestion as a representative of the border states to offset the President's unpopularity there. Lincoln had dropped Hannibal Hamlin of Maine because he wanted a Union ticket. Lincoln was elected in 1864 on the American Union ticket and not on the Republican ticket.

Johnson was one of the most mistreated of all Presidents. The press attacked him unmercifully for almost everything he did, including the purchase of Alaska for $7,200,000. The newspapers referred to the new territory as "Johnson's Russian fairy land" and "Seward's Ice Box," and between the press and the Radical Republicans, Johnson was given one of the hardest administrations in our history. I could sympathize with him, because I had received a good measure of the same kind of opposition.

If a man does not have a background and experience in politics, he must have something else in his favor if he is to run for the presidency of the United States. Usually the alternative to a political career has been a military career. Washington was the hero of the Revolution. Jackson won the only great victory in the War of 1812, at New Orleans, though he won it after the peace treaty had actually been signed. Taylor was made prominent by the battle of Buena Vista. And the Civil War produced four generals who be-

came Presidents—Grant, Hayes, Garfield, and Benjamin Harrison.

Grant was typical of the soldier-President. Without any understanding of political machinery he was able to ride into office on the popularity which military victory always brings. People are always grateful and happy when a war ends in victory and time after time they have bestowed the honor of the highest political office upon their military heroes.

Grant had voted only once in his life—in 1856—and he cast a Democratic vote then. As a matter of fact, he was the logical Democratic candidate in 1868, but his break with President Johnson made him appear to be a Radical Republican. He wavered for a long time, concealed his intentions *from both parties, and* finally changed his politics to run on the Republican ticket, winning by a very slight popular majority

Popularity and glamour are only part of the factors involved in winning presidential elections. One of the most important of all is luck. In my own case, luck was always with me though there was never any intention on my part to make things work my way If a man starts out to make himself President, he hardly ever arrives. Henry Clay is an outstanding example. He was so sure he would be President that he twice refused the vice-presidency and in both cases he would have succeeded to the highest office because of the death of the President. James G Blaine was another such man. And I was convinced, as I sat waiting to be called into the convention, that Thomas E. Dewey was another whose determined efforts to make himself President would never materialize.

A President needs political understanding to *run* the government, but he may be *elected* without it. There are many factors that have entered into the people's selection of their Chief Executive from time to time. In Grant's second election to the presidency the chief factor was money He did no campaigning of any kind, while his lieutenants poured money in every direction that would bring in votes. And he won, despite a bolt by Liberal Republicans, who nominated Horace Greeley editor of the New York *Tribune* at their convention in Cincinnati.

Greeley had the support of some Democrats, while the Straight Democrats supported a third candidate, Charles O'Conor Greeley's defeat was helped along by the cartoons of Thomas Nast, creator of the Republican elephant, and the poor old man died three weeks after the election as the worst-beaten man who ever ran for the presidency I never

did believe that newspapermen belong in politics any more than politicians belong in the newspaper business.

The election of 1876 was one of the most confused of all. Samuel Tilden, the Democratic nominee was elected, but the electoral votes of three carpetbag states and Oregon were disputed. Tilden needed only one more electoral vote, but Rutherford B. Hayes was the Republican nominee, and when the Congress unconstitutionally appointed an election commission to decide the votes to be received, he was declared elected.

President Grant was so worried about the situation that he had Hayes sworn in on a Saturday afternoon, March 3 the day before inauguration day The Democrats were threatening "Tilden or blood," but Tilden said be would not urge his people to go to war over an election, because he thought the country would come out all right. Hayes made a good President, he ordered the withdrawal of federal troops from the South.

In the convention of 1880 the Democrats nominated Winfield Scott Hancock, a 250-pound general who had saved the battle of Gettysburg on the first day for the North. The Republican party was badly split that year with one faction supporting Grant, another Blaine and another John Sherman. James Garfield had nominated Sherman with the best speech of the convention. The convention was hopelessly deadlocked. Rutherford B Hayes is said to have gotten in touch with the chairman of the convention and, on the strength of the speech nominating Sherman, suggested Garfield's nomination.

Garfield was elected. with Chester A. Arthur as Vice-President. Arthur who had been Collector of the Port of New York, had been nominated for reasons of expediency but that was not true of Garfield, and though be had been a Civil War general, he turned out to be a good Chief Executive. It is my belief that any man who sincerely tries to live up to the responsibilities of the office cannot keep from growing in the presidency Garfield, however had little time to grow for unfortunately he was shot by an assassin in July following his inauguration, and he died in September

The Democratic party which by now had been out of power for so many years, closed ranks behind Grover Cleveland in 1884 He was opposed by James G Blaine, the Republican candidate, known as the "plumed knight from Maine" but Cleveland was elected. The campaign, however was a bitter one, and the press clearly rated how

abusive it could be. Furthermore, the abuse and the criticism continued throughout the four years that followed. Cleveland was renominated in 1888 and in the election of that year actually received more popular votes than Benjamin Harrison, his Republican opponent. Despite this, however, he lost in the electoral college. Harrison, who had made the tariff an issue in the campaign, became President despite his minority vote. Four years later—in 1892—Cleveland, running for the third time, was re-elected to his second term. Cleveland was re-elected on the strength of the "Billion Dollar" Congress, which spent a billion dollars in the two sessions and, it was claimed, brought on the Panic of 1893. Cleveland had a lot of trouble with strikes and riots, but the Democratic party, as usual, was on the liberal side during his second administration. But the President was not. He became an ultra-conservative. His older son became a leading Republican in Baltimore, Maryland.

The campaign of 1896 was the first of which I personally took much notice, and four years later when I was sixteen, I was a page at the Democratic convention in Kansas City which nominated William Jennings Bryan for a second time.

Bryan had been only thirty-six years old when, at the Chicago convention in 1896, he made his famous "Cross of Gold and Crown of Thorns" speech which won him his first presidential nomination. He was one of my heroes. I remember that there were seventeen thousand people in the old convention hall in Kansas City when Bryan spoke. There were no loudspeakers, and a man had to have a real carrying voice to be heard in that hall. At the convention of 1900 another candidate for the Democratic nomination—Judson Harmon of Ohio—was on the platform and was having a time making himself heard. Bryan came out on the rostrum and everyone stood up and shouted. Bryan said, "Why don't you give the gentleman from Ohio a chance to speak?" Harmon tried again, but the tumult continued and he had to quit. Bryan took charge. But so great was the enthusiasm of the delegates for the great orator that he was nominated at once—by acclamation. His appeal that day was like nothing else I have ever heard. He had a bell-like voice that carried well and he knew how to use it.

Despite Bryan's popularity with the people in 1896, the Republicans and the "gold" Democrats elected their ticket. Four years later McKinley was re-elected and was sworn in in 1901, and assassinated in September of the same year.

McKinley was sometimes described as "the President Mark

did believe that newspapermen belong in politics any more than politicians belong in the newspaper business.

The election of 1876 was one of the most confused of all. Samuel Tilden, the Democratic nominee, was elected, but the electoral votes of three carpetbag states and Oregon were disputed. Tilden needed only one more electoral vote, but Rutherford B Hayes was the Republican nominee, and when the Congress unconstitutionally appointed an election commission to decide the votes to be received, he was declared elected.

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Reserve System, the tariff reforms, and a great many others in the public interest. Shortly after his second term began, the country became involved in World War I. He was very much against entry into the European conflict and tried his best to keep out. His race against Charles Evans Hughes in 1916 was based on the slogan, "He Kept Us Out of War" and he won on the strength of that and his "New Freedom" accomplishments.

No President could have kept us out of that war and still maintained the sovereignty of the United States Government under the circumstances that existed at that time. He did succeed in bringing about a cessation of hostilities in 1918 by his Fourteen Point speech setting out a plan for a just peace. After the Armistice was signed, Wilson spent the rest of his term in an endeavor to set up the League of Nations to assure the peace of the world. Because of the opposition which he faced in the Senate he worked himself up to such a point that he had a stroke, which was eventually fatal.

In the campaign of 1920 the people were tired of the war and were intrigued by the promise of Warren G. Harding, the Republican candidate, for a "return to normalcy" whatever that meant. Harding was a handsome man who had been picked by the forces of conservatism and private wealth to protect the special interests. He was one of the darkest horses ever chosen at a convention, and his nomination was a surprise to him as well as to everyone else. The contest was supposed to be between General Leonard Wood and Governor Frank Lowden of Illinois, but after the balloting had failed to show an edge for either man, the political bosses got together and picked Harding "because he looks like a President." This convention produced the term "smoke-filled room" to suggest that strings had been pulled to manipulate the convention. The "smoke-filled room" was nothing new but Harding's nomination dramatized the tag and made it stick. Calvin Coolidge, because of his handling of a police strike in Boston while he was governor of Massachusetts, was chosen as Harding's running mate.

The Republicans won by a landslide that year. Running on the Democratic ticket were Governor James Cox of Ohio and Wilson's Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt. Governor Cox had been an outstanding congressman and an efficient governor of Ohio. He would have made a good President.

When Coolidge succeeded to the presidency at Harding's death in 1923, he announced that he would be a candidate

Hanna made," Hanna being the millionaire senator from Cleveland who virtually bought the election while McKinley stayed at home and spoke only to such delegations as came to his house from time to time. This was the first of the "front porch" campaigns. I do not approve of "front porch" campaigns. I never liked to see any man elected to office who did not go out and meet the people in person and work for their votes.

The first President I ever saw was Teddy Roosevelt—William McKinley's successor. It was in 1904 after Roosevelt had just about served out the remainder of McKinley's second term and wanted to be elected President in his own right. He was in Kansas City on a trip through the Middle West, and I was working in the National Bank of Commerce at that time. I ran down to the corner of Tenth and Main streets just to see what a President looked like. Roosevelt made an excellent speech. I was disappointed to find that he was no giant, but a little man in a long Prince Albert coat to make him look taller. After I became President I often thought back to that time. I found out that the people usually ran to see the President and not the man. A few decades back I had done exactly the same thing—running to see the President—who was then Teddy Roosevelt.

It was Theodore Roosevelt who in 1912 helped bring about the return of the Democrats to the Presidency. In 1908 William Howard Taft had been hand picked by Roosevelt as his successor. Before Taft's term was over, however, Teddy was displeased with the result, and he wanted the nomination for himself. Teddy had been far to the left for a Republican—but still right of center as far as the Democrats were concerned—and had put into effect a lot of liberal ideas such as conservation of natural resources and the checking of "malefactors of great wealth." Taft was an ultra-conservative and partial to the special interests. He was not willing to use the full power of the presidency.

Although Taft had more than half of his party against him, he was the incumbent President and, as such, he controlled the convention of 1912. Not even Roosevelt himself, with his large following, could change that all important political fact. He bolted the Republican convention and had himself nominated on the "Bull Moose" ticket. This defeated Taft and permitted the Democrats to come back into power with the election of one of our greatest Presidents, Woodrow Wilson.

Wilson brought about significant reforms during his first term, such as the Federal Trade Comm[illegible] the Federal

I had begun serving in the United States Senate the year before.

With Hitler overrunning the countries of western Europe, Roosevelt decided to break precedent and run for the third term. Roosevelt chose Henry Wallace as his running mate, although Jesse Jones, Paul McNutt, Jim Farley and William Bankhead were also nominated. But Wallace was named.

In 1944 Wallace was again a candidate for renomination for the vice-presidency and the Democrats had quite a time in keeping him from being renominated. Roosevelt had decided upon me for the vice-presidency although he did not tell me in advance, but he did not want publicly to turn down Wallace. He had the kindliest heart in the world and never liked to hurt anyone. He would do all sorts of maneuvering to get rid of people he did not want without his being the one to fire them.

It was now past midnight in Philadelphia. Messages were being delivered from the floor. Delegates and friends were drifting in and out. I was growing more and more impatient. It hardly seemed possible to me, in the early-morning hours of July 15, 1948, that so much had happened since that 1944 convention at which I was nominated for the vice-presidency and that shortly I was to take my place before the 1948 Democratic National Convention to accept the nomination for President of the United States. Into this situation, as into every major experience which I went through in that high office, I went with a consciousness of the history of American government and politics. The caucuses and conventions of the forty national elections which had preceded that of 1948 were as real to me as the one before which I was about to make my appearance. They were typical of the American way of life and of the wonderful system of self-government that had developed over a period of 160 years. I was both proud and humble to be able to take an active part in that development.

The convention system has its faults, of course, but I do not know of a better method for choosing a presidential nominee. There has been a great deal of talk regarding the need of a presidential primary, but there is not a man in the country who could afford the expenses of both a primary and a campaign. The physical effort alone is no small consideration. In theory it sounds plausible, but the great population centers of the country would have virtual control of the nomination for President. Yet it has been my experience that

the following year "Business as usual" was his motto, although Will Rogers put it another way: Keep Cool with Coolidge and Do Nothing." In 1924 at one of the most chaotic Democratic conventions in years, the delegates held ballot after ballot trying to decide between William G. McAdoo and Alfred E. Smith who had been put in nomination by Franklin Roosevelt. On the one hundred and third ballot the convention finally named John W Davis as a compromise candidate. I remember listening to the whole thing over the radio while I was eastern judge of the county court in Jackson County There was a tremendous split in the Democratic party and Coolidge won in another Republican landslide

I recalled the 1928 Democratic convention in Houston. There were two or three native-son nominations that year including Jim Reed of Missouri. But Al Smith was given the nomination, and that set off the most vicious anti-Catholic, anti Jewish, anti-Negro movement that we have ever had during any political campaign. The Ku Klux Klan was near the top of its influence since its revitalization after World War I and there was more slander and mud-slinging going on than at any time I can remember

The Republicans held their convention that year in Kansas City and they had a time meeting their expenses. As presiding judge of the county court, incidentally I helped take care of the situation, because it brought people into Kansas City and Jackson County Consequently I had more tickets to the convention than some of the Republican leaders, and I was present when Hoover was nominated. Andrew Mellon was in control of that convention, just as Mark Hanna had been at the nomination of McKinley

In the election that followed, the South s opposition to Al Smith gave Hoover many southern states, and he won by a comfortable margin. In the general election two years later however almost all the people who were running for office in the South and had supported Hoover were defeated. That was the price they had to pay for going off the reservation in 1928 And the great depression which began in 1929 marked the end of Republican rule. Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats were swept into office in 1932.

Roosevelt s plurality in the 1936 election was the greatest ever received in a national election up to that time, and he won all but eight of the electoral votes. Alf Landon of Kansas was the unsuccessful Republican contender This was the first presidential election I saw from the Washington end

had begun serving in the United States Senate the year before.

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forget that." I meant just that, and I said it as if I meant it. There could be no mistake. I intended to win.

The Democrats had been waiting to hear somebody say positively that we were going to win, and the effect on them was electric. They saw right then and there that there was going to be a fight for Democratic principles by the man who was the head of the party. That gave them the shot in the arm they so badly needed.

I had learned from my June tour that people wanted the facts before they would fight for or *against anything*. I felt that the convention would react in the same manner as the crowds at the train had done when they heard the facts straight from the President of the United States. I was not fooling and they knew it.

I made a tough, fighting speech. I recited the benefits that had been won by the Democratic administrations for the people. "Never in the world," I said, "were the farmers of any republic or any kingdom or any other country as prosperous as the farmers of the United States; and if they don't do their duty by the Democratic party, they are the most ungrateful people in the world."

I pointed out that wages and salaries had increased from $29,000,000,000 in 1933 to more than $128,000,000,000 in 1947. "That's labor," I added, "and labor never had but one friend in politics, and that is the Democratic party and Franklin D. Roosevelt. And I say to labor what I have said to the farmers. They are the most ungrateful people in the world if they pass the Democratic party by this year."

Then I tore into the Eightieth Congress, emphasizing that "the Republican party favors the privileged few and not the common, everyday man. Ever since its inception, that party has been under the control of special privilege, and they concretely proved it in the Eightieth Congress. They proved it by the things they failed to do."

I listed in detail the failures of the Republican-controlled Congress and I did not pull any punches. Then, toward the end of the speech, I played my trump card. I announced:

"On the twenty-sixth day of July, which out in Missouri we call 'Turnip Day,' I am going to call Congress back and ask them to pass laws to halt rising prices, to meet the housing crisis—which they are saying they are for in their platform.

At the same time, I shall ask them to act upon other needed measures, such as aid to education, which they say they are for; a national health program, civil rights legisla-

# CHAPTER 15

At 2 A.M. I was escorted to the convention floor there and onto the speaker's platform. The huge hall was packed with weary perspiring delegates who had spent three days and nights in bedlam. They were still capable of making noise, however and they greeted me with thundering applause.

But it was clear to me that the work of the opposition in propagandizing against my chances of winning—plus the splintering within our own party—had taken its toll. The Democratic party was dispirited and dejected. I meant to give them something to cheer about and something to campaign for It was not the first time in history that a President had personally appeared at a convention hall to accept the nomination. The first nominee to do so was Franklin D. Roosevelt, when he flew to the convention in 1932. The effect was the same in both cases, I think. It reinvigorated the whole party in 1948 as it had in 1932.

Barkley who had accompanied me to the platform, made a short acceptance speech first. Then I was introduced. I had studied the acceptance speeches of two or three other Presidents, principally Roosevelt's, and had made up my mind that I would spring my first big surprise of the campaign in that speech.

The acceptance speech is a formal procedure which closes or follows the action of a political convention. When a man is nominated he must accept formally if he intends to run.

I had been working on my notes for the speech on the train and went over them in the room downstairs just before the escorting committee arrived to usher me to the convention floor I had my notes in a black notebook, which I placed on the lectern as I waited for the hall to grow quiet enough for me to speak.

It took only a short sentence to bring the delegates to their feet. That was when I said, "Senator Barkley and I will win this election and made these Republicans like it—don't you

The stage was now set for the active 1948 presidential campaign. I picked Labor Day, which was on September 6, to sound the starting gun of my bid for the presidency, and most of my opponents did the same. The field, besides Thomas Dewey for the Republicans, Henry Wallace for the Progressives, and J. Strom Thurmond for the States' Rights Democrats, included a number of minority candidates: Norman Thomas for the Socialists, among others.

While I knew that the southern dissenters and the Wallaceites would cost some Democratic votes, my opponent was the Republican party. The campaign was built on one issue—the interests of the people, as represented by the Democrats, against the special interests, as represented by the Republicans and the record of the Eightieth Congress. I staked the race for the presidency on that one issue.

The Labor Day speech at Cadillac Square in Detroit set the pace for the campaign speeches that were to follow. "As you know, I told a nationwide audience, I speak plainly sometimes. In fact, I speak bluntly sometimes. I am going to speak plainly and bluntly today. These are critical times for labor and for all who work. There is great danger ahead. Right now, the whole future of labor is wrapped up in one simple proposition.

"If, in this next election, you get a Congress and an administration friendly to labor, you have much to hope for. If you get an administration and a Congress unfriendly to labor, you have much to fear, and you had better look out.

"If the Congressional elements that made the Taft-Hartley Law are allowed to remain in power, and if these elements are further encouraged by the election of a Republican President, you men of labor can expect to be hit by a steady barrage of body blows. And, if you stay at home, as you did in 1946, and keep these reactionaries in power, you will deserve every blow you get.

"Remember that the reactionary of today is a shrewd man. He is in many ways much shrewder than the reactionaries of the twenties. He is a man with a calculating machine where his heart ought to be. He has learned a great deal about how to get his way by observing demagogues and reactionaries in other countries. And now he has many able allies in the press and in the radio.

"If you place the government of this country under the

tion, which they say they are for an increase in the minimum wage, which I doubt very much they are for extension of the Social Security coverage and increased benefits, which they say they are for funds for projects needed in our program to provide public power and cheap electricity. By indirection, this Eightieth Congress has tried to sabotage the power policies the United States has pursued for fourteen years. That power lobby is as bad as the real estate lobby which is sitting on the housing bill.

"I shall ask for adequate and decent laws for displaced persons in place of this anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic law which this Eightieth Congress passed.

"Now my friends, if there is any reality behind that Republican platform, we ought to get some action from a short session of the Eightieth Congress. They can do this job in fifteen days, if they want to do it. They will still have time to go out and run for office.

"They are going to try to dodge their responsibility. They are going to drag all the red herrings they can across this campaign, but I am here to say that Senator Barkley and I are not going to let them get away with it."

This announcement of a special session of the Congress electrified the convention to a new pitch of confidence and enthusiasm. I was telling the Democrats that we were calling the bluff of the Republican opposition and that we were going to fight them with everything we had.

Of course I knew that the special session would produce no results in the way of legislation. But I felt justified in calling the Congress back to Washington to prove to the people whether the Republican platform really meant anything or not. Every item of legislation which I called essential to the welfare of the country was included in the Republican platform and needed to be acted upon without delay. Yet I knew they would run out on their platform.

Just as I had predicted, the "Turnip Day" session of the Congress came and went without any response to my demands for constructive legislation promised by the Republican party platform. The Republican leaders turned a deaf ear to my warning that the American people would expect some kind of action before the election and ignored the recommendations which I made in a six-page message on July 27. After two weeks of doing nothing, the special session adjourned.

Lausche, who was a candidate for the governorship of Ohio, got on the train just south of Columbus, intending to get off again at Columbus. At that little town where Lausche got on there was a crowd of from six to eight thousand people and at the next one the crowd was even larger. At Columbus the crowd was so big they could not even get into the station.

"Is this the way all the crowds have been?" the governor asked.

"Yes," I said, "but this is smaller than we had in most states."

"Well," he said, "this is the biggest crowd I ever saw in Ohio," and he rode on to Cleveland with us. He gave our ticket his fullest support.

Another interesting trip was from Albany to Buffalo. We started early in the morning in a driving rainstorm from the Albany station, where there was a huge crowd of people. And at every station along the way it was still pouring down rain, but there were overflow crowds everywhere—even in those Republican congressional districts.

It was the same in Pennsylvania as it had been in New York.

I saw that the crowds had turned up in greater numbers in June when I made the western tour to dedicate Grand Coulee Dam in Washington. I felt that if people in such places as Butte, Montana, Grand Coulee, and Sacramento (there were ten thousand people at the Sacramento station at seven o'clock in the morning, and in Los Angeles I was told there were a million people on the streets) were as interested as they appeared to be, they could not be fooled by the press.

It was quite a campaign. I worked my staff almost to death. I believe that at one time or another I put them all to bed, and despite the long hours and hard work I gained weight during the campaign. I worked the reporters very hard too.

The major public-opinion polls, meanwhile, continued, through the press and over the air, up to the very day of the election, to predict my defeat. Only Louis Bean, an economist of the Department of Agriculture, and a few others forecast any chance of a Democratic victory.

The technique I used at the whistle stops was simple and straightforward. There were no special "gimmicks" or oratorical devices. I refused to be "coached." I simply told the people in my own language that they had better wake up to the fact that it was their fight.

If they did not get out and help me win this fight, I

control of those who hate labor whom can you blame if measures are thereafter adopted to destroy the powers, prestige, and earning power of labor?

"I tell you that labor must fight now harder than ever before to make sure that its rights are kept intact.

"I know from my own experience with labor leaders and unions that the ability of labor to discipline itself and to cooperate with other groups in the country is steadily growing.

"During the war when I was surveying American industry as Chairman of the Senate Investigating Committee, I came to know the conditions under which labor works and lives. I came to know and respect the minds and spirit of workers and union leaders. I saw them and talked to them, and visited their homes in scores of communities. I watched them at work in hundreds of plants.

"Labor has always had to fight for its gains. Now you are fighting for the whole future of the labor movement. We are in a hard, tough fight against shrewd and rich opponents. They know they can't count on your vote. Their only hope is that you won't vote at all. They have misjudged you. I know that we are going to win this crusade for the right!"[1]

On September 17 I began an extended tour I had warned my staff and the reporters who prepared to make the trip with me that I was going out to win the election. "I'm going to fight hard" I told Senator Barkley "I'm going to give them hell." We would be on the road most of the time for the next six weeks, getting up at all hours to make stops at any place where people wanted to see me.

At first the critics referred to my tour as a "one-man circus" and called it less efficient and less dignified than the campaign being put on by the Republicans. But as the crowds grew larger and larger and more people flocked to my train than showed up around the Dewey train, our opponents began to get worried.

The trip across Ohio from Cincinnati to Cleveland was made in the daytime on the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad, which goes through a whole string of little towns, and the crowds there were immense. Former Governor

[1] There were over one hundred thousand people massed in Cadillac Square and I was encouraged by their response. It was a good start for my campaign.

A President can never get away from the urgent and never-ending duties of his office. A political campaign provides no escape. It increases his burdens, and this was critically true during 1948. The autumn of that year was the worst possible time for me to have to wage a political campaign, for at the same time we were negotiating foreign policy matters with the stubborn and suspicious Russian totalitarian government.

We were rapidly exhausting all traditional avenues of negotiation. The United Nations forum—the organization which had been set up for the exchange of views and the adjustment of differences—was being subverted by the Russians into a propaganda sounding board, and our normal diplomatic channels were being stifled and frustrated by Russian truculence.

A number of special missions of businessmen, industrialists, educators, and top military people yielded nothing toward improving our relations, not even the slightest encouragement that they could be improved. I reviewed in my mind every precedent I could recall in an effort to arrive at some new and more promising approach.

I recalled that in the closing days of World War I there was evidence of considerable strain in British-American relations. For many reasons, mostly trivial, and largely related to our expeditionary forces, a certain coolness toward the British was manifest in several important areas in the United States, notably in Washington, D.C.

Coincident with the development of this mutual cooling off, a distinguished visitor came to the United States and made diplomatic history. He was the Chief Justice of England, Viscount Reading, who, quietly and in a spirit of refreshing candor and directness, managed to melt away most of the tender sore spots.

Lord Reading arrived unheralded and without the benefit of the usual preliminary publicity build-up. He departed just as quietly but behind him he left a much-improved feeling between our two countries. Many people felt then that his timely visit, his complete disassociation from the everyday run of diplomacy and politics, and the manner of the man himself accounted for this uniquely successful mission.

What we most urgently needed, I felt, was a totally new approach—along with the right man to make it. The current political contest for the presidency was a serious handicap, for though the State and Defense Departments were kept out of the campaign, they were at the same time ... my administration. Nor could —

emphasized, the Republicans would soon be giving the farmers and the workers the little end of the stick again. I spoke bluntly and sincerely and warned the people that if they were fools enough to accept the little end again, they deserved it.

I also clarified the issues which the Republicans were trying to make complex for the voters. I talked to them as human beings with real needs and feelings and fears. I talked to them about their jobs, their homes, and the cost of living. I treated them not like crowds of people but like businessmen, tenant farmers, housewives, married veterans, laboring men, teachers—individuals with interests for whom I, as President had a genuine concern.

One of the things I tried to keep out of the campaign was foreign policy. There should be no break in the bi-partisan foreign policy of the United States at any time—particularly during a national election. I even asked that a teletype machine be set up on the Dewey train so that the Republican candidate personally could be informed on all the foreign developments as they progressed, and I did so, because I did not want to encourage the possibility of a partisan, political approach to foreign policy. I saw to it that Dewey received important messages that came to me on the subject of international affairs.

There were many danger spots in our foreign relations at the time. The Jews, Arabs, Egyptians, and Syrians had been fighting a shooting war and I was trying to get an agreement among those people to stop the shooting. Also we were endeavoring in every way we could to get the free countries of Europe in a co-operative mood in order to meet the Soviet threat to take over the free world. We were working for disarmament and for the proper control of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the world and any partisan reversal of policy would have meant turmoil at home and in the rest of the world. I was particularly worried about the effects any such move would have in the rest of the world.

The business of the government went on as usual from aboard the presidential train. As in all of my absences from Washington, long or short, the mail pouches were delivered to me from the White House every day. I always had a regular staff with me so that the White House was wherever the President happened to be. I also held a lot of conversations by telephone over a communications system installed on the train, and I always maintained a complete and close contact with the government.

tle through the United Nations toward the establishment of a climate of peace: that we did not want to force and had no intention of forcing our way of life upon them or anyone else, as we would resist to the utmost any attempt to impose another system upon us; that I wanted to see if we could not understand one another a little better and we had to do something about our poor communications. Surely our side had tried. The Russians must also try if the future of the world and the very survival of civilization were not to be lost.

I pointed out to Vinson that we had made all manner of approaches to the Russians, from Roosevelt to Hull, Hopkins, Davies, Nelson, Hurley, Harriman, Byrnes, and Marshall. Through some of these efforts we had received some hopeful signs, only to have them fade again into suspicion and intransigence. The Russians had tried our patience. But we had kept our tempers and kept trying to get along with them.

In our dealings with the Russians we had learned that we had to lead from strength and that any show of weakness was fatal. But there was never the suggestion of belligerency in our attitude. We made every effort to talk reason and co-operation with them, and we meant it. But for reasons best known to them they either could not, or would not, believe us.

One of our big international issues of the moment was the organization of a setup by the United Nations for the peaceful handling of atomic energy and the wrangling about the key point of inspection was now in full swing at the United Nations meeting in Paris. The uncompromising position which the Russian bloc took on this decisive provision left little hope that we would reach a practical and enforceable international agreement on the control of atomic energy with the Communist bloc.

I told Vinson that the Russian spokesmen were acting as if they intended to wreck any sane proposal for the handling of atomic energy by the United Nations. Perhaps we were not making our position and ourselves clear to the Russian High Command. I warned Vinson that the Russians would not trust either us or themselves to talk freely and frankly. I hoped that this new approach would provide Stalin an opportunity to open up, and I wanted to try it.

Above all, I hoped that Vinson's mission, as an off-channel approach to Stalin, might expose the Russian dictator to a better understanding of our attitude as a people and of our nation's peaceful aspirations for the whole world. I had a

political camp for the reason that identification with Dewey was no asset either

In the meantime, the Wallace Progressives were gathering steam with their shrill campaign of "warmongers" which they directed at both major parties. This was precisely the line of propaganda used by the Communists, and it made for a further irritant in an already bad situation. The Wallace theme of preaching appeasement found emotional response among several minority groups who innocently swallowed the tempting notion of peace at any price. I believe that Wallace himself was a victim of his own naïveté.

It was for these reasons that I found it necessary to interrupt my scheduled activities right at the height of the campaign so as to work out some new approach to the Kremlin in an effort to ease the tensions and to get on with our many unfinished negotiations with the Russians. I thought of sending Chief Justic Fred M. Vinson on a special mission to Moscow for an informal exchange of views and impressions with Stalin.

I telephoned Justice Vinson on Sunday October 3 and asked him to meet with me on a most urgent matter

When Vinson came to the White House, I outlined to him what I had in mind. When I finished, he remained silent for a considerable time. When he spoke, he said he fully understood the gravity of the situation, and that he wished he could undertake this crucial mission, but that if the decision were left solely to him he would be compelled to decline.

Vinson held that the justices should confine themselves to their Court duties and stay out of all side activities, especially in a political year and he added that he, as Chief Justice, could not break his own rule, even on a matter of such overriding importance. I then waited for Vinson to say what I knew he would.

"Mr President," he said, "as Chief Justice I must decline to undertake this mission to Moscow But if you make it as a presidential request, I shall have a clear duty to comply

"I am sorry Fred, to do this to you," I said to him, "but in the interest of the country and the peace of the world I am compelled to request you to go."

Vinson s response was "I'll be ready in a few days."

This was the situation as I presented it to Chief Justice Vinson

The Russians simply did not understand—or *would* not—our peaceful intentions and our genuine desire to co-oper

Sunday evening and we reached an agreement on the scope of the mission, the timing, the clearances, and the press statement.

Sunday afternoon I instructed Press Secretary Charlie Ross to notify the networks to allocate a half hour for a public statement of major importance. I also alerted the Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, to make the necessary preparations for clearances with Stalin to receive Vinson on arrival in Moscow and told him that I was preparing a personal message to Stalin regarding Vinson. I further instructed those involved in the undertaking to maintain the strictest confidence and to take every possible precaution against premature leaks to the press.

But before the complicated international machinery could be coordinated and all clearances obtained, there was an unfortunate leak to an unfriendly newspaper and a big outcry of "appeasement," "politics," "unilateral action" was picked by other newspapers and press services. The Vinson mission was severely embarrassed before it could even be fully explored with all the powers concerned. Most of the outcry by the press was, as usual, the result of poor information, half-truths, and deliberate distortion of the facts.

Following the premature publication of the proposed Vinson mission to Moscow a number of complications set in that compelled me to reconsider the advisability of this mission. I had a talk with Secretary Marshall in Paris and found him upset over the misinterpretations by other delegates of the purpose of this mission. It seemed that there had developed a feeling that by this move I was circumventing the United Nations, which would tend to undermine their prestige and their authority. This was precisely what I wanted to avoid and why I insisted that great care be taken to clear with all governments concerned before formally announcing the nature and purpose of the Vinson mission.

But the damage was done. There was no longer any use in going ahead with this project. I thereupon summoned Secretary Marshall to return to Washington for a meeting with me to repair some of the damage and used the occasion to clarify some of the speculations that had risen in the wake of the now much-talked-about mission.

Following my conference with Secretary Marshall, I issued a statement which set forth the facts and helped to clear away many misunderstandings concerning the mission.

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"General Marshall has returned to Washington at my request, this statement read, "to report to me on the progress

of the work of the various United Nations bodies in Paris. I had a long talk with him this morning, and again this afternoon he gave me a detailed picture of what has been taking place in Paris, and we discussed questions relating to the future course of this Government in the various matters at issue.

"With regard to the report published in the morning's press concerning a possible journey of Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow the facts are as follows On last Tuesday when I communicated with Secretary Marshall, I told him of my continuing great desire to see peace firmly established in the world, and of my particular concern at this time over the attitude taken by the Soviet representatives regarding the atomic problem. I said that I was wondering whether their attitude did not reflect a misunderstanding in the minds of the Soviet leaders so serious, from the standpoint of world peace in general, that we would be remiss if we left undone anything that might conceivably serve to dispel it. I asked the Secretary whether he felt that a useful purpose would be served by sending to Moscow Chief Justice Vinson, in an effort to make the Soviet leaders understand the seriousness and sincerity of the feelings of the people of the United States about these matters. Secretary Marshall described to me the situation which we faced in Paris, and, in the light of his report and the possibilities of misunderstanding to which any unilateral action, however desirable otherwise, could lead at present, I decided not to take this step.

"My talk with Secretary Marshall has been gratifying to me. I was glad to hear his report of the unity which has prevailed between ourselves and the French and British representatives in Paris in all phases of the handling of the Berlin crisis, and of the earnest efforts being made by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations to find solutions to many of the other problems which have been troubling people everywhere. I was glad to be able to assure him of the determination with which people in this country are supporting our efforts to find the road to peace."

There was a speech I was scheduled to make before the American Legion Convention in Miami in October. In this I planned to cover the essence of the Vinson mission and I wanted to use the occasion for a major foreign policy speech. I also wanted to use the occasion to overcome any damage the Wallace campaign may have caused in stirring up among some of the minority groups the feeling that this administra-

tion was not doing all it could in the interest of peace. They were distorting for political purposes the facts about our efforts for peace and our foreign policy. They were dangerously wrong—and their falsehood in branding the administration as warmongering was harmful. The Vinson mission would have served also to spike this political maneuver.

In the speech before the American Legion I said:

"Unfortunately—and I say that advisedly—unfortunately a dark fog of distrust has risen between the Soviet Union and the West, distorting and confusing our relations. It is clear that little progress is likely to be made in settling disputes between the western powers and Soviet Russia, so long as there is so much distrust.

"If that distrust is to be dispelled, there needs to be evidence of long-range peaceful purposes—evidence that will enable the world to shake off the fear of war, reduce the burden of armaments, and concentrate on useful economic activities.

"In recently considering sending a special emissary to Moscow my purpose was to ask Premier Stalin's cooperation in dispelling the present poisonous atmosphere of distrust which now surrounds the negotiations between the western powers and the Soviet Union. My emissary was to convey the seriousness and sincerity of the people of the United States in their desire for peace.

"This proposal had no relation to existing negotiations within the scope of the United Nations or the Council of Foreign Ministers. Far from cutting across these negotiations, the purpose of this mission was to improve the atmosphere in which they must take place and so help in producing fruitful and peaceful results.

"At this time, I want to make it perfectly clear that I have not departed one step from my determination to utilize every opportunity to work for peace. Whenever an appropriate opportunity arises, I shall act to further the interests of peace within the framework of our relations with our allies and the work of the United Nations.

"I am working for peace, and I shall continue to work for peace.

"Both we and the Soviet Union have a fundamental job to do—the job of raising the living standards of our peoples.

"We must remember that many a serious crisis has in the past been resolved without war. We must remember that the struggle for existence among nations, as among individual men, goes on all the time, and expresses itself in many ways

other than war. We must remember that rivalry among nations is an old story. History shows that rival powers can exist peacefully in the world.

"Patience must be our watchword. When the destiny of all mankind is at stake, we need to exercise all the patience we can muster. We should utilize every opportunity to strengthen the United Nations for the great undertakings which lie ahead.

"The people of the world are looking to their leaders to dispel the fog of distrust which now confuses the approach to peace. At the present moment, I would only add that our nation has never failed to meet the great crises of its history with honor and devotion to its ideals."

The reaction of the delegates of the Legion convention was surprisingly warm. The reaction of the country as a whole was equally encouraging. It soon became apparent that a great many people who had been attracted to the Wallace peace offensive had thought the better of it and now began to realize that the prospects for peace were to be best served in the hands of this Democratic administration.

I felt all along that, although the Vinson mission and its high purpose turned out to be a casualty brought about by a hostile press, it still had a practical use. Although I think it would have been better for the mission to have been consummated, still there was a meaning that was implicit in this undertaking that said for all to hear and know that we would do anything that was honorable and practicable to pursue peaceful negotiations without, of course, "going it alone" or attempting to function outside the United Nations.

Even during the height of the campaign I would not alter these basic attitudes on our foreign policy to be suppressed or submerged. And the operations of our government had to be maintained without disruption. There was a complete White House staff on the job in Washington, and the members of the Cabinet went right on with their business, keeping in constant communication with me. Very few members of my Cabinet made any political speeches unless they were asked something specific on a subject relating to their departments.

As the campaign gathered speed, I stepped up my schedule of the whistle stops. In all, I traveled about 31,700 miles and delivered more than three hundred speeches—356, to be exact. I was used to hard work, and my job was cut out for me. I campaigned for thirty-five days and averaged about ten speeches every day. On one single day I delivered sixteen

Twelve to fifteen million people gathered in big crowds and small groups along the railroad junctions and stops from one end of the country to the other. Sometimes I would bring Mrs. Truman and Margaret, who were making their first tour with me, out on the rear platform to meet the crowds. At other times I would speak for a few minutes alone before the train started off for the next stop.

My one-man crusade took effect. The people responded with increasing enthusiasm as the day of election neared. I never doubted that they would vote for me, although my advisers were still not optimistic and the polls continued to hack away at my chances of getting elected. I believed that when the people learned the facts for themselves they would make the right decisions, that people still prefer to make up their own minds about candidates upon the basis of direct observation, despite all the claims of how society depends today upon newspapers, radio, and other media of communication.

On October 31 1948, I returned from the bedlam of the longest and hardest political campaign of my career to the restful quiet of my home in Independence. The tumultuous weeks of speechmaking, handshaking, and traveling day and night had culminated in St. Louis the night before in a tremendous rally I felt that I had given the voters a clearer view of the choice before them and that the response from the grass roots of America was so great that it would carry me back to the White House for four years as an elected President.

The following day which was the eve of the election, I made two more speeches. The first was a non-political address to members of the Ararat Shrine in the Kansas City Auditorium during the afternoon. That night I spoke from the living room of my home to about seventy million Americans listening over the four major radio networks. I was introduced by vice-presidential candidate Barkley who spoke from his home in Paducah, Kentucky

This was my final appeal to the voters to decide between the principles of the party for the people and the party for the special interests. I warned the nation that their vote would not be just for one man or another but would affect every person and his family for years to come.

With this, I was through. There was nothing to do but wait for the results.

At four-thirty in the afternoon on Election Day Jim Row-

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had been Ohio and California, which had fluctuated throughout the night until the late counting of votes had put them in the Democratic column to stay. Without Ohio and California, I would have been assured of only 254 electoral votes, twelve less than the required 266.

The 1948 election proved the pollsters and forecasters so wrong and unreliable that to this day their reputations have not been fully restored and their influence is much reduced. It was almost universally predicted, right up to the last minute, that I would lose the election. Then it was predicted that, because no candidate would receive a majority of electoral votes, the election would be thrown into the House of Representatives.

What I tried to do in 1948, as always, was to make a living, going Democratic party that stood and fought for human rights. I wanted to keep it a party that represented the common people, no matter how it was maligned or how many attempts were made to destroy it from within. The effort succeeded in spite of the two splinter groups, and won with almost a majority of the popular vote.

The greatest achievement was winning without the extreme radicals in the party and without the Solid South. It is customary for a politician to say that he wants all the votes he can get, but I was happy and pleased to be elected to the presidency by a Democratic party that did not depend upon either the extreme left-wing or the southern bloc. And of course I did not want the reactionary votes which went for my Republican opponent. The fundamental purpose of the campaign in 1948 was to put the Democratic party on its own feet and to leave it intact. This was achieved.

It was a historic victory for the party. The Democrats recaptured the Republican House by a landslide and obtained control of the Senate. My long campaign against the Eightieth Congress had convinced the voters that a turnover was necessary and I was given an overwhelmingly Democratic Congress to replace the one which had blocked the administration's domestic program for two years.

Two days after the election the presidential special train took me to Washington. There was a great demonstration in the Union Station in St. Louis, and when I arrived in the capital city one of the largest crowds I have ever seen in Washington took part in a "home-coming" celebration.

As the Vice-President-elect and I rode up Pennsylvania Avenue to the plaudits of immense crowds, I saw a sign on the front of the Washington Post Building which said, "Mr.

ley and Henry Nicholson, who were first and second in command of the White House Secret Service detail, drove with me from my home down to the Elms Hotel at Excelsior Springs, Missouri, a resort about thirty miles northeast of Kansas City. We had slipped away from the reporters, who spent the rest of the night trying to find me. They kept telephoning my family at Independence, hoping to get some information. At Excelsior Springs, after taking a Turkish bath, I went upstairs to my room at six-thirty, had a ham sandwich and a glass of milk, turned on the radio to listen to some of the eastern returns, and then went to bed. I was reported some thousands ahead.

I awoke at midnight and again listened to the radio broadcast of Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn. I was about 1,200,000 ahead on the count but, according to this broadcaster, was still undoubtedly beaten.

About four o'clock in the morning Rowley came into my room and advised me to tune in again on Kaltenborn's broadcast. I did so, and learned that at that time I was over 2,000,000 ahead, but the commentator continued to say he couldn't see how I could be elected.

I told Rowley and Nicholson that we had better go back to Kansas City because it looked very much as if we were in for another four years, and we arrived in Kansas City at about six o'clock Wednesday morning, November 3. At ten-thirty I received a telegram from Governor Dewey congratulating me on my election.

The final figures showed that I had received 24,105,695 votes, carrying twenty-eight states. Dewey had 21,969,170 votes, carrying sixteen states. Wallace and Thurmond polled slightly over 1,000,000 votes each. I lost four of the southern states to the Dixiecrats—South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. But I carried all thirteen of the country's biggest cities and the seven large agricultural states—Missouri, California, Iowa, Illinois, Texas, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. If it had not been for the half million American Labor party votes which went to Wallace in New York State, I would have beaten Dewey in his own state by a majority of about 300,000. As it was, he carried New York by only 61,000 votes.

My majority in the electoral college was greater than my popular majority. I had 304 electoral votes (it was finally 303 because one fell out in Tennessee), despite the loss of 38 votes to Thurmond in South Carolina 8, Mississippi 9, Alabama 11, and Louisiana 10. The key states in the election

had been Ohio and California, which had fluctuated throughout the night until the late counting of votes had put them in the Democratic column to stay. Without Ohio and California, I would have been assured of only 254 electoral votes, twelve less than the required 266.

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President, we are ready to eat crow whenever you are ready to serve it."

I sent that great newspaper word that I did not want anyone to eat crow that I was not elated or in a mood myself to crow over anyone. I said I felt the tremendous responsibility that was mine for the next four years, and that I hoped for the support of all the people in carrying out the program which I thought they had entrusted me to accomplish.

On arriving at the White House, I had a Cabinet meeting and a series of conferences to plan immediate repeal of the Taft Hartley Act, as promised in the campaign. There was much work to be done, and I was eager to get on with it. On the advice of the White House physician, however I left Washington on November 7 for a two weeks rest in Key West but continued to hold daily conferences with the new Vice-President-elect and with other party leaders to outline the program to go before the Eighty-first Congress in January 1949

# CHAPTER 16

My thoughts kept going back, as I approached Inauguration day, to someone I particularly wanted near me but who would not be there. I wished that my mother had lived long enough to see me sworn in as an elected President.

A year and a half ago, on July 25, 1947, serious news reached me from my mother's home in Grandview, Missouri.

More than five months earlier she had fallen and had broken her right hip. She was ninety-four at the time, and it was plain that the injury was serious. Nevertheless, the first reports were good, and we confidently hoped for her recovery. Twice previously—once when she was eighty-eight and again when she was ninety—she had recovered from similar but lesser fractures of her left hip. Now, however, recovery was slow.

I visited her within two days of the accident, and twice again in the months that followed—once for twelve days when she took a turn for the worse. And of course I kept constantly in touch with her through my sister Mary, my brother Vivian, and her physicians. My own physician, too, Brigadier General Wallace Graham, saw her frequently.

At first the reports were excellent, and it was felt that she could be out of bed in six weeks or so. In May, however, her condition took a turn for the worse, and it was then that I spent twelve days with her in Grandview. By May 30, however, she was better again and all of us were reassured. In the weeks that followed, her condition improved. She sat up now and again, and before the end of June, Mary reported that she was "getting along fine," though the fracture was healing very slowly. On July 12 she was "feeling much better" after having been kept in bed for several days, and on the sixteenth Dr. Graham, who had gone to Grandview to see her and to consult with her physicians, reported that she was recovering from the setback of the week before and that he would return to Washington.

Now, however, a new and adverse report had come. Dr.

Margaret, and I were the guests of honor at a gala concert and show staged by the Inaugural Committee. It was late when we returned to Blair House.

Inauguration day January 20, 1949 started with a breakfast with ninety-seven veterans of Battery D, which I commanded in France in 1918. These friends of World War I crowded around me, shaking my hand and calling me "Mr. President" until I put a stop to it. "We'll have none of that here, I told them, and insisted that they call me "Captain Harry" as they had done in the Argonne thirty years before.

Our former regimental chaplain, Monsignor L. Curtis Tiernan, said grace before that breakfast, and then, with thirty years of memories to recount, we paid far less attention to our orange juice and our country ham, our hominy grits and fried eggs, than to each other. We fought the war again, as veterans always do, and reminded each other of endless happenings that would no doubt have seemed very unimportant to anyone but ourselves. I reminded them of the part they were to play in the inaugural parade. Despite their lack of uniforms, they were to be a kind of "guard of honor" for me and were to march in two long lines beside my car all the way from the Capitol to the reviewing stand before the White House. No one knew better than I that they were not the physical specimens they had been three decades earlier but "I'm sure, I told them, "that you can still make 120 steps a minute for a mile and a quarter." Before I left, they sang a special song or two that had been composed for the occasion by one of their number—Eugene Donnelly of Kansas City—and then they presented me with a handsome gold-handled ebony cane which I promised faithfully to use every morning on my daily walk.

Even on inauguration day there is work a President must do, and I went from that breakfast to my office at the White House. Then, having returned to Blair House, Mrs. Truman, Margaret, and I, together with Senator Barkley, Chief Justice Vinson, and some of the members of the Cabinet, drove around Lafayette Park to St. John's Episcopal Church, where we attended an impressive ten o'clock service. Afterward we returned once more to Blair House, and then the Joint Committee of Congress arrived to escort me to the Capitol.

The oath-taking ceremony—first that of the Vice-President and after that, as has long been customary, that of the President—was scheduled for noon, but in the rotunda of the Capitol the gathering of diplomats, members of Congress,

fred, referred to the false philosophy which had made such headway throughout the world, misleading many peoples and adding to their sorrows and their difficulties.

"That false philosophy," I said, "is Communism.

"Communism is based on the belief that man is so weak and inadequate that he is unable to govern himself and therefore requires the rule of strong masters.

"Democracy is based on the conviction that man has the moral and intellectual capacity as well as the inalienable right to govern himself with reason and justice.

"Communism subjects the individual to arrest without lawful cause, punishment without trial, and forced labor as a chattel of the state. It decrees what information he shall receive, what art he shall produce, what leaders he shall follow and what thoughts he shall think.

"Democracy maintains that government is established for the benefit of the individual, and is charged with the responsibility of protecting the rights of the individual and his freedom in the exercise of those abilities of his.

I then spoke of our hopes for the future—of the possibilities for world improvement that lay within the scope of the United Nations, the European Recovery Program, and other measures aimed at the betterment of life all about the world.

"We must embark on a bold new program," I said, "for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.

I proposed four important major courses of action. The first was continued support for the United Nations and its related agencies; second, a continuation of the program for world economic recovery; third, strengthening of the freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression.

"More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery," I said in outlining the fourth point. "Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.

"For the first time in history humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.

"The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for the assistance of other people are limited. But our imponderable resources

"Our allies," I pointed out, "are the millions who hunger and thirst after righteousness.

"In due time, as our stability becomes manifest, as more and more nations come to know the benefits of democracy and to participate in growing abundance, I believe that those countries which now oppose us will abandon their delusions and join with the free nations of the world in a just settlement of international differences.

"Events have brought our American democracy to new influence and new responsibilities. They will test our courage, our devotion to duty, and our concept of liberty.

"Steadfast in our faith in the Almighty, we will advance toward a world where man's freedom is secure. To that end we will devote our strength, our resources, and our firmness of resolve. With God's help the future of mankind will be assured in a world of justice, harmony, and peace."

At twelve-thirty the ceremony was ended, and with Vice-President Barkley beside me, I entered the leading car in the long parade down Pennsylvania Avenue.

In my inaugural address I wanted to make it clear that lasting freedom and independence cannot be achieved among free nations unless they possess the means to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose totalitarian regimes upon them. The seeds of such regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the soil of poverty and discontent. They reach their full growth when the hope of the people for a better life has died.

We could not falter in accepting the responsibilities of leadership which had fallen to us. On March 12, 1947, I had asked the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey, both threatened by Soviet power. I had also asked the Congress, at the request of those countries, to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey to assist in reconstruction and to supervise the use of such materials as would be furnished.

The assistance then asked amounted to little more than one tenth of one percent of the \$341,000,000,000 the United States had contributed toward the winning of World War II. It was common sense that we should safeguard this investment.

The American people have always been traditionally altruistic, and the spirit of neighborliness has been a characteristic of our society since the earliest days, even when there

for the first time in my inaugural address. "We must embark on a bold new program," I announced, "for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."

Thus was launched what came to be universally known, within a matter of months, as the "Point Four program," because it was the fourth of the four important courses of action set forth in the inaugural address.

To call the undertaking a "bold new program" was no exaggeration. It was an adventurous idea such as had never before been proposed by any country in the history of the world. Its announcement on January 20, 1949 created a great deal of interest and excitement, and my answers at a press conference six days later re-emphasized both the novelty and the boldness of the plan.

"Mr. President," I was asked, "can you give us any background on the origin of Point Four?"

"The origin of Point Four has been in my mind," I replied, "and in the minds of the government, for the past two or three years, ever since the Marshall Plan was inaugurated. It originated with the Greece and Turkey proposition. Been studying it ever since. I spend most of my time going over to that globe back there, trying to figure out ways to make peace in the world."

"Can you tell us," I was asked, "how you are going to implement it?"

"It's a policy of the Administration over the next four years," I replied, "and it's something that will have to be implemented generally. I have asked the Secretary of State to get together with the heads of the Departments of the Government, and try to work out preliminary plans for an approach to it. I can't tell you just what is going to take place, where it is going to take place, or how it is going to take place. I know what I want to do."

I knew from my study of American history that this country was developed by the investment of foreign capital by the British, the Dutch, the Germans, and the French. These countries invested immense sums in the development of our railroads, mines, oil lands, and the livestock industry. This included ranches, cattle breeding, and the packing industry. The first packing house west of the Mississippi River was built by a Frenchman, a count in Napoleon's army.

After two world wars, in each of which the United States was used as a source of supply for munitions and materials by

develop their own resources. The principal item of expenditure would be the skill of our technicians teaching these people how to help themselves.

In this country we had both the capital and the technical "know-how." I did not see how we could follow any other course but to put these two great assets to work in the underdeveloped areas in order to help them elevate their own standards of living and thus move in the direction of world-wide prosperity and peace. The alternative, as I saw it, was to continue to allow those vast areas to drift toward poverty, despair, fear, and the other miseries of mankind which breed unending wars.

The Point Four program was a practical expression of our attitude toward the countries threatened by Communist domination. It was consistent with our policies of preventing the expansion of Communism in the free world by helping to insure the proper development of those countries with adequate food, clothing, and living facilities. It was an effort to bring to such people not the idealism of democracy alone, but the tangible benefits of better living through intelligent co-operation.

Thus the plan was realistic as well as idealistic. Common sense told me that the development of these countries would keep our own industrial plant in business for untold generations. The resources of such areas as Mesopotamia, Iran, India, North Africa, and huge sections of South America have hardly been touched, and their development would be as beneficial to American trade as to the areas themselves. It would enable the peoples of many areas to subsist on trade and not aid.

This, then, was the idea which I broached at the outset of my second term. It was generally recognized and accepted as a good idea. The next problem was to make it work.

I immediately instituted a series of conferences on the subject of how best to implement the Point Four program and ordered the Secretary of State to direct the planning necessary to translate the program into action. The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Willard L. Thorp, was designated to co-ordinate the planning of the program, and interdepartmental consultations were set up through a Committee on Economic Foreign Policy.

In developing the program, I made it clear that all existing private and governmental activities would be utilized. American business enterprises overseas and private non-profit organizations such as the Rockefeller Institute or the Institute of

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ers to prevail in these areas, and particularly in the Far East, that their people experience in their own lives the benefits of scientific and economic advances."

The message pointed out that this program would require the movement of large amounts of capital from the industrial nations, particularly from the United States, to productive uses in the backward areas, that recent world events made prompt action imperative.

"This program," I said, "is in the interest of all peoples—and it has nothing in common with either the old imperialism of the last century or the new imperialism of the Communists."

The plan was laid before the United Nations early that year and in the first official act taken on the Point Four idea, the United Nations Economic and Social Council endorsed the program on March 4, 1949, and drafted some provisions which were adopted later in the year.

It was not until June 5, 1950, however, that Point Four became a reality. On that date I signed the act to provide foreign economic assistance which was passed by the second session of the Eighty-first Congress. Point Four was embodied in this act as Title IV, the "Act for International Development." The same legislation included also the Economic Cooperation Act of 1950, the China Area Aid Act of 1950, the United Nations Palestine Refugees Aid Act of 1950, and the International Children's Welfare Work Act of 1950.

Among the appropriations authorized for these various purposes was $34,500,000 for the technical assistance program. Specific appropriations were contained in the General Appropriation Act of 1951, approved on September 6, 1950.

The sum appropriated for technical assistance was small in comparison with the need and was ten and a half million dollars less than the minimum requested. But it was a beginning, and already Point Four had become a symbol of hope to those nations which were being fed Communist propaganda that the free nations were incapable of providing a decent standard of living for the millions of people in the underdeveloped areas of the earth. This money, together with the contributions of other countries, would have a cumulative effect in promoting the well-being of such people.

Pursuant to the Act for International Development, an Executive Order was issued on September 8, 1950, delegating to the Secretary of State the responsibility for carrying out the Point Four program and establishing the International Development Advisory Board. This Board was set up for

development of fibers and insecticides, were given an important place in the Point Four program.

By the end of 1951 Point Four had been extended to thirty-three countries, and the State of the Union message of January 9 1952, summarized the progress of the program, pointing out that during the year the United States had made available millions of bushels of wheat to relieve the famine in India. But far more important in the long run, I said, was the work which Americans were doing in India to help the farmers themselves raise more grain.

"This is our Point Four program at work. It is working, not only in India, but in Iran and Paraguay and Liberia—in thirty-three countries around the globe. Our technical missionaries are out there. We need more of them. We need more funds to speed their efforts, because there is nothing of greater importance in all our foreign policy. There is nothing that shows more clearly what we stand for and what we want to achieve.

As the value of the plan became clearer to the Congress, subsequent laws were passed authorizing and providing funds for its operations. For the fiscal year 1952, the budget was expanded from the original appropriation of $34,500,000 to $147,900,000, and for the fiscal year 1953 this amount was increased to $155,600,000.

Changes in personnel and organization were made necessary in 1952, but the program continued to grow in scope and activity. After Dr. Bennett's death, Stanley Andrews, a former official of the Department of Agriculture, became director of the program. Rockefeller resigned at the close of 1951 to devote his attention to private administration of technical assistance and was succeeded in January 1952 by Eric A. Johnston, former Administrator of the Economic Stabilization Agency.

Under the consolidation of current aid programs in 1952 technical and economic assistance in Southeast Asia and the Pacific was placed under the Mutual Security Agency headed by Averell Harriman, while the Technical Cooperation Administration of the State Department continued to administer economic and technical assistance in the Middle East, South Asia, the American republics, and the independent states of Africa.

At the time I left the presidency in January 1953 the Point Four program had been in operation less than thirty months. During that short period the program had relieved famine measurably in many portions of the world, had re-

the purpose of considering desirable plans for accomplishing the objectives and policies of the Point Four program. Nelson Rockfeller became the first chairman of the Board.

Soon after the responsibility for the implementation of the program had been delegated to the State Department, the technical staff which was assembled by the Secretary of State became known as the Technical Cooperation Administration. On November 14 1950 I appointed Dr Henry Garland Bennett as Administrator of the TCA. A former college president, Dr Bennett had distinguished himself in three assignments abroad for the federal government. In 1945 he had gone to Quebec as a United States delegate to the first session of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. In 1949 he had been in Germany on an agricultural survey mission for the United States Army of Occupation. In April of 1950 he had acted as adviser to the government of Ethiopia on the organization of an agricultural training center along the lines of American land-grant colleges.

Dr Bennett was the guiding spirit of the actual working out of the Point Four program until his untimely death in an airplane accident in Iran hardly more than a year later. His death was a terrible loss to Point Four. He knew the world situation in every corner of it by actual contact. He had the full concepts of TCA at his fingertips.

Thus, within two years after the inaugural address, the minimum machinery for getting the Point Four program under way was put together and ready to go into operation.

We lost no time. In March 1951 barely six months after the first Point Four budget was approved by the Congress, about 350 technicians were at work on more than a hundred technical co-operation projects in twenty-seven countries. Thirty-five governments in Latin America, Africa, and Asia had asked the United States Government for specific help in solving their problems through the Point Four program.

Also by March of 1951 there were 236 Point Four trainees from thirty four countries in the United States for advanced study and plans were under way to bring in many more during the next six months.

By the end of March the United States had concluded Point Four general agreements with twenty-two countries in the less developed areas of the world. Primary emphasis was put on food supply since food is a *key to all production*. Other projects contributing to food supply such as prevention of disease, basic and vocational education, transportation,

development of fibers and insecticides, were given an important place in the Point Four program.

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duced the incidence of diseases that keep many areas poverty-stricken, and had set many nations on the path of rising living standards by their own efforts and by the work of their own nationals.

For example, Chimbote, Peru, a pesthole of malaria for generations, was virtually free of it. The incidence of malaria in the Shan States of Burma was cut from fifty per cent to ten per cent. A typhus epidemic in Bukan, Iran, was checked and the disease stamped out. Entire school systems emphasizing vocational and technical training went into operation in various countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

A monetary fiscal, and banking system was introduced in Saudi Arabia. Schools of medicine, public health, and nursing were set up in several countries. A 75 000-acre irrigation project in the Artibonite Valley of Haiti got under way. A great multi-purpose hydroelectric plant was constructed in the Mexican state of Michoacán. Irrigation projects in Jordan were started to create 120,000 acres of arable land providing homes and six-and-a-quarter-acre tracts for 21,000 families consisting of 105 000 individuals.

Demonstrations of improved seed achieved high yields in Iran, particularly in the Ardebil-Moghan area of Azerbaijan, where the first crop in four years was harvested as a result of an emergency program of planting and culture advice. Egyptian farmers were supplied with tractors to aid in converting three million acres of desert, which had resulted from overgrazing, into arable land. In India fifty-five rural development projects were launched to raise food production, provide potable water foster irrigation, introduce fertilizer, teach reading and writing, devise better tools, improve village workshops, and better the forms of landownership.

Some 2,445 United States technicians in thirty-five countries were putting such programs as these into effect. Thirty-four of those countries sent 2,862 of their most promising young specialists abroad, mostly to this country as trainees for post-graduate training in their specialties. They and the technicians they train in turn, release the American technical missionaries for pioneer work in other fields.

We found that even in countries which were anti-American the relations between United States technicians and their local counterparts were excellent. The program in action had the effect of disarming hostile propagandists and in discouraging the advance of both Communism and extreme nationalism.

There were, of course, some great difficulties encountered in the implementation of the program. Chief among these was the attempt, both at home and abroad, by selfish interests to change the character of the program by shifting the emphasis from technical assistance to financial aid. Point Four was not conceived as a lending program or as a giveaway plan. Its basic aim is to spread knowledge that will aid others to improve themselves.

The American taxpayers, who approved the Point Four program, showed their general support of the plan from the beginning. There was little or no opposition in the press to this effort of the government to help other countries to help themselves. The only dangerous threat to the continued success of the plan, as I saw it, was that which might come from the reactionaries and isolationists.

It is a program which requires vision. It has been estimated that an improvement of only two per cent in the living standards of Asia and Africa would keep the industrial plants of the United States, Great Britain, and France going at full tilt for a century just to keep up with the increased demand for goods and services.

Only America could undertake such a unique approach to world affairs. Our population, unlike that of other great nations, is made up of strains from every population around the world, and when we became the most powerful nation in the world, we tried to put into effect the ideals of all races and nationalities which we had written into the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.

The American approach to world affairs was best demonstrated by the manner in which we treated conquered nations after the first and second world wars. We set up the means to feed and clothe and take care of the physical needs of the people. We rehabilitated the conquered nations instead of attempting to keep them conquered and prostrate. We asked for no reparations.

This was something new in the history of nations. The traditional practice had always been for the conqueror to strip the defeated countries and to make off with whatever spoils were available. Our idea has been to restore the conquered nations of Germany Italy and Japan to prosperity in the hope that they would understand the futility of aggression as a means of expansion and progress. We had to refute the historic claim that a nation must use aggression and military means to gain markets.

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The satellite countries of Russia are the unhappiest places

# CHAPTER 17

On April 4, 1949 I stood by Secretary of State Dean Acheson as he signed his name, on behalf of the United States, to a treaty which was the first peacetime military alliance concluded by the United States since the adoption of the Constitution. Earlier in our history (before the Constitution was written) the colonies had signed a military alliance with France. The document Acheson signed was the North Atlantic Treaty and the occasion was the closing ceremonial event of a historic meeting, held in the auditorium of the Department of Labor in Washington, D.C.

The North Atlantic Treaty was one more step in the evolution of our foreign policy along with the United Nations Charter, the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, and the Marshall Plan. Because of the Marshall Plan, the economy of western Europe began, within a short time, to show evidence of recovery. But the problems of Europe were not only economic. There was fear of aggression and, therefore, lack of confidence in the future. A large volume of European capital had been transferred abroad before and during World War II, and this was now needed in western Europe to rebuild its cities and its industries. Capital, however, was not likely to flow to countries threatened by Communist conquest.

In 1947 and 1948 the Communists were pushing hard in Europe. Even as the Marshall Plan was being launched, they captured the government of Hungary. This was the first seizure of a government by Communists which was openly supported by Russia since the fighting had stopped in Europe. The following month the Kremlin ordered Czechoslovakia and Poland to call off their participation in the Marshall Plan.

In early 1948 still another series of events jarred the free world. In Czechoslovakia, which had so long been the stronghold of democracy in central Europe, a ruthless Communist leadership backed by the Russian Army at the border demanded the full powers of government. President Eduard

Beneš, the able successor to the great Masaryk, held out for four days before yielding to the pressure. On February 25 1948 however democratic Czechoslovakia, for the second time in less than nine years, fell under the heel of totalitarianism Two weeks later Jan Masaryk, son of the founder of the Czech republic and a close friend and associate of many statesmen in the countries of western Europe, died in Prague under mysterious circumstances that suggested foul play His death was a dramatic symbol of the tragic end of freedom in his nation.

In Poland, where Russian armies had set up a Communist government at the end of the war the Russians now dropped all pretext of Polish sovereignty A Russian Red Army marshal was sent to take over the Polish Army At about the same time, Stalin "invited" little Finland to sign a "pact of friendship" with the Soviet Union. There were threats of what would happen if the "invitation" was not accepted. To the people in Europe, who were just beginning to take courage from the Marshall Plan, these Communist moves looked like the beginning of a Russian "big push."

I had planned to deliver an address on the menace of Communism on March 17 1948 at a St. Patrick's Day observance in New York. The grave events in Europe were moving so swiftly however that I felt it necessary to report to the nation first through Congress. Therefore, I asked Speaker Joseph W Martin to arrange for me to address a joint session of the Congress, suggesting March 17 as the date.

"Almost three years have elapsed" I told the Congress, "since the end of the greatest of all wars, but peace and stability have not returned to the world. We were well aware that the end of the fighting would not automatically settle the problems arising out of the war The establishment of peace after the fighting is over has always been a difficult task. And even if all the Allies of World War II were united in their desire to establish a just and honorable peace, there would still be great difficulties in the way of achieving that peace.

"But the situation in the world today is not primarily the result of natural difficulties which follow a great war It is chiefly due to the fact that one nation has not only refused to cooperate in the establishment of a just and honorable peace, but—even worse—has actively sought to prevent it.

"One nation has persistently obstructed the work of the United Nations by constant abuse of the veto.

"But that is not all Since the close of the hostilities, the Soviet Union and its agents have destroyed the independence

and democratic character of a whole series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe.

"It is this ruthless course of action, and the design to extend it to the remaining free nations of Europe, that have brought about the critical situation in Europe today.

"The tragic death of the Republic of Czechoslovakia has sent a shock throughout the civilized world. Now pressure is being brought to bear on Finland, to the hazard of the entire Scandinavian peninsula. Greece is under direct military attack from rebels actively supported by her Communist dominated neighbors. In Italy a determined and aggressive effort is being made by a Communist minority to take control of that country. The methods vary but the pattern is all too clear.

"Faced with this growing menace, there have been encouraging signs that the free nations of Europe are drawing closer together for their economic well-being and for the common defense of their liberties.

"At the very moment I am addressing you, five nations of the European community in Brussels, are signing a 50-year agreement for economic cooperation and common defense against aggression.

"This action has great significance, for this agreement was not imposed by the decree of a powerful neighbor. It was the free choice of independent governments representing the will of their people, and acting within the terms of the Charter of the United Nations.

"Its significance goes far beyond the actual terms of the agreement itself. It is a notable step in the direction of unity in Europe for protection and preservation of its civilization. This development deserves our full support. I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to protect themselves."

I then urged the Congress to complete legislative action on the European Recovery Program and to provide for a strengthening of national defense through universal military training and the restoration of Selective Service.

That evening my speech to the Society of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick in New York struck the same note:

"Free men in every land are asking: 'Where is this leading? When will it end?'

"I can bring you tonight no simple or easy answer.

"But I can express my firm conviction that, at this moment in history the faith and strength of the United States are mighty forces for the prevention of war and the establishment of peace.

"Our faith and our strength must be made unmistakably clear to the world."

Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary had informed Secretary of State Marshall as early as January 13, 1948, that England was planning to approach France and the so-called Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) with a proposal for a series of bilateral defense agreements. The pattern he had in mind was that of the Dunkirk Treaty a postwar agreement by which Great Britain and France had agreed to come to each other's defense in case of renewed German aggression.

General Marshall brought Bevin's message to me. I thought it was a good beginning—a step in the right direction. If the countries of western Europe were ready to organize for their joint defense, that would be an important contribution to the peace of the world.

Bevin in his message had asked what our attitude would be toward this new alliance. I authorized Marshall to inform the British Foreign Secretary that we agreed with them on the urgent need for concerted measures by the nations of western Europe As in the case of the European Recovery Program, we welcomed European initiative and would give their undertaking our wholehearted sympathy the United States would do anything it properly could to assist the European nations to bring this or a similar project to fulfillment.

With this backing from the United States, Bevin approached the French and the Benelux countries. It was from the three small nations that a counterproposal came for one regional arrangement rather than a series of two-party treaties. M. Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister was largely responsible for this change and it was in this form that the treaty was made. I think to Spaak goes the credit for lining up the Europeans for the treaty

But even as the Brussels Pact was signed, it was clear that it would take a far more important political act to dispel the fears and to restore full confidence among the western European nations. The State Department had already made some extensive studies and drawn up lists of possible courses of action. In my own mind there was no doubt that much more

would have to be done in order to bolster Europe's will to resist—and to recover.

But I always kept in mind the lesson of Wilson's failure in 1920. I meant to have legislative co-operation. Our European friends apparently remembered the League of Nations too; they were most anxious to have not only a presidential declaration of policy but also a congressional expression confirming it.

Under Secretary of State Lovett and the Republican foreign policy spokesman, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, went to work on a congressional declaration of policy which put the Senate on record as favoring regional arrangements "based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid."

This was Senate Resolution 239 which Senator Vandenberg skillfully steered through the Senate to overwhelming approval by that body. On the final roll call, on June 11, 1948, only four senators voted against it. Even counting pairs and announced positions of senators absent from the floor there were seventy-nine for and only six against the resolution.

Senator Vandenberg was thoroughly familiar with the workings of the Senate and knew how to get results. He could take ideas conceived by others—many in this case came from the State Department—and then include an element or two that would add his legislative trademark without changing anything basic. From then on he would fight for the ideas without letting up. When Vandenberg died, nobody in the Republican ranks was able to step into his shoes.

Meanwhile, the State Department was working out the details for our support of Western Union, which was the name given to the Brussels Pact arrangements. The plan was sent to the National Security Council for further study and at the Council meeting on April 22, 1948, Lovett announced that the plan was being rewritten in order more closely to approach the language used in the Senate resolution that he and Vandenberg were then preparing.

On April 23 Lovett came to see me with a top-secret telegram from the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, in which were outlined the possible risks involved in a formal treaty association by the nations of the North Atlantic area. He said that he had discussed these risks in the greatest secrecy with Prime Minister Attlee and a few of his closest colleagues, and they had agreed that the summoning of a conference by the United States Government to discuss defense arrangements for the North Atlantic area would be the

best guarantee of peace at the present moment. I instructed the State Department to circulate this message to the members of the National Security Council for their immediate information.

The principal risk involved, Bevin said, was that the Russians might be so provoked by the formation of a defense organization that they would resort to rash measures and plunge the world into war. In this, our experts agreed with the British. On the other hand, if a collective security system could be built up effectively it was more than likely that the Russians might restudy the situation and become more co-operative.

The British Foreign Secretary also pointed out that an Atlantic security system was probably the only way in which the French could be brought to agree to a rebuilding of Germany. Such a system would give all the free nations of Europe the sense of confidence they needed to build peace and prosperity in the world.

Bevin thought that to be effective the security arrangements must carry real assurance for the nations of free Europe. He reminded us that in 1940 the British government knew that the American Chief Executive held strong sympathies for them, but they had to fight on without knowing positively what help if any America would give. He then expressed the opinion that it would be very difficult for the British, or other free nations, to stand up to new acts of aggression unless there was a definitely worked-out arrangement, which included the United States, for collective resistance against aggression.

At the meeting of the National Security Council on May 20 1948 Under Secretary Lovett explained that the Vandenberg Resolution, if passed by the Senate, would put us in a stronger position to discuss with the countries of western Europe measures to strengthen our national security as well as theirs. He pointed out that there were two basic factors in our planning. First, we wanted to get away from the one-way arrangements in which we did something for foreign countries without receiving anything in return; second we did not want any automatic, unlimited engagements under our constitutional system. We could not agree upon anything amounting to a guarantee. But we had to give assurances sufficient enough to inspire the confidence and bolster the faith of the countries of Europe who felt themselves under constant and heavy Soviet pressure.

Secretary of State Marshall then informed the NSC that he

vad that morning received a message from Bevin declaring that evidence was needed that the United States was willing to assume certain obligations, and that Bevin also felt that negotiations should be initiated from Washington.

The military point of view was represented by Secretary of the Army Royall, who reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt we should not commit ourselves to any defense arrangement until we knew what they were. For that reason we should send observers only to the military talks which the Western Union nations were planning to hold in London in July. Royall suggested that any arrangement made should be sufficiently flexible so that Spain, Germany and Austria could later be added.

Secretary of Defense Forrestal pointed out that the French seemed to think that the first item on any regional security program should be the re-equipping of twenty-five French divisions. Our Chiefs of Staff, however, were of the opinion that our own strength should be bolstered first. They admitted, however, that if that course were followed it would be some time before the French could get what they wanted.

Mr. Lovett observed that it was virtually impossible to get Congress to approve substantial shipments of military equipment to other powers except for an emergency. If Congress believed that we were thinking of a revival of Lend-Lease, he added, there would be drastic cuts in domestic military appropriations.

The National Security Council then recommended to me that the line of action proposed by the State Department should generally be followed, though with proper weight given both to the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to any changes that might be made in the Vandenberg Resolution during Senate debate.

On July 2 I approved a policy statement which said that the Vandenberg Resolution should be implemented to the fullest extent possible and that the Department of State should now go ahead with the preliminary conversations which the Brussels Pact powers had suggested.

It was decided also that U.S. military representatives should go to London to take part in the five-power military discussions there, although on a non-membership basis, and that we should seek to convince the Brussels Pact nations to proceed with military talks at once, even though the U.S. commitment was not to be made formal until later. Furthermore, the Department of State was to explore the possibility of including Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy and perhaps

Portugal and Sweden in the proposed arrangement and sug-
gest for later adherence of Spain, Germany and Austria, or
the western zones of the last two countries. If Canada was
willing to participate, the Department of State was to arrange
for Canadian attendance at the London military talks.

If, as a result of the diplomatic talks with the Brussels Pact
nations, we became convinced that some further political
commitment from us was necessary at this time in order to
bolster public morale and confidence in western Europe, then
we should undertake to discuss such an association with those
countries. This was the cornerstone of the defense program,
but no U.S. commitment should be entered into without the
fullest bi-partisan clearance here.

At the same time, the National Security Council proposed
certain recommendations which I approved and which later
became the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

The two proposals—Mutual Defense Assistance Program
and association with the Brussels Pact powers—supplemented
each other, and yet they were independent of one another.
The Congress had on several occasions authorized the grant
of aid in the nature of military supplies and technical advice to
certain nations. MDAP was intended to replace this piece-
meal approach by a comprehensive program which would
permit us to aid in the defense of those countries whose
strategic location made them most important to the security
of the United States in such amounts and at such times as a
broad military and political view of the situation might de-
mand.

The program was a long-range proposition and not a stop-
gap measure. It should not jeopardize the minimum needs of
our own armed forces, as determined by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. It should be tied in with the European Recovery Pro-
gram in such a way that the total of the two programs would
not endanger the stability of our domestic economy. The
countries participating in the program should be encouraged
to eliminate overlapping production by standardizing weapons
and matériel.

This was the summer of 1948. Berlin was blockaded, and
it was not yet at all certain that the airlift would succeed.
Free men in Europe and in Asia, eager to resist aggression,
could not wait for the future delivery of arms, which might
come too late. Indeed, the main purpose of this aid proposal
was to make sure that we did not have another tragic instance
of "too little and too late"—the kind of thing that had helped
Hitler subjugate Europe.

The State Department wasted little time getting the talks th the Brussels Pact powers under way. The first session of he talks was held on July 6, with Under Secretary Lovett ading the American delegation, and the ambassadors in ashington of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belum, and Canada representing their respective countries (the elgian also attended on behalf of Luxembourg).

These conversations were held in the utmost secrecy. A ecial security system was applied so that only a bare minimum of documentary material was distributed. Special couriers handled all papers. Telephone discussion of matters overed in the conference was absolutely ruled out, and telegraphic communication was held to a minimum. Only a very estricted number of persons were allowed to handle any of he documents involved.

This system was the same that the Brussels Pact powers ad established for their own use in negotiations and was ntended to prevent leaks to Soviet agents.

Because of the crucial importance of these meetings I anted to make sure that I had all the information. Under ecretary of State Lovett called on me regularly bringing the inutes of each meeting with him. The sessions were marked y a completely frank exchange of views, sometimes to the oint of bluntness. Rarely has a group of diplomats, representing six different nations, sat around one table and spoken with such complete frankness.

Next to Lovett, Dr. Van Kleffens, the Netherlands Ambassador was the outstanding member of the group. He seemed o have a remarkable grasp of the thing that mattered and as always able to supply the right word at the right time. It as he who first expressed the hope that the association which the Vandenberg Resolution had envisaged would take the form of a "North Atlantic Pact."

At last, after numerous sessions of working committees, an agreed statement was prepared, to be submitted to the respective governments. Here are the most important points of that statement:

> The first section discussed the situation in Europe as it affected security. Here it was clearly recognized that the Soviet advance was a direct result of the war which had created a vacuum in central and eastern Europe where German power had once prevailed. The Soviets' actions were described as part of an avowed drive for maximum extension of power and influence. At this stage the Soviet Union was

capable of extending her domination over the continent of Europe by force.

The conferees noted that while there was no evidence that the Soviets had a timetable for armed aggression there was a constant danger of incidents developing from the internation- al tension, and it was part of Soviet technique to apply pressure wherever an advantage might be gained. Further- more, the extension of a minor incident could easily result in war and in the Soviet conquest of the continent of Europe.

This was the key point

The Marshall Plan had brought some relief, but the con- stant threat of unpredictable Soviet moves resulted in an atmosphere of insecurity and fear among the peoples of western Europe. Something more needed to be done to coun- teract the fear of the peoples of Europe that their countries would be overrun by the Soviet Army before effective he- could arrive. Only an inclusive security system could dispel these fears.

The next question was what countries should be associated in such a system. It was pointed out that enemy occupatio of the territories of Norway Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, and Portugal (with their dependent territories in the Atlan area, such as Greenland and the Azores) would represent a threat to the security of western Europe. The conferees took note of the fact that all of these nations might not be willing or prepared to assume the commitments of such an association. It was suggested, therefore, that there might be different classes of association, with varying degrees of obli- gation.

It was agreed that there might be countries which, whi not "Atlantic" in geography might have such significance to Atlantic defense plans that they should be associated with the Atlantic nations. The case of Italy was especially in poi and the agreed statement recorded the fact that the United States delegation had particularly insisted that Italy should in some manner be brought into any proposed arrangement.

The problems of Spain and Western Germany it was decided, would eventually have to be determined, but it was too early to attempt it at this particular moment. An outlin of proposed provisions for a North Atlantic security arrange- ment was attached to the conference report.

The Brussels Pact nations wanted the North Atlantic pact to state that, if a member was attacked, the other members would supply all the military and other aid and assistance in their power This, of course, implied going to war On

delegation was instructed to take the position that this was an obligation which, in view of our Constitution, we were not prepared to assume.

Canada proposed a compromise. This provided that in case of attack on a member state the other members should consider this an attack on themselves. But instead of becoming immediately involved in war the compromise provided that each nation would be expected to lend aid to the victim in accordance with its own constitutional processes. In plain language this means there is an obligation to give all aid possible, but subject to the constitutional procedures of each country.

When the treaty was later given its final form, this compromise became, in substance, Article V—the key provision of the treaty.

On October 13 Canada notified the State Department that she was ready to enter into a treaty along the general lines suggested by the agreed statement of September 9. Two weeks later word was received that the Brussels Pact nations had agreed in principle to the negotiation of such a North Atlantic security pact.

When the negotiators came together again, following these decisions by Canada and the Brussels Pact nations, it took little time to produce a draft treaty. When the National Security Council reviewed the situation in my presence on January 6, 1949, Under Secretary Lovett spoke in highly complimentary terms about the spirit in which the talks had been carried on.

Obviously each government had its own problems. The French were anxious to have the treaty extended to cover other North African possessions. The British were a little reluctant to include the Italians. As I observed at this NSC meeting, this reluctance was understandable. One had to remember that the British had had some bad experiences with Italy in recent years. But I said that nothing would ever be accomplished if people spent all their time pondering flaws and worrying about difficulties. Making policy means making decisions. We must look forward with faith and confidence.

In working out the North Atlantic Treaty we had made a truly momentous decision. As I described it to the National Security Council, it could be called "an offensive-defensive alliance to maintain the peace in the North Atlantic area but without automatic provision for war.

With the North Atlantic Treaty and the corresponding

bate ended on July 21, when eighty-two senators voted to ratify the treaty, far more than were needed under the constitutional requirements for a two-thirds vote for the ratification of treaties. One senator was not voting; thirteen answered "Nay" when their names were called. Eleven of these thirteen were Republicans.

On July 25 I affixed my signature to the treaty ratification and thus completed American accession to the pact. On August 24, 1949, a sufficient number of ratifications had been deposited to bring the treaty into effect. This, officially, is the day on which NATO became a reality.

We realized, of course, that much still remained to be done if the new arrangement was to prove effective. As soon as the treaty had been ratified, I asked the Congress to provide approximately $1,400,000,000 for a military assistance program, both for the NATO countries and others, such as Greece, Turkey, and the Philippines. There were three different types of assistance planned under this program. First, we wanted to help the nations that were friendly with us to increase their own military production. Second, we would transfer to them some essential items of military equipment. And third, we would send some of our experts abroad to help train and equip their military forces.

I explained the purpose of the military assistance program to the 50th Annual Encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in these terms.

"The purpose of the military assistance program is to prevent aggression. Our European partners in the North Atlantic Treaty are not strong enough today to defend themselves effectively. Since the end of the war they have been concentrating on rebuilding their war-torn economies. We can strengthen them, and ourselves, by transferring some military means to them, and joining with them in a common defense plan. The military assistance program is based on the same principle of self-help and mutual aid that is the corner stone of the European recovery program and the North Atlantic Treaty.

"We are not arming ourselves and our friends to start a fight with anybody. We are building defenses so that we won't have to fight.

"Our aid will be limited to the material necessary to equip mobile defense forces. These forces will constitute no threat to the independence of other nations. The democratic nations have no desire for aggression; they only want to be able to defend their homes.

"The cost of such a program is considerable but it represents an investment in security that will be worth many times its cost. It is part of the price of peace. Which is better to make expenditures to save the peace, or to risk all our resources and assets in another war?"

Administrative machinery under the treaty organization was set up without delay A North Atlantic Council was formed on September 17 1949 with the Foreign Ministers of the participating nations as members. The Cabinet officers in charge of defense in the several member nations formed a Defense Committee and under that body a Military Committee of top-ranking generals and admirals from all twelve nations went to work at once.

The first major task was to reach an agreement on how to work out the defense of the NATO area. Up to this time each country had its own defense plans, but now it became necessary to think of the area as one. This did not involve specific national defense positions but, instead, the overall strategic approach. This plan was worked out without delay and the NATO Council gave its approval on January 6 1950

Secretary Acheson brought the plan to me and I examined it at length, with the assistance of my diplomatic, military and economic advisers. I thought it was a good plan and one that would serve the interest of the United States well. On January 27 1950 I formally approved this proposal for the strategy that would control a major part of our defenses and occupy a major share of our defense efforts.

The NATO defense was based on the idea of a "balanced force"—that is, on the use of a NATO defense force to which each country would contribute its share This was one of the problems. The Dutch, for instance with their long tradition of seafaring and exploration, did not want to restrict their Navy yet the plan called for them to concentrate on certain types of ground forces Almost all the member nations indicated their understanding of the basic principle involved namely that by avoiding duplication of effort more could be accomplished. However there was also the thought present, and sometimes expressed, that they wanted to have a balanced defense of their own in case NATO did not succeed. In other words, it was again a question of confidence, a question of overcoming uncertainty and doubt.

In Congress there were demands for proof that the Europeans would carry an appropriate share of the burden of common defense. In Europe just as ...ably there

was reluctance to extend risks and expenses until America's participation was clearly evident.

In addition, there were Europe's internal tensions that complicated the job. France was unwilling to give up any part of its preoccupation with the defense against Germany. The Benelux countries wanted to make sure that Britain as well as France shared in the actual defense arrangements in their part of Europe. The Scandinavians felt they were out on a flank and dangerously exposed on their end of the strategic arc. England tried to preserve her strength for the preservation of the remnants of her empire. And this is just the beginning of the list.

Through a series of conferences, Secretary Acheson worked with great patience and skill to drive home the point that NATO would have no meaning at all unless a really joint effort was made at common defense and mutual aid, and his arguments won the day. There would have been no NATO without Dean Acheson.

The major problem in these discussions soon proved to be the question of German participation in the defense of Europe. The German people, divided between East and West, were still under occupation following the defeat and destruction of Hitler. But the land they inhabit is the very core of Europe, and the people who live in it have proved over the centuries that they have the will and the ability to defend it. Without Germany the defense of Europe was a rear-guard action on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. With Germany there could be a defense in depth, powerful enough to offer effective resistance to aggression from the East.

The logic behind this situation is very plain. Any map will show it, and a little arithmetic will prove what the addition of German manpower means to the strength of the joint defense of Europe.

To bring the Germans into the defense arrangements of Europe and to spur the Europeans on to great efforts themselves were the two main efforts required in making NATO work. The Germans wanted restoration of their full sovereignty before they assumed their place in the scheme of defense, but the French kept insisting that Germany had to be kept under controls. In conference after conference it seemed impossible to break this deadlock.

When Dean Acheson went to these conferences, he would send me a daily cable with a full summary of the day's events. This was not the same as the report which the delegation secretary would compile for the use of the State Depart-

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This purpose was achieved and, while the results were immediately discouraging, I think that we may be getting somewhere.

I pointed out that you had been able to bring about a complete revolution in American foreign policy, based upon the realities of the international situation. We were prepared to take steps which were absolutely unprecedented in our history to place substantial forces in Europe, to put these forces into an integrated force for the defense of Europe, to agree to a command structure, to agree to a supreme commander to join in a program for integrating European production, to take far reaching steps in the financial field, but all based upon the expectation that others would do their part, and that the entire scheme would result in the creation of such power that chances of peace would be immeasurably improved; and, if contrary to our hopes and beliefs war should come, we had a first class chance to win it. I went on to say that this involved a defense in Europe as far to the east as possible, and that such a defense was not possible without facing squarely and deciding wisely the question of German participation. I pointed out that in our discussions the British and French had been prepared to accept what we offered, had been reticent about their own contributions, and had flatly refused to face in any way the question of German participation. I, therefore, wanted to talk about this question with the gloves off and see exactly where we stood.

The morning discussion brought out very clearly two fundamental facts. The first was that Bevin who really agreed with me, had been put under wraps by his government and was not permitted to say anything. This grows out of the current debate in the House of Commons on this very subject, in which the Labor Government has a pathological fear of Churchill and does not dare say anything for fear that it will leak to the American press and be used by Churchill in the debate. I hope that this situation is not permanent and may clear up in the near future.

On the part of Schuman the difficulty was deeper. His attitude was that he was not able or willing, as the spokesman of his government, to take any decision even on principle in regard to German participation until the forces of the Allies had been so strengthened in Europe that the French Government could face the psychological reaction to the creation of German armed force.

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One of the most important of this series of NATO conferences was the one held in New York in September 1950.

I had been reviewing the difficulties that had been encountered in Europe and realized we had to take into account the anxiety of our European allies in the face of the developments in the Far East. Many of them were fearful that we would now turn most of our attention to Korea and that the European defense would become subordinate. It was therefore decided, as evidence of our concern about the defense of Europe, to send over additional United States troops. These American forces would be part of a balanced European defense force which would include the Germans. This force eventually would have a supreme commander

Acheson took this plan with him when he went to New York to meet French Foreign Minister Schuman and British Foreign Secretary Bevin for preliminary talks on September 12. Both statesmen realized at once that we had moved a very considerable distance to encourage European action, but Schuman's instructions from his government were to oppose any arrangement that would bring about the creation of a German army or of anything that could serve as the framework for such an army. Bevin was immediately taken with the idea of a supreme commander. He thought the appointment of a supreme commander especially an American would spur the Europeans to action more than anything else. Our thought on this was to do what had been done in World War II in the molding of the invasion forces: set up a joint staff to work on preliminaries and appoint a supreme commander when there is something for him to command.

Acheson described the situation to me

September 15 12 15 A.M

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ACHESON

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ability of leaks to the press and stories that all is not going well. I feel reasonably sure that we can work this out; that it may be a question of whose nerve lasts longer, but that it just must come out in the right way.

I am dictating this wire to you myself so that you may know my mind fully and instruct me at any point where you think I may be wrong or give me any guidance which you want me to have. I shall keep you fully and intimately informed.

Bevin was instructed by his government to join Acheson in working for a united defense force with German participation. As a result of Acheson's efforts, all member countries except France accepted the idea of a united force, though the countries on the outer rim of the alliance, such as Norway and Portugal, were not as enthusiastic about it as the Benelux countries. But in principle, only French objections remained in the path of erecting an effective defense for western Europe.

The talks with the French and British were continued while the Atlantic Council was recessed. The Defense Ministers of the three countries joined the Foreign Ministers at the conference table. France sent Jules Moch. From London came Emanuel Shinwell. And I sent General George C. Marshall, whom I had just persuaded to return from his well-deserved retirement, to take over the serious job of running the Defense Department in this period of crisis.

In the candid talks to these men it became very plain that the French knew just as well as we or the British that they would need German manpower if Europe was to be successfully defended. They were convinced that the French parliament would never agree to any proposal that would permit Germans to be armed before there was a European defense force actually in being. The French Defense Minister, M. Moch, said quite frankly that he would need the answer to three questions before he could make up his mind about German participation in the united force that was planned.

1. How many German divisions are contemplated?
2. How many U.S. divisions will be sent to Europe?
3. When can the U.S. send them?

I was glad to learn that General Marshall and Mr. Shinwell were able to persuade the French minister that it was possible to agree in principle without having specific answers to these questions. Marshall drew up a list of ten items that could be done by the NATO powers without further delay

When it became clear that neither man had any discretion and that therefore argument could not result in any immediate change of position, I suggested that we examine the positions taken by each of them solely for the purpose of clarifying our minds so that when they had some flexibility returned to them, we would understand how each of us thought about the various points.

I think it is fair to say that the discussion was useful. It completely blew out of the water the practicality of leaving the beginning of the formation of German military units until the Allied forces were completely supplied with equipment. I think it destroyed any logical basis to their fear that the bringing of Germans into the creation of Allied strength in the west increased the possibility of preventive war by the Russians as against the mere creation of Allied strength. I think we showed that it was quite possible to deal with the German Government on the issue, not as supplicants, but merely as agreeing to proposals already made by Adenauer to contribute units to European forces and to force him to accept conditions to our acceptance of his proposal.

All this was useful, but the discussion ended with one situation quite clear. That they were prepared to accept what we offered but they were not prepared to accept what we asked. In this situation I am now taking the attitude, not that we are imposing specific conditions, but that we are unable to proceed with the discussion until their attitude is made more clear. The result is that no agreed papers on the matters on which they are ready to agree will issue from our delegation. We have ended the first part of our tripartite meeting with communiqué which cannot announce decisions and therefore, says merely that we are continuing our discussions in the Council and will resume them next week.

In the Council meetings, I intend to argue the issues all over again and have already been assured of vigorous support from the smaller European countries. It seems highly unlikely that we can reach satisfactory conclusions by Saturday night, but I feel sure that the British and French will become increasingly uncomfortable on their seats. It may be that we shall have to have further meetings. It may be that I shall have to come back to you for further instructions before the matter goes too far. For the present there is no need for you to worry although I think you must face the strong pos-

heard me out in silence and then said he would accept the assignment. Eisenhower told me that he would take it because he was a soldier and this was a call to duty. But it was the kind of duty, he told me, that he accepted gladly because it was a job that very badly needed to be done. He believed firmly, he said, in the importance of bringing the nations of Europe together and doing it speedily.

Two days later I received the Defense Ministers and defense chiefs of the NATO countries and was able to tell them in confidence that a top-ranking general would be available for the NATO High Command and that I had already conferred with him about it.

The appointment itself was not made until December 18. The procedure was for the North Atlantic Council to pass a resolution in which they asked me to designate an American officer as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Europe. At the same time, Dean Acheson sent me a message from the Council meeting in Brussels in which he reported that the Council members had unanimously expressed the hope that I would appoint General Eisenhower. I replied at once that General Eisenhower had been so designated.

The new Supreme Commander left for Europe in January 1951 for a quick survey of the situation. He returned then to Washington and made a full report to me, and I suggested that he also report on the European situation to the Congress, and by radio to the nation. I think these reports were effective because they were made with utmost candor and sincerity.

Eisenhower reported to me, and later at a Cabinet meeting, that while he had found general agreement on the principles of a unified defense for Europe, and general agreement also that such a defense could be successfully organized, he found it much tougher trying to reach an understanding with each country as to its contribution. He said that at each stop on his recent survey trip he would ask, "What are you going to do? You have to tell me exactly what you are going to do so that I can report back to the United States Government."

The answers to this question, Eisenhower said, all tripped over one hard, tough fact. This fact was the poverty of western Europe. General Eisenhower said he had found that this poverty meant that no one yardstick could be used to measure the contributions of the various countries. We could not, for example, expect the western Europeans to spend the same percentage of their budget on defense that we were able to spend. They were so desperately poor that some of

and without prejudicing a later decision on the questions Moch wanted answered. What was more important, Marshall urged, was to draw up an understanding in principle. The United States, for instance, could state that it would send additional troops to Europe as soon as possible, but, with fighting under way in Korea, it could not specify a date. In the same way the French could agree that a united force should be built up for the defense of Europe and that German manpower should be included, even though it was not possible at this stage to say how large or how small a part the Germans should play I thought that this typical, clearheaded approach by Marshall made a lot of sense.

In a later separate meeting, Acheson and Marshall assured Schuman and Moch that we would be willing to discuss with the French the problem of helping them with the financing of their military program. With this assurance, the French were now willing to agree to the general principles of the proposal that Acheson had originally placed before Bevin and Schuman. On September 26 a communiqué from New York announced that the North Atlantic Council had agreed on the establishment of a unified force for the defense of Europe. This left a great many things still to be agreed on. M. Pleven the French Premier came out with a plan that would let the Germans participate in the European defense force but only as additions to existing regimental combat teams. This was at least something to work on, even if it did not satisfy everybody

The main thing, we all thought, was to get the project of a unified force started. It had been understood by all concerned that the supreme commander to be designated would be an American. As a matter of fact, in our planning of the program I had always had General Eisenhower in mind as the logical man for this unique job. As the Allied commander in Europe during World War II General Eisenhower had shown remarkable ability in leadership in heading up a combined headquarters for the forces of several nations. He was very popular in Europe and at the head of a European defense headquarters would demonstrate our determination and our desire to make the joint effort a success.

On October 19 I added this handwritten postscript to a letter to Eisenhower "First time you are in town, I wish you'd come in and see me. If I send for you, we'll start the 'speculators to work."

General Eisenhower called on me at the White House on October 28 I told him what I had in m[illegible] him to do. He

Churchill commented that he realized very well the great burden that the United States was carrying in the common cause, and said that the United Kingdom would bear all it could. However, he pointed out that they had drawn very heavily on the life and energy of the fifty million people in their island in recent years, and added that great overseas investments had been lost to them. England, he said, had a great many problems that could be traced to the past. The point now was that there was no use in the United Kingdom's pretending that it could bear burdens that it could not bear.

I replied to the Prime Minister that, in the fifty years before World War I, the British and the French and the Germans had invested many billions of dollars in our country. Some of this had been used up, in World War I and World War II, as the British and the French paid for their war supplies. The German investment, of course, had been taken over as enemy property. "Your reserves," I said, "are now in effect a financial surplus here, which we hope to get reinvested abroad under Point Four and in other ways. The rehabilitation of the free world is one of the most important things we have to do. We want to keep the free world a going concern."

I reminded the Prime Minister that we had sent abroad some sixty billion dollars since the end of the war but that it was important to bear in mind that this was an election year and that Congress was rarely inclined to increase foreign spending while an election was in the offing.

Churchill said he certainly understood what effect an election had on a country's position in the world. England had gone through a general election during the past year and it certainly made it difficult for His Majesty's Government to act with vigor while its political life was at stake. But he thought that they were through now with electioneering in England, "for a few years at any rate."

The approach of the 1952 presidential election caused a great deal of anxiety in friendly capitals. Everywhere the same doubts and fears began to spring up again that had been so dominant before the treaty was signed and General Eisenhower sent over to organize the defense. We found that statesmen of other nations were holding back because they wanted to be sure that the commitments they might make would not be made to an American who voted for an isolationist administration.

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believed in the basic need for NATO and European defense. But it is one of the facts of American foreign policy and one that those in responsibility must bear in mind, that an impending change in administration in Washington makes our friends abroad anxious and our enemies hopeful. They all remember what happened when Harding replaced Wilson, and what calamity it meant for the world.

When the time came for me to turn over the reins of the government to General Eisenhower NATO was one of the projects that I could pass on to him in the full knowledge that he would understand my motives and share them. He had, after all, played a most important part in it.

The treaties with Germany and the European Defense Community Treaty still awaited completion. We had hoped that these treaties would be ratified toward the end of 1952, but both in France and, to a lesser degree, in Germany resistance to the proposed arrangements had flared up sharply in November and further delay was likely though this was delay over matters of timing and emphasis, not over principles.

The structure of western European defense had been built—built largely because we were ready to break with tradition and enter into a peacetime military alliance because we had been ready to assume not only our share but the leadership in the forging of joint forces because we had recognized that the peace of the world would best be served by a Europe that was strong and united, and that therefore European unity and European strength were the best guarantees for the prevention of another major war

# CHAPTER 18

I was raised on a farm, and even as a boy I helped my father there. My home state of Missouri is primarily a farm state, and my brother Vivian farms to this day. I know what the farmer's problems are. I learned early, when I worked in a bank, how important the farmers' prosperity is to the welfare of the country.

When the crops failed, two things happened to the bank. The farmers withdrew their deposits, and later many farmers came to borrow money on their land. When the farmers were hurt, merchants and tradesmen suffered. To see this happen was a basic lesson in economics. It was a practical demonstration that prosperous farmers make for a prosperous nation, and when farmers are in trouble the nation is in trouble.

In 1921 the bottom fell out of agricultural prices, and throughout the twenties the farmer was barely able to hang on. Then came 1932 and the victory of the Democrats. Sound policies followed, restoring farm prosperity, for the New Deal knew that farm income had to be stabilized if the national economy as a whole was to be stabilized. Soil conservation, the Triple A, Farm Credit Administration, rural electrification—all these and other measures contributed to the return of farm prosperity. Then World War II gave this trend a strong push as American crops were shipped overseas to help feed our allies and as greatly increased employment at home increased domestic food consumption to an all-time high. Even after the war, relief shipments and Marshall Plan aid continued to demand the products of American farms.

Throughout these years the government had guaranteed the prices of farm products at a fixed level, but the continued high demand had kept the government-guaranteed surplus at a minimum. The result was that in 1948 the American farmer had reached an economic position better than he had ever known before.

Cash farm income was up to more than thirty billion

dollars a year from less than five billion in 1932, and the farm-mortgage debt had dropped twenty-five per cent since 1941 Bank deposits and savings of farmers were twenty-two billion dollars, the highest in our history

While this agricultural prosperity was due partly to special factors in the postwar situation, the sound farm legislation which had been adopted since 1932 provided a much better basis for sustained farm prosperity than we had ever had before. In 1932, for example, we had had no soil-conservation program, no price-support program, no school-lunch program, and only a limited agricultural-research program.

But the farmers still had reason to be fearful. A sudden change, such as that of 1921 might cause the bottom to fall out of agricultural prices, and I intended to do everything I could to prevent an agricultural depression from happening. The farmer I felt, was entitled to real protection against a postwar slump, and the nation as a whole had to be protected against a farm depression. I wanted a program of action to insure that the gains made since 1932 would be held and that we could move forward with the job of building our economy on a foundation provided by the organized, sustained, and realistic prosperity of American agriculture.

I was concerned about the many farm families who were not sharing fairly in the progress of American life. In too many rural communities, as my reports showed, housing, medical services, and educational facilities were still inadequate. Some farms were still isolated by poor roads. Others were still without the benefits of electricity

It was my conviction that the federal government had a definite responsibility in building for lasting agricultural abundance and in making farm life attractive to future generations of Americans. The sound and far-reaching legislation of the preceding sixteen years constituted an excellent basis for continued progress, but we needed a number of extensions and improvements in our farm program.

Most of all we needed a permanent system of price supports for agricultural commodities. I believed that the entire nation should be protected against the wide swings in farm prices that in the past had caused economic insecurity that affected all of us. Furthermore we needed a more vigorous soil-conservation program and it was important that steps be taken to maintain adequate markets for farm products and to improve the methods of distributing them to consumers.

In order to provide answers to these problems, I

asked Charles F. Brannan, the Secretary of Agriculture, to make an over-all study of the farm situation and to draw up specific proposals, as Brannan and I had discussed various plans and ideas on three or four different occasions. When the final draft of his report was ready he came to the White House, and we went over it item by item.

The purpose of the program was to assure the farmer a stable income, and the device by which this was to be accomplished made good sense to me. Each commodity affected would be allowed to seek its level in the market. Then, if this level was below a fair return to the farmer, the government—at the end of a predetermined period—would pay the farmer directly the difference between what he got on the average for his commodity over the particular marketing period and what was calculated by a formula to be a fair price.

There was nothing new about this approach. It had been applied to cotton as the first price mechanism in 1937 and 1938 and was being used for the support of sugar beets, as it still is. Each year every producer of sugar beets and sugar cane in the United States receives a check from the government for the difference if the price at which he sells his crop is less than the price determined by a statutory formula. Similar legislation for wool had been in effect for an equally long period.

Specifically, the plan Brannan asked me to approve would see that perishable commodities like meat, dairy products, poultry and eggs would be put on the market at prices which consumers could afford. The program was to apply first of all to dairy products, for many marketing studies indicated that milk prices and milk consumption were closely related. As the price of milk goes down, the volume of milk consumed goes up correspondingly. Thus we could almost put our finger on how many more quarts of milk could be sold at a given lower market price, and this approach also provided a reliable index for other commodities.

The basic idea of the plan was to approach the economics of agriculture not from the point of view of agriculture, as had formerly been done, but with an eye to production and abundance. We wanted to make it increasingly worth while for the farmer to produce, and at the same time keep the consumer price level at a point at which the average man could afford to buy. Without some such policy, the price level of farm products plays its part in a vicious circle: the more the farmer plants, the less he gets, the less he can

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the leadership of Allan B. Kline, attacked the price-support program on the same grounds that the private utilities companies fought every attempt of the government to make public power available to the people, and as the American Medical Association fought the health program which would benefit all the people.

I paid no attention to the "anti-Brannan Plan" campaign, which cost the Farm Bureau members more than half a million dollars in one year. I knew what the farmers themselves wanted and needed because I had talked with thousands of them personally in 1948 about it. I have never been interested in what the big, expensive lobbies in Washington have to say about farming, real estate, electricity, medicine, or any other subject. They do not represent the views of the man on the job. Instead, they represent selfish special interests who support the lobbies to fight their legislation battles for them.

What I had to overcome was the traditional attitude toward such scare words as "socialization," "socialism," and "subsidization." Industry and business have demanded subsidies from the federal government for generations—in the form of mailing permits, freight rates, tariffs disguised by the word "protection" for special-privilege use, tax privileges for plant construction, and other fields. In our time, agriculture is no less dependent upon such assistance than industry, labor or business. The parity device is only one effort that has been made in the interest of bringing farming up to the level shared by other segments of the economy.

The Brannan Plan was nothing new. It was consistent with the policy of every Democratic administration that has tried to elevate the standards of living of the American rural population through price supports and through a score of other measures designed to strengthen and stabilize this basic occupation.

The opposition has always tried to convince the farmer that he is being placed under the heel of controls. To make the parity legislation work, the farmers must agree to controls. In every election since Roosevelt the Republicans have tried to coax the farmer to vote down controls, so that parities would then find their own level. If the farmer finally accepts this advice the bottom will drop out of prices and he will go back to 1921.

My hope was to see the farmer go on to even higher levels of prosperity than he enjoyed throughout the administrations

cash return of twenty thousand dollars, then whatever yielded twenty thousand dollars in wheat or rye or potatoes would also be eighteen hundred units of production. And eighteen hundred units was to have been the maximum on which production payments were to be made.

Representatives of associations of small farmers complained that this limit was too high and that it did not channel the proposed benefits to the small operator who needed them most. But it was not the purpose of the plan to redistribute the wealth. I wanted a farm program that would serve the farm, and I wanted it designed in such a way that agricultural corporations would not be able to grow fat on it. The unit limitation as written would have applied to only about two per cent of the farm operators of the United States, but these produced twenty-five per cent of the total dollar volume of all the farm products of the nation.

Secretary Brannan warned me that this recommendation in favor of what we called the family-sized farmer would be attacked as containing political implications. It was a new and unusual proposal for farm economy he said, and would probably be criticized as too radical or labeled a political gesture. This did not trouble me, however for I had given the provision most careful study

"Well Charlie," I said, "it is right, isn't it?"

Brannan replied that, in his opinion, it was.

"Then it stays in," I told him.

Interestingly enough, the unit limitation was hardly criticized at all, and the reason for this I believe, was that the critics of the plan saw the irrefutable reasoning on which the limitation policy was based.

As soon as the proposals were made public, a great hue and cry was raised in the press over what many writers called the socialistic and political implications of the Brannan Plan. Secretary Brannan discussed the program at a joint hearing of the House Committee on Agriculture and the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on April 7 1949 and from then on there was a great deal of heated discussion on the floor of both the House and the Senate with respect to the plan.

I had expected criticism of this sort. All the ballyhoo that was raised over the Brannan Plan was similar to the furor that was created by the American Medical Association over the health-insurance program. The American Farm Bureau Federation, which represented the special-interest farmers under

the leadership of Allan B. Kline, attacked the price-support program on the same grounds that the private utilities companies fought every attempt of the government to make public power available to the people, and as the American Medical Association fought the health program which would benefit all the people.

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of Roosevelt and myself. This could have been accomplished only through a positive program such as the one worked out with Secretary Brannan. Unfortunately the Congress refused to enact the plan into law

## CHAPTER 19

All my life I have fought against prejudice and intolerance. As a young man I was disturbed by the attitude of some people toward other races and religions. And as I grew older, I could never understand how people could forget the origins and blessings of their own freedom.

I have little patience with people who take the Bill of Rights for granted. The Bill of Rights, contained in the first ten amendments to the Constitution, is every American's guarantee of freedom.

Equality of opportunity and equal justice under the law are not mere phrases or fine words. These are the living achievements of a people who had rebelled against despotism. Many generations had fled to this country to get away from oppression by their own governments. And it has always troubled me how some who called themselves Americans could themselves become oppressors.

Those old and young fellows who wrote the Constitution knew what they were doing. They had been pounded down by the absolute monarchy of George III. They knew the meaning of oppression and persecution.

Jefferson was one of those who said that he would not support the Constitution if the Bill of Rights was not made part of it.

One of the most important guarantees under the Bill of Rights is the right to claim exemption from self-incrimination. This is a fundamental basis of our liberty and is provided for in the Fifth Amendment.

With the advent of Communism the world has been introduced to the outrage of brain-washing. By this method men and women are forced to confess against themselves, whether they are guilty or not.

In the police state no individual has any immunity from persecution. People condemned to brain-washing can have no hope because they are deprived of all rights.

In this country every person is protected against persecution by the Bill of Rights.

In recent years I have been alarmed by the reckless attempts to undermine some of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Men like McCarthy have made it appear that any person claiming his rights under the Fifth Amendment is guilty. McCarthy has even gone so far as to brand as "Fifth Amendment Communists" those persons who sought to invoke their constitutional rights. He has charged these witnesses with abusing the Fifth Amendment.

The fact is that the abuse came not from the people invoking the Fifth Amendment but from those who made it appear that a man claiming his rights under it is automatically guilty without having been proved guilty.

We must understand, of course, that as a matter of government necessity in the investigation of crime or subversion, it is essential for the investigative authorities to have sources of information which they cannot reveal. But when it comes to an individual being charged with a crime, under our procedure he has a right to be confronted with his accusers.

If the government cannot produce witnesses in court, then it cannot prosecute. And if a man cannot be prosecuted in the courts, then he should not be persecuted by a Senate or House committee. That is my theory. Of course every government does its best to get rid of every disloyal employee. But we should not, and we did not, want to treat the remaining 99.9 per cent of government employees, who are decent and honorable, in a way that would ruin their reputations.

When you have over 2,300,000 people employed in the national government, some are bound to be bad and some weak. Persons in government, like other people, are exposed to associations and temptations that occasionally may break down some of them. But I do not believe in taking hearsay charges against any person, expecially against anyone who has the background to qualify as a government servant.

Frequently hearsay evidence is accepted as the truth and is used to smear a government employee in such a way that he cannot defend himself. This is what the Communists do, what McCarthy did, what the so-called Un-American Activities Committee in the House did. It simply cannot be squared with the Bill of Rights.

Any move to abridge the rights of the individual under the Constitution—no matter in what form—is a danger to the freedom of all.

Self-appointed guardians of the country and bigots have

even carried on attacks against our schools and colleges and churches. "Little Dies Committees" have sprung up in some state legislatures, and the epidemic of investigations has infected school boards and town councils.

I do not believe schoolteachers should be required to take a special oath.

I think it proper where a school is publicly supported, that a teacher take the same oath of office as any other public official to support the Constitution of the United States and the government of the state in which the teacher lives.

But it is wrong to tell teachers not to discuss or not to teach subject matter that should be taught in a free educational system. We should have freedom to teach and to learn, and that does not mean that a teacher is disloyal because he teaches everything there is to learn. There is no limit to knowledge. A person learns as long as he lives.

In education we must not limit the opportunities for generating ideas. People must have freedom of mind for research that makes progress, otherwise there is no use in having an educational system. If everyone remained in the same groove and were taught exactly the same thing, we would end up with a nation of mediocrities. Men with ideas can express those ideas only where there is freedom of education.

Whenever we come to the point where we are spying on each other, as was done under Hitler and Mussolini and as is now done in Russia and Spain, we cease to be the republic we were set up to be. If we cannot have confidence in our neighbors and the teachers who are teaching our children, then our country is in trouble.

Everyone has the right to express what he thinks. That, of course, lets the crackpots in. But if you cannot tell a crackpot when you see one, then you ought to be taken in.

I don't think there is any danger that this country will be upset from within.

From 1930 to 1953 we had the greatest social and economic revolution in our history without violence. This was done in an orderly manner under the Constitution by the majority of the people, through the ballot, without curtailing the rights of individuals. Of course this great social change did not please some people, especially those who would like to see in this country a higher class and a lower class of society. But the everyday man today has more of the better things of life, the country is better off, and, anyway, the people will not stand for being divided into classes.

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Frequently hearsay evidence is accepted as the truth and is used to smear a government employee in such a way that he cannot defend himself This is what the Communists do, what McCarthy did, what the so-called Un-American Activities Committee in the House did. It simply cannot be squared with the Bill of Rights.

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Self-appointed guardians of the country and bigots have

I approved an immediate reply by the Joint C
Staff to MacArthur. I took the position that we s
sacrifice men. Until the United Nations decided to
a major move, it seemed best to concentrate our str
beachheads that we might be able to hold.

3 D

We consider that the preservation of your forc
now the primary consideration. Consolidation of fo
into beachheads is concurred in.

At the same time, I directed General Collins to
Tokyo at once and to find out both there and in Korea
the latest facts were. On November 30 I received a me
from British Prime Minister Clement Attlee asking
might come to Washington and discuss, on a person-to-p
basis, what meaning we should give to the Korean events
where we might go from there.

# CHAPTER 25

The first among the United Nations to join us in ac-tion in Korea were the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries. They did this in spite of the fact that Communist activity in Malaya put a heavy drain on British manpower. The British, however, had shown much con-cern over the danger that the conflict might enlarge and draw in the Soviet Union.

There had been some indication of this concern when our Air Force bombed the North Korean port of Rashin early in August. This city was a proper military target because of the large depots and storage places there, but it was only seventeen miles from the Soviet border, and there was fear abroad and in our State Department, too, that the Russians might take this as an attack aimed at them.

After the first signs of Chinese intervention, and following MacArthur's request for authority to retaliate against air attacks on his forces from Manchurian bases, the State Department had consulted the British and all other governments with forces in Korea to obtain their reaction. All of them, and most notably the British, were strongly opposed.

The anxiety of our allies became even more pronounced after a highly secret report was received from Peiping on November 17, stating that a top Russian diplomat there had said that if Manchurian airfields were bombed by United Nations planes the Soviet Air Force would strike back in Korea.

The massive counterblow by which the Chinese halted MacArthur's offensive was perhaps even more of a shock abroad than it was for us at home. Foreign newspapers speculated openly about the American reaction, quoting some of our more saber-rattling senators and talking about MacArthur's ill-concealed disapproval of the American government's policies. There actually were open predictions that we would disregard the United Nations and plunge straight on into war

forget that. I meant just that, and I said it as if I meant it. There could be no mistake. I intended to win.

The Democrats had been waiting to hear somebody say positively that we were going to win, and the effect on them was electric. They saw right then and there that there was going to be a fight for Democratic principles by the man who was the head of the party. That gave them the shot in the arm they so badly needed.

I had learned from my June tour that people wanted the facts before they would fight for or against anything. I felt that the convention would react in the same manner as the crowds at the train had done when they heard the facts straight from the President of the United States. I was not fooling and they knew it.

I made a tough, fighting speech. I recited the benefits that had been won by the Democratic administrations for the people. "Never in the world," I said, "were the farmers of any republic or any kingdom or any other country as prosperous as the farmers of the United States; and if they don't do their duty by the Democratic party they are the most ungrateful people in the world."

I pointed out that wages and salaries had increased from $29,000,000,000 in 1933 to more than $128,000,000,000 in 1947. "That's labor," I added, "and labor never had but one friend in politics, and that is the Democratic party and Franklin D. Roosevelt. And I say to labor what I have said to the farmers. They are the most ungrateful people in the world if they pass the Democratic party by this year."

Then I tore into the Eightieth Congress, emphasizing that "the Republican party favors the privileged few and not the common, everyday man. Ever since its inception, that party has been under the control of special privilege, and they concretely proved it in the Eightieth Congress. They proved it by the things they failed to do."

I listed in detail the failures of the Republican-controlled Congress and I did not pull any punches. Then, toward the end of the speech, I played my trump card. I announced:

"On the twenty-sixth day of July, which out in Missouri we call 'Turnip Day,' I am going to call Congress back and ask them to pass laws to halt rising prices, to meet the housing crisis—which they are saying they are for in their platform.

"At the same time, I shall ask them to act upon other needed measures, such as aid to education, which they say they are for; a national health program, civil rights legisla-

The stage was now set for the active 1948 presidential campaign. I picked Labor Day which was on September 6, to sound the starting gun of my bid for the presidency and most of my opponents did the same. The field, besides Thomas Dewey for the Republicans, Henry Wallace for the Progressives, and J. Strom Thurmond for the States' Rights Democrats, included a number of minority candidates. Norman Thomas for the Socialists, among others.

While I knew that the southern dissenters and the Wallaceites would cost some Democratic votes, my opponent was the Republican party. The campaign was built on one issue—the interests of the people, as represented by the Democrats, against the special interests, as represented by the Republicans and the record of the Eightieth Congress. I staked the race for the presidency on that one issue.

The Labor Day speech at Cadillac Square in Detroit set the pace for the campaign speeches that were to follow. "As you know," I told a nationwide audience, "I speak plainly sometimes. In fact, I speak bluntly sometimes. I am going to speak plainly and bluntly today. These are critical times for labor and for all who work. There is great danger ahead. Right now the whole future of labor is wrapped up in one simple proposition.

"If, in this next election, you get a Congress and an administration friendly to labor, you have much to hope for. If you get an administration and a Congress unfriendly to labor you have much to fear and you had better look out.

"If the Congressional elements that made the Taft-Hartley Law are allowed to remain in power and if these elements are further encouraged by the election of a Republican President, you men of labor can expect to be hit by a steady barrage of body blows. And, if you stay at home, as you did in 1946 and keep these reactionaries in power you will deserve every blow you get.

"Remember that the reactionary of today is a shrewd man. He is in many ways much shrewder than the reactionaries of the twenties. He is a man with a calculating machine where his heart ought to be. He has learned a great deal about how to get his way by observing demagogues and reactionaries in other countries. And now he has many able allies in the press and in the radio.

"If you place the government of this country under the

Lausche, who was a candidate for the governorship of Ohio, got on the train just south of Columbus, intending to get off again at Columbus. At that little town where Lausche got on there was a crowd of from six to eight thousand people, and at the next one the crowd was even larger. At Columbus the crowd was so big they could not even get into the station.

"Is this the way all the crowds have been?" the governor asked.

"Yes," I said, "but this is smaller than we had in most states."

"Well," he said, "this is the biggest crowd I ever saw in Ohio," and he rode on to Cleveland with us. He gave our ticket his fullest support.

Another interesting trip was from Albany to Buffalo. We started early in the morning in a driving rainstorm from the Albany station, where there was a huge crowd of people. And at every station along the way it was still pouring down rain, but there were overflow crowds everywhere—even in those Republican congressional districts.

It was the same in Pennsylvania as it had been in New York.

I saw that the crowds had turned up in greater numbers in June when I made the western tour to dedicate Grand Coulee Dam in Washington. I felt that if people in such places as Butte, Montana, Grand Coulee, and Sacramento (there were ten thousand people at the Sacramento station at seven o'clock in the morning, and in Los Angeles I was told there were a million people on the streets) were as interested as they appeared to be, they could not be fooled by the press.

It was quite a campaign. I worked my staff almost to death. I believe that at one time or another I put them all to bed, and despite the long hours and hard work I gained weight during the campaign. I worked the reporters very hard too.

The major public-opinion polls, meanwhile, continued, through the press and over the air, up to the very day of the election, to predict my defeat. Only Louis Bean, an economist of the Department of Agriculture, and a few others forecast any chance of a Democratic victory.

The technique I used at the whistle stops was simple and straightforward. There were no special "gimmicks" or oratorical devices. I refused to be "coached." I simply told the people in my own language that they had better wake up to the fact that it was their fight.

If they did not get out and help me win this fight, I

A President can never get away from the urgent and never-ending duties of his office. A political campaign provides no escape. It increases his burdens, and this was critically true during 1948. The autumn of that year was the worst possible time for me to have to wage a political campaign, for at the same time we were negotiating foreign policy matters with the stubborn and suspicious Russian totalitarian government.

We were rapidly exhausting all traditional avenues of negotiation. The United Nations forum—the organization which had been set up for the exchange of views and the adjustment of differences—was being subverted by the Russians into a propaganda sounding board, and our normal diplomatic channels were being stifled and frustrated by Russian truculence.

A number of special missions of businessmen, industrialists, educators, and top military people yielded nothing toward improving our relations, not even the slightest encouragement that they could be improved. I reviewed in my mind every precedent I could recall in an effort to arrive at some new and more promising approach.

I recalled that in the closing days of World War I there was evidence of considerable strain in British-American relations. For many reasons, mostly trivial, and largely related to our expeditionary forces, a certain coolness toward the British was manifest in several important areas in the United States, notably in Washington, D.C.

Coincident with the development of this mutual cooling off, a distinguished visitor came to the United States and made diplomatic history. He was the Chief Justice of England, Viscount Reading, who, quietly and in a spirit of refreshing candor and directness, managed to melt away most of the tender, sore spots.

Lord Reading arrived unheralded and without the benefit of the usual preliminary publicity build-up. He departed just as quietly but behind him he left a much-improved feeling between our two countries. Many people felt then that his timely visit, his complete disassociation from the everyday run of diplomacy and politics, and the manner of the man himself accounted for this uniquely successful mission.

What we most urgently needed, I felt, was a totally new approach—along with the right man to make it. The current political contest for the presidency was a serious handicap, for though the State and Defense Departments were kept out of the campaign, they were at the same time part of my administration. Nor could we use anyone from the other

emphasized, the Republicans would soon be giving the farmers and the workers the little end of the stick again. I spoke bluntly and sincerely and warned the people that if they were fools enough to accept the little end again, they deserved it.

I also clarified the issues which the Republicans were trying to make complex for the voters. I talked to them as human beings with real needs and feelings and fears. I talked to them about their jobs, their homes, and the cost of living. I treated them not like crowds of people but like businessmen, tenant farmers, housewives, married veterans, laboring men, teachers—individuals with interests for whom I, as President, had a genuine concern.

One of the things I tried to keep out of the campaign was foreign policy. There should be no break in the bi-partisan foreign policy of the United States at any time—particularly during a national election. I even asked that a teletype machine be set up on the Dewey train so that the Republican candidate personally could be informed on all the foreign developments as they progressed, and I did so, because I did not want to encourage the possibility of a partisan, political approach to foreign policy. I saw to it that Dewey received important messages that came to me on the subject of international affairs.

There were many danger spots in our foreign relations at the time. The Jews, Arabs, Egyptians, and Syrians had been fighting a shooting war and I was trying to get an agreement among those people to stop the shooting. Also, we were endeavoring in every way we could to get the free countries of Europe in a co-operative mood in order to meet the Soviet threat to take over the free world. We were working for disarmament and for the proper control of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the world, and any partisan reversal of policy would have meant turmoil at home and in the rest of the world. I was particularly worried about the effects any such move would have in the rest of the world.

The business of the government went on as usual from aboard the presidential train. As in all of my absences from Washington, long or short, the mail pouches were delivered to me from the White House every day. I always had a regular staff with me so that the White House was wherever the President happened to be. I also held a lot of conversations by telephone over a communications system installed on the train, and I always maintained a complete and close contact with the government.

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political camp for the reason that identification with Dewey was no asset either

In the meantime, the Wallace Progressives were gathering steam with their shrill campaign of "warmongers" which they directed at both major parties. This was precisely the line of propaganda used by the Communists, and it made for a further *irritant* in an already bad situation. The Wallace theme of preaching appeasement found emotional response among several minority groups who innocently swallowed the tempting notion of peace at any price. I believe that Wallace himself was a victim of his own naïveté.

*It was for these reasons that I found it necessary to* interrupt my scheduled activities right at the height of the campaign so as to work out some new approach to the Kremlin in an effort to ease the tensions and to get on with our many unfinished negotiations with the Russians. I thought of sending Chief Justic Fred M. Vinson on a special mission to Moscow for an informal exchange of views and impressions with Stalin.

I telephoned Justice Vinson on Sunday October 3 and asked him to meet with me on a most urgent matter

When Vinson came to the White House, I outlined to him what I had in mind. When I finished, he remained silent for a considerable time. When he spoke, he said he fully understood the gravity of the situation, and that he wished he could undertake this crucial mission, but that if the decision were left solely to him he would be compelled to decline.

Vinson held that the justices should confine themselves to their Court duties and stay out of all side activities, especially in a political year and he added that he, as Chief Justice, could not break his own rule, even on a matter of such overriding importance. I then waited for Vinson to say what I knew he would.

"Mr President," he said, "as Chief Justice I must decline to undertake this mission to Moscow But if you make it as a presidential request, I shall have a clear duty to comply"

"I am sorry Fred, to do this to you," I said to him, "but in the interest of the country and the peace of the world I am compelled to request you to go"

Vinson's response was "I'll be ready in a few days."

This was the situation as I presented it to Chief Justice Vinson,

The Russians simply did not understand—or *would* not—our peaceful intentions and our genuine desire to co-oper

ate through the United Nations toward the establishment of a climate of peace that we did not want to force and had no intention of forcing our way of life upon them or anyone else, as we would resist to the utmost any attempt to impose another system upon us; that I wanted to see if we could not understand one another a little better and we had to do something about our poor communications. Surely our side had tried. The Russians must also try if the future of the world and the very survival of civilization were not to be lost.

I pointed out to Vinson that we had made all manner of approaches to the Russians, from Roosevelt to Hull, Hopkins, Davies, Nelson, Hurley, Harriman, Byrnes, and Marshall. Through some of these efforts we had received some hopeful signs, only to have them fade again into suspicion and intransigence. The Russians had tried our patience. But we had kept our tempers and kept trying to get along with them.

In our dealings with the Russians we had learned that we had to lead from strength and that any show of weakness was fatal. But there was never the suggestion of belligerency in our attitude. We made every effort to talk reason and co-operation with them, and we meant it. But for reasons best known to them they either could not, or would not, believe us.

One of our big international issues of the moment was the organization of a setup by the United Nations for the peaceful handling of atomic energy, and the wrangling about the key point of inspection was now in full swing at the United Nations meeting in Paris. The uncompromising position which the Russian bloc took on this decisive provision left little hope that we would reach a practical and enforceable international agreement on the control of atomic energy with the Communist bloc.

I told Vinson that the Russian spokesmen were acting as if they intended to wreck any sane proposal for the handling of atomic energy by the United Nations. Perhaps we were not making our position and ourselves clear to the Russian High Command. I warned Vinson that the Russians would not trust either us or themselves to talk freely and frankly. I hoped that this new approach would provide Stalin an opportunity to open up, and I wanted to try it.

Above all, I hoped that Vinson's mission, as an off-channel approach to Stalin, might expose the Russian dictator to a better understanding of our attitude as a people and of our nation's peaceful aspirations for the whole world. I had a

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Sunday evening, and we reached an agreement on the scope of the mission, the timing, the clearances, and the public statement.

Sunday afternoon I instructed Press Secretary Charlie Ross to notify the networks to allocate a half hour for a public statement of major importance. I also alerted the Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, to make the necessary preparations for clearances with Stalin to receive Vinson on arrival in Moscow and told him that I was preparing a personal message to Stalin regarding Vinson. I further instructed those involved in the undertaking to maintain the strictest confidence and to take every possible precaution against premature leaks to the press.

But before the complicated international machinery could be coordinated and all clearances obtained, there was an unfortunate leak to an unfriendly newspaper and a big outcry of "appeasement," "politics," "unilateral action" was picked by other newspapers and press services. The Vinson mission was severely embarrassed before it could even be fully explored with all the powers concerned. Most of the outcry by the press was, as usual, the result of poor information, half-truths, and deliberate distortion of the facts.

Following the premature publication of the proposed Vinson mission to Moscow a number of complications set in that compelled me to reconsider the advisability of this mission. I had a talk with Secretary Marshall in Paris and found him upset over the misinterpretations by other delegates of the purpose of this mission. It seemed that there had developed a feeling that by this move I was circumventing the United Nations, which would tend to undermine their prestige and their authority. This was precisely what I wanted to avoid and why I insisted that great care be taken to clear with all governments concerned before formally announcing the nature and purpose of the Vinson mission.

But the damage was done. There was no longer any use in going ahead with the project. I thereupon summoned Secretary Marshall to return to Washington for a meeting with me to repair some of the damage and used the occasion to clarify some of the speculations that had risen in the wake of the now much-talked-about mission.

Following my conference with Secretary Marshall, I issued a statement which set forth the facts and helped to clear away many misunderstandings concerning the mission.

"General Marshall has returned to Washington at my request," this statement read, "to report to me on the progress

feeling that Stalin might get over some of his inhibitions if he were to talk with our own Chief Justice.

I asked Vinson to point out to Stalin that the folly and tragedy of another war would amount to an act of national suicide and that no sane leader of any major power could ever again even contemplate war except in defense. Surely the next war—an atomic war—could have no victors, and the total annihilation of vast areas was as unthinkable as it was abhorrent.

This was the big challenge to the leaders of the world and this is why we created a United Nations. This is why we kept on with our negotiations, and this is why we were prepared to go to any practical lengths to insure the future survival of the world.

Play it by ear, I said to Vinson. Let Stalin see clearly from the outset, that this is no probing maneuver in the accepted diplomatic sense. Make it clear that this is on the highest level of frankness—a free, uninhibited expression of attitudes, doubts, fears suspicions, and perhaps even ambitions.

If we could only get Stalin to unburden himself to someone on our side he felt he could trust fully I thought that perhaps we could get somewhere. But of course if the Russians were hell-bent for communizing and dominating the world on a rule-or-ruin basis, there was little we could do by the negotiation route. Even then we had to exhaust every conceivable avenue of approach, as I told Vinson, and we had to keep trying. That was why I wanted him to go to Moscow and to see if he could not get Stalin to open up.

Of course I assured the Chief Justice that this mission in no way constituted an action to circumvent the Secretary of State, the United Nations, and most certainly none of our allies.

"I intend," I explained, "to discuss the purpose of this mission and mean to have the full agreement of our allies before you leave for Moscow I will also tell our own people. But first, everyone who is concerned will be duly informed before any public announcement is made. We must be careful in all respects or this could misfire and be misunderstood as a unilateral action. I will telephone Marshall in Paris from the Map Room Monday morning before we do anything further I am sure that he will be for it, as he always is for any constructive move to advance the cause of peace."

Vinson and I had a second visit on this subject that same

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"General Marshall has returned to Washington at my request," this statement read, "to report to me on the progress

of the work of the various United Nations bodies in Paris. I had a long talk with him this morning, and again this afternoon, he gave me a detailed picture of what has been taking place in Paris, and we discussed questions relating to the future course of this Government in the various matters at issue.

"With regard to the report published in the morning's press concerning a possible journey of Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow the facts are as follows On last Tuesday when I communicated with Secretary Marshall, I told him of my continuing great desire to see peace firmly established in the world, and of my particular concern at this time over the attitude taken by the Soviet representatives regarding the atomic problem. I said that I was wondering whether their attitude did not reflect a misunderstanding in the minds of the Soviet leaders so serious, from the standpoint of world peace in general, that we would be remiss if we left undone anything that might conceivably serve to dispel it. I asked the Secretary whether he felt that a useful purpose would be served by sending to Moscow Chief Justice Vinson, in an effort to make the Soviet leaders understand the seriousness and sincerity of the feelings of the people of the United States about these matters. Secretary Marshall described to me the situation which we faced in Paris, and, in the light of his report and the possibilities of misunderstanding to which any unilateral action, however desirable otherwise, could lead at present, I decided not to take this step.

"My talk with Secretary Marshall has been gratifying to me. I was glad to hear his report of the unity which has prevailed between ourselves and the French and British representatives in Paris in all phases of the handling of the Berlin crisis, and of the earnest efforts being made by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations to find solutions to many of the other problems which have been troubling people everywhere. I was glad to be able to assure him of the determination with which people in this country are supporting our efforts to find the road to peace."

There was a speech I was scheduled to make before the American Legion Convention in Miami in October. In this I planned to cover the essence of the Vinson mission and I wanted to use the occasion for a major foreign policy speech. I also wanted to use the occasion to overcome any damage the Wallace campaign may have caused in stirring up among some of the minority groups the feeling that this administra-

tion was not doing all it could in the interest of peace. They were distorting for political purposes the facts about our efforts for peace and our foreign policy. They were dangerously wrong—and their falsehood in branding the administration as warmongering was harmful. The Vinson mission would have served also to spike this political maneuver.

In the speech before the American Legion I said.

"Unfortunately—and I say that advisedly—unfortunately a dark fog of distrust has risen between the Soviet Union and the West, distorting and confusing our relations. It is clear that little progress is likely to be made in settling disputes between the western powers and Soviet Russia, so long as there is so much distrust.

"If that distrust is to be dispelled, there needs to be evidence of long-range peaceful purposes—evidence that will enable the world to shake off the fear of war, reduce the burden of armaments, and concentrate on useful economic activities.

"In recently considering sending a special emissary to Moscow my purpose was to ask Premier Stalin's cooperation in dispelling the present poisonous atmosphere of distrust which now surrounds the negotiations between the western powers and the Soviet Union. My emissary was to convey the seriousness and sincerity of the people of the United States in their desire for peace.

"This proposal had no relation to existing negotiations within the scope of the United Nations or the Council of Foreign Ministers. Far from cutting across these negotiations, the purpose of this mission was to improve the atmosphere in which they must take place and so help in producing fruitful and peaceful results.

At this time, I want to make it perfectly clear that I have not departed one step from my determination to utilize every opportunity to work for peace. Whenever an appropriate opportunity arises, I shall act to further the interests of peace within the framework of our relations with our allies and the work of the United Nations.

"I am working for peace, and I shall continue to work for peace.

"Both we and the Soviet Union have a fundamental job to do—the job of raising the living standards of our peoples.

"We must remember that many a serious crisis has in the past been resolved without war. We must remember that the struggle for existence among nations, as among individual men, goes on all the time, and expresses itself in many ways

other than war. We must remember that rivalry among nations is an old story. History shows that rival powers can exist peacefully in the world.

"Patience must be our watchword. When the destiny of all mankind is at stake, we need to exercise all the patience we can muster. We should utilize every opportunity to strengthen the United Nations for the great undertakings which lie ahead.

"The people of the world are looking to their leaders to dispel the fog of distrust which now confuses the approach to peace. At the present moment, I would only add that our nation has never failed to meet the great crises of its history with honor and devotion to its ideals."

The reaction of the delegates of the Legion convention was surprisingly warm. The reaction of the country as a whole was equally encouraging. It soon became apparent that a great many people who had been attracted to the Wallace peace offensive had thought the better of it and now began to realize that the prospects for peace were to be best served in the hands of this Democratic administration.

I felt all along that, although the Vinson mission and its high purpose turned out to be a casualty brought about by a hostile press, it still had a practical use. Although I think it would have been better for the mission to have been consummated, still there was a meaning that was implicit in this undertaking that said for all to hear and know that we would do anything that was honorable and practicable to pursue peaceful negotiations without, of course, "going it alone" or attempting to function outside the United Nations.

Even during the height of the campaign I would not allow these basic attitudes on our foreign policy to be suppressed or submerged. And the operations of our government had to be maintained without disruption. There was a complete White House staff on the job in Washington, and the members of the Cabinet went right on with their business, keeping in constant communication with me. Very few members of my Cabinet made any political speeches unless they were asked something specific on a subject relating to their departments.

As the campaign gathered speed, I stepped up my schedule of the whistle stops. In all, I traveled about 31 700 miles and delivered more than three hundred speeches—356, to be exact. I was used to hard work, and my job was cut out for me. I campaigned for thirty-five days and averaged about ten speeches every day. On one single day I delivered sixteen speeches.

Twelve to fifteen million people gathered in big crowds and small groups along the railroad junctions and stops from one end of the country to the other. Sometimes I would bring Mrs. Truman and Margaret, who were making their first tour with me, out on the rear platform to meet the crowds. At other times I would speak for a few minutes alone before the train started off for the next stop.

My one-man crusade took effect. The people responded with increasing enthusiasm as the day of election neared. I never doubted that they would vote for me, although my advisers were still not optimistic and the polls continued to back away at my chances of getting elected. I believed that when the people learned the facts for themselves they would make the right decisions; that people still prefer to make up their own minds about candidates upon the basis of direct observation, despite all the claims of how society depends today upon newspapers, radio, and other media of communication.

On October 31, 1948, I returned from the bedlam of the longest and hardest political campaign of my career to the restful quiet of my home in Independence. The tumultuous weeks of speechmaking, handshaking, and traveling day and night had culminated in St. Louis the night before in a tremendous rally. I felt that I had given the voters a clearer view of the choice before them and that the response from the grass roots of America was so great that it would carry me back to the White House for four years as an elected President.

The following day, which was the eve of the election, I made two more speeches. The first was a non-political address to members of the Ararat Shrine in the Kansas City Auditorium during the afternoon. That night I spoke from the living room of my home to about seventy million Americans listening over the four major radio networks. I was introduced by vice-presidential candidate Barkley, who spoke from his home in Paducah, Kentucky.

This was my final appeal to the voters to decide between the principles of the party for the people and the party for the special interests. I warned the nation that their vote would not be just for one man or another but would affect every person and his family for years to come.

With this, I was through. There was nothing to do but wait for the results.

At four-thirty in the afternoon on Election Day Jim Rowley

other than war. We must remember that rivalry among nations is an old story. History shows that rival powers can exist peacefully in the world.

"Patience must be our watchword. When the destiny of all mankind is at stake, we need to exercise all the patience we can muster. We should utilize every opportunity to strengthen the United Nations for the great undertakings which lie ahead.

"The people of the world are looking to their leaders to dispel the fog of distrust which now confuses the approach to peace. At the present moment, I would only add that our nation has never failed to meet the great crises of its history with honor and devotion to its ideals."

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At four-thirty in the afternoon on Election Day, Jim Row

ley and Henry Nicholson, who were first and second in command of the White House Secret Service detail, drove with me from my home down to the Elms Hotel at Excelsior Springs, Missouri, a resort about thirty miles northeast of Kansas City We had slipped away from the reporters, who spent the rest of the night trying to find me. They kept telephoning my family at Independence, hoping to get some information. At Excelsior Springs, after taking a Turkish bath I went upstairs to my room at six-thirty had a ham sandwich and a glass of milk, turned on the radio to listen to some of the eastern returns, and then went to bed. I was reported some thousands ahead.

I awoke at midnight and again listened to the radio broadcast of Mr H. V Kaltenborn. I was about 1,200,000 ahead on the count but, according to this broadcaster was still undoubtedly beaten.

About four o clock in the morning Rowley came into my room and advised me to tune in again on Kaltenborn's broadcast. I did so, and learned that at that time I was over 2,000 000 ahead, but the commentator continued to say he couldn't see how I could be elected.

I told Rowley and Nicholson that we had better go back to Kansas City because it looked very much as if we were in for another four years, and we arrived in Kansas City at about six o clock Wednesday morning, November 3 At ten-thirty I received a telegram from Governor Dewey congratulating me on my election.

The final figures showed that I had received 24 105,695 votes, carrying twenty-eight states. Dewey had 21,969 170 votes, carrying sixteen states. Wallace and Thurmond polled slightly over 1 000 000 votes each. I lost four of the southern states to the Dixiecrats—South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. But I carried all thirteen of the country's biggest cities and the seven large agricultural states—Missouri, California, Iowa, Illinois, Texas, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. If it had not been for the half million American Labor party votes which went to Wallace in New York State, I would have beaten Dewey in his own state by a majority of about 300,000 As it was, he carried New York by only 61,000 votes.

My majority in the electoral college was greater than my popular majority I had 304 electoral votes (it was finally 303 because one fell out in Tennessee) despite the loss of 38 votes to Thurmond in South Carolina 8 Mississippi 9 Alabama 11 and Louisiana 10. The key states in the election

had been Ohio and California, which had fluctuated throughout the night until the late counting of votes had put them in the Democratic column to stay. Without Ohio and California, I would have been assured of only 254 electoral votes, twelve less than the required 266.

The 1948 election proved the pollsters and forecasters so wrong and unreliable that to this day their reputations have not been fully restored and their influence is much reduced. It was almost universally predicted, right up to the last minute, that I would lose the election. Then it was predicted that, because no candidate would receive a majority of electoral votes, the election would be thrown into the House of Representatives.

What I tried to do in 1948, as always, was to make a living, going Democratic party that stood and fought for human rights. I wanted to keep it a party that represented the common people, no matter how it was maligned or how many attempts were made to destroy it from within. The effort succeeded in spite of the two splinter groups, and won with almost a majority of the popular vote.

The greatest achievement was winning *without the extreme* radicals in the party and without the Solid South. It is customary for a politician to say that he wants all the votes he can get, but I was happy and pleased to be elected to the presidency by a Democratic party that did not depend upon either the extreme left-wing or the southern bloc. And of course I did not want the reactionary votes which went for my Republican opponent. The fundamental purpose of the campaign in 1948 was to put the Democratic party on its own feet and to leave it intact. This was achieved.

It was a historic victory for the party. The Democrats recaptured the Republican House by a landslide and obtained control of the Senate. My long campaign against the Eightieth Congress had convinced the voters that a turnover was necessary and I was given an overwhelmingly Democratic Congress to replace the one which had blocked the administration's domestic program for two years.

Two days after the election the presidential special train took me to Washington. There was a great demonstration in the Union Station in St. Louis, and when I arrived in the capital city one of the largest crowds I have ever seen in Washington took part in a "home-coming" celebration.

As the Vice President-elect and I rode up Pennsylvania Avenue to the plaudits of immense crowds, I saw a sign on the front of the Washington Post Building which said, "Mr.

President, we are ready to eat crow whenever you are ready to serve it."

I sent that great newspaper word that I did not want anyone to eat crow that I was not elated or in a mood myself to crow over anyone. I said I felt the tremendous responsibility that was mine for the next four years, and that I hoped for the support of all the people in carrying out the program which I thought they had entrusted me to accomplish.

On arriving at the White House, I had a Cabinet meeting and a series of conferences to plan immediate repeal of the Taft Hartley Act, as promised in the campaign. There was much work to be done and I was eager to get on with it. On the advice of the White House physician, however I left Washington on November 7 for a two weeks rest in Key West but continued to hold daily conferences with the new Vice-President-elect and with other party leaders to outline the program to go before the Eighty-first Congress in January 1949

# CHAPTER 16

My thoughts kept going back, as I approached inauguration day, to someone I particularly wanted near me but who would not be there. I wished that my mother had lived long enough to see me sworn in as an elected President.

A year and a half ago, on July 25, 1947, serious news reached me from my mother's home in Grandview, Missouri.

More than five months earlier she had fallen and had broken her right hip. She was ninety-four at the time, and it was plain that the injury was serious. Nevertheless, the first reports were good, and we confidently hoped for her recovery. Twice previously—once when she was eighty-eight and again when she was ninety—she had recovered from similar but lesser fractures of her left hip. Now, however, recovery was slow.

I visited her within two days of the accident, and twice again in the months that followed—once for twelve days when she took a turn for the worse. And of course I kept constantly in touch with her through my sister Mary, my brother Vivian, and her physicians. My own physician, too, Brigadier General Wallace Graham, saw her frequently.

At first the reports were excellent, and it was felt that she would be out of bed in six weeks or so. In May, however, her condition took a turn for the worse, and it was then that I spent twelve days with her in Grandview. By May 30, however, she was better again and all of us were reassured. In the weeks that followed, her condition improved. She sat up now and again, and before the end of June, Mary reported that she was "getting along fine," though the fracture was healing very slowly. On July 12 she was "feeling much better" after having been kept in bed for several days, and on the nineteenth Dr. Graham, who had gone to Grandview to see her and to consult with her physician, reported that she was recovering from the setback of the week before and that he would return to Washington.

Now, however, a new and adverse report had come. Dr

President, we are ready to eat crow whenever you are ready to serve it."

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Margaret, and I were the guests of honor at a gala concert and show staged by the Inaugural Committee. It was late when we returned to Blair House.

Inauguration day January 20, 1949 started with a breakfast with ninety-seven veterans of Battery D which I commanded in France in 1918. These friends of World War I crowded around me, shaking my hand and calling me "Mr President" until I put a stop to it. "We'll have none of that here, I told them, and insisted that they call me "Captain Harry" as they had done in the Argonne thirty years before.

Our former regimental chaplain, Monsignor L. Curtis Tiernan, said grace before that breakfast, and then, with thirty years of memories to recount, we paid far less attention to our orange juice and our country ham, our hominy grits and fried eggs, than to each other. We fought the war again, as veterans always do, and reminded each other of endless happenings that would no doubt have seemed very unimportant to anyone but ourselves. I reminded them of the part they were to play in the inaugural parade. Despite their lack of uniforms, they were to be a kind of guard of honor" for me and were to march in two long lines beside my car all the way from the Capitol to the reviewing stand before the White House. No one knew better than I that they were not the physical specimens they had been three decades earlier but "I'm sure," I told them, "that you can still make 120 steps a minute for a mile and a quarter. Before I left, they sang a special song or two that had been composed for the occasion by one of their number—Eugene Donnelly of Kansas City—and then they presented me with a handsome gold-handled ebony cane which I promised faithfully to use every morning on my daily walk.

Even on inauguration day there is work a President must do, and I went from that breakfast to my office at the White House. Then, having returned to Blair House, Mrs. Truman, Margaret, and I, together with Senator Barkley Chief Justice Vinson, and some of the members of the Cabinet, drove around Lafayette Park to St. John's Episcopal Church, where we attended an impressive ten o'clock service. Afterward we returned once more to Blair House, and then the Joint Committee of Congress arrived to escort me to the Capitol.

The oath-taking ceremony—first that of the Vice-President and after that, as has long been customary that of the President—was scheduled for noon, but in the rotunda of the Capitol the gathering of diplomats, members of Congress,

lived, referred to the false philosophy which had made such headway throughout the world, misleading many peoples and adding to their sorrows and their difficulties.

"That false philosophy " I said, "is Communism.

"Communism is based on the belief that man is so weak and inadequate that he is unable to govern himself, and therefore requires the rule of strong masters.

"Democracy is based on the conviction that man has the moral and intellectual capacity as well as the inalienable right, to govern himself with reason and justice.

"Communism subjects the individual to arrest without lawful cause, punishment without trial, and forced labor as a chattel of the state. It decrees what information he shall receive, what art he shall produce, what leaders he shall follow and what thoughts he shall think.

"Democracy maintains that government is established for the benefit of the individual, and is charged with the responsibility of protecting the rights of the individual and his freedom in the exercise of those abilities of his."

I then spoke of our hopes for the future—of the possibilities for world improvement that lay within the scope of the United Nations, the European Recovery Program, and other measures aimed at the betterment of life all about the world.

"We must embark on a bold new program," I said, "for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of under developed areas.

I proposed four important major courses of action. The first was continued support for the United Nations and its related agencies; second, a continuation of the program for world economic recovery; third, strengthening of the freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression.

"More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery " I said in outlining the fourth point. "Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.

"For the first time in history humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.

"The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for the assistance of other people are limited. But our imponderable resources

"Our allies, I pointed out, "are the millions who hunger and thirst after righteousness.

"In due time, as our stability becomes manifest, as more and more nations come to know the benefits of democracy and to participate in growing abundance, I believe that those countries which now oppose us will abandon their delusions and join with the free nations of the world in a just settlement of international differences.

"Events have brought our American democracy to new influence and new responsibilities. They will test our courage, our devotion to duty, and our concept of liberty.

"Steadfast in our faith in the Almighty, we will advance toward a world where man's freedom is secure. To that end we will devote our strength, our resources, and our firmness of resolve. With God's help the future of mankind will be assured in a world of justice, harmony, and peace."

At twelve-thirty the ceremony was ended, and with Vice-President Barkley beside me, I entered the leading car in the long parade down Pennsylvania Avenue.

In my inaugural address I wanted to make it clear that lasting freedom and independence cannot be achieved among free nations unless they possess the means to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose totalitarian regimes upon them. The seeds of such regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the soil of poverty and discontent. They reach their full growth when the hope of the people for a better life has died.

We could not falter in accepting the responsibilities of leadership which had fallen to us. On March 12, 1947, I had asked the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey, both threatened by Soviet power. I had also asked the Congress, at the request of those countries, to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey to assist in reconstruction and to supervise the use of such materials as would be furnished.

The assistance then asked amounted to little more than one tenth of one percent of the $341,000,000,000 the United States had contributed toward the winning of World War II. It was common sense that we should safeguard this investment.

The American people have always been traditionally altruistic, and the spirit of neighborliness has been a characteristic of our society since the earliest days, even when there

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in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.

"I believe that we should make available to peace-loving people the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development.

"Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.

"We invite other countries to pool their technological resources in this undertaking. Their contributions will be warmly welcomed. This should be a cooperative enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies wherever practicable. It must be a world-wide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty and freedom.

"With the cooperation of business, private capital, agriculture and labor in this country this program can greatly increase the industrial activity in other nations and can raise substantially their standards of living.

"Such new economic developments must be devised and controlled to benefit the people of the areas in which they are established. Guaranties to the investor must be balanced by guaranties in the interest of the people whose resources and whose labor go into these developments.

"The old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in the concepts of democratic fair dealing.

"All countries, including our own, will greatly benefit from a constructive program for the better use of the world's human and natural resources. Experience shows that our commerce with other countries expands as they progress industrially and economically

"Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.

"Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people.

"Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies—hunger misery and despair

for the first time in my inaugural address. "We must embark on a bold new program," I announced, "for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas."

Thus was launched what came to be universally known, within a matter of months, as the "Point Four program," because it was the fourth of the four important courses of action set forth in the inaugural address.

To call the undertaking a "bold new program" was no exaggeration. It was an adventurous idea such as had never before been proposed by any country in the history of the world. Its announcement on January 20, 1949 created a great deal of interest and excitement, and my answers at a press conference six days later re-emphasized both the novelty and the boldness of the plan:

"Mr. President," I was asked, "can you give us any background on the origin of Point Four?"

"The origin of Point Four has been in my mind," I replied, "and in the minds of the government, for the past two or three years, ever since the Marshall Plan was inaugurated. It originated with the Greece and Turkey proposition. Been studying it ever since. I spend most of my time going over to that globe back there, trying to figure out ways to make peace in the world."

"Can you tell us," I was asked, "how you are going to implement it?"

"It's a policy of the Administration over the next four years," I replied, "and it's something that will have to be implemented generally. I have asked the Secretary of State to get together with the heads of the Departments of the Government, and try to work out preliminary plans for an approach to it. I can't tell you just what is going to take place, where it is going to take place, or how it is going to take place. I know what I want to do."

I knew from my study of American history that this country was developed by the investment of foreign capital by the British, the Dutch, the Germans, and the French. These countries invested immense sums in the development of our railroads, mines, oil lands, and the livestock industry. This included ranches, cattle breeding, and the packing industry. The first packing house west of the Mississippi River was built by a Frenchman, a count in Napoleon's army.

After two world wars, in each of which the United States was used as a source of supply for munitions and materials by

evelop their own resources. The principal item of expendi-
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In this country we had both the capital and the technical
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The Point Four program was a practical expression of our
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tions. The resources of such areas as Mesopotamia, Iran,
India, North Africa, and huge sections of South America
have hardly been touched, and their development would be
as beneficial to American trade as to the areas themselves. It
would enable the peoples of many areas to subsist on trade
and not aid.

This, then, was the idea which I broached at the outset of
my second term. It was generally recognized and accepted as
a good idea. The next problem was to make it work.

I immediately instituted a series of conferences on the
subject of how best to implement the Point Four program
and ordered the Secretary of State to direct the planning
necessary to translate the program into action. The Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Willard L. Thorp,
was designated to co-ordinate the planning of the program,
and interdepartmental consultations were set up through a
Committee on Economic Foreign Policy.

In developing the program, I made it clear that all existing
private and governmental activities would be utilized. Ameri-
can business enterprises overseas and private non-profit organ-
izations such as the Rockefeller Institute or the Institute of

the European countries, the invested funds in the United States of Britain, Holland, Germany and France were depleted. Germany's were confiscated.

It seemed to me that if we could encourage stabilized governments in underdeveloped countries in Africa, South America, and Asia, we could encourage the use for the development of those areas some of the capital which had accumulated in the United States. If the investment of capital from the United States could be protected and not confiscated, and if we could persuade the capitalists that they were not working in foreign countries to exploit them but to develop them, it would be to the mutual benefit of everybody concerned.

The Point Four idea, then, originated at about the same time as the Marshall plan concept. It was never intended, however to have any connection with the Marshall Plan, which was purely for postwar rehabilitation in the countries of western Europe whose production and economy were ruined by the war. Point Four was conceived as a worldwide, continuing program of helping underdeveloped nations to help themselves through the sharing of technical information already tested and proved in the United States.

I was thinking in terms of a foreign policy for a nation that was the free-world leader. During the administrations of Roosevelt and myself it had been proved that the way to build a successful economy in which the most people enjoyed high standards of living was to keep the national resources out of the hands of special interests and in the possession of the people themselves. This was our program domestically and I wanted to make it a permanent part of our foreign policy.

Point Four was aimed at enabling millions of people in underdeveloped areas to raise themselves from the level of colonialism to self-support and ultimate prosperity. All of the reports which I had received from such areas of the world indicated that a great many people were still living in an age almost a thousand years behind the times. In many places this was the result of long exploitation for the benefit of foreign countries, of developments for foreign benefit rather than for the interest of the native peoples. This was the curse of colonialism, and I, for one, have always hoped to see it disappear.

What I hoped Point Four would accomplish was to provide technical assistance so that these peoples themselves, with a very small capital investment from us, would be able to

develop their own resources. The principal item of expenditure would be the skill of our technicians teaching these people how to help themselves.

In this country we had both the capital and the technical "know-how." I did not see how we could follow any other course but to put these two great assets to work in the underdeveloped areas in order to help them elevate their own standards of living and then move in the direction of world-wide prosperity and peace. The alternative, as I saw it, was to continue to allow those vast areas to drift toward poverty, despair, fear and the other miseries of mankind which breed unending wars.

The Point Four program was a practical expression of our attitude toward the countries threatened by Communist domination. It was consistent with our policies of preventing the expansion of Communism in the free world by helping to insure the proper development of those countries with adequate food, clothing, and living facilities. It was an effort to bring to such people, not the idealism of democracy alone, but the tangible benefits of better living through intelligent co-operation.

Thus the plan was realistic as well as idealistic. Common sense told me that the development of these countries would keep our own industrial plant in business for untold generations. The resources of such areas as Mesopotamia, Iran, India, North Africa, and huge sections of South America have hardly been touched, and their development would be as beneficial to American trade as to the areas themselves. It would enable the peoples of many areas to subsist on trade and not aid.

This, then, was the idea which I broached at the outset of my second term. It was generally recognized and accepted as a good idea. The next problem was to make it work.

I immediately instituted a series of conferences on the subject of how best to implement the Point Four program and ordered the Secretary of State to direct the planning necessary to translate the program into action. The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Willard L. Thorp, was designated to co-ordinate the planning of the program, and interdepartmental consultations were set up through a Committee on Economic Foreign Policy.

In developing the program, I made it clear that all existing private and governmental activities would be utilized. American business enterprises overseas and private non-profit organizations such as the Rockefeller Institute or the Institute of

are to prevail in these areas, and particularly in the Far East, that their people experience in their own lives the benefits of scientific and economic advances."

The message pointed out that this program would require the movement of large amounts of capital from the industrial nations, particularly from the United States, to productive uses in the backward areas, that recent world events made prompt action imperative.

"This program," I said, "is in the interest of all peoples—and it has nothing in common with either the old imperialism of the last century or the new imperialism of the Communists."

The plan was laid before the United Nations early that year and in the first official act taken on the Point Four idea, the United Nations Economic and Social Council endorsed the program on March 4, 1949, and drafted some proposals which were adopted later in the year.

It was not until June 5, 1950, however, that Point Four became a reality. On that date I signed the act to provide foreign economic assistance which was passed by the second session of the Eighty-first Congress. Point Four was embodied in this act as Title IV, the Act for International Development. The same legislation included also the Economic Cooperation Act of 1950, the China Area Aid Act of 1950, the United Nations Palestine Refugees Aid Act of 1950, and the International Children's Welfare Work Act of 1950.

Among the appropriations authorized for these various purposes was $34,500,000 for the technical assistance program. Specific appropriations were contained in the General Appropriation Act of 1951, approved on September 6, 1950.

The sum appropriated for technical assistance was small in comparison with the need and was ten and a half million dollars less than the minimum requested. But it was a beginning, and already Point Four had become a symbol of hope to those nations which were being fed Communist propaganda that the free nations were incapable of providing a decent standard of living for the millions of people in the underdeveloped areas of the earth. This money, together with the contributions of other countries, would have a cumulative effect in promoting the well-being of such people.

Pursuant to the Act for International Development, an Executive Order was issued on September 8, 1950, delegating to the Secretary of State the responsibility for carrying out the Point Four program and establishing the International Development Advisory Board. This Board was set up for

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development of fibers and insecticides, were given an important place in the Point Four program.

By the end of 1951 Point Four had been extended to thirty-three countries, and the State of the Union message of January 9 1952, summarized the progress of the program, pointing out that during the year the United States had made available millions of bushels of wheat to relieve the famine in India. But far more important in the long run, I said, was the work which Americans were doing in India to help the farmers themselves raise more grain.

"This is our Point Four program at work. It is working, not only in India, but in Iran and Paraguay and Liberia—in forty-three countries around the globe. Our technical missionaries are out there. We need more of them. We need more funds to speed their efforts, because there is nothing of greater importance in all our foreign policy There is nothing that shows more clearly what we stand for and what we want to achieve.

As the value of the plan became clearer to the Congress, subsequent laws were passed authorizing and providing funds for its operations. For the fiscal year 1952, the budget was expanded from the original appropriation of $34,500,000 to $147,900,000 and for the fiscal year 1953 this amount was increased to $155,600,000.

Changes in personnel and organization were made necessary in 1952, but the program continued to grow in scope and activity After Dr. Bennett's death, Stanley Andrews, a former official of the Department of Agriculture, became director of the program. Rockefeller resigned at the close of 1951 to devote his attention to private administration of technical assistance and was succeeded in January 1952 by Eric A. Johnston, former Administrator of the Economic Stabilization Agency

Under the consolidation of current aid programs in 1952 technical and economic assistance in Southeast Asia and the Pacific was placed under the Mutual Security Agency headed by Averell Harriman, while the Technical Cooperation Administration of the State Department continued to administer economic and technical assistance in the Middle East, South Asia, the American republics, and the independent states of Africa.

At the time I left the presidency in January 1953 the Point Four program had been in operation less than thirty months. During that short period the program had relieved famine measurably in many portions of the world, had re-

There were, of course, some great difficulties encountered in the implementation of the program. Chief among these was the attempt, both at home and abroad, by selfish interests to change the character of the program by shifting the emphasis from technical assistance to financial aid. Point Four was not conceived as a lending program or as a giveaway plan. Its basic aim is to spread knowledge that will aid others to improve themselves.

The American taxpayers, who approved the Point Four program, showed their general support of the plan from the beginning. There was little or no opposition in the press to this effort of the government to help other countries to help themselves. The only dangerous threat to the continued success of the plan, as I saw it, was that which might come from the reactionaries and isolationists.

It is a program which requires vision. It has been estimated that an improvement of only two per cent in the living standards of Asia and Africa would keep the industrial plants of the United States, Great Britain, and France going at full tilt for a century just to keep up with the increased demand for goods and services.

Only America could undertake such a unique approach to world affairs. Our population, unlike that of other great nations, is made up of strains from every population around the world, and when we became the most powerful nation in the world, we tried to put into effect the ideals of all races and nationalities which we had written into the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.

The American approach to world affairs was best demonstrated by the manner in which we treated conquered nations after the first and second world wars. We set up the means to feed and clothe and take care of the physical needs of the people. We rehabilitated the conquered nations instead of attempting to keep them conquered and prostrate. We asked for no reparations.

This was something new in the history of nations. The traditional practice had always been for the conqueror to strip the defeated countries and to make off with whatever spoils were available. Our idea has been to restore the conquered nations of Germany, Italy and Japan to prosperity in the hope that they would understand the futility of aggression as a means of expansion and progress. We had to refute the historic claim that a nation must use aggression and military means to gain markets.

The satellite countries of Russia are the unhappiest places

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# CHAPTER 17

On April 4, 1949 I stood by Secretary of State Dean Acheson as he signed his name, on behalf of the United States, to a treaty which was the first peacetime military alliance concluded by the United States since the adoption of the Constitution. Earlier in our history (before the Constitution was written) the colonies had signed a military alliance with France. The document Acheson signed was the North Atlantic Treaty and the occasion was the closing ceremonial event of a historic meeting, held in the auditorium of the Department of Labor in Washington, D.C.

The North Atlantic Treaty was one more step in the evolution of our foreign policy along with the United Nations Charter, the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, and the Marshall Plan. Because of the Marshall Plan, the economy of western Europe began, within a short time, to show evidence of recovery. But the problems of Europe were not only economic. There was fear of aggression and, therefore, lack of confidence in the future. A large volume of European capital had been transferred abroad before and during World War II, and this was now needed in western Europe to rebuild its cities and its industries. Capital, however, was not likely to flow to countries threatened by Communist conquest.

In 1947 and 1948 the Communists were pushing hard in Europe. Even as the Marshall Plan was being launched, they captured the government of Hungary. This was the first seizure of a government by Communists which was openly supported by Russia since the fighting had stopped in Europe. The following month the Kremlin ordered Czechoslovakia and Poland to call off their participation in the Marshall Plan.

In early 1948 still another series of events jarred the free world. In Czechoslovakia, which had so long been the stronghold of democracy in central Europe, a ruthless Communist leadership, backed by the Russian Army at the border, demanded the full powers of government. President Eduard

and democratic character of a whole series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe.

"It is this ruthless course of action, and the design to extend it to the remaining free nations of Europe, that have brought about the critical situation in Europe today

"The tragic death of the Republic of Czechoslovakia has sent a shock throughout the civilized world. Now pressure i being brought to bear on Finland, to the hazard of the entir Scandinavian peninsula. Greece is under direct military at tack from rebels actively supported by her Communist domi nated neighbors. In Italy a determined and aggressive effort is being made by a Communist minority to take control of that country. The methods vary but the pattern is all too clear.

"Faced with this growing menace, there have been encouraging signs that the free nations of Europe are drawing closer together for their economic well-being and for the common defense of their liberties.

At the very moment I am addressing you, five nations of the European community in Brussels, are signing a 50-year agreement for economic cooperation and common defense against aggression.

"This action has great significance, for this agreement was not imposed by the decree of a powerful neighbor. It was the free choice of independent governments representing the will of their people, and acting within the terms of the Charter of the United Nations.

"Its significance goes far beyond the actual terms of the agreement itself. It is a notable step in the direction of unity in Europe for protection and preservation of its civilization. This development deserves our full support. I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to protect themselves.

I then urged the Congress to complete legislative action on the European Recovery Program and to provide for a strengthening of national defense through universal military training and the restoration of Selective Service.

That evening my speech to the Society of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick in New York struck the same note

"Free men in every land are asking: 'Where is this leading? When will it end?'

"I can bring you tonight no simple or easy answer

"But I can express my firm conviction that, at this moment in history the faith and strength of the United States are mighty forces for the prevention of war and the establishment of peace.

"Our faith and our strength must be made unmistakably clear to the world."

Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary had informed Secretary of State Marshall as early as January 13 1948, that England was planning to approach France and the so-called Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) with a proposal for a series of bilateral defense agreements. The pattern he had in mind was that of the Dunkirk Treaty a postwar agreement by which Great Britain and France had agreed to come to each other's defense in case of renewed German aggression.

General Marshall brought Bevin's message to me. I thought it was a good beginning—a step in the right direction. If the countries of western Europe were ready to organize for their joint defense, that would be an important contribution to the peace of the world.

Bevin in his message had asked what our attitude would be toward this new alliance. I authorized Marshall to inform the British Foreign Secretary that we agreed with them on the urgent need for concerted measures by the nations of western Europe. As in the case of the European Recovery Program, we welcomed European initiative and would give their undertaking our wholehearted sympathy the United States would do anything it properly could to assist the European nations to bring this or a similar project to fulfillment.

With this backing from the United States, Bevin approached the French and the Benelux countries. It was from the three small nations that a counterproposal came for one regional arrangement rather than a series of two-party treaties. M. Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister was largely responsible for this change, and it was in this form that the treaty was made. I think to Spaak goes the credit for lining up the Europeans for the treaty

But even as the Brussels Pact was signed, it was clear that it would take a far more important political act to dispel the fears and to restore full confidence among the western European nations. The State Department had already made some extensive studies and drawn up lists of possible courses of action. In my own mind there was no doubt that much more

would have to be done in order to bolster Europe's will to resist—and to recover

But I always kept in mind the lesson of Wilson's failure in 1920. I meant to have legislative co-operation. Our European friends apparently remembered the League of Nations too: they were most anxious to have not only a presidential declaration of policy but also a congressional expression confirming it.

Under Secretary of State Lovett and the Republican foreign policy spokesman, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, went to work on a congressional declaration of policy which put the Senate on record as favoring regional arrangements "based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid."

This was Senate Resolution 239 which Senator Vandenberg skillfully steered through the Senate to overwhelming approval by that body. On the final roll call, on June 11 1948, only four senators voted against it. Even counting pairs and announced positions of senators absent from the floor there were seventy-nine for and only six against the resolution.

Senator Vandenberg was thoroughly familiar with the workings of the Senate and knew how to get results. He could take ideas conceived by others—many in this case came from the State Department—and then include an element or two that would add his legislative trademark without changing anything basic. From then on he would fight for the ideas without letting up. When Vandenberg died, nobody in the Republican ranks was able to step into his shoes.

Meanwhile, the State Department was working out the details for our support of Western Union, which was the name given to the Brussels Pact arrangements. The plan was sent to the National Security Council for further study and at the Council meeting on April 22, 1948, Lovett announced that the plan was being rewritten in order more closely to approach the language used in the Senate resolution that he and Vandenberg were then preparing.

On April 23 Lovett came to see me with a top-secret telegram from the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, in which were outlined the possible risks involved in a formal treaty association by the nations of the North Atlantic area. He said that he had discussed these risks in the greatest secrecy with Prime Minister Attlee and a few of his closest colleagues, and they had agreed that the summoning of a conference by the United States Government to discuss defense arrangements for the North Atlantic area would be the

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had that morning received a message from Bevin declaring that evidence was needed that the United States was willing to assume certain obligations, and that Bevin also felt that negotiations should be initiated from Washington.

The military point of view was represented by Secretary of the Army Royall, who reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt we should not commit ourselves to any defense arrangement until we knew what they were. For that reason we should send observers only to the military talks which the Western Union nations were planning to hold in London in July. Royall suggested that any arrangement made should be sufficiently flexible so that Spain, Germany and Austria could later be added.

Secretary of Defense Forrestal pointed out that the French seemed to think that the first item on any regional security program should be the re-equipping of twenty-five French divisions. Our Chiefs of Staff, however, were of the opinion that our own strength should be bolstered first. They admitted, however that if that course were followed it would be some time before the French could get what they wanted.

Mr. Lovett observed that it was virtually impossible to get Congress to approve substantial shipments of military equipment to other powers except for an emergency. If Congress believed that we were thinking of a revival of Lend-Lease, he added, there would be drastic cuts in domestic military appropriations.

The National Security Council then recommended to me that the line of action proposed by the State Department should generally be followed, though with proper weight given both to the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to any changes that might be made in the Vandenberg Resolution during Senate debate.

On July 2 I approved a policy statement which said that the Vandenberg Resolution should be implemented to the fullest extent possible and that the Department of State should now go ahead with the preliminary conversations which the Brussels Pact powers had suggested.

It was decided also that U.S. military representatives should go to London to take part in the five-power military discussions there, although on a non-membership basis, and that we should seek to convince the Brussels Pact nations to proceed with military talks at once, even though the U.S. commitment was not to be made formal until later. Furthermore, the Department of State was to explore the possibility of including Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy and perhaps

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The State Department wasted little time getting the talks with the Brussels Pact powers under way. The first session of these talks was held on July 6, with Under Secretary Lovett heading the American delegation, and the ambassadors in Washington of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada representing their respective countries (the Belgian also attended on behalf of Luxembourg.)

These conversations were held in the utmost secrecy. A special security system was applied so that only a bare minimum of documentary material was distributed. Special couriers handled all papers. Telephone discussion of matters covered in the conference was absolutely ruled out, and telegraphic communication was held to a minimum. Only a very restricted number of persons were allowed to handle any of the documents involved.

This system was the same that the Brussels Pact powers had established for their own use in negotiations and was intended to prevent leaks to Soviet agents.

Because of the crucial importance of these meetings I wanted to make sure that I had all the information. Under Secretary of State Lovett called on me regularly bringing the minutes of each meeting with him. The sessions were marked by a completely frank exchange of views, sometimes to the point of bluntness. Rarely has a group of diplomats, representing six different nations, sat around one table and spoken with such complete frankness.

Next to Lovett, Dr. Van Kleffens, the Netherlands Ambassador was the outstanding member of the group. He seemed to have a remarkable grasp of the thing that mattered and was always able to supply the right word at the right time. It was he who first expressed the hope that the association which the Vandenberg Resolution had envisaged would take the form of a "North Atlantic Pact."

At last, after numerous sessions of working committees, an agreed statement was prepared, to be submitted to the respective governments. Here are the most important points of that statement.

The first section discussed the situation in Europe as it affected security. Here it was clearly recognized that the Soviet advance was a direct result of the war which had created a vacuum in central and eastern Europe where German power had once prevailed. The Soviets' actions were described as part of an avowed drive for maximum extension of power and influence. At this stage the Soviet Union was

Portugal and Sweden in the proposed arrangement and suggest for later adherence of Spain, Germany and Austria, or the western zones of the last two countries. If Canada was willing to participate, the Department of State was to arrange for Canadian attendance at the London military talks.

If, as a result of the diplomatic talks with the Brussels Pact nations, we became convinced that some further political commitment from us was necessary at this time in order to bolster public morale and confidence in western Europe, then we should undertake to discuss such an association with those countries. This was the cornerstone of the defense program, but no U.S. commitment should be entered into without the fullest bi-partisan clearance here.

At the same time, the National Security Council proposed certain recommendations which I approved and which later became the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

The two proposals—Mutual Defense Assistance Program and association with the Brussels Pact powers—supplemented each other and yet they were independent of one another. The Congress had on several occasions authorized the giving of aid in the nature of military supplies and technical advice to certain nations. MDAP was intended to replace this piecemeal approach by a comprehensive program which would permit us to aid in the defense of those countries whose strategic location made them most important to the security of the United States in such amounts and at such times as a broad military and political view of the situation might demand.

The program was a long-range proposition and not a stop-gap measure. It should not jeopardize the minimum needs of our own armed forces, as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should be tied in with the European Recovery Program in such a way that the total of the two programs would not endanger the stability of our domestic economy. The countries participating in the program should be encouraged to eliminate overlapping production by standardizing weapons and matériel.

This was the summer of 1948. Berlin was blockaded, and it was not yet at all certain that the airlift would succeed. Free men in Europe and in Asia, eager to resist aggression, could not wait for the future delivery of arms, which might come too late. Indeed, the main purpose of this aid proposal was to make sure that we did not have another tragic instance of "too little and too late"—the kind of thing that had helped Hitler subjugate Europe.

delegation was instructed to take the position that this was an obligation which, in view of our Constitution, we were not prepared to assume.

Canada proposed a compromise. This provided that in case of attack on a member state the other members should consider this an attack on themselves. But instead of becoming immediately involved in war, the compromise provided that each nation would be expected to lend aid to the victim in accordance with its own constitutional processes. In plain language this means there is an obligation to give all aid possible, but subject to the constitutional procedures of each country.

When the treaty was later given its final form, this compromise became, in substance, Article V—the key provision of the treaty.

On October 13 Canada notified the State Department that she was ready to enter into a treaty along the general lines suggested by the agreed statement of September 9. Two weeks later word was received that the Brussels Pact nations had agreed in principle to the negotiation of such a North Atlantic security pact.

When the negotiators came together again, following these decisions by Canada and the Brussels Pact nations, it took little time to produce a draft treaty. When the National Security Council reviewed the situation in my presence on January 6, 1949, Under Secretary Lovett spoke in highly complimentary terms about the spirit in which the talks had been carried on.

Obviously each government had its own problems. The French were anxious to have the treaty extended to cover their North African possessions. The British were a little reluctant to include the Italians. As I observed at this NSC meeting, this reluctance was understandable. One had to remember that the British had had some bad experiences with Italy in recent years. But I said that nothing would ever be accomplished if people spent all their time pondering fears and worrying about difficulties. Making policy means making decisions. We must look forward with faith and confidence.

In working out the North Atlantic Treaty we had made a truly momentous decision. As I described it to the National Security Council, it could be called "an offensive-defensive alliance to maintain the peace in the North Atlantic area but without automatic provision for war."

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When the negotiators came together again, following these decisions by Canada and the Brussels Pact nations, it took little time to produce a draft treaty. When the National Security Council reviewed the situation in my presence on January 6, 1949, Under Secretary Lovett spoke in highly complimentary terms about the spirit in which the talks had been carried on.

Obviously each government had its own problems. The French were anxious to have the treaty extended to cover their North African possessions. The British were a little reluctant to include the Italians. As I observed at this NSC meeting, this reluctance was understandable. One had to remember that the British had had some bad experiences with Italy in recent years. But I said that nothing would ever be accomplished if people spent all their time pondering flaws and worrying about difficulties. Making policy means making decisions. We must look forward with faith and confidence.

In working out the North Atlantic Treaty we had made a truly momentous decision. As I described it to the National Security Council, it could be called "an offensive-defensive alliance to maintain the peace in the North Atlantic area but without automatic provision for war.

With the North Atlantic Treaty and the corresponding

"The cost of such a program is considerable, but it represents an investment in security that will be worth many times its cost. It is part of the price of peace. Which is better, to make expenditures to save the peace, or to risk all our resources and assets in another war?"

Administrative machinery under the treaty organization was set up without delay. A North Atlantic Council was formed on September 17, 1949, with the Foreign Ministers of the participating nations as members. The Cabinet officers in charge of defense in the several member nations formed a Defense Committee and under that body a Military Committee of top-ranking generals and admirals from all twelve nations went to work at once.

The first major task was to reach an agreement on how to work out the defense of the NATO area. Up to this time each country had its own defense plans, but now it became necessary to think of the area as one. This did not involve specific national defense positions but, instead, the over-all strategic approach. This plan was worked out without delay and the NATO Council gave its approval on January 6, 1950.

Secretary Acheson brought the plan to me and I examined it at length, with the assistance of my diplomatic, military and economic advisers. I thought it was a good plan and one that would serve the interest of the United States well. On January 27, 1950, I formally approved this proposal for the strategy that would control a major part of our defenses and occupy a major share of our defense efforts.

The NATO defense was based on the idea of a "balanced force"—that is, on the use of a NATO defense force to which each country would contribute its share. This was one of the problems. The Dutch, for instance, with their long tradition of seafaring and exploration, did not want to restrict their Navy, yet the plan called for them to concentrate on certain types of ground forces. Almost all the member nations indicated their understanding of the basic principles involved, namely, that by avoiding duplication of effort more could be accomplished. However, there was also the thought present, and sometimes expressed, that they wanted to have a balanced defense of their own in case NATO did not succeed. In other words, it was again a question of confidence, a question of overcoming uncertainty and doubt.

In Congress there were demands for proof that the Europeans would carry an appropriate share of the burden of common defense. In Europe, just as understandably, there

was reluctance to extend risks and expenses until America's participation was clearly evident.

In addition, there were Europe's internal tensions that complicated the job. France was unwilling to give up any part of its preoccupation with the defense against Germany. The Benelux countries wanted to make sure that Britain as well as France shared in the actual defense arrangements in their part of Europe. The Scandinavians felt they were out on a flank and dangerously exposed on their end of the strategic arc. England tried to preserve her strength for the preservation of the remnants of her empire. And this is just the beginning of the list.

Through a series of conferences, Secretary Acheson worked with great patience and skill to drive home the point that NATO would have no meaning at all unless a really joint effort was made at common defense and mutual aid, and his arguments won the day. There would have been no NATO without Dean Acheson.

The major problem in these discussions soon proved to be the question of German participation in the defense of Europe. The German people, divided between East and West, were still under occupation following the defeat and destruction of Hitler. But the land they inhabit is the very core of Europe, and the people who live in it have proved over the centuries that they have the will and the ability to defend it. Without Germany the defense of Europe was a rear-guard action on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. With Germany there could be a defense in depth, powerful enough to offer effective resistance to aggression from the East.

The logic behind this situation is very plain. Any map will show it, and a little arithmetic will prove what the addition of German manpower means to the strength of the joint defense of Europe.

To bring the Germans into the defense arrangements of Europe and to spur the Europeans on to great efforts themselves were the two main efforts required in making NATO work. The Germans wanted restoration of their full sovereignty before they assumed their place in the scheme of defense, but the French kept insisting that Germany had to be kept under controls. In conference after conference it seemed impossible to break this deadlock.

When Dean Acheson went to these conferences, he would send me a daily cable with a full summary of the day's events. This was not the same as the report which the delegation secretary would compile for the use of the State Depart-

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This purpose was achieved; and, while the results were immediately discouraging, I think that we may be getting somewhere.

I pointed out that you had been able to bring about a complete revolution in American foreign policy based upon the realities of the international situation. We were prepared to take steps which were absolutely unprecedented in our history to place substantial forces in Europe, to put these forces into an integrated force for the defense of Europe, to agree to a command structure, to agree to a supreme commander, to join in a program for integrating European production, to take far reaching steps in the financial field, but all based upon the expectation that others would do their part, and that the entire scheme would result in the creation of such power that chances of peace would be immeasurably improved; and, if contrary to our hopes and beliefs war should come, we had a first class chance to win it. I went on to say that this involved a defense in Europe as far to the east as possible, and that such a defense was not possible without facing squarely and deciding wisely the question of German participation. I pointed out that in our discussions the British and French had been prepared to accept what we offered, had been reticent about their own contributions; and had flatly refused to face in any way the question of German participation. I, therefore, wanted to talk about this question with the gloves off and see exactly where we stood.

The ensuing discussion brought out very clearly two fundamental facts. The first was that Bevin who really agreed with me, had been put under wraps by his government and was not permitted to say anything. This grows out of the current debate in the House of Commons on this very subject, in which the Labor Government has a pathological fear of Churchill and does not dare say anything for fear that it will leak to the American press and be used by Churchill in the debate. I hope that this situation is not permanent and may clear up in the near future.

On the part of Schuman the difficulty was deeper. His attitude was that he was not able or willing, as the spokesman of his government, to take any decision even on principle in regard to German participation until the forces of the Allies had been so strengthened in Europe that the French Government could face the psychological reaction to the creation of German armed force.

ment. It was an entirely personal account, dictated by the Secretary himself and intended for me alone. In this manner I would know from day to day what was going on behind the closed doors of the conference. Acheson always kept me fully informed about every move he intended to make.

One of the most important of this series of NATO conferences was the one held in New York in September 1950.

I had been reviewing the difficulties that had been encountered in Europe and realized we had to take into account the anxiety of our European allies in the face of the developments in the Far East. Many of them were fearful that we would now turn most of our attention to Korea and that the European defense would become subordinate. It was therefore decided, as evidence of our concern about the defense of Europe, to send over additional United States troops. These American forces would be part of a balanced European defense force which would include the Germans. This force eventually would have a supreme commander

Acheson took this plan with him when he went to New York to meet French Foreign Minister Schuman and British Foreign Secretary Bevin for preliminary talks on September 12. Both statesmen realized at once that we had moved a very considerable distance to encourage European action, but Schuman's instructions from his government were to oppose any arrangement that would bring about the creation of a German army or of anything that could serve as the framework for such an army Bevin was immediately taken with the idea of a supreme commander He thought the appointment of a supreme commander especially an American, would spur the Europeans to action more than anything else. Our thought on this was to do what had been done in World War II in the molding of the invasion forces set up a joint staff to work on preliminaries and appoint a supreme commander when there is something for him to command.

Acheson described the situation to me

September 15 12 15 A.M.
PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ACHESON

After two days of conferences which had persistently failed in coming to grips with the central problem of the defense of Europe, I asked for and obtained a private conference attended only by me, Bevin, Schuman and our three High Commissioners for Germany The purpose of this talk was to get away from minor difficulties of language and really reach the essence of the problem.

When it became clear that neither man had any discretion and that therefore argument could not result in any immediate change of position, I suggested that we examine the positions taken by each of them solely for the purpose of clarifying our minds so that when they had some flexibility returned to them, we would understand how each of us thought about the various points.

I think it is fair to say that the discussion was useful. It completely blew out of the water the practicality of leaving the beginning of the formation of German military units until the Allied forces were completely supplied with equipment. I think it destroyed any logical basis to their fear that the bringing of Germans into the creation of Allied strength in the west increased the possibility of preventive war by the Russians as against the mere creation of Allied strength. I think we showed that it was quite possible to deal with the German Government on the issue, not as supplicants, but merely as agreeing to proposals already made by Adenauer to contribute units to European forces and to force him to accept conditions to our acceptance of his proposal.

All this was useful, but the discussion ended with one situation quite clear That they were prepared to accept what we offered but they were not prepared to accept what we asked. In this situation I am now taking the attitude, not that we are imposing specific conditions, but that we are unable to proceed with the discussion until their attitude is made more clear The result is that no agreed papers on the matters on which they are ready to agree will issue from our delegation. We have ended the first part of our tripartite meeting with communiqué which cannot announce decisions and, therefore says merely that we are continuing our discussions in the Council and will resume them next week.

In the Council meetings, I intend to argue the issues all over again and have already been assured of vigorous support from the smaller European countries. It seems highly unlikely that we can reach satisfactory conclusions by Saturday night, but I feel sure that the British and French will become increasingly uncomfortable on their seats. It may be that we shall have to have further meetings. It may be that I shall have to come back to you for further instructions before the matter goes too far For the present there is no need for you to worry although I think you must face the strong pos-

sibility of leaks to the press and stories that all is not going well. I feel reasonably sure that we can work this out; that it may be a question of whose nerve lasts longer, but that it just must come out in the right way.

I am dictating this wire to you myself so that you may know my mind fully and instruct me at any point where you think I may be wrong or give me any guidance which you want me to have. I shall keep you fully and intimately informed.

Bevin was instructed by his government to join Acheson in working for a united defense force with German participation. As a result of Acheson's efforts, all member countries except France accepted the idea of a united force, though the countries on the outer rim of the alliance, such as Norway and Portugal, were not as enthusiastic about it as the Benelux countries. But in principle, only French objections remained in the path of erecting an effective defense for western Europe.

The talks with the French and British were continued while the Atlantic Council was recessed. The Defense Ministers of the three countries joined the Foreign Ministers at the conference table. France sent Jules Moch. From London came Emanuel Shinwell. And I sent General George C. Marshall, whom I had just persuaded to return from his well-deserved retirement, to take over the serious job of running the Defense Department in this period of crisis.

In the candid talks to these men it became very plain that the French knew just as well as we or the British that they would need German manpower if Europe was to be successfully defended. They were convinced that the French parliament would never agree to any proposal that would permit Germans to be armed before there was a European defense force actually in being. The French Defense Minister, M. Moch, said quite frankly that he would need the answer to three questions before he could make up his mind about German participation in the united force that was planned.

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I was glad to learn that General Marshall and Mr. Shinwell were able to persuade the French minister that it was possible to agree in principle without having specific answers to these questions. Marshall drew up a list of ten items that could be done by the NATO powers without further delay

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heard me out in silence and then said he would accept the assignment. Eisenhower told me that he would take it because he was a soldier and this was a call to duty. But it was the kind of duty, he told me, that he accepted gladly because it was a job that very badly needed to be done. He believed firmly, he said, in the importance of bringing the nations of Europe together and doing it speedily.

Two days later I received the Defense Ministers and defense chiefs of the NATO countries and was able to tell them in confidence that a top-ranking general would be available for the NATO High Command and that I had already conferred with him about it.

The appointment itself was not made until December 18. The procedure was for the North Atlantic Council to pass a resolution in which they asked me to designate an American officer as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Europe. At the same time, Dean Acheson sent me a message from the Council meeting in Brussels in which he reported that the Council members had unanimously expressed the hope that I would appoint General Eisenhower. I replied at once that General Eisenhower had been so designated.

The new Supreme Commander left for Europe in January 1951 for a quick survey of the situation. He returned then to Washington and made a full report to me, and I suggested that he also report on the European situation to the Congress, and by radio to the nation. I think these reports were effective because they were made with utmost candor and sincerity.

Eisenhower reported to me, and later at a Cabinet meeting, that while he had found general agreement on the principles of a unified defense for Europe, and general agreement also that such a defense could be successfully organized, he found it much tougher trying to reach an understanding with each country as to its contribution. He said that at each stop on his recent survey trip he would ask, "What are you going to do? You have to tell me exactly what you are going to do so that I can report back to the United States Government."

The answers to this question, Eisenhower said, all tripped over one hard, tough fact. This fact was the poverty of western Europe. General Eisenhower said he had found that this poverty meant that no one yardstick could be used to measure the contributions of the various countries. We could not, for example, expect the western Europeans to spend the same percentage of their budget on defense that we were going to spend. They were so desperately poor that some of

them could not spend any more than they were already doing.

The main thing, Eisenhower said when he spoke at the Cabinet meeting, was for us to get this "combined spiral of strength going up" "These people," he said, "believe in the cause. Now they have got to believe in themselves. They have got to have confidence that they can do the job. The way we can give them that confidence is by sending equipment and by sending American units over there to help morale."

General Eisenhower was fully in accord with my policy in Europe. He worked for it diligently and devotedly from the day of his appointment as Supreme Commander until he returned to the United States in 1952 to enter the political arena. Throughout his stay in Europe he frequently wrote to me directly or through Averell Harriman, and he was always assured of my full support in everything he was doing in Europe.

Near the end of his first year in Europe, in early January 1952, Eisenhower wrote me a long, detailed letter reporting on the first year's work. He reviewed the progress that had been made in the direction of a European army and discussed some of the major things that still remained to be done. He took the position that those countries of the alliance on the continent of Europe would have to work toward economic and political consolidation. Britain could not easily be fitted into such a picture and he agreed with the British that they should be associated with the proposed European Defense Community but not directly take part in it. But there was some hope in Eisenhower's opinion, that the return of Winston Churchill to the government in England would mean more emphasis on political union Eisenhower urged me to persuade Churchill, in his forthcoming visit to Washington, to make "a ringing statement that would minimize British nonparticipation and emphasize British moral, political and military support for the European Army

Churchill's visit was a welcome reunion with an old friend, and I was looking forward to it Though he had been out of the government for six years, we had remained in frequent personal contact. To greet him once again as head of His Majesty's Government was a distinct pleasure for me even though I knew we would have to resolve many difficult problems between the two of us and our staffs

During the three days of discussion with Churchill we covered a great range of topics, and among them was NATO.

Churchill commented that he realized very well the great burden that the United States was carrying in the common cause, and said that the United Kingdom would bear all it could. However he pointed out that they had drawn very heavily on the life and energy of the fifty million people in their island in recent years, and added that great overseas investments had been lost to them. England, he said, had a great many problems that could be traced to the past. The point now was that there was no use in the United Kingdom's pretending that it could bear burdens that it could not bear.

I replied to the Prime Minister that, in the fifty years before World War I, the British and the French and the Germans had invested many billions of dollars in our country. Some of this had been used up in World War I and World War II, as the British and the French paid for their war supplies. The German investment, of course, had been taken over as enemy property. "Your reserves," I said, "are now in effect a financial surplus here, which we hope to get reinvested abroad under Point Four and in other ways. The rehabilitation of the free world is one of the most important things we have to do. We want to keep the free world a going concern."

I reminded the Prime Minister that we had sent abroad some sixty billion dollars since the end of the war but that it was important to bear in mind that this was an election year and that Congress was rarely inclined to increase foreign spending while an election was in the offing.

Churchill said he certainly understood what effect an election had on a country's position in the world. England had gone through a general election during the past year, and it certainly made it difficult for His Majesty's Government to act with vigor while its political life was at stake. But he thought that they were through now with electioneering in England, "for a few years at any rate."

The approach of the 1952 presidential election caused a great deal of anxiety in friendly capitals. Everywhere the same doubts and fears began to spring up again that had been so dominant before the treaty was signed and General Eisenhower sent over to organize the defense. We found that statesmen of other nations were holding back because they wanted to be sure that the commitments they might make would not be made to an American who voted for an isolationist administration.

They were relieved, therefore, so our diplomats reported to know that the nominees of both parties were men who

them could not spend any more than they were already doing.

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## CHAPTER 18

I was raised on a farm, and even as a boy I helped my father there. My home state of Missouri is primarily a farm state, and my brother Vivian farms to this day. I know what the farmer's problems are. I learned early, when I worked in a bank, how important the farmers' prosperity is to the welfare of the country.

When the crops failed, two things happened to the bank: the farmers withdrew their deposits, and later many farmers came to borrow money on their land. When the farmers were hurt, merchants and tradesmen suffered. To see this happen was a basic lesson in economics. It was a practical demonstration that prosperous farmers make for a prosperous nation, and when farmers are in trouble the nation is in trouble.

In 1921 the bottom fell out of agricultural prices, and throughout the twenties the farmer was barely able to hang on. Then came 1932 and the victory of the Democrats. Sound policies followed, restoring farm prosperity. For the New Deal knew that farm income had to be stabilized if the national economy as a whole was to be stabilized. Soil conservation, the Triple A, Farm Credit Administration, rural electrification—all these and other measures contributed to the return of farm prosperity. Then World War II gave this trend a strong push as American crops were shipped overseas to help feed our allies and as greatly increased employment at home increased domestic food consumption to an all-time high. Even after the war, relief shipments and Marshall Plan aid continued to demand the products of American farms.

Throughout these years the government had guaranteed the price of farm products at a fixed level, but the continued high demand had kept the government-guaranteed surplus at a minimum. The result was that in 1948 the American farmer had reached an economic position better than he had ever known before.

Cash farm income was up to more than thirty billion

believed in the basic need for NATO and European defense. But it is one of the facts of American foreign policy and one that those in responsibility must bear in mind, that an impending change in administration in Washington makes our friends abroad anxious and our enemies hopeful. They all remember what happened when Harding replaced Wilson, and what calamity it meant for the world.

When the time came for me to turn over the reins of the government to General Eisenhower NATO was one of the projects that I could pass on to him in the full knowledge that he would understand my motives and share them. He had, after all, played a most important part in it.

The treaties with Germany and the European Defense Community Treaty still awaited completion. We had hoped that these treaties would be ratified toward the end of 1952, but both in France and, to a lesser degree, in Germany resistance to the proposed arrangements had flared up sharply in November and further delay was likely though this was delay over matters of timing and emphasis, not over principles.

The structure of western European defense had been built—built largely because we were ready to break with tradition and enter into a peacetime military alliance; because we had been ready to assume not only our share but the leadership in the forging of joint forces, because we had recognized that the peace of the world would best be served by a Europe that was strong and united, and that therefore European unity and European strength were the best guarantees for the prevention of another major war

# CHAPTER 18

I was raised on a farm, and even as a boy I helped my father there. My home state of Missouri is primarily a farm state, and my brother Vivian farms to this day. I know what the farmer's problems are. I learned early, when I worked in a bank, how important the farmers' prosperity is to the welfare of the country.

When the crops failed, two things happened to the bank: the farmers withdrew their deposits, and later many farmers came to borrow money on their land. When the farmers were hurt, merchants and tradesmen suffered. To see this happen was a basic lesson in economics. It was a practical demonstration that prosperous farmers make for a prosperous nation, and when farmers are in trouble the nation is in trouble.

In 1921 the bottom fell out of agricultural prices, and throughout the twenties the farmer was barely able to hang on. Then came 1933 and the victory of the Democrats. Sound policies followed, restoring farm prosperity, for the New Deal knew that farm income had to be stabilized if the national economy as a whole was to be stabilized. Soil conservation, the Triple A, Farm Credit Administration, rural electrification—all these and other measures contributed to the return of farm prosperity. Then World War II gave this trend a strong push as American crops were shipped overseas to help feed our allies and as greatly increased employment at home increased domestic food consumption to an all-time high. Even after the war, relief shipments and Marshall Plan aid continued to demand the products of American farms.

Throughout these years the government had guaranteed the price of farm products at a fixed level, but the continued high demand had kept the government-guaranteed surplus at a minimum. The result was that in 1948 the American farmer had reached an economic position better than he had ever known before.

Cash farm income was up to more than thirty billion

dollars a year from less than five billion in 1932 and the farm-mortgage debt had dropped twenty-five per cent since 1941 Bank deposits and savings of farmers were twenty-two billion dollars, the highest in our history

While this agricultural prosperity was due partly to special factors in the postwar situation, the sound farm legislation which had been adopted since 1932 provided a much better basis for sustained farm prosperity than we had ever had before. In 1932, for example, we had had no soil-conservation program, no price-support program, no school-lunch program and only a limited agricultural-research program.

But the farmers still had reason to be fearful. A sudden change, such as that of 1921 might cause the bottom to fall out of agricultural prices, and I intended to do everything I could to prevent an agricultural depression from happening. The farmer I felt, was entitled to real protection against a postwar slump and the nation as a whole had to be protected against a farm depression I wanted a program of action to insure that the gains made since 1932 would be held and that we could move forward with the job of building our economy on a foundation provided by the organized, sustained, and realistic prosperity of American agriculture.

I was concerned about the many farm families who were not sharing fairly in the progress of American life. In too many rural communities, as my reports showed, housing, medical services, and educational facilities were still inadequate. Some farms were still isolated by poor roads. Others were still without the benefits of electricity

It was my conviction that the federal government had a definite responsibility in building for lasting agricultural abundance and in making farm life attractive to future generations of Americans The sound and far-reaching legislation of the preceding sixteen years constituted an excellent basis for continued progress but we needed a number of extensions and improvements in our farm program

Most of all we needed a permanent system of price supports for agricultural commodities I believed that the entire nation should be protected against the wide swings in farm prices that in the past had caused economic insecurity that affected all of us Furthermore we needed a more vigorous soil-conservation program and it was important that steps be taken to maintain adequate markets for farm products and to improve the methods of distributing them to consumers.

In order to provide answers to these and other problems, I

asked Charles F. Brannan, the Secretary of Agriculture, to make an over-all study of the farm situation and to draw up specific proposals, as Brannan and I had discussed various plans and ideas on three or four different occasions. When the final draft of his report was ready he came to the White House, and we went over it item by item.

The purpose of the program was to assure the farmer a stable income, and the device by which this was to be accomplished made good sense to me. Each commodity affected would be allowed to seek its level in the market. Then, if this level was below a fair return to the farmer, the government—at the end of a predetermined period—would pay the farmer directly the difference between what he got on the average for his commodity over the particular marketing period and what was calculated by a formula to be a fair price.

There was nothing new about this approach. It had been applied to cotton as the first price mechanism in 1937 and 1938 and was being used for the support of sugar beets, as it still is. Each year every producer of sugar beets and sugar cane in the United States receives a check from the government for the difference if the price at which he sells his crop is less than the price determined by a statutory formula. Similar legislation for wool had been in effect for an equally long period.

Specifically the plan Brannan asked me to approve would see that perishable commodities like meat, dairy products, poultry and eggs would be put on the market at prices which consumers could afford. The program was to apply first of all to dairy products, for many marketing studies indicated that milk prices and milk consumption were closely related. As the price of milk goes down, the volume of milk consumed goes up correspondingly. Thus we could almost put our finger on how many more quarts of milk could be sold at a given lower market price, and this approach also provided a reliable index for other commodities.

The basic idea of the plan was to approach the economics of agriculture not from the point of view of agriculture, as had formerly been done, but with an eye to production and abundance. We wanted to make it increasingly worth while for the farmer to produce, and at the same time keep the consumer price level at a point at which the average man could afford to buy. Without some such policy the price level of farm products plays its part in a vicious circle: the more the farmer plants, the less he gets, the less he can

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But the farmers still had reason to be fearful. A sudden change, such as that of 1921, might cause the bottom to fall out of agricultural prices, and I intended to do everything I could to prevent an agricultural depression from happening. The farmer, I felt, was entitled to real protection against a postwar slump, and the nation as a whole had to be protected against a farm depression. I wanted a program of action to insure that the gains made since 1932 would be held and that we could move forward with the job of building our economy on a foundation provided by the organized, sustained, and realistic prosperity of American agriculture.

I was concerned about the many farm families who were not sharing fairly in the progress of American life. In too many rural communities, as my reports showed, housing, medical services, and educational facilities were still inadequate. Some farms were still isolated by poor roads. Others were still without the benefits of electricity.

It was my conviction that the federal government had a definite responsibility in building for lasting agricultural abundance and in making farm life attractive to future generations of Americans. The sound and far-reaching legislation of the preceding sixteen years constituted an excellent base for continued progress, but we needed a number of extensions and improvements in our farm program.

Most of all, we needed a permanent system of price supports for agricultural commodities. I believed that the entire nation should be protected against the wide swings in farm prices that in the past had caused economic insecurity that affected all of us. Furthermore, we needed a more vigorous soil-conservation program, and it was important that steps be taken to maintain adequate markets for farm products and to improve the methods of distributing them to consumers.

In order to provide answers to these and other problems, I

benefit of the lower price. He would be encouraged to purchase more. This increased demand would tend to bring the price up again. And in this way the support of the farmer would be self-compensating and, in the true sense of the word, would contribute to the general welfare.

There was also another important change in the manner in which we proposed to make price supports available. As I have always seen it, there is only one really sound reason for farm-price supports, and that is to maintain a decent standard of living for ordinary farm families. However, under the commodity-purchase program, large payments were being made (and still are) to corporations operating vast acreages almost as if they were factories in mass production. But these are not the kinds of farm operators who require government support to hold their position. There is probably a place in our economy for this kind of farm operation, but it is not as vital to the life and welfare of the nation as the work of the millions of families who—often literally—"toil in the sweat of their brow."

The Brannan Plan contained a provision that would have excluded from production payments the yields of any one farm over and above a certain limit. This limit was defined as eighteen hundred units of production, and at 1949 prices this could have meant, in practice, about twenty thousand dollars' worth of the affected commodity.

The unit of production was defined as ten bushels of corn or the cash equivalent in other crops. The reason corn was chosen as the basic crop is, of course, evident: our farm economy is essentially a corn economy. Not only do we raise large amounts of corn, but also virtually all our cattle and dairy production depends on corn as the principal feed staple.

No other country in the world runs its whole agricultural economy on corn. This is explained by the fact that the United States produces every year about 3,300,000,000 bushels of corn, and out of this production come all of our poultry, eggs, beef, hogs, and all of our livestock products. There are other feed grains, of course, but all of our farm stock from chickens to the finest cattle depends primarily on corn for production.

By fixing the unit of production in terms of corn, the relationship of all other farm products to be supported would be stabilized in reference to the price of corn. If, for example, eighteen hundred units of production in corn brought

spend the less he spends, the fewer non-farm goods are bought, the fewer non-farm goods are sold, the less money is available to pay for the things the farmer wants to sell. And the Brannan Plan, as it soon came to be called, was a blueprint for breaking this circle.

"Price supports," Brannan pointed out, "are the farmer's equivalent of the laboring man's minimum-wage, social-security and collective-bargaining arrangements." Like labor the farmer lacks equality at the bargaining table. The prices he pays for products are generally fixed, many times by monopolies or by tacit agreements among producers. But the individual farmer must sell when his crops are ready for the market, and the result is that he must take whatever price he is offered. I remember years when wheat was as low as forty four cents a bushel, and other times when it went as high as three dollars. I know that corn has fluctuated between twenty-two cents and $2.88—rye between thirty cents and four dollars—cotton between five and forty cents a pound.

The old laissez-faire theorists would tell us that the answer is to cut down on producing units until the fittest survive. But this theory is without humanity for in human terms it means the breakup of homes, the destruction of families, and the surrender of the family farm to the absentee landlord or the corporate owner. No American government worthy of the name can allow this sort of thing to recur every twenty years or so. The farmers' sense of security is a vital part of the foundation of American life.

What was important about the Brannan Plan was that it shifted the emphasis in price supports from commodity purchases to production payments. Under the law as it then read —and as it still reads today I regret to say—the price of agricultural products is supported either by government loans at the parity level or by government purchases in the open market. The result is that large surpluses accumulate in the government warehouses whenever prices fall below the guarantee level set by Congress, but the consumer does not get the benefit of the excess supply. This sets in motion a spiral effect, the consumer because of higher prices buys less, the farmer for the same reason is encouraged to raise even more, and the imbalance tends to become worse.

Under the Brannan Plan however if the price of a given product included in the plan should fall below support levels, the government would make a direct payment to the farmer for the difference between the price he received and the support price. The consumer nevertheless, would have the

benefit of the lower price. He would be encouraged to purchase more. This increased demand would tend to bring the price up again. And in this way the support of the farmer would be self-compensating and, in the true sense of the word, would contribute to the general welfare.

There was also another important change in the manner in which we proposed to make price supports available. As I have always seen it, there is only one really sound reason for farm-price supports, and that is to maintain a decent standard of living for ordinary farm families. However under the commodity-purchase program, large payments were being made (and still are) to corporations operating vast acreages almost as if they were factories in mass production. But these are not the kinds of farm operators who require government support to hold their position. There is probably a place in our economy for this kind of farm operation, but it is not as vital to the life and welfare of the nation as the work of the millions of families who—often literally—"toil in the sweat of their brow

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By fixing the unit of production in terms of corn, the relationship of all other farm products to be supported would be stabilized in reference to the price of corn. If, for example, eighteen hundred units of production in corn brought a

cash return of twenty thousand dollars, then whatever yielded twenty thousand dollars in wheat or rye or potatoes would also be eighteen hundred units of production. And eighteen hundred units was to have been the maximum on which production payments were to be made.

Representatives of associations of small farmers complained that this limit was too high and that it did not channel the proposed benefits to the small operator who needed them most. But it was not the purpose of the plan to redistribute the wealth. I wanted a farm program that would serve the farm, and I wanted it designed in such a way that agricultural corporations would not be able to grow fat on it. The unit limitation as written would have applied to only about two per cent of the farm operators of the United States, but these produced twenty-five per cent of the total dollar volume of all the farm products of the nation.

Secretary Brannan warned me that this recommendation in favor of what we called the family-sized farmer would be attacked as containing political implications. It was a new and unusual proposal for farm economy he said, and would probably be criticized as too radical or labeled a political gesture This did not trouble me, however for I had given the provision most careful study

"Well, Charlie," I said, "it is right, isn't it?"

Brannan replied that, in his opinion, it was.

"Then it stays in," I told him.

Interestingly enough, the unit limitation was hardly criticized at all, and the reason for this, I believe, was that the critics of the plan saw the irrefutable reasoning on which the limitation policy was based.

As soon as the proposals were made public, a great hue and cry was raised in the press over what many writers called the socialistic and political implications of the Brannan Plan. Secretary Brannan discussed the program at a joint hearing of the House Committee on Agriculture and the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on April 7 1949 and from then on there was a great deal of heated discussion on the floor of both the House and the Senate with respect to the plan.

I had expected criticism of this sort. All the ballyhoo that was raised over the Brannan Plan was similar to the furor that was created by the American Medical Association over the health-insurance program. The American Farm Bureau Federation, which represented the special-interest farmers under

the leadership of Allan B. Kline, attacked the price-support program on the same grounds that the private utilities companies fought every attempt of the government to make public power available to the people, and as the American Medical Association fought the health program which would benefit all the people.

I paid no attention to the "anti-Brannan Plan" campaign, which cost the Farm Bureau members more than half a million dollars in one year. I knew what the farmers themselves wanted and needed because I had talked with thousands of them personally in 1948 about it. I have never been interested in what the big, expensive lobbies in Washington have to say about farming, real estate, electricity, medicine, or any other subject. They do not represent the views of the man on the job. Instead, they represent selfish special interests who support the lobbies to fight their legislation battles for them.

What I had to overcome was the traditional attitude toward such scare words as "socialization," "socialism," and "subsidization." Industry and business have demanded subsidies from the federal government for generations—in the form of mailing permits, freight rates, tariffs disguised by the word "protective" for special-privilege use, tax privileges for plant construction, and other fields. In our time, agriculture is no less dependent upon such assistance than industry, labor, or business. The parity device is only one effort that has been made in the interest of bringing farming up to the level shared by other segments of the economy.

The Brannan Plan was nothing new. It was consistent with the policy of every Democratic administration that has tried to elevate the standards of living of the American rural population through price supports and through a score of other measures designed to strengthen and stabilize this basic occupation.

The opposition has always tried to convince the farmer that he is being placed under the heel of controls. To make the parity legislation work, the farmers must agree to controls. In every election since Roosevelt the Republicans have tried to coax the farmer to vote down controls, so that parities would then find their own level. If the farmer finally accepts this advice, the bottom will drop out of prices and he will go back to 1921.

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# CHAPTER 19

All my life I have fought against prejudice and intolerance. As a young man I was disturbed by the attitude of some people toward other races and religions. And as I grew older I could never understand how people could forget the origins and blessings of their own freedom.

I have little patience with people who take the Bill of Rights for granted. The Bill of Rights, contained in the first ten amendments to the Constitution, is every American's guarantee of freedom.

Equality of opportunity and equal justice under the law are not mere phrases or fine words. These are the living achievements of a people who had rebelled against despotism. Many generations had fled to this country to get away from oppression by their own governments. And it has always troubled me how some who called themselves Americans could themselves become oppressors.

Those old and young fellows who wrote the Constitution knew what they were doing. They had been pounded down by the absolute monarchy of George III. They knew the meaning of oppression and persecution.

Jefferson was one of those who said that he would not support the Constitution if the Bill of Rights was not made part of it.

One of the most important guarantees under the Bill of Rights is the right to claim exemption from self-incrimination. This is a fundamental basis of our liberty and is provided for in the Fifth Amendment.

With the advent of Communism the world has been introduced to the outrage of brain-washing. By this method men and women are forced to confess against themselves, whether they are guilty or not.

In the police state no individual has any immunity from persecution. People condemned to brain-washing can have no hope because they are deprived of all rights.

even carried on attacks against our schools and colleges and churches. "Little Dies Committees" have sprung up in some state legislatures, and the epidemic of investigations has infected school boards and town councils.

I do not believe schoolteachers should be required to take a special oath.

I think it proper, where a school is publicly supported, that a teacher take the same oath of office as any other public official to support the Constitution of the United States and the government of the state in which the teacher lives.

But it is wrong to tell teachers not to discuss or not to teach subject matter that should be taught in a free educational system. We should have freedom to teach and to learn, and that does not mean that a teacher is disloyal because he teaches everything there is to learn. There is no limit to knowledge. A person learns as long as he lives.

In education we must not limit the opportunities for presenting ideas. People must have freedom of mind for research that makes progress, otherwise there is no use in having an educational system. If everyone remained in the same groove and were taught exactly the same thing, we would end up with a nation of mediocrities. Men with ideas can express those ideas only where there is freedom of education.

Whenever we come to the point where we are spying on each other, as was done under Hitler and Mussolini and as is now done in Russia and Spain, we cease to be the republic we were set up to be. If we cannot have confidence in our neighbors and the teachers who are teaching our children, then our country is in trouble.

Everyone has the right to express what he thinks. That, of course, lets the crackpots in. But if you cannot tell a crackpot when you see one, then you ought to be taken in.

I don't think there is any danger that this country will be upset from within.

From 1930 to 1953 we had the greatest social and economic revolution in our history without violence. This was done in an orderly manner under the Constitution by the majority of the people, through the ballot, without curtailing the rights of individuals. Of course this great social change did not please some people, especially those who would like to see in this country a higher class and a lower class of society. But the everyday man today has more of the better things of life, the country is better off, and, anyway, the people will not stand for being divided into classes.

But no matter what social and economic changes are

brought about, a real democracy is always careful to protect the minority from the majority

In the federal state, county and city governments, unless the men in control are strongly imbued with the constitutional rights of the people, the first thing you know you will have the Ku Klux Klan, or the Silver Shirts, or something like the German Bunds, organized on the basis of direct action or taking the law into their own hands. Then people will be accused and condemned without any chance of defending themselves.

When the Klan was at its height, homes were invaded and people were tarred and feathered and run out of town. The Klan was anti-Catholic anti-Jewish, and anti Negro. I remember some towns in Oklahoma at that time where they had signs, "Negro, don t let the sun set on you here.

Our ideas of freedom came from many people. The greatest government in the history of the world grew out of the inspiration, energy and ideas which were brought here by the English, the Scotch, the Irish the Danes, the Swedes, the Dutch, the Germans the Poles, the Jews, the Italians and others who came to these shores in search of freedom.

We want to be careful that those freedoms contained in our Bill of Rights are not destroyed by those who incite fear and hysteria and cause injustice

In times of crisis involving the security of the nation, the government has to take special measures, of course to protect itself against sabotage and disloyalty The operations of the government, with its many defense and diplomatic secrets, must be safeguarded against foreign agents.

But I have always believed that if we are to maintain our republic, in keeping with the Bill of Rights the government has the paramount responsibility of protecting the rights of the individual against injustice and false accusations.

I recall the periods of mass hysteria in this country which led to witch hunts Demagogues and unprincipled individuals have always seized upon crises to incite emotional and irrational fears. Racial religious and class animosities are stirred up Charges and accusations are directed against many innocent people in the name of false "patriotism and hatred of things "foreign."

During such periods of mass excitement individuals in government are particularly singled out for attack In recent years, as in other periods, some of the charges have arisen from political rivalry others from employees seeking to profit at the expense of others, usuall their superiors. In

such an atmosphere, when one isolated individual employee is found to be disloyal, the incident is used by demagogues to intensify the hysteria, and there is a tendency to condemn all employees of the government. There are chronic intolerants who are all too ready to condemn a whole race of people, a religious group, a labor union, or a political party when it is discovered that there is one offender among them. This type of wholesale condemnation hurts government morale, and it hurts the country.

I believe that people in positions of responsibility in government should know the historical background of these periods of mass hysteria and the events which have led to them.

For example, during the period when the French Revolution reached its height with the Jacobins in power in France, Jefferson was accused of being a Jacobin, and therefore disloyal. Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Laws in 1798 because it thought that the French revolutionists were trying to gain control of our government.

To enforce the Sedition Laws, the Bill of Rights had to be thrown out the window. When sanity returned, most of the bills which had not expired were repealed.

Later in 1919 there was the period in which A. Mitchell Palmer, as Attorney General, used the forces of government in raids on many citizens. It was a terrible thing. That was the "Communist hysteria" program of its day.

During other periods of hysteria, attacks on the rights o[f] individuals were made on other pretexts in total disregard o[f] guarantees under the Bill of Rights. But we recovered fro[m] all of them. And we will continue to return to sanity aft[er] each attack because we have freedom of the press, freedo[m] of religion, a free educational system, and our people vote [in] free elections giving them control and the right to chan[ge] their government. When we have these fits of hysteria, we [are] like the person who has a fit of nerves in public—when [he] recovers, he is very much ashamed—and so are we as [a] nation when sanity returns.

This is why I never believed that this government could [be] subverted or overturned from within by Communists. [Our] security agencies of the government are well able to [deal] quietly and effectively with any Communists who sneak [into] the government, without invoking Gestapo methods.

The business of security is a highly specialized oper[ation] requiring skilled technicians, experts, and constant vigil[ance]

Europe. Hitler and Mussolini, using the Communist threat as a means to seize power, began to threaten the peace. As a result of this international tension, Communist and Fascist activity and intrigue were intensified here at home.

It became necessary for the government, in order to keep subversion out of its ranks, to seek special legislation.

Congress passed the Hatch Act on August 2, 1939 under which it was made unlawful for any employee of the government to have membership in a party which advocated the overthrow of the constitutional form of government of the United States. The responsibility of investigation under the Hatch Act was placed in the hands of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In this atmosphere of international fear and intrigue it was natural that some demagogues would be tempted to make political capital out of the situation. In 1939 when I was nearing the end of my first term in the Senate, a congressman from Texas, Martin Dies, was sounding off about Communists in government. As chairman of the first House Committee on Un-American Activities he made many wild charges. He conducted hearings in a manner which I charged from the floor of the Senate as being most un-American itself. Witnesses before his committee were too often browbeaten, falsely accused, and given no opportunity to have either the source of charges against them revealed or a chance to disprove the accusations. In fact, people were being tried before a congressional committee instead of a court of law. This was a dangerous misuse of the investigatory powers of Congress, which are solely for the purpose of helping in the preparation of legislation. The methods used by the Dies Committee set a precedent which has plagued the Congress ever since.

I recall Vice-President Garner that sage from Uvalde, saying to me at that time, "The Dies Committee is going to have more influence on the future of American politics than any other committee of Congress." I did not agree with him. I could not believe that the people would be long misled by the type of charges that were being hurled about or be influenced by such procedures in the handling of so important a matter. I was wrong, and unfortunately Jack Garner's prophecy came true. Something of the quality of American justice and fair play has been sacrificed by the methods of Congressman Dies and his successors in congressional investigations.

Security often requires secret action instead of public move, since open publicity may actually hurt security

We did not recognize Soviet Russia until 1933 I think that President Roosevelt was right in giving diplomatic recognition to Russia. In doing so he laid down, at that time, certain conditions to be met by the Soviet Union. One of the most important of these was the Russian commitment to cease all activities inciting revolutionary or Communist propaganda in the United States.

We soon found out that Russia did not keep agreements and that the subversive propaganda did not cease. The Soviet Union used the Third International, or Comintern, as an instrument and a front of revolutionary policy using the pretext that she had no control over its activities. I have known some politicians in this country who claimed to have no control over their followers if they wanted to break agreements.

During this period the American people were undergoing great economic and social reforms brought on by the economic and financial collapse of the 1930's. Some of our young people and intellectuals seemed attracted to the Russian experiment of setting up a new economy based on Communism. Most of these young people and intellectuals soon learned that they had been duped into believing that Russia was really trying to create a new kind of social and economic order that would abolish depressions, unemployment, hunger and war. They soon realized that a colossal hoax was being perpetrated by a group of cruel but skillful fanatics who set up a dictatorship with all the trappings of a state religion. What this new system brought to Russia was not Communism or Socialism but simply another type of dictatorship. The individual became the subject of the state in perpetual enslavement, and, as the Russians themselves soon found out, depression, unemployment, hunger and war were not abolished.

The Soviet Union, getting its power principally from its millions of enslaved labor and vast resources, concentrated on the building of a gigantic military machine. This posed a new kind of threat to the world, because it combined a major military power and a revolutionary force bent upon conquering the world through subversion, revolutionary intrigue, and fifth columns.

Those responsible for the conduct of our government security were fully alert to, and aware of, the new threat of a Communist menace.

In this same period Fascism had begun to develop in

Europe, Hitler and Mussolini, using the Communist threat as a means to seize power, began to threaten the peace. As a result of this international tension, Communist and Fascist activity and intrigue were intensified here at home.

It became necessary for the government, in order to keep subversion out of its ranks, to seek special legislation.

Congress passed the Hatch Act on August 2, 1939 under which it was made unlawful for any employee of the government to have membership in a party which advocated the overthrow of the constitutional form of government of the United States. The responsibility of investigation under the Hatch Act was placed in the hands of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In this atmosphere of international fear and intrigue it was natural that some demagogues would be tempted to make political capital out of the situation. In 1939 when I was nearing the end of my first term in the Senate, a congressman from Texas, Martin Dies, was sounding off about Communists in government. As chairman of the first House Committee on Un-American Activities he made many wild charges. He conducted hearings in a manner which I charged from the floor of the Senate as being most un-American itself. Witnesses before his committee were too often browbeaten, falsely accused, and given no opportunity to have either the source of charges against them revealed or a chance to disprove the accusations. In fact, people were being tried before a congressional committee instead of a court of law. This was a dangerous misuse of the investigatory powers of Congress, which are solely for the purpose of helping in the preparation of legislation. The methods used by the Dies Committee set a precedent which has plagued the Congress ever since.

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I appointed the following to serve on the Commission (as representatives of their respective agencies):

A. Devitt Vanech, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Department of Justice (chairman);

John E. Peurifoy, Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State for Administration, Department of State;

Edward H. Foley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Department of the Treasury;

Kenneth C. Royall, Under Secretary of War, Department of War;

John L. Sullivan, Under Secretary of the Navy, Department of the Navy; and

Harry B. Mitchell, President, Civil Service Commission.

The Commission submitted its report to me on March 20, 1947. It pointed out that historically the Civil Service Commission was prohibited from inquiring into an employee's or prospective employee's political or religious opinions or affiliations and that this had been considered essential to a nonpartisan public service. It was only with the Hatch Act of 1939 that a category of "pernicious political activity" had been identified that could properly be prohibited and searched out. The Commission's report then traced the development of legislative and executive action since 1939 aimed at the dismissal of disloyal persons from the government service.

The Commission concluded, on the basis of a comprehensive survey of government agencies, that there was virtually no uniformity in the administrative handling of the problem. Standards of judgment differed from agency to agency, as did procedures. There was also considerable difference of opinion as to the kind of program that would best accomplish the purpose.

That some sort of program for combating subversion within the government was needed, the Commission was entirely agreed upon. They had heard testimony from the various intelligence and security agencies of the government, who had told them exactly what the international situation was and that attempts to influence our government might be expected. On this last point the Commission reported that while it believed that "the employment of disloyal or subversive persons presents more than a speculative threat to our system of government, it [the Commission] is unable, based on the facts presented to it, to state with any degree of certainty how far-reaching that threat is.

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organization should be placed on this list without prior investigation and formal determination of its subversive nature.

In the Executive Order (No. 9835) which I issued on March 22, 1947 I emphasized two facts that I felt should control the program.

1. That although the loyalty of by far the overwhelming majority of all government employees was beyond question, the presence in the government service of any disloyal or subversive person constituted a threat to our democratic processes, and

2. That maximum protection must be afforded the United States against infiltration of disloyal persons into the ranks of its employees, *and equal protection from unfounded accusation of disloyalty must be afforded the loyal employees of the government.*

By this new Executive Order I felt we had tightened the precautions against subversive infiltration. But at the same time we had set up machinery to protect the individual against false charges based on rumors or unsubstantiated gossip.

The program as I saw it operate had a lot of flaws in it. It was by no means a perfect instrumentality. By and large, it did give anyone who was accused as fair an opportunity to have his case adjudicated as was possible under the climate of opinion that then existed.

Under the Executive Order of 1947 when a person was accused of belonging to a subversive organization or engaging in any activities that would be called subversive or disloyal, he was given a hearing in the first instance before a loyalty board, and he was allowed to have counsel before that board.

The accused was provided with a résumé of the charges, omitting everything that was considered secret. In many instances the accused was confronted with the accuser or was told who had made the charges, provided the accusers agreed to appear.

The accused first appeared before a departmental loyalty board named by the head of the department.

The report and findings of the board were made to the head of the department. The head of the department could either approve the recommendations of the board or rejec
them. But, in any case, the accused had the right to appeal t
the Loyalty Review Board if he was a permanent civil ser
vant, and to a regional board if he had only temporary statu

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In my order to the departments I said,

"This information is necessary in the interest of our national security and welfare to preserve the confidential character and sources of information furnished, and to protect Government personnel against the dissemination of unfounded or disproved allegations."

I therefore instructed the departments to refer all congressional requests for such information to the Office of the President, "for such response as the President may determine to be in the public interest in the particular case."

The reason for this order was well illustrated in the action of the House Appropriations Committee in January and February 1948, when it investigated the security procedures of the State Department. The committee undertook this investigation in the course of considering the appropriations requested by the State Department.

The State Department gave full co-operation to the committee investigators to the extent of permitting them to examine and make abstracts of the information in the confidential personnel files. These files included unsubstantiated rumors and suspicion as well as proven facts and indicated in detail the progress which the investigators had made in every case.

In total disregard of their obligation to protect the secrecy of these files, the committee placed into public record the abstract of these files, omitting only the names and substituting symbols. The danger of this kind of procedure is that it may help the real subversives to find out who is being watched and what the government knows about them. It would also tend to injure innocent employees who might be readily identified by other employees through the disclosure of the records.

By this procedure the committee was putting the entire State Department under suspicion, for this was like saying to a group of people gathered in a room, "One of you in this room is a crook," without naming the culprit or backing up the charge with evidence. The result is that everybody in that room is a suspect until cleared. This was the technique used in public statements by demagogues which led so many people to condemn unjustly a whole department in the government. There is good reason why congressional committees, except in extraordinary cases, should be barred from having access to secret unevaluated personnel information.

In 1949 Congress began to include in various appropriation bills riders giving heads of departments the power to

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the findings of the Regional Board, he had the right of another appeal to the Loyalty Review Board. The Loyalty Review Board was the top organization. Members of this Board were appointed by me.

I selected the twenty-three members of this Review Board on the basis of their known ability and their representation of different walks of life. They came from the top ranks of executives, lawyers, businessmen, and the professions.

Seth Richardson was named to head the Board. He was a prominent conservative Republican and worked in close contact with the Department of Justice.

One of the defects of the loyalty program, which we did not realize at the outset, was that once a person had been cleared by a loyalty board, or finally by the Loyalty Review Board, all of the data about that individual remained in the files. Every time a cleared employee moved from one job to another his file was reviewed again, so that he was forced to answer the same charges over and over again. In fact, he had to be cleared over and over again. This is not in the tradition of American fair play and justice.

During the latter part of 1947 and 1948 with the Republicans in control of the Eightieth Congress, some House committee chairmen introduced bills in an effort to have Congress join in the administration of the loyalty program. In one instance the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments attempted through a rider on an appropriation bill to gain access to the confidential reports of the Civil Service Commission on employees in government.

The confidential reports of the Civil Service Commission, as well as those of the FBI, contain many unsupported, uninvestigated, and unevaluated charges and are never intended for public consumption or distribution. A confidential report on any employee may of necessity contain items based on suspicion, rumor prejudice, and malice, and therefore, if released, may do great harm to the reputations and careers of many innocent people.

On March 28, 1948 the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments submitted a joint resolution requiring any department of the government to give up any information in its possession, confidential or otherwise, to a committee of Congress requesting it.

In requesting passage of the resolution, the committee said it wanted such a law because I had instructed the executive departments to preserve the secrecy of the confidential information contained in the loyalty-program files.

range from 3 years by requiring persons who had received instruction from a foreign government or political party in espionage or subversive tactics to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and by giving broader authority than for the President to establish security regulations concerning the protection of military bases and other national defense installations.

Second, I recommended that the Congress enact legislation permitting the Attorney General to exercise supervision over aliens subject to deportation and to require them, under the sanction of criminal penalties, to report their whereabouts and activities at regular intervals.

I reminded the Congress what my basic attitude in this matter had always been.

"I am determined that the United States shall be secure. I am equally determined that we shall keep our historic liberties."

But Congress, in an atmosphere of emotion and excitement, chose to go along with the advocates of extreme measures.

On September 23, 1950, Congress enacted the Internal Security Act. This bill was passed over my veto within twenty-four hours. I had disapproved of this bill because the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State advised me that the bill would seriously damage the security and the intelligence operations for which they were responsible.

I believed, too, that this bill would give government of ficials vast powers to harass all of our citizens in the exercise of their right of free speech. Government stifling of the free expression of opinion is a long step toward totalitarianism. There is no more fundamental axiom of American freedom than the familiar statement. In a free country we punish men for the crimes they commit but never for the opinions they have.

One of the bad results of the act soon came to pass. The Communists now began to scurry underground. Through many devices such as changes of name, of physical appearance, of occupation, and residence they made it more difficult for our agents to keep track of them.

But since this act was now the law of the land, I set up the Subversive Activities Control Board and appointed Seth Richardson as chairman. To take his place as chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, I named another Republican, former Senator Hiram Bingham of Connecticut.

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Early in 1951 I called on Admiral Nimitz to head a Commission of leading citizens to make a comprehensive and basic study of the whole loyalty program. I wanted recommendations on what the government needed to provide greater protection to the rights of individuals and at the same time maintain zealous watch over its security.

I chose Admiral Nimitz for this task because in previous discussions I had had with him he expressed himself vigorously about the need of protecting fully every individual right. He was not only our greatest naval strategist in the Pacific and a forthright leader of men but also a devout patriot, always at his country's call, no matter what the task. He understood the problems of security and loyalty as well as anyone in the country.

I appointed the following to serve with Admiral Nimitz on the Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights:

Most Reverend Emmet M. Walsh, D.D., Coadjutor Bishop of Youngstown, Ohio; Right Reverend Karl Morgan Block, D.D., Bishop of California, San Francisco, California; Miss Anna Lord Strauss of Washington, D.C.; Russell C. Leffingwell of New York; Mr. Charles H. Silver of New York; Honorable John A. Danaher of Washington, D.C.; Mr. Harvey S. Firestone, Jr., of Akron, Ohio; and Mr. William E. Leahy of Washington, D.C.

On January 23, 1951, a public statement announcing the appointment of the Commission declared, in part,

"Today we are particularly concerned by the threat to our government and our national life arising from the activities of the forces of communist imperialism. ... At the same time we are concerned lest the measures taken to protect us from these dangers infringe the liberties guaranteed by our Constitution and stifle the atmosphere of freedom in which we have so long expressed our thoughts and carried on our daily affairs."

I wanted to make it clear that I would not tolerate the intrusion of partisan politics: "To keep these problems from falling into the arena of partisanship, I am appointing this Commission of distinguished citizens on a non-partisan basis. I believe the people of this country will receive from them an authoritative judgment on these problems, based on the facts, and formulated in the national interest, with no question of political advantage."

When I met with Admiral Nimitz, I told him that I was troubled by the growing persecution mania being directed against government employees. What I thought was badly

Subversive Activities Control Board, was compelled to sign for reasons of health. In his letter of resignation he said, in part, "I have been advised by my doctors that it is imperative that I be at once hospitalized for immediate, intensive, critical surgical attention.

"The Board is presently carrying on a hearing of vital national importance under great difficulties, and I feel that it would not be in the public interest, or my own, for me to remain indefinitely as an inactive member and chairman.

"I deeply appreciate the faith and the esteem you have shown me—a life long contentious Republican—in affording me opportunities to engage in important non-partisan public service, free from any suggestion of political motives, and so recently affecting the vital field of national loyalty."

Replying to Richardson, I said, "Ever since you returned to duty in the government on November 11, 1947 as Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, you have been guarding our security against subversion and protecting our heritage of constitutional Government.

"You brought to the Federal Loyalty Program a balanced, mature judgment and a leadership which resulted in the rooting out, from our government, of the guilty while always protecting the innocent. Your magnificent performance on the Loyalty Review Board prompted me last October to appoint you as Chairman and member of the Subversive Activities Control Board.

"I noted with a chuckle your description of yourself as 'a life long contentious Republican.' The job to which I called you demanded integrity, discretion, sound judgment, and ability to view all problems, no matter how complex, with complete detachment and objectivity. Those qualities you possessed in abundance. Best of all, you 'don't panic easy.'"

Impatient at the delay of the Senate Judiciary Committee and its failure to take action to enable the Nimitz Commission to go to work, I decided to put the study of the program into the hands of the National Security Council.

On July 14, 1951, I sent the following letter to James S. Lay, Jr., executive secretary of the National Security Council.

Dear Mr. Lay:

I have become seriously concerned by a number of

needed was a civil-rights program for the people who work in the government. If I had yielded to the clamor by agreeing to a reckless dismissal of the people under fire, I could have silenced many critics—at the cost of ruining the reputations of many innocent people.

When Admiral Nimitz started to staff the Commission he found that there were statutes which imposed serious restrictions on the employment of persons. For example, they would limit any counsel for the Commission in his professional activity for a period of two years after his services with the Commission ceased. They would also curtail the business activity of any of the businessmen I had appointed. Congress had lifted this so-called "conflict-of-interest" restriction in several recent instances, and Admiral Nimitz asked that it be removed in this instance in order that the Commission might recruit a staff equal to its high task.

Congressman Walter introduced a bill for this purpose, and it was favorably reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary and passed the House on March 15 1951 This measure was then transmitted to the Senate, where it was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary

Senator McCarran, who was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and whose record for obstruction and bad legislation is matched by that of only a very few reactionaries, blocked the bill in his committee. By this obstruction McCarran succeeded in killing this legislation and kept the Nimitz Commission from making a non-partisan and honest study of the government s loyalty-security program.

This was another move by McCarran calculated to check the administration's program and to encourage the demagogues in the Congress. It left the Nimitz Commission with no choice but to resign as a body

On October 26, 1951 I wrote Admiral Nimitz

"Now that the Congress has adjourned without completing action on the legislation which was necessary if the Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights was to operate effectively I have concluded reluctantly to accept the resignation of the members of the Commission.

"I had hoped that the Congress would be as anxious as I am to make sure that our procedures for maintaining the security of the government service are working effectively I had hoped that the Congress would be so anxious as I am to make sure that the Bill of Rights is not undermined in our eagerness to stamp out subversive activities. "

Earlier on June 6, 1951 Seth Richardson, chairman of

e Subversive Activities Control Board, was compelled to sign for reasons of health. In his letter of resignation he id, in part, "I have been advised by my doctors that it is imperative that I be at once hospitalized for immediate, intensive, critical surgical attention.

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I am asking each of the departments and agencies concerned to cooperate fully in this study.

Sincerely yours,
HARRY S. TRUMAN

The National Security Council worked on this study for many months. This work was done by an interdepartmental committee on internal security composed of officers and civilians in the security field from the various departments and included the head of the FBI, the security officer of the State Department, and a general from the Department of Defense.

The report of this committee came to me on April 29, 1952. It was a comprehensive and detailed study. It made many recommendations to improve procedures and pointed up the need for uniform standards for all security employees. It also recommended that the Civil Service Commission review agency decisions in security-risk cases.

On August 8, 1952, after giving the report considerable thought, I wrote Robert Ramspeck, chairman of the Civil Service Commission, expressing my conclusions. In my letter to Mr. Ramspeck I said, in part:

"The most desirable action at this time would be to merge the loyalty security and suitability programs, thus eliminating the overlapping, duplication and confusion which apparently now exists. It is my understanding that the status of the incumbent employees' loyalty program is now so advanced that there would be little or no obstacle to accomplishing this.

"In the meantime, however, departments and agencies having employee security programs should re-examine their procedures, and should assist them in assuring adequate procedural safeguards for the protection of all personnel who are subject to employee security programs."

In plain words, I wanted to make sure that if an employee was terminated on grounds that he was unsuitable—but not undesirable—he should not be branded as disloyal or as a security risk.

This was an evil twist that the loose critics and demagogues were putting on many of the people who quit or were dismissed for routine reasons by the government.

The government's loyalty program was a vast undertaking that took the time and work of many of the top men in the government. Commissions to help in this program were composed of leading citizens of both political parties. They sat in

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reports I have heard recently concerning the administration of the provisions of existing law which authorize the head of the various departments and agencies to discharge Government employees, or to refuse Government employment to applicants, on the ground that they are poor security risks.

If these provisions of law are to achieve their purpose of protecting the security of the Government without unduly infringing on the rights of individuals they must be administered with the utmost wisdom and courage. We must never forget that the fundamental purpose of our Government is to protect the rights of individual citizens and one of the highest obligations of the Government is to see that those rights are protected in its own operations.

The present situation does not make for good administration. There are no uniform standards or procedures to be followed in the different departments and agencies concerned. Neither is there any provision for review at a central point as there is in the case of the Government Employee Loyalty Program. This is a problem that falls within the scope of the work which I have asked to have undertaken by the Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights. However the work of that Commission has been delayed because of the failure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to report legislation which would exempt the members and staff of the Commission from the conflict-of-interest statutes.

I believe that the present problems involved in the administration of the Government Employee Security Program are so acute that they should be given at least preliminary consideration without waiting further for the Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights. Consequently I should like the National Security Council, utilizing its Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and with the participation of the Civil Service Commission, to make an investigation of the way this program is being administered, and to advise me what changes are believed to be required. In particular, I should like consideration given to whether provision should be made for uniform standards and procedures and for central review of the decisions made in the various departments and agencies.

When the Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights is able to resume its work, it would, of course, have the benefit of the work done pursuant to this request.

could be safe from attack. This was the tragedy and shame of our time.

I refused to lose confidence in the good sense of the American people. I knew this period of hysteria would eventually run its course, as did all other such unhappy periods in our past.

In times past, situations similar to that through which we were passing had happened. There was Salem, the Alien and Sedition Laws, the Anti-Masons, the Know-Nothings (who were anti-Catholic), the Ku Klux Klan in the late 1860's, "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion" in 1884, the Ku Klux Klan in 1920, 1924, and 1928. In 1928 Al Smith was knocked out by the Ku Klux Klan, which was anti-Catholic, anti-Jewish, anti-Negro.

The country had reason to be proud of and have confidence in our security agencies. They had kept us almost totally free of sabotage and espionage during the war. All the foreign agents who were caught had been run down by the established intelligence agencies of the government. Those suspected of being spies or subversives were under continued surveillance by these agencies.

Ironically enough, some of our secrets got out because certain good citizens did not realize what they were doing.

A number of dangerous leaks affecting national security resulted from news stories by people whose patriotism or loyalty could not be questioned.

For instance, a certain columnist wrote an article for a national weekly publication which gave locations of our atomic installations. Our intelligence would have liked as easy a way to learn the locations of Russian atomic installations from Russian sources. Atomic installations will be the first targets in a possible war. Yet such vital information was made available to the Russians in one of our magazines.

Then a whole series of air photographs of our principal cities—Washington, New York, Detroit, Chicago, and others—was printed as page-one news by one of the newspaper chains.

In an effort to put a stop to some of these defense leaks, Secretary of Defense Forrestal had called in a group of newspaper publishers—about six or eight, as I recall it—to see if they could not be persuaded to work out a voluntary censorship arrangement. The publishers told Forrestal, "It is your responsibility to stop your own people from giving information to the press." Certain publishers seem to forget that the responsibility belongs to them as well as to the

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because of rivalry were blinded to what they were doing. In this respect, Washington politicians and newspaper and magazine publishers are in the same class.

One of the ablest top intelligence men in the government said this about our security setup: "I don't think anything more could have been done against subversion, espionage and sabotage. Those functions were being carried out during the war and after the war and are functioning today. With respect to government personnel, some fuzzy situations were permitted to exist that should have been remedied, but we must recognize the difficulties that confronted us in the early period.

"While the professional security people in the government were aware of the problems and were vigilant, some political and less experienced officials could not always distinguish between honest liberals and troublesome radicals. It was not easy always to separate from among the extreme radicals the misguided zealots and those who were disloyal. As a matter of fact, the professional security people had difficulty in proving that among the suspects there were really Communists. It was hard to pin anything on them. I don't think the government could have gotten them out.

"It must be remembered that all the so-called non-security people had difficulty in shifting from their acceptance of the Russians as our allies to the Russians now being our enemies. For example, in security circles there was a feeling that even when General Eisenhower was in charge of Germany there were some questionable characters on his staff, and we had to send over a task force to clean it up.

"You cannot shift the position of a country doing everything in the world for an ally to veering around to considering him an enemy without some confusion, and that's the field through which we have travelled."

The AEC has broad powers and full control over its own operations. It is responsible for the conduct of all research, development, and production in the field of atomic energy. Only the President, however, can authorize the use of an atomic bomb. Only the President can decide the nature of the weapons to be made. Only the President can decide whether a weapon can be detonated for test purposes. Only the President can approve where and when the weapons may be shipped or stored. In fact, the President even sets the annual goal of the number of bombs and the quantity of material to be produced.

But the President is no less concerned with the development and uses of atomic power for peaceful purposes. Through his control of the budget he is able to provide guidance and stimulation to the Commission.

To assist the Commission in the exercise of its powers, the law established the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy composed of nine senators and nine representatives, and the Atomic Energy Commission is required to keep the congressional committee fully and currently informed with respect to the Commission's activities.

The law also provides for a Military Liaison Committee, which is appointed by the Secretary of Defense and consists of two representatives from each of the three armed services, plus a chairman, who may be either a military man or a civilian. The Liaison Committee keeps the Atomic Energy Commission fully informed of all atomic energy activities of the Defense Department, and the Commission, in turn, must keep the committee informed about all of its activities in the military field. The Military Liaison Committee has authority to make written recommendations to the Commission on matters relating to military application. In cases where a difference of opinion might arise between the Military Liaison Committee and the Atomic Energy Commission there is a provision in the law whereby the committee may carry the matter through the Secretary of Defense to the President. The President's decision is final.

As a final step, the law provides for a General Advisory Committee of nine members to be appointed by the President from civilian life. This Advisory Committee supplies scientific and technical advice to the Atomic Energy Commission and also to the Military Liaison Committee.

I had a great many suggestions made to me about the men to be appointed to the Atomic Energy Commission. These are the men I finally selected as the first members of the

grams on an even keel. This meant shutting down some tions and pushing the work of others.

Of course the reasons for these actions were not only tly technical, they were also reasons which the Russians uld have given much to know. Senators and representatives re expressing concern about production, and some of them med to think that any kind of expansion of the atomic gram, especially the weapons program, was worth while. tually of course, in order to build a sound program for e future, it was more prudent, as the scientists and the litary were advising, not to go all out in any one direction.

The atomic program, furthermore, had to be geared to the eds of our foreign policy as well as of our national de-nse, and it was my responsibility as President to maintain a lance between these and other factors all the time.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had been set up y the Congress to keep a constant vigil on the activities of e AEC. Senator Brien McMahon and Senator Bourke lickenlooper the Democratic and Republican senior mem-ers on this body soon made themselves into specialists and, o a degree, special pleaders.

I spent considerable time with Brien McMahon in late 1945 and 1946 while the work on *atomic energy legislation* was going on, and I was impressed by his grasp and under-standing of the problems of atomic power. Then, when Sena-tor Hickenlooper became chairman of the Joint Committee in January 1947 he and I held a number of constructive meetings in connection with his new duties.

It was not easy for some members of Congress to realize just how complex a thing they were dealing with. On one occasion, for instance, Senator Hickenlooper called the White House and said his committee urgently needed a cer-tain highly classified document. He was quite sure they could not proceed unless they had it.

I invited him to come over to see me, and when he came in I took him to the Cabinet Room, gave him the document, and asked him to read it. The document was a long one, and about an hour and a half later the senator came back into my office. He was visibly shaken.

"I now wish you hadn't given me this thing to read," he said. "I'd rather not have known anything about it."

I said, "Now you see why this should not properly be brought before your committee."

The important point, however is this. Regardless of who was chairman of the Joint Committee, McMahon or Hicken-

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looper I dealt with him in the same open and frank manner. Party politics, so far as I was concerned, had no business in the atomic picture. I was glad to see that the members of the Joint Committee were most careful about observing strict atomic security. Still, there was always the risk that a public row would result in vital secrets getting out.

The Joint Committee was primarily concerned with atomic developments as such, and it was always pushing for more production. Some of its members tended to oversimplify the problem and took the position that all that was necessary in the program was for the military to tell the AEC, "We want so many bombs," and then it would be up to the AEC to deliver. But in addition to the fact that it was unwise to let the military have control in this way, it was impossible to schedule production on a military requisition basis. There was not enough raw material in sight to satisfy our needs.

The bulk of the uranium available to us came then from the Belgian Congo. However, in 1944 we had made an agreement with the British that called for a combined effort to acquire as much uranium (and some other scarce materials) as possible. While the war was on we had no difficulties with the allocation of these materials. The entire nuclear program was then centered in the United States, and, except for negligible amounts, all uranium available to the British-American-Canadian combination was allocated to the United States. But after the war, arrangements had to be changed. The visiting scientists and technicians, who had now returned to their home countries, had set up facilities of their own, and they needed uranium for their experiments.

In the meantime, our own needs had greatly increased. After a period of negotiations with the British we reached a temporary agreement in July 1946 for an approximately equal division of all the uranium produced from the Belgian Congo between ourselves and the United Kingdom. By this division, however, the British were now getting more than they could put to any practical use, while we were left short. In order to correct this difficulty and in order to get a more proportionate distribution of this uranium, we reopened negotiations in late 1947, and the discussions which followed were held in Washington.

On January 7, 1948, the two countries reached a new agreement for a revised, but still temporary, allocation. This *modus vivendi*, as it was always referred to in later negotiations, now provided that all uranium produced in the Belgian Congo during 1948-49 should go to the United States. In

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In exchange for this major concession we agreed to disclose to the British nuclear data in nine specified areas of information, an agreement which was in keeping with the provisions and the spirit of the Atomic Energy Act. Information about atomic weapons was specifically excluded, and both countries promised that they would not pass any information on to any other country. A very minor exception was made for New Zealand because of the work done by New Zealand scientists on British atomic energy installations.

At the end of 1947 a group of unusually qualified experts brought me an appraisal of our atomic progress. This report came from the General Advisory Committee, which included, among others, such outstanding men of science as J. Robert Oppenheimer, James B. Conant, Lee A. DuBridge, Enrico Fermi, and I. I. Rabi.

Here is Dr. Oppenheimer's letter reporting on their first year's work.

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
to the
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Washington, D.C.

December 31 1947

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

A year has passed since you named us to the General Advisory Committee, to advise the Atomic Energy Commission "on scientific and technical matters relating to materials production and research and development." We were prepared to understand the importance of the work of the Commission for the welfare of the United States. Thus we have taken our duties as advisors very earnestly, have devoted to them much time and study and for at least fifteen days, at intervals throughout the year, have held meetings at which all of us were present. We have had frequent and candid discussions with the Atomic Energy Commission, with its staff, and with the Military Liaison Committee, and have reported such recommendations as we were able to make to the Commission in seven detailed reports, which necessarily have a very high classification.

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of altered and improved weapons can be put to the test of actual proof and measurement. While much yet remains to be done, and while the long term program of atomic armament is only in its earliest beginning, we nevertheless believe that steps already taken to improve our situation, and others which will follow as time makes them appropriate, have gone very far toward establishing this activity on a sound basis.

Atomic reactors have many purposes. They can produce the fissionable materials which can be used in atomic weapons or as fuel for other reactors. They can be useful instruments of research in the physical and biological sciences and in technology. They may within a decade, be developed to provide sources of power for specialized application, for instance, for the propulsion of a limited number of naval craft. They may within a time which will probably not be short, and which is difficult to estimate reliably be developed to provide general industrial power and to make important contributions to our whole technological and economic life. This variety of purpose, the novelty of the field, and the relatively small number of men trained to work in it, makes substantial progress in the development of atomic reactors difficult to realize. Many steps have been taken by the Commission during the past year to encourage work in this field, to invite the participation of industry to promote the completion and construction of promising specific designs, and to enlist the participation of qualified experts. Yet, it is the opinion of the Advisory Committee that much yet remains to be done, that new personnel and new talent must come to contribute and that many years will elapse before our work in this field has the robustness and vigor which its importance justifies. As an aid to the Commission, we have attempted to formulate the prospects, and to give some estimates of the nature of the effort required, for attainment of the various objectives. We believe that a more widespread understanding of the nature of the problems, and of the contribution which engineers can and must make and of the way in which industry can helpfully participate, are essential for the health of these efforts.

In the support of basic science we have welcomed the broad interpretation of its responsibilities which the Atomic Energy Commission has maintained. We studied in detail the proposals recently adopted for making certain radioactive isotopes available, primarily for biological and medical research, not only within this country

Our activity during this year reflects not only the sense of great importance which we attach to successful development of this field It also reflects the difficulties with which the Commission was faced in assuming its responsibilities, and the unsatisfactory state of its inheritance. We very soon learned that in none of the technical areas vital to the common defense and security nor in those looking toward the beneficial applications of atomic energy was the state of development adequate. Important questions of technical policy were undecided, and in many cases unformulated. Giant installations and laboratories were operating with confused purposes and with inadequate understanding of the importance and relevance of the technical problems before them. Our atomic armament was inadequate, both quantitatively and qualitatively and the tempo of progress was throughout dangerously slow This state of affairs can in large measure be attributed to the long delays in setting up an atomic energy authority and to the inevitable confusions of policy and of purpose which followed the termination of the war The difficulties were increased by the fact that the wartime installations and laboratories, which served so well their primary function of developing atomic weapons for early military use, were in most cases not suited to continue the work as the nature of the technical problems altered, and as the transition from wartime to peacetime operation changed the conditions under which rapid progress might be possible.

It has thus been our function to assist the Commission in formulating technical programs, both for the short and for the somewhat longer term. These programs are aimed in the main at three objectives

(1) The development, improvement and increase of atomic armament.

(2) The development of reactors for a variety of purposes.

(3) The support of the physical and biological sciences which in one way or another touch on the field of atomic energy

As to the improvement of our situation with regard to atomic weapons, we are glad to report that the year has seen great progress, and that we anticipate further progress in the near future. From the beginning, we shared with the Commission an understanding of how dangerous complacency could be with regard to our work in this field. We have been much gratified at the establishment of Pacific proving grounds, where the performance

of altered and improved weapons can be put to the test of actual proof and measurement. While much yet remains to be done, and while the long term program of atomic armament is only in its earliest beginning, we nevertheless believe that steps already taken to improve our situation, and others which will follow as time makes them appropriate, have gone very far toward establishing this activity on a sound basis.

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pplication of atomic power has always been the same. I ave been uncompromisingly opposed to sharing or yielding tomic military secrets to any other government.

The Atomic Energy Commission was meticulous in providing me with information. Some of it was highly technical, so that I had to do considerable studying to come to grips with it. And of course I would never presume to pass judgment on technical opinions. But I always asked for all points of view even on technical questions, before giving approval to any major decision.

Under the law I had to fix each year the amount of fissionable materials that should be produced in the following year. To reach a decision, I would have before me a joint recommendation from the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission. This was always highly secret, and exceptional precautions were taken to keep it secret. For example, in no document in my office, in the AEC, or anywhere in government, could anyone find the exact figure of the number of bombs in stockpile, or the number of bombs to be produced, or the amount of material scheduled for production.

If anyone should happen to run across a document dealing with atomic weapons production, he will find either a cipher or a blank in the space where the actual figure should appear. The figure in question would be recorded on separate and detached pieces of paper safeguarded in a special way and of which only a bare minimum of copies exist.

While there were many problems of adjustment in those days among the several agencies interested in our atomic energy policies, they had no effect upon the continuity and perseverance in the research laboratories. One of the broad areas of research on which the laboratories had been working from the very beginning was the hydrogen atom.

When the atomic program first got under way during World War II, the scientists concentrated their immediate efforts on the "heavy elements"—especially uranium. During 1947 and 1948 we continued our emphasis on uranium and plutonium as sources of atomic power but research on the light elements, of which hydrogen is the most important, was carried on at the same time without letup or interruption.

It was in the year 1949 that many developments in the atomic nuclear field demanded our attention and many important decisions had to be made. By early 1949 the Atomic

regardless of which of the two major parties controlled the government.

Britain had many noted scientists, who had made considerable progress toward an atomic bomb and would undoubtedly soon develop their own. I pointed out that a British scientific mission participated extensively in the research and development and later in the production of atomic bombs at Los Alamos. Furthermore, they had participated in the preparation and evaluation of the Bikini tests. Similar scientific missions had participated in the research and development at Oak Ridge in the separation of U-235. In addition, British and Canadian scientists were in consultation with our scientists at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago on the design of the heavy-water reactor built at Chalk River, Canada.

I related how in 1947 Britain, Canada and the United States had adopted a uniform system for handling the information jointly developed. In January 1948 the three governments had agreed upon a *modus vivendi* providing for co-operation involving exchange of scientific and technical information in certain defined areas, as well as collaboration on matters of raw materials. Now, however, this agreement was coming to an end, and I proposed that we conclude a new agreement based on full partnership, subject to the terms of the Atomic Energy Act; this, I thought, could be done by having all available uranium brought to this country for processing and storage. The British and Canadian scientists would then join their American colleagues to work with them. To overcome any complaints the British might have that they were being excluded from the atomic weapons field, we would arrange to have a number of our unassembled bombs placed in the British Isles.

Acheson, Johnson, and Lilienthal spoke in considerable detail in support of this plan. Senator Vandenberg, however, spoke sharply against the proposal. He was of the opinion that the British should accept our dominant position in the atomic field, and gave two reasons for his point of view.

First, he cited the fact of our aid to Great Britain during and since World War II. Second, he expressed himself as believing that any other approach would result in the kind of duplication of effort which the North Atlantic Treaty was supposed to eliminate in the field of common defense.

Senator Hickenlooper also opposed the suggestion. His principal reason for objection was his distrust of British security and he did not think we should take the risk at this

[illegible] of successful delivery of bombs as contemplated by [th]is plan, together with a joint evaluation of the results to be [ex]pected by such bombing."

Secretary Johnson, in a reply to me, reported that the [Jo]int Chiefs of Staff were already at work on such an evalua[tio]n. The men who are responsible for our military planning [ca]n never be satisfied with their preparations and conclusions. [The]ir plans are never frozen and fixed. They are forever [re]vising and improving their ideas in order to keep pace with [th]e current of progress and power in the world. Occasionally [so]me newspaperman gets wind of the existence of certain [mi]litary plans and reports them as the fixed position of the [go]vernment. This happened frequently during my administra[tio]n, and such reports are often as damaging as they are [illegible].

In government there can never be an end to study, im[pro]vement, and the evaluation of new ideas, and no one is [mo]re conscious of this than the President, for he can see how [th]e machinery of government operates.

I have been impressed by both the speed and thoroughness [o]f the response of departments when I asked for detailed [st]udies, even on the most difficult problems. As President, I [al]ways insisted on as complete a picture as possible before [ma]king a decision, and I did not want fuzzy statements that [con]cealed differences of opinion.

I wanted to hear all sides when there was disagreement, [b]ut even more important, I wanted to know when disa[gree]ments existed among my advisers. I do not believe that [th]e President is well served if he depends upon the agreed [reco]mmendations of just a few people around him, boiled down to a brief statement submitted to him for approval.

This may be efficiency in military administration, but not in government at the top level. In the long run the best results come from intensive study of different viewpoints and from arguments pro and con. I have spent many hours, late at night and early in the morning, poring over papers giving all sides. Many times I was fairly convinced in my own mind which course of action would be the right one, but I still wanted to cover every side of the situation before coming to a final decision.

As far as the atomic program was concerned, I talked to the AEC Commissioners both individually and as a group. I talked to scientists and to military advisers. I called in for[eig]n policy experts and heard their views. They were not always in accord, of course, but in my mind I was firmly

The other legislators present were more sympathetic to the idea, but there was a general feeling among them that the majority of Congress would refuse to go along.

As was my custom, I adjourned the meeting without announcing a decision. I had listened to as many sides as possible, and now I had to draw my own conclusion. It seemed to me more important to maintain bi-partisan support for the atomic program than to insist on a program which was opposed by strong elements in Congress, and I therefore instructed our delegation to the exploratory talks to be held in September to work for an arrangement that would not include the sharing of weapons data.

By the spring of 1949 we had to think of atomic weapons on a different scale. We now had a stockpile, but I wanted to know whether the weapons we had on hand and those that were planned were adequate in number and whether we were keeping up with technological progress.

In July I again called in the Special Committee of the National Security Council, telling them now to assess the rate of progress being made in our atomic program. There were many questions that needed study, and one of these was how we were now to distribute our defense dollar. Both the Special Committee of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considering how best to prepare ourselves militarily so as to keep our strength in balance and avoid weakness by overemphasizing one category of defense at the expense of another.

As a result of my request, the Special Committee brought this important conclusion to me: that production of atomic weapons should be stepped up. At the same time they recommended that the newly developed B-36 bomber be given a priority second only to atomic weapons, for the B-36 was designed as a long-range plane capable of delivering the new-type A-bomb on any target in the world.

Prior to this, on April 20, 1949, General Hoyt Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, had reported to me in detail the plans of the Strategic Air Command. By the use of maps and graphs he showed me exactly what the Strategic Air Command expected to do in case war broke out. It was after I had had this briefing by the Air Force that I sent the following memorandum to the Secretary of Defense:

"Yesterday afternoon I listened with interest to an Air Force presentation of plans for strategic bombing operations in the event of war against a potential enemy. I should like to examine an evaluation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the

...ments made to appear like personal feuds. Public officials were found themselves pictured as either villains or heroes, depending upon the columnist or commentator whose opinion was heard or read.

The Government of the United States was not unprepared for the Russian atomic explosion. There was no panic, and there was no need for emergency decisions. This was a situation that we had been expecting to happen sooner or later. To be sure, it came sooner than the experts had estimated, but it did not require us to alter the direction of our program.

The first persons I wanted to be informed about the Russian atomic explosion, even before I made a public statement, were the members of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I therefore asked Senator McMahon, the chairman, and Senator Hickenlooper, the ranking Republican member, to join me in my office at the White House the following day, September 22. Hickenlooper was out of town, however, and so McMahon came alone.

I showed him the report I had received from the Air Force, together with the evaluations of the scientists. We discussed the meaning of the event, and I informed McMahon then that a public announcement would be made the following day.

It was at eleven o'clock in the morning on September 23, just after I had given the news to the regular meeting of the Cabinet, that I issued through Press Secretary Ross the following public statement:

"I believe the American people, to the fullest extent consistent with national security, are entitled to be informed of all developments in the field of atomic energy. That is my reason for making public *the following information.*

"We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R.

"Ever since atomic energy was first released by man, the eventual development of this new force by other nations was to be expected. This probability has always been taken into account by us.

"Nearly four years ago I pointed out that 'scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based is already widely known. There is also substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge in time.' And, in the Three-Nation Declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime

committed to the proposition that, as long as international agreement for the control of atomic energy could not be reached, our country had to be ahead of any possible competitor. It was my belief that, as long as we had the lead in atomic developments, that great force would help us keep the peace.

In all my dealings with the Atomic Energy Commission I made it a practice to conclude each discussion with the admonition that we must keep ahead. But our monopoly came to an end sooner than the experts had predicted. An atomic explosion took place in Russia in August 1949.

The intelligence experts had different opinions about it, but in general none of them had looked for the Russians to detonate any atomic device before 1952. Fortunately the Long Range Detection System of the Air Force had become fully developed in early 1949, and it was through this network that we were able to learn, in surprising detail, that an atomic explosion, not under our control, had taken place.

On September 3, 1949, one of the planes operating in the Long Range Detection System collected an air sample that was decidedly radioactive, and the entire detection machinery at once went into high gear. The cloud containing the suspicious matter was tracked by the United States Air Force from the North Pacific to the vicinity of the British Isles, where it was also picked up by the Royal Air Force, and from the first these developments were reported to me by the CIA as rapidly as they became known.

Then the scientists went to work and analyzed the data. The Air Force specialists, the AEC's experts, and consultants called in from universities went over the available information. Then a special committee, composed of Vannevar Bush, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Robert F. Bacher and W. S. Parsons, reviewed the findings. There was no room for doubt. Between August 26 and 29 an atomic explosion had been set off somewhere on the Asiatic mainland.

General Hoyt Vandenberg, who as Chief of Staff of the Air Force was directly responsible for the long-range detection program, reported these facts to me on September [illegible]. I was surprised, of course, that the Russians had made progress at a more rapid rate than was anticipated.

There has been a great deal of misinformation and deliberate distortion in stories about this period. The n[illegible] ha[illegible] not been well served in this connection, and no one has been helped by these unreliable reports. Men of science have been embarrassed by having their candid professional dis-

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Ministers of the United Kingdom and Canada, dated November 15, 1945 it was emphasized that no single nation could in fact have a monopoly of atomic weapons.

"This recent development emphasizes once again, if indeed such emphasis were needed, the necessity for that truly effective enforceable international control of atomic energy which this government and the large majority of the United Nations support."

One of the positive effects of this development was to spur our laboratories and our great scientists to make haste on hydrogen bomb research. By the early fall of 1949, development of the "super"—the thermonuclear or hydrogen—bomb had progressed to the point where we were almost ready to put our theories into practice. I believed that anything that would assure us the lead in the field of atomic energy development for defense had to be tried out, but a most complicated and baffling problem had arisen, and the alternatives were a long way from clear-cut.

The first problem was to decide how much of the AEC's energies and resources should be devoted to an early test that might show us whether or not the H-bomb would work. In order to do this, uranium now going into A-bomb production would have to be diverted. But how far could a program now working so successfully (the uranium-plutonium process) be cut back for tests on a method that might fail?

Everything pertaining to the hydrogen bomb was at the time still in the realm of the uncertain. It was all theory and assumption. Even the scientists and the Commission were divided. And, in addition the questions with which we were *concerned related not only to matters of scientific knowledge* but also to our defense strategy and our foreign policy All of these had to be weighed.

On the AEC, Chairman David Lilienthal, Sumner Pike, and Robert Bacher favored a policy of going slow on the hydrogen bomb. Gordon Dean and Lewis Strauss, however, saw no reason for any delay and wanted to go ahead at once with a test program.

The Commission gave me a full account of its differences of opinion, and individual members expressed their own views in separate letters. I once again sought the advice of the Special Committee of the National Security Council, with Dean Acheson, Louis Johnson, and David Lilienthal as members.

"I have recently received," I wrote this committee on November 10 "a report by the Chairman of the Atomic

Energy Commission which raises the question as to whether the United States should proceed with the construction of "super" atomic weapons. This question involves consideration not only of the factors presented by the Atomic Energy Commission in its report but also political and military factors of concern to the Departments of State and Defense.

"To assist me in reaching a decision with respect to this last question, I am therefore designating the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission as a special committee of the National Security Council to advise me on this problem. I request that each member of the committee provide from his agency appropriate staff officers to prepare under your supervision the necessary studies. I desire that the committee analyze all phases of the question including particularly the technical, military and political factors, and make recommendations as to whether and in what manner the United States should undertake the development and possible production of 'super' atomic weapons. Included in these recommendations, I should like to have the advice of the Council as to whether and when any publicity should be given this matter."

On January 31, 1950, at twelve-thirty, the Special Committee came to the White House with their report. It was a unanimous recommendation signed by all three members—Dean Acheson, Louis Johnson, and David Lilienthal—and the gist of their recommendation was this: that I should direct the AEC to take whatever steps were necessary to determine whether we could make and set off a hydrogen weapon. Concurrently with this, the Special Committee recommended a re-examination of our foreign policy and our strategic plans, both diplomatic and military.

I approved these recommendations and issued a public statement:

"It is part of my responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces to see to it that our country is able to defend itself against any possible aggressor.

Accordingly, I have directed the Atomic Energy Commission to continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or super-bomb.

"Like all other work in the field of atomic weapons, it is being and will be carried forward on a basis consistent with the overall objectives of our program for peace and security.

"This we shall continue to do until a satisfactory plan for international control of atomic energy is achieved. We shall

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"This we shall continue to do until a satisfactory plan for international control of atomic energy is achieved. We shall

also continue to examine all those factors that affect our program for peace and this country's security."

On February 24, about a month later, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a recommendation to step up our program sharply by "immediate implementation of all-out development of hydrogen bombs and means for their production and delivery."

The military chiefs were going on the assumption that the test of the H-bomb would be successful and that for this reason they recommended authorization to plan for full-scale production of facilities, equipment, and appropriate carriers.

I referred this proposal for examination to the Special Committee of the National Security Council, which made a thorough study of all phases of the situation and on March 9 brought me a detailed report. In this I was informed that according to my directive of January 31 (to the Atomic Energy Commission) the scientists at Los Alamos had turned their maximum efforts to a research and development program that would enable us to test a thermonuclear weapon as soon as possible, and that they were now of the opinion that a test of the first step in the process could take place sometime in 1951.

If the first test succeeded, then the entire process might be ready for testing by late 1952. The Special Committee reported that after a careful examination of all the facts it had been concluded that "there are no known additional steps which might be taken for further acceleration of the test program."

With these conclusions reached it was now necessary to decide whether the AEC should proceed with its plans for the production of materials needed for thermonuclear weapons on the assumption that the tests would be successful.

There were many considerations involved, including the expense. The tests would cost an estimated ninety-five million dollars, and the diversion of parts of the U 235 bomb program would cost considerably more. The plants for the production, the main substance needed for the hydrogen bomb, would take, even on a modest scale, two hundred million dollars as a start. There would also be about one hundred million dollars involved in development programs that were less directly related to the making of the bomb.

It is obvious that a great many facts had to be studied in order to make a decision like this. Still, it is the President's responsibility to draw all ideas and all the obtainable facts together and balance them. He cannot allow himself to be

strayed in any one direction. He must balance the military with the foreign policy and both with the nation's economy. Studying the report of the Special Committee, I had noted that the production facilities for one of the components could also be used for our current atomic program and in other fields of defense production. Thus there would not be a total loss even if it turned out that the process failed to work. This, however was still the big "IF."

Later in 1950 and in early 1951 Dr Ulam and Dr Teller, at Los Alamos, made new discoveries that changed the picture. But in March 1950 it was still to be proved that the fusing of a light atom like hydrogen could be achieved.

These were the circumstances at the time. Nevertheless, on March 10 additional emphasis was given to the H-bomb research by my declaring it to be "of the highest urgency," and I directed the Commission to plan at once for quantity production. Then, once we knew that the H-bomb was feasible, production on it should get under way as soon as possible.

As a result of this decision, the huge Savannah River project of the Atomic Energy Commission was started, and other expansions were made in the AEC plant facilities.

Meanwhile, the State Department policy planners and the planners in the Defense Department had been hard at work on the re-evaluation of our objectives which I had asked them to make in the directive of January 31 and I received from the two departments a first draft of their conclusions on April 7.

The report began with an analysis of the world situation. It pointed out that within the past thirty-five years the world had gone through two world wars, had seen two major revolutions, in Russia and in China, had witnessed the passing of five empires and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the French and the British. These events had basically altered the historical distribution of power until now there were only two major centers of power remaining, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The United States, the report continued, had its fundamental purpose clearly defined. The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States lists the aims of the American people in simple words that cannot be misunderstood: "... to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity ..."

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In short, our fundamental aim was and is to assure integrity and vitality of the free society we live in, a s that is based upon the dignity and worth of the individual.

The fundamental design of the Soviet Union, on the ot hand, is a world dominated by the will of the Kre Whether we like it or not, this makes the United States principal target of the Kremlin—the enemy that must destroyed or subverted before the Soviets can achieve goal.

The danger spots in the situation were discussed, and d attention was given to the effect of Russian atomic streng as it was likely to develop over the next few years.

*Our foreign policy aimed at building up rapidly the bined political, economic, and military strength of the world.*

The power of the atom is of key importance in a sea for a peaceful world. With its vast potentialities for pe development, the atom can bring welfare and prosperity to world at peace. On the other hand, in a world that is close the brink of war as ours has been for the past few years, t atom's power in the wrong hands can spell disaster In right hands, however it can be used as an overriding fluence against aggression and reckless war and for t reason I have always insisted that, within the resources of balanced security system and a balanced economy, we s ahead of all the world in atomic affairs.

The development of the hydrogen bomb was one directi in which we held our commanding lead. But we were a able to adapt the A bomb to new uses, even to the po where it became possible to build atomic cannons, to atomic warheads on guided missiles and atomic-powered m into submarines.

As we were putting the atomic principle to new u however we found it difficult to do the necessary testing such remote places as Bikini and Eniwetok. In the summer 1952 Gordon Dean, who had succeeded Lilienthal as A chairman, came to me with a proposal that we set up a t site in the continental United States. He recommended location in Nevada, some seventy miles north of Las Veg but he also told me that the few top government officials wi whom this had been discussed had been most doubtful abo the proposal. One of them told him flatly "The people of th United States will never stand for shooting off A-bombs i this country"

"Gordon," I asked, "if we set up this testing ground, will i

ly help our weapons program from the standpoint of
st?"

Dean assured me that it would.

"Can this be done in such a way that nobody will get
nt?" I asked.

Dean said that every precaution would be taken.

I told him to go ahead. I suggested, however, that it might
well to do it without fanfare, and very quietly to advise
e key officials in the area of the plans we had for the
ting area.

By the end of 1952 twenty separate atomic detonations had
en set off at the Nevada testing grounds on Yucca Flats,
d a great number of different devices had been tested.
roops had been brought in to test defensive equipment and
ctics, and several battalions of the Army were already
quipped with new-type cannon capable of firing atomic
ells. Furthermore, another important milestone in the devel-
pment of the use of atomic power took place on June 14
952, when we laid the keel of the U.S.S. Nautilus, the first
ubmarine and the first seagoing vessel of any kind to be
perated by atomic power.

Meanwhile, the field of atomic energy for peacetime uses
ceived continuous attention. On every occasion when Li-
enthal, or later Gordon Dean, conferred with me, I asked
r a report on research and industrial development efforts.
tomic energy can and should be turned into a power of vast
nefit to humanity—unless, of course, men are foolish
ough to let that power be turned to destruction.

Among the peaceful developments of the period was the
uilding of a reactor at Arco, Idaho, that could turn out
more fissionable material than was put into it. That this
xperiment was successful should prove of the greatest impor
ance for the future development of atomic power for peace-
ul uses. It meant that the way had been cleared for uses of
tomic power that will be economically feasible. It meant
hat "atoms for peace" could now be talked about as some-
hing real and not merely a hope.

Thermonuclear power developments were moving on, in
pite of unavoidable delays by material shortages. A crucial
est came off successfully in March 1951 at Eniwetok. This
was a tremendously important event, for it proved that the
scientific calculations were correct, and with that knowledge
in hand it now became possible to make further definite
plans. Major progress was made shortly thereafter at a plan-
ning conference at Princeton, New Jersey, in June 1951,

lopment in nuclear energy. By 1953 the nation had a
tpile of atomic bombs, together with the means for deliv-
g these bombs to the target. It also had a growing
nal of tactical weapons using atomic warheads, a submar-
e under construction powered by atomic energy, and a
cessfully tested hydrogen bomb and facilities for its pro-
tion. By 1953 atomic energy had been applied successful-
in the fields of medicine and biology, and research was
ng pushed still further for economically feasible peacetime
s. Furthermore, we had taken the leadership in promoting
ited Nations control of atomic power. In the interest of
ace, we kept pressing for international control in the face
obstructive resistance of the Russians.

It is to the scientists, the members of the *Commission*, and
e dedicated workers in laboratories and in factories to
hom all credit must go. The roster of the membership of
e Atomic Energy Commission, its staff and its advisory
roups, reads like a list of the best men who have been
tracted to public service. Some of them were subjected to
ssment and abuse because they spoke their minds and
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development in nuclear energy. By 1953 the nation had a stockpile of atomic bombs, together with the means for delivering these bombs to the target. It also had a growing arsenal of tactical weapons using atomic warheads, a submarine under construction powered by atomic energy, and a successfully tested hydrogen bomb and facilities for its production. By 1953 atomic energy had been applied successfully in the fields of medicine and biology, and research was being pushed still further for economically feasible peacetime uses. Furthermore, we had taken the leadership in proposing United Nations control of atomic power. In the interest of peace, we kept pressing for international control in the face of obstructive resistance of the Russians.

It is to the scientists, the members of the Commission, and the dedicated workers in laboratories and in factories to whom all credit must go. The roster of the membership of the Atomic Energy Commission, its staff and its advisory groups, reads like a list of the best men who have been attracted to public service. Some of them were subjected to harassment and abuse because they spoke their minds and refused to play politics with the program, but these are the men who keep democracy in the lead.

In this list of atomic developments, I have put the peaceful uses and the military uses side by side. It is a matter of practical necessity in the kind of world in which we live today that we gave priority to security, but I have always had the profound hope that atomic energy would one day soon serve its rightful purpose—the benefit of all mankind.

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that the British should be asked to join in the trusteeship arrangement. Furthermore, he confirmed this understanding after I succeeded to the presidency telling Harry Hopkins on May 28, 1945 that Russia was committed to the policy of a four-power trusteeship for Korea.

Korea was mentioned by Molotov but not discussed at my conferences with the Russian Premier and the British Prime Minister at Potsdam. However, the Potsdam Declaration clearly implied that Japan would not be allowed to retain Korea. Also, when the military chiefs of our three nations conferred, it was agreed that following Russia's entry into the Pacific war there should be a line of demarcation in the general area of Korea between American and Russian air and sea operations. There was no discussion of any zones for ground operations or for occupation, for it was not expected that either American or Soviet ground troops would enter Korea in the immediate future.

The 38th parallel as a dividing line in Korea was never the subject of international discussions. It was proposed by us as a practicable solution when the sudden collapse of the Japanese war machine created a vacuum in Korea. We had no troops there and no shipping to land forces at more than a few locations in the southern half of the peninsula. The State Department urged that in all Korea the surrender of Japanese forces should be taken by Americans, but there was no way to get our troops into the northern part of the country with the speed required without sacrificing the security of our landings in Japan. In view of the fact that Stalin had concurred in the idea of a joint trusteeship we expected that the division of the country would be solely for the purpose of accepting the Japanese surrender and that joint control would then extend throughout the peninsula.

The Russians, however began at once to treat the 38th parallel as a permanent dividing line. They would allow no traffic across the line except with their express permission in each case. Since most of Korea's meager industrial plant was north of the parallel and most of its good farming area south of it, the division of the country disrupted the normal economic life of the nation and added to the misery of its people.

Our commander in Korea, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, tried to open talks with his Russian counterpart, but his efforts were regularly rebuffed. After three months of occupation, General Hodge reported on the situation in Korea to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressing the opinion that

The subject was brought up at the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers under the agreed agenda heading, "the formation of a unified administration for Korea looking toward the establishment of an independent Korean government. Secretary Byrnes introduced copies of a letter which Ambassador Harriman had addressed to Molotov on November 8 asking that the Soviet commander in Korea be given authority to consult with the American commander with a view to working out arrangements for such common problems as communications, commerce, currency and other outstanding issues in Korea.

Molotov showed at once how difficult it was to deal with him. This letter he said, dealt with matters other than government administration and therefore had no connection with the topic on the agenda. He wanted the discussion confined to the matters of administration and trusteeship.

The next day Mr. Byrnes brought in a statement of United States policy toward Korea. This statement began with a review of the Cairo Declaration, which, it was stressed, committed us to the establishment of an independent Korea. To attain this end, we proposed immediate action to abolish the separate zones of military administration and the creation of a unified administration as the temporary but necessary preliminary to a four-power trusteeship under the United Nations. We said we expected that independence might then be granted within five years.

Molotov asked for time to study our statement, and it was not until December 20 that he returned to the subject. Then he admitted that the Soviet Union had agreed to the idea of a four-power trusteeship, but, he said, this was a long-term rather than an immediate question. He then proposed on behalf of the Soviet government that a provisional government be set up in Korea to undertake all necessary measures for the development of industry, agriculture, and transportation of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people. A joint commission of representatives of the Soviet and United States commands in Korea should assist in the formation of such a provisional government, consulting with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and presenting its recommendations to the respective governments for their consideration. The commission should also work out trusteeship proposals for the joint consideration of Great Britain, China, and the United States. Meanwhile, representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea should meet within two weeks to consider urgent questions relating to both

the dual occupation of Korea, with Russia north and the United States south of the 38th parallel, imposed an impossible condition upon our occupation missions of establishing sound economy and preparing Korea for future independence. In South Korea the United States was being blamed for the partition, and resentment was growing against all Americans in the area. The Koreans, the general reported, knew full well that under the dual occupation any talk of real freedom and independence was purely academic, but they wanted their independence and were beginning to think that the Allied powers were not sincere in their promise. By occidental standards, Hodge wrote, the Koreans were not ready for independence, but it was also growing daily more apparent that their capacity for self-government would not greatly improve as long as the dual occupation continued.

The Allied interim solution of trusteeship was so strongly disliked by the Koreans that, in Hodge's opinion, "if it is imposed now or at any future time, it is believed possible that the Korean people will actually and physically revolt."

General Hodge wrote in summary: "The U.S. occupation of Korea under present conditions and policies is surely drifting to the edge of a political-economic abyss from which it can never be retrieved with any credit to the United States prestige in the Far East. Positive action on the international level or the seizure of complete initiative in south Korea by the U.S. in the very near future is absolutely essential to stop this drift. Specifically and urgently needed are:

"(1) Clarification and removal of 38th degree barrier so as to unify Korea. (2) Clear-cut statement of policy regarding status of former Japanese property in Korea and reparations as applied to any such property. (3) Reiteration of allied promise of Korean independence accompanying foregoing acts. (4) Establish complete separation of Korea from Japan in the minds of the press, the public, the State and War Departments and allied nations.

"Under present conditions with no corrective action forthcoming I would go so far as to recommend we give serious consideration to an agreement with Russia that both the U.S. and Russia withdraw forces from Korea simultaneously and leave Korea to its own devices and an inevitable internal upheaval for its self purification."

It had already been decided to take up the matter on the governmental level. When Secretary Byrnes went to Moscow in December 1945, the question of Korea was one of the items he was to take up with Molotov.

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not ever having come to grips with the problems of the nation. General Hodge made several efforts in the next few months to reach a basis for agreement with his Soviet counterpart, but with no results.

Meanwhile, one of the very few Americans who was allowed to visit the Russian zone of Korea submitted his report to me. Edwin W. Pauley, my personal representative in reparations matters, with the rank of Ambassador, visited the Russian-occupied zone of North Korea from May 29 to June 3, 1946, and was taken on an inspection of industrial plants by the Russian authorities there. He also spent considerable time in our zone of Korea. Upon the completion of his visit to Korea he wrote me a letter giving a summary of his observations:

June 2[illegible], 1946

> Following are some observations, conclusions, and recommendations on the Korean situation based upon a firsthand inspection by myself and my staff in Korea. I have also given consideration to interviews with people in our Occupation Forces in Korea as well as Koreans and members of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Northern Korea.
>
> Frankly, I am greatly concerned with our position in Korea and believe it is not receiving the attention and consideration it should. While Korea is a small country and in terms of our total military strength is a small responsibility, it is an ideological battleground upon which our entire success in Asia may depend. It is here where a test will be made of whether a democratic competitive system can be adapted to meet the challenge of a defeated feudalism, or whether some other system, i.e. Communism will become stronger.
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> It is clear from the actions of the Soviets that they have no immediate intention of withdrawing from Korea for the following reasons:
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> 1. They apparently are stalling on taking any joint action with the United States toward setting up a trusteeship, toward forming anything resembling a provisional government, or doing anything that might in any way hamper their entrenching themselves more firmly in Northern Korea.
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> They are propagandizing and promoting a Communist Party and a Soviet type of program which would establish loyalty to Moscow as the highest form of loyalty to Korea. To this end they are riding roughshod over all political factions which might oppose or

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Secretary Byrnes informed Mr Molotov the following day that, with two minor changes, this proposal would be acceptable to us, and it was incorporated in the communiqué of the Moscow conference.

This was reported to me by Byrnes on his return to the United States.

As had been agreed at Moscow the American and Russian commanders in Korea met on January 16, 1946, but almost at once it became clear that no results would come from their talks. The Russians insisted that the conference had no authority to discuss anything except minor accommodations between the two zones. Our representatives took the position that the discussions should point toward the eventual joining of the zones. In the end, by February 5 only limited agreements had been reached on such matters as the interchange of mails, the allocation of radio frequencies, and the movement of persons and goods across the parallel. Even these understandings later proved difficult to translate into action, so that the net result of the commanders talks was limited to occasional exchanges of mail and the exchange of small military liaison teams.

The Joint Commission provided for in the Moscow agreement began its work at Seoul, the ancient capital of Korea, on March 20 1946. This Commission, which was, of course, the key element in the plan agreed upon at Moscow was deadlocked almost from the start. We took the position that all Koreans were free to express their opinions and that the Commission should listen to representatives of any Korean political or social group that wished to be heard. The Russians, however insisted that only those Koreans should be allowed to address the Commission who had given full support to the terms of the Moscow agreement. Virtually all the political parties active in our zone, however had expressed their disappointment that independence would be postponed and a trusteeship phase instituted first, and by Russian standards that disqualified them from being heard by the Joint Commission. Korean Communists, of course, had refrained from open opposition to the Moscow agreement and because of this, if the Russians had had their way no one but the Communists would have been allowed to speak on behalf of the Korean people.

The Joint Commission adjourned *sine die* on May 8 with-

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5. They are devoting considerable effort to rejuvenate economic activity in Northern Korea probably directed toward replacing the broken economic ties to Japan with new economic ties to the U.S.S.R.

6. The Soviet Army is obviously ensconcing itself for a long stay. Officers' families are already with them. The Army is virtually operating the railroads. Statements by high ranking officers show no indication of any plan of leaving or even a hope of leaving.

That fall the Russians conducted elections in their zone for local "People's Committees. Ninety-three and one third per cent of the voters went to the polls in a great demonstration of "loyalty" to the new regime. In accordance with Soviet practice, the voters did not have the embarrassment of having to choose between candidates. There was only one slate.

In our portion of Korea the keyword was "education, not indoctrination. Our military government allowed fullest freedom of speech, even where Koreans criticized the American occupation. Of course the majority of the Koreans wanted neither American nor Russian soldiers in their country and the Communists made good use of this anti-foreign sentiment. There were disorders and demonstrations in our zone in the fall of 1946, and in a few instances our troops had to fire into threatening mobs.

The people of Korea had never known democratic government, and our methods were thus often misunderstood. When our military government tried to hear all factions, it was accused of indecision. When it warned against acts of violence, it was charged with partiality. Syngman Rhee, the veteran fighter for Korean independence, actually accused General Hodge and the military government of "trying to build up and foster the Korean Communist Party."

In January 1947 General Hodge reported that Korea might in fact engage in civil war unless American-Russian co-operation brought about some solution to the nation's problems. Economically the country seemed to be going from bad to worse. Black markets were driving prices sky high and draining the market of supplies. Floods, strikes, and the general deterioration of facilities as a result of the war brought about an almost complete breakdown of transportation.

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Many of the posters read as follows

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"The Soviet Government is the highest form of Democracy"

"We will raise the honor of the Red Army still higher"

"For the Fatherland, for the party for Stalin."

"Long live Stalin, the creator of our victories."

"In a strange land a fighter must be more observant and on guard."

"The first teacher of a Red Army soldier is his Sergeant."

From the above it is clear that the Soviet Government does not intend to allow the United States exclusive use of the word "Democracy" "Democracy" means one thing to the Soviets, and quite another to the United States. To us it means, among other things, freedom of speech, assembly and press. The Soviet interpretation of "Democracy" is expressed in terms of the welfare of the masses.

In considering the effect of Soviet propaganda on the Koreans, it must be remembered that about 70% of the present 27 000 000 people in Korea are small farmers and fishermen. Only a few have ever voted or even have the right to vote. They have little knowledge of national or international economic affairs, and are easily swayed by golden tongues and promises.

3 Communism in Korea could get off to a better start than practically anywhere else in the world. The Japanese owned the railroads, all of the public utilities including power and light, as well as all of the major industries and natural resources. Therefore, if these are suddenly found to be owned by "The People's Committee" (The Communist Party) they will have acquired them without any struggle of any kind or any work in developing them. This is one of the reasons why the United States should not waive its title or claim to Japanese external assets located in Korea until a democratic (capitalistic) form of government is assured.

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1. Early elections shall be held to choose provisional legislatures for each of the Russian and American zones. Voting shall be by secret, multi-party ballot on a basis of universal suffrage, and elections shall be held in accordance with the laws adopted by the present Korean legislatures in each zone.

2. These provisional zonal legislatures shall choose representatives in numbers which reflect the proportion between the populations of the two zones, these representatives to constitute a national provisional legislature. This legislature shall meet at Seoul to establish a provisional government for a united Korea.

3. The resulting provisional government of a united Korea shall meet in Korea with representatives of the four powers adhering to the Moscow agreement on Korea to discuss with them what aid and assistance is needed in order to place Korean independence on a firm economic and political foundation and on what terms this aid and assistance is to be given.

4. During all the above stages the United Nations shall be invited to have observers present.

5. The Korean provisional government and the powers concerned shall agree upon a date by which all occupation forces in Korea will be withdrawn.

6. The provisional legislatures in each zone shall be encouraged to draft provisional constitutions which can later be used as a basis for the adoption by the national provisional legislature of a constitution for all of Korea.

7. Until such time as a united, independent Korea is established, public and private Korean agencies in each zone shall be brought into contact with international agencies established by or under the United Nations.

The Russians flatly rejected the suggestion. The Moscow agreement, they insisted, provided for a joint commission as the first step toward Korean independence, and any other approach to the subject would be in violation of that agreement. Our proposals were "unacceptable."

This left us no alternative but to conclude that direct negotiations with the Russians about Korea would be futile. I therefore instructed Secretary Marshall to place the issue before the General Assembly of the United Nations, which was about to convene at Lake Success, New York. Marshall presented our side of the controversy and asked the United Nations to do what "the inability of two powers to reach agreement" had so far prevented, which was to reunite Korea.

person at the White House. He gave me a full description of the economic distress and the political unrest in Korea. He described what the military government had done to prepare the way for a provisional government for our zone but recommended again that Russia and the United States find a joint solution to Korean problems. Earlier General MacArthur had endorsed this recommendation when Hodge made it in writing from his headquarters in Seoul, urging that measures be taken immediately to break the U.S.-Russian deadlock in Korea by diplomatic means.

On the basis of these reports from General Hodge and General MacArthur, I approved Secretary Marshall's plan for one more effort to make the Joint Commission work. In April and May 1947 the Secretary of State exchanged letters with Molotov regarding Korea, and it appeared that the Soviet government was willing to modify its position. Arrangements were therefore made for the Joint Commission to resume its work at Seoul on May 21, 1947.

This development met with much opposition among the Koreans, who did not care to have the subject of trusteeship revived. Syngman Rhee was prominent in leading this opposition, and General Hodge was seriously worried that Rhee would use extreme rightist groups to sabotage the work of the Commission.

The Commission, on which Major General Albert E. Brown was the senior American representative, appeared at first to get off to a good start. The Russians were willing to hear any Korean group, regardless of its past position, which was now ready to support the policy of the Moscow agreements. Early in July, however, the Soviet delegation reverted to the position it had taken in the 1946 meetings of the Joint Commission. The Russians insisted again that those parties and individuals who had opposed the trusteeship provisions of the Moscow agreement were ineligible for consultation. Once again the basic issue of freedom of expression was raised, and on this point our representatives could not yield. Our delegation continued, however, to make efforts toward some joint action, but not one of its proposals was favorably considered by the Russians.

On August 26, 1947, we proposed to the Russians that the four powers who were to constitute the trusteeship powers for Korea—Britain, China, the U.S.S.R., and the United States—should meet in Washington on September 8 to find a way to carry out the Moscow agreement. With this invitation we submitted a seven-point proposal

1. Early elections shall be held to choose provisional legislatures for each of the Russian and American zones. Voting shall be by secret, multi-party ballot on a basis of universal suffrage, and elections shall be held in accordance with the laws adopted by the present Korean legislatures in each zone.

2. These provisional zonal legislatures shall choose representatives in numbers which reflect the proportion between the populations of the two zones, these representatives to constitute a national provisional legislature. This legislature shall meet at Seoul to establish a provisional government for a united Korea.

3. The resulting provisional government of a united Korea shall meet in Korea with representatives of the four powers adhering to the Moscow agreement on Korea to discuss with them what aid and assistance is needed in order to place Korean independence on a firm economic and political foundation and on what terms this aid and assistance is to be given.

4. During all the above stages the United Nations shall be invited to have observers present.

5. The Korean provisional government and the powers concerned shall agree upon a date by which all occupation forces in Korea will be withdrawn.

6. The provisional legislatures in each zone shall be encouraged to draft provisional constitutions which can later be used as a basis for the adoption by the national provisional legislature of a constitution for all of Korea.

7. Until such time as a united, independent Korea is established, public and private Korean agencies in each zone shall be brought into contact with international agencies established by or under the United Nations.

The Russians flatly rejected the suggestion. The Moscow agreement, they insisted, provided for a joint commission as the first step toward Korean independence, and any other approach to the subject would be in violation of that agreement. Our proposals were "unacceptable."

This left us no alternative but to conclude that direct negotiations with the Russians about Korea would be futile. I therefore instructed Secretary Marshall to place the issue before the General Assembly of the United Nations, which was about to convene at Lake Success, New York. Marshall presented our side of the controversy and asked the United Nations to do what "the inability of two powers to reach agreement" had so far prevented, which was to [illegible]

The Russians countered this move with a proposal made to the Joint Commission on September 26, that all occupation troops in Korea be withdrawn at the same time, sometime early in 1948. The American delegation to the Joint Commission replied that they had no power to enter into such an agreement. The Russian suggestion was thereupon repeated in a formal communication to the State Department. Acting Secretary of State Lovett replied that we could not enter into separate agreements while the principal issue was pending before the United Nations.

We had, however, given thought to the question of troop removal. Our armed forces had been drastically reduced from their wartime peaks, and there was strong congressional pressure to reduce military spending even further. Our commitments were many, but our forces were limited. I instructed the State and Defense Departments to weigh our commitments and consider where we might safely withdraw.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made a careful study of the military aspects of a troop withdrawal from Korea and in September 1947 reported that we had little strategic interest in maintaining our undermanned occupation units in that country. At the time, the membership of the J.C.S., besides Admiral Leahy, consisted of General Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz, and General Spaatz. Their views were incorporated in the following memorandum which was addressed to the Secretary of State, who brought it to me.

September 1947

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, from the standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea for the reasons hereafter stated.

In the event of hostilities in the Far East, our present forces in Korea would be a military liability and could not be maintained there without substantial reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities. Moreover, any offensive operation the United States might wish to conduct on the Asiatic continent most probably would by-pass the Korean peninsula.

If, on the other hand, an enemy were able to establish and maintain strong air and naval bases in the Korean peninsula, he might be able to interfere with United States communications and operations in East China, Manchuria, the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan and adjacent islands. Such interference would require an enemy to maintain substantial air and naval forces in an area

where they would be subject to neutralization by air action. Neutralization by air action would be more feasible and less costly than large-scale ground operations.

In the light of the present severe shortage of military manpower, the corps of two divisions, totaling some 45,000 men, now maintained in south Korea, could well be used elsewhere, the withdrawal of these forces from Korea would not impair the military position of the Far East Command unless, in consequence, the Soviets establish military strength in south Korea capable of mounting an assault on Japan.

At the present time, the occupation of Korea is requiring very large expenditures for the primary purpose of preventing disease and disorder which might endanger our occupation forces with little, if any lasting benefit to the security of the United States.

Authoritative reports from Korea indicate that continued lack of progress toward a free and independent Korea, unless offset by an elaborate program of economic, political and cultural rehabilitation, in all probability will result in such conditions, including violent disorder as to make the position of United States occupation forces untenable. A precipitate withdrawal of our forces under such circumstances would lower the military prestige of the United States, quite possibly to the extent of adversely affecting cooperation in other areas more vital to the security of the United States.

When the Joint Chiefs made this report, they had available to them the results of a later much-talked-about study trip which Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer had undertaken at my request. General Wedemeyer had made a firsthand study of the situation in the summer of 1947 and on the question of American troop withdrawal he stated his conclusions in these words.

"So long as Soviet troops remain in occupation of North Korea, the United States must maintain troops in South Korea or admit before the world an 'ideological retreat. The military standing of the United States would decline accordingly not only through the Far East, but throughout the world.

"Except as indicated above, and the fact that its occupation denies a potential enemy the use of warm-water ports and the opportunity to establish strong air and naval bases in the peninsula, the United States has little military interest in

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"There are three possible courses of action with referen[ce] to United States Occupation Forces in Korea

"They may be withdrawn immediately which would aban[-] don South Korea to the Soviet Union through pressu[re] which could be exerted by the North Korean People's (Com[-] munist) Army and is therefore an unacceptable course fro[m] the strategic viewpoint.

"They may remain in occupation indefinitely which cour[se] would be unacceptable to the American public after Sovi[et] withdrawal, and would subject United States to internation[al] censure.

"They may be withdrawn concurrently with Soviet occupa[-] tion forces."

General Wedemeyer then recommended that this thi[rd] course be followed, preferably on the basis of agreeme[nt] with the Russians, and that we assist the South Koreans in th[e] building and training of a native defense force before ou[r] troops were withdrawn

To invite some form of agreement with the Russians o[n] Korea, I gave approval to a detailed plan which was place[d] before the General Assembly of the United Nations. W[e] proposed that elections be held in the two zones befor[e] March 31 1948 under U N supervision, as the first ste[p] toward the establishment of a national government. This gov[-] ernment, we urged, should then be asked to build up its own security forces, organize the machinery of government, and then arrange with the occupying powers for withdrawal of their troops. To supervise the elections and speed the subse[-] quent steps, we suggested the creation of a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea

The Russians replied with the charge that we had violate[d] the Moscow agreement by taking the case to the United Nations in the first place Then they introduced a resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of occupation troops. The resolution was defeated both in the First Committee and at the plenary session of the General Assembly whereupon the Soviet representatives announced that if a U N commission on Korea were set up the Soviet Union would not be able to take part in its work.

The American spokesman before the General Assembly was Mr John Foster Dulles, and the General Assembly

adopted, with only the Soviet bloc abstaining, the United proposal for Korea.

The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was set up accordingly. This body held its first meeting in Seoul on January 12, 1948 although the Russian commander in North Korea would not allow the Commission to enter the area north of the 38th parallel. He even refused to accept communications addressed to him by the Commission.

The Interim Committee of the General Assembly then instructed the Commission to carry out its work in whatever part of Korea it could reach. The Commission was to supervise free elections, which were held on May 10, 1948 and in spite of organized efforts by the Communists to create disorders and to sabotage the election, four out of five eligible South Koreans registered to vote, and better than ninety per cent of those registered cast their ballots. The election, the first free election in Korean history was, as the U.N Commission later reported, "a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constituted approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea."

The National Assembly elected by the people of the American zone met for the first time on May 31 1948. It chose Mr Syngman Rhee as chairman and then proceeded to the writing of a constitution for the Republic of Korea. This task was completed on July 12, the new constitution for Korea being promulgated on July 17 On July 20 Syngman Rhee was elected President of the Republic of Korea by the National Assembly

The next step in the establishment of the Republic of Korea, in accordance with the General Assembly resolution, was the transfer of governmental authority from the military command and civilian occupation agencies in the southern zone to the newly constituted Republic of Korea. Our military government officers had, in the three years past, built up a complete governmental system, staffed almost completely by Koreans. This made the turnover easy

I instructed the State Department to put it into effect as soon as possible. The people of Korea wanted a government of their own, and they were entitled to have it. On August 15, 1948, therefore, the Republic of Korea was formally proclaimed, and the American military government came to an end. Arrangements were made for the new government to assume control of the several police and security forces, and

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The South Koreans, by that time, had brought together an army of about sixty-five thousand men, and their training had progressed very satisfactorily. They were aided in their tasks by an advisory group of about five hundred officers and men of our Army. Except for that group, the last of our troops left Korea on June 29, 1949.

Shortly before the expiration of the military appropriations for Korea (for fiscal 1949), I sent a message to the Congress asking for economic aid to Korea in the amount of $150,000,000. Unfortunately the Congress took over four months to authorize this sum, and when I asked for another sixty million dollars for the same purpose in the budget for 1950-51, the request was actually defeated in the House of Representatives, with most of the negative votes coming from the Republican members. While it was later passed as part of a combined Korea-China aid bill, it can be said that, generally, Congress was in no hurry to provide the aid which had been requested for Korea by the President.

To bolster Korea's military position, I approved a defense agreement, which was signed on January 26, 1950. We continued, however, to be concerned over the internal and economic situation in South Korea. One of the reasons, though a minor one, why I had approved the policy of troop withdrawal was the danger that we might be able to escape involvement in the political arguments of the young state. President Syngman Rhee is a man of strong convictions and has little patience with those who differ with him. From the moment of his return to Korea in 1945 he attracted to himself men of extreme right-wing attitudes and disagreed sharply with the political leaders of more moderate views, and the withdrawal of military government removed restraints that had prevented arbitrary actions against his opponents. I did not care for the methods used by Rhee's police to break up political meetings and control political enemies, and I was deeply concerned over the Rhee government's lack of concern about the serious inflation that swept the country. Yet we had no choice but to support Rhee. Korea had been overrun and downtrodden by the Japanese since 1905 and had had no chance to develop other leaders and leadership.

We knew that Rhee's government would be in grave danger if the military units of North Korea were to start a full-scale attack. We wanted him to make his own area

a property and financial settlement was concluded on September 11

The Soviet occupation authorities in North Korea countered the establishment of the Republic of Korea, when, on September 9 a "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" was proclaimed in Pyongyang. Then, ten days later the Soviet Foreign Office advised our embassy in Moscow that all Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Korea by the end of December 1948. It later informed us that this had been done on schedule.

We, of course, were in favor of troop withdrawals. I have always believed that there is nothing that more easily creates antagonisms than the presence of unwanted soldiers, foreign or domestic. That was the way people in the southern states felt during the terrible reconstruction period, and when I was a very small boy I had heard much of southern reactions from my father and mother and from friends of my family. My father was just as unreconstructed as my mother was.

We knew however that the Russians had built up a "People's Army" in North Korea. We knew that Communist infiltration into South Korea was considerable. We knew that the new government of Syngman Rhee would find it difficult to resist effectively if it were attacked. However a careful estimate had been made by our experts of the chances of survival of the new Republic of Korea, and the conclusion had been reached that "its prospects for survival may be considered favorable as long as it can continue to receive large-scale aid from the U.S."

In the spring of 1948 the National Security Council reported to me that we could do one of three things We could abandon Korea or we could continue our military and political responsibility for the country or we could extend to a Korean government aid and assistance for the training and equipping of their own security forces and offer extensive economic help to prevent a breakdown of the infant nation. The Council recommended, however that we choose the last course, and I gave my approval

Secretary of the Army Royall said that in his talk with General MacArthur in early February 1949 the general expressed himself in favor of prompt withdrawal of our troops from Korea. Furthermore, when the National Security Council reviewed the situation in Korea on March 22, 1949 it had before it a report from MacArthur stating that the training and combat readiness of the new security forces of the Korean Republic had reached such a level that complete

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Of course each commander believed that his area was in the greatest danger. It is obvious that the final decisions on the allocation of forces and matériel cannot be left to an area commander and must be made by the top-level command.

The intelligence reports from Korea in the spring of 1950 indicated that the North Koreans were steadily continuing their build-up of forces and that they were continuing to send guerrilla groups into South Korea.

There were continuing incidents along the 38th parallel, where armed units faced each other.

Throughout the spring the Central Intelligence reports said that the North Koreans might at any time decide to change from isolated raids to a full-scale attack. The North Koreans were capable of such an attack at any time according to the intelligence, but there was no information to give any clue as to whether an attack was certain or when it was likely to come. But this did not apply alone to Korea. These same reports also told me repeatedly that there were any number of other spots in the world where the Russians "possessed the capability" to attack.

On Saturday June 24, 1950, I was in Independence, Missouri, to spend the weekend with my family and to attend to some personal family business.

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"Mr President," said Dean Acheson, "I have very serio news. The North Koreans have invaded South Korea.

My first reaction was that I must get back to the capit and I told Acheson so. He explained, however that detai were not yet available and that he thought I need not re back until he called me again with further information. In th meantime, he suggested to me that we should ask the Unite Nations Security Council to hold a meeting at once to declare that an act of aggression had been committed again the Republic of Korea. I told him that I agreed and aske him to request immediately a special meeting of the Securit Council, and he said he would call me to report again th following morning, or sooner if there was more informatio on the events in Korea.

Acheson's next call came through around eleven-thirty Sun day morning, just as we were getting ready to sit down to a early Sunday dinner Acheson reported that the U.N Security Council had been called into emergency session. Addition al reports had been received from Korea, and there was n doubt that an all-out invasion was under way there. The Security Council, Acheson said, would probably call for a cease-fire, but in view of the complete disregard the North Koreans and their big allies had shown for the U.N in the past, we had to expect that the U N order would be ignored. Some decision would have to be made at once as to the degree of aid or encouragement which our government was willing to extend to the Republic of Korea.

I asked Acheson to get together with the Service Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff and start working on recommendations for me when I got back. Defense Secretary Louis Johnson and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley were on their way back from an inspection tour of the Far East. I informed the Secretary of State that I was returning to Washington at once.

The crew of the presidential plane Independence did a wonderful job. They had the plane ready to fly in less than an hour from the time they were alerted, and my return trip got under way so fast that two of my aides were left behind. They could not be notified in time to reach the airport

The plane left the Kansas City Municipal Airport at two o'clock, and it took just a little over three hours to make the trip to Washington. I had time to think aboard the plane In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time

but the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war. It was also clear to me that the foundations and the principles of the United Nations were at stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped.

I had the plane's radio operator send a message to Dean Acheson asking him and his immediate advisers and the top defense chiefs to come to Blair House for a dinner conference.

When the Independence landed, Secretary of State Acheson was waiting for me at the airport, as was Secretary of Defense Johnson, who himself had arrived only a short while before. We hurried to Blair House where we were joined by the other conferees. Present were the three service Secretaries, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews, and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter. There were the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, the Army Chief General Collins, the Air Force Chief General Vandenberg, and Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. Dean Acheson was accompanied by Under Secretary Webb, Deputy Under Secretary Dean Rusk and Assistant Under Secretary John Hickerson, and Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup.

It was late, and we went at once to the dining room for dinner. I asked that no discussion take place until dinner was served and over and the Blair House staff had withdrawn. I called on Dean Acheson first to give us a detailed picture of the situation. Acheson read us the first report that had been received by the State Department from our Ambassador in Seoul, Korea, at nine twenty-six the preceding evening:

> According Korean army reports which partly confirmed by KMAG field advisor reports North Korean forces invaded ROK territory at several points this morning. Action was initiated about 4 A.M. Ongjin blasted by North Korean artillery fire. About 6 A.M.

"Mr President," said Dean Acheson, "I have very serious news. The North Koreans have invaded South Korea."

My first reaction was that I must get back to the capital, and I told Acheson so. He explained, however that details were not yet available and that he thought I need not rush back until he called me again with further information. In the meantime, he suggested to me that we should ask the United Nations Security Council to hold a meeting at once and declare that an act of aggression had been committed against the Republic of Korea. I told him that I agreed and asked him to request immediately a special meeting of the Security Council, and he said he would call me to report again the following morning, or sooner if there was more information on the events in Korea.

Acheson's next call came through around eleven-thirty Sunday morning, just as we were getting ready to sit down to an early Sunday dinner Acheson reported that the U.N Security Council had been called into emergency session. Additional reports had been received from Korea, and there was no doubt that an all-out invasion was under way there. The Security Council, Acheson said, would probably call for a cease-fire, but in view of the complete disregard the North Koreans and their big allies had shown for the U N in the past, we had to expect that the U N order would be ignored. Some decision would have to be made at once as to the degree of aid or encouragement which our government was willing to extend to the Republic of Korea.

I asked Acheson to get together with the Service Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff and start working on recommendations for me when I got back Defense Secretary Louis Johnson and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley were on their way back from an inspection tour of the Far East. I informed the Secretary of State that I was returning to Washington at once.

The crew of the presidential plane Independence did a wonderful job. They had the plane ready to fly in less than an hour from the time they were alerted, and my return trip got under way so fast that two of my aides were left behind. They could not be notified in time to reach the airport

The plane left the Kansas City Municipal Airport at two o'clock, and it took just a little over three hours to make the trip to Washington. I had time to think aboard the plane In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time

would be ordered north at once but that I wanted to withhold making any statement until the fleet was in position.

After this report I asked each person in turn to state his agreement or disagreement and any views he might have in addition. Two things stand out in this discussion. One was the complete, almost unspoken acceptance on the part of every one that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be done. There was no suggestion from anyone that either the United Nations or the United States could back away from it. This was the test of all the talk of the last five years of collective security. The other point which stands out in my mind from the discussion was the difference in view of what might be called for. Vandenberg and Sherman thought that air and naval aid might be enough. Collins said that if the Korean army was really broken, ground forces would be necessary. But no one could tell what the state of the Korean army really was on that Sunday night. Whatever the estimates of the military might be, everyone recognized the situation as serious in the extreme.

I then directed that orders be issued to put the three recommendations into immediate effect.

As we continued our discussion, I stated that I did not expect the North Koreans to pay any attention to the United Nations. This, I said, would mean that the United Nations would have to apply force if it wanted its order obeyed.

General Bradley said we would have to draw the line somewhere. Russia, he thought, was not yet ready for war, but in Korea they were obviously testing us, and the line ought to be drawn now.

I said that most emphatically I thought the line would have to be drawn.

General Collins reported that he had had a teletype conference with General MacArthur. The Far East commander, he told us, was ready to ship ammunition and supplies to Korea as soon as he received the green light.

I expressed the opinion that the Russians were trying to get Korea by default, gambling that we would be afraid of starting a third world war and would offer no resistance. I thought that we were still holding the stronger hand, although how much stronger it was hard to tell.

I asked the three Chiefs of Staff, Collins, Vandenberg, and Sherman, what information they had on Russian forces in the Far East. Then I asked Admiral Sherman what the location of the Seventh Fleet was. The admiral said the fleet was nearing the Philippines, two days out of Japan, and when

North Korean infantry commenced crossing parallel in Ongjin area, Kaesong area, Chunchon area and amphibious landing was reportedly made south of Kangnung on east coast. Kaesong was reportedly captured at 9 A.M., with some 10 North Korean tanks participating in operation. North Korean forces, spearheaded by tanks, reportedly closing in on Chunchon. Details of fighting in Kangnung are unclear although it seems North Korean forces have cut highway. Am conferring with KMAG advisors and Korean officials this morning re situation.

It would appear from nature of attack and manner in which it was launched that it constitutes all out offensive against ROK.

Muccio

There were additional messages from Ambassador Muccio, too, giving more details, but all confirmed that a full-fledged attack was under way and the North Koreans had broadcast a proclamation that, in effect, was a declaration of war.

Earlier that Sunday evening, Acheson reported, the Security Council of the United Nations had, by a vote of 9 to 0, approved a resolution declaring that a breach of the peace had been committed by the North Korean action and ordering the North Koreans to cease their action and withdraw their forces.

I then called on Acheson to present the recommendations which the State and Defense Departments had prepared. He presented the following recommendations for immediate action:

1. That MacArthur should evacuate the Americans from Korea—including the dependents of the Military Mission—and, in order to do so, should keep open the Kimpo and other airports, repelling all hostile attacks thereon. In doing this, his air forces should stay south of the 38th parallel.

2. That MacArthur should be instructed to get ammunition and supplies to the Korean army by airdrop and otherwise.

3. That the Seventh Fleet should be ordered into the Formosa Strait to prevent the conflict from spreading to that area. The Seventh Fleet should be ordered from Cavite north at once. We should make a statement that the fleet would repel any attack on Formosa and that no attacks should be made from Formosa on the mainland.

At this point I interrupted to say that the Seventh Fleet

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I asked General Collins how many divisions we had in Japan and how long it would take to move two or three of them to Korea. The general gave the information.

Next I asked the Secretary of the Air Force Finletter and General Vandenberg what the present disposition of the Air Force was and how long it would take to reinforce our air units in the Far East.

I instructed the service chiefs to prepare the necessary orders for the eventual use of American units if the United Nations should call for action against North Korea, and meanwhile General MacArthur was directed to send a survey party to Korea to find out what kind of aid would be most effective and how the military forces available to the Far East commander might be used. He was also to furnish such ammunition and equipment to the Republic of Korea as he could spare, and was authorized to use air and naval cover to assure the delivery of these supplies and to protect the American dependents being evacuated from Korea. The Seventh Fleet was placed under MacArthur's command and was to have its base at Sasebo, Japan.

As the meeting adjourned, Acheson showed me a message which had reached him from John Foster Dulles, who had just returned to Tokyo from Korea. For some time Dulles had been at work for the State Department on the preparation of the peace treaty with Japan, and he too seemed to have little doubt about the course of action we had to take.

"It is possible," his message read, "that South Koreans may themselves contain and repulse attack, and, if so, this is best way. If, however it appears they cannot do so then we believe that US force should be used even though this risks Russian counter moves. To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war. We suggest that Security Council might call for action on behalf of the organization under Article 106 by the five powers or such of them as are willing to respond."

By Monday the reports from Korea began to sound dark and discouraging, and among the messages that arrived was one from Syngman Rhee asking for help in the telegraphic style of the State Department messages:

"Beginning in early morning 25 June, North Korean Communist Army began armed aggression against South. Your

Excellency and Congress of US already aware of fact that our people, anticipating incident such as today's established strong national defense force in order to secure bulwark of democracy in the east and to render service to world peace. We again thank you for your indispensable aid in liberating us and in establishing our Republic. As we face this national crisis, putting up brave fight, we appeal for your increasing support and ask that you at the same time extend effective and timely aid in order to prevent this act of destruction of world peace.

The Korean Ambassador who brought me President Rhee's appeal, was downhearted almost to the point of tears. I tried to encourage him by saying that the battle had been going on for only forty-eight hours and other men in other countries had defended their liberties to ultimate victory under much more discouraging circumstances. I told him to hold fast—that help was on the way.

But the Republic of Korea troops were no match for the tanks and heavy weapons of the North Koreans. Seoul, the capital of Syngman Rhee's government, seemed doomed; Communist tanks were reported in the outskirts of the city. Rhee moved his government to Taegu, about one hundred and fifty miles to the south.

Throughout Monday the situation in Korea deteriorated rapidly. I called another meeting at Blair House Monday night. The same persons who attended the first meeting were again present except Secretary of the Navy Matthews, while Assistant Secretary of State Matthews took Rusk's place. MacArthur's latest message was alarming:

> Piecemeal entry into action vicinity Seoul by South Korean Third and Fifth Divisions has not succeeded in stopping the penetration recognized as the enemy main effort for the past 2 days with intent to seize the capital city of Seoul. Tanks entering suburbs of Seoul. Govt transferred to south and communication with part of KMAG opened at Taegu. Ambassador and Chief KMAG remaining in the city. FEC mil survey group en route to Korea has been recalled, under the rapidly deteriorating situation.
>
> South Korean units unable to resist determined Northern offensive. Contributory factor exclusive enemy possession of tanks and fighter planes. South Korean casualties as an index to fighting has not shown adequate resistance capabilities or the will to fight and our estimate is that a complete collapse is imminent.

There was now no doubt! The Republic of Korea needed

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help at once if it was not to be overrun. More seriously a Communist success in Korea would put Red troops and planes within easy striking distance of Japan, and Okinawa and Formosa would be open to attack from two sides.

I told my advisers that what was developing in Korea seemed to me like a repetition on a larger scale of what had happened in Berlin. The Reds were probing for weaknesses in our armor' we had to meet their thrust without getting embroiled in a world-wide war

I directed the Secretary of Defense to call General MacArthur on the scrambler phone and to tell him in person what my instructions were. He was to use air and naval forces to support the Republic of Korea with air and naval elements of his command, but only south of the 38th parallel. He was also instructed to dispatch the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Strait. The purpose of this move was to prevent attacks by the Communists on Formosa as well as forays by Chiang Kai-shek against the mainland, this last to avoid reprisal actions by the Reds that might enlarge the area of conflict.

I also approved recommendations for the strengthening of our forces in the Philippines and for increased aid to the French in Indo-China. Meanwhile the Security Council of the United Nations met again and adopted on June 27 the resolution calling on all members of the U.N to give assistance to South Korea.

That same morning, Tuesday I asked a group of congressional leaders to meet with me so that I might inform them on the events and the decisions of the past few days. With me that morning, in addition to the "Big Four" (Barkley McFarland, Rayburn, McCormack) were Senators Connally Wiley Alexander Smith, George, Tydings, Bridges, and Thomas of Utah, and Representatives Kee, Eaton, Vinson, and Short. Acheson, Johnson, Pace, Matthews, Finletter and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were present, with some of their aides.

I asked the Secretary of State to summarize the situation. Then I pointed out that it was the United Nations which had acted in this case and had acted with great speed. I read a statement which had already been prepared for release to the press later that day and I asked for the views of the congressional leaders.

Senator Wiley asked what forces General MacArthur had dispatched so far Secretary Johnson assured him that MacArthur had sent his air and naval t
received his instructions to do so.

Senator Tydings said that his Armed Services Committee had that morning acted to extend the draft act and to give the President power to call out the National Guard.

Senator Smith commented that in Korea we would act as members of the U.N. rather than as a single nation. I said this was correct but pointed out that, so far as our action concerned Formosa, we were acting on our own and not on behalf of the U.N.

John McCormack wanted to know from Admiral Sherman if the Navy would not have to be enlarged, and Secretary Johnson replied that the Joint Chiefs had already begun to study such expansion of the services as might be needed but that a balanced program would be maintained.

Congressman Kee, Senator Connally and the Secretary of State made several suggestions regarding the wording of the U.N. resolution, and Dewey Short expressed the hope that other nations would join in supporting the U.N. in this cause.

The congressional leaders approved of my action. On that same day Thomas E. Dewey, Republican leader, pledged his full support.

This is the statement I gave out to the press at the conclusion of this meeting with the congressional leaders.

June 27, 1950

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the

help at once if it was not to be overrun. More seriously a Communist success in Korea would put Red troops and planes within easy striking distance of Japan, and Okinawa and Formosa would be open to attack from two sides.

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the caution of the Soviets in undertaking new efforts of this kind. Thus the safety and prospects for peace of the free world would be increased.

The top-level policy discussions were continued on Wednesday, June 28, when I opened another meeting of the National Security Council with a survey of the most recent developments reported from Korea. I told the departments concerned that I wanted a complete restudy made of all our policies in areas adjoining the U.S.S.R., and Secretaries Johnson and Acheson reported that a study of some of the immediate aspects growing out of the Korean situation had already been begun.

At this point Vice-President Barkley joined the meeting. He had been detained on Capitol Hill, but for a good cause, for he was able to report that the Senate had just voted unanimously to extend the draft.

Secretary Acheson pointed out that the unanimity of support for my policy might not be of lasting duration. What had been done in Korea had had tremendous effect, but the responsibilities that went with it were equally significant, for what had been done in the last three days might ultimately involve us in all-out war.

I replied that the danger involved was obvious but that we should not back out of Korea unless a military situation elsewhere demanded such action.

Averell Harriman, who had just arrived from Europe, reported that the people there had been gravely concerned lest we fail to meet the challenge in Korea. After my decision had been announced, he said, there had been a general feeling of relief, since it had been believed that disaster would otherwise be certain. He added that the Europeans were fully aware of the implications of my decision.

The Vice-President mentioned that he had heard one of the senators doubt the willingness of other NATO countries to help. I said that we had just received a specific offer by the British to furnish naval assistance, and I asked Secretary Johnson to provide the Vice-President with the details so that Barkley might be able to inform the members of the Senate.

The Secretary of the Air Force, Thomas Finletter, brought up the question of mutual understanding between Washington and the Far East Command in Tokyo. He felt that personal contact might help us avoid mistakes and suggested that General Vandenberg be sent over to inform General MacArthur more specifically on the thinking in Washington.

*Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.*

Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack upon Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

I have also directed that United States Forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indo-China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law

I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the United States to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council.

Our allies and friends abroad were informed through our diplomatic representatives that it was our feeling that it was essential to the maintenance of peace that this armed aggression against a free nation be met firmly We let it be known that we considered the Korean situation vital as a symbol of the strength and determination of the West Firmness now would be the only way to deter new actions in other portions of the world. Not only in Asia but in Europe the Middle East, and elsewhere the confidence of peoples in countries adjacent to Soviet Union would be very adversely affected, in our judgment, if we failed to take action to protect a country established under our auspices and confirmed in its freedom by action of the United Nations If however the threat to South Korea was met firmly and successfully it would add to our successes in Iran, Berlin, and Greece a fourth success in opposition to the aggressive moves of the Communists And each success, we suggested to our allies, was likely to add to

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It was my opinion, however that at the present moment the Chiefs of Staff were most urgently needed in Washington. Nevertheless, I understood the need for mutual understanding between Washington and Tokyo and expressed my regret that General MacArthur had so consistently declined all invitations to return to the United States for even a short visit. There had been no opportunity for him to meet me as Commander in Chief. I felt that if the Korean conflict was prolonged I would want to see General MacArthur

Secretary of the Army Pace reported that instructions had been issued to military intelligence to be alert for any evidence of Soviet participation in the Korean fighting, and wanted to know if there were any other special intelligence targets. I replied that our strategic intelligence was watching other areas besides Korea and I thought that Soviet activities in the vicinity of Yugoslavia, in Bulgaria especially and in the vicinity of northern Europe should be given special attention.

The Army Secretary also reported that arrangements had been made for a system of military briefings to be given on Capitol Hill, whereupon I told the Vice-President that I wanted to be certain that those briefings were bi-partisan and that I wanted him to select those to attend them.

The National Security Council met again Thursday when Secretary of Defense Johnson introduced a proposed directive to General MacArthur The final paragraph of this proposed directive, however permitted an implication that we were planning to go to war against the Soviet Union. I stated categorically that I did not wish to see even the slightest implication of such a plan. I wanted to take every step necessary to push the North Koreans back behind the 38th parallel. But I wanted to be sure that we would not become so deeply committed in Korea that we could not take care of such other situations as might develop

Secretary Pace expressed the belief that we should be very careful in authorizing operations above the 38th parallel and that we should clearly limit such operations. I agreed, pointing out that operations above the 38th parallel should be designed only to destroy military supplies, for I wanted it clearly understood that our operations in Korea were designed to restore peace there and to restore the border Secretary Acheson said that the Air Force should not be restricted in its tasks by a rigid application of the 38th parallel as a restraining line, but he wanted to be sure that precautions would be taken to keep the air elements beyond

the boundaries of Korea. He suggested that the directive to MacArthur include some instructions in the case of Soviet intervention, perhaps to the effect that he defend his positions
our forces, and report at once for further instructions from the President.

I accepted this suggestion, and I told Acheson and Johnson to get together and work out the wording.

The Secretary of State then reviewed the reply received from the Soviets to our appeal to them to help bring the fighting in Korea to an end. Acheson expressed the belief that a statement which had been released in Peiping, taken together with the Russian reply, seemed to indicate that the Soviets would not intervene themselves but might help the Chinese Communists to do so. Acheson suggested, and I approved, the public release of our note to the U.S.S.R. and their reply.

The Secretary of State reported offers of assistance from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. I said that it was my hope that the forces assisting South Korea could be made truly representative of the United Nations.

Before closing the meeting I asked the Secretary of Defense to prepare a directive in my name to General MacArthur instructing him to make a full and complete report on the situation in the Far East each day.

A little later that day Secretary Acheson returned to the White House, and among the things we discussed was a communication from the Chinese government offering assistance in Korea. Chiang Kai-shek had instructed his Ambassador to tell us that he was willing to send ground forces numbering up to thirty-three thousand men but that he had neither air nor sea units and that U.S. assistance would be needed to get the ground forces from Formosa to Korea and then to supply them there.

I told Acheson that my first reaction was to accept this offer because I wanted, as I had said to the National Security Council earlier in the day, to see as many of the members of the United Nations as possible take part in the Korean action. Acheson suggested that the situation of Nationalist China was different from that of other U.N. members. Formosa was one of the areas most exposed to attack. That had been the reason we had dispatched the Seventh Fleet, and it would be a little inconsistent to spend American money to protect an island while its natural defenders were somewhere else. He also raised the question whether the troops of the Generalissimo would not require a great deal of re-equipping

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his best, would have very little modern equipment and would be as helpless as Syngman Rhee's army against the North Korean tanks.

Furthermore, the transportation they would require would be better used if we assigned it the task of carrying supplies and additional manpower of our own to MacArthur.

I was still concerned about our ability to stand off the enemy with the small forces available to us, but after some further discussion I accepted the position taken by practically everyone else at this meeting: namely, that the Chinese offer ought to be politely declined. I then decided that General MacArthur should be given full authority to use the ground forces under his command.

The first American ground troops sent into the Korean fighting were infantrymen from the 24th Infantry Division. By sea and by air units of this veteran combat organization were rushed to the front lines to slow down the Communist advance, and the story of their action will always remain a glorious chapter in the history of the American Army. Inspiringly led by that wonderful fighting commander, Major General William F. Dean, the men of the 24th, most of them young recruits without battle experience, put up one of the finest rear-guard actions in military history.

I kept myself posted on the battle-front situation by way of a daily briefing which I was given each morning by General Bradley or by an officer from the Joint Chiefs' office. I also arranged for the National Security Council to meet each week, and at each of these meetings a briefing on the Korean situation was given by General Bradley himself or by an officer of his staff. This began on July 6, 1950, at the first meeting of the National Security Council after American troops had been committed to the ground action. It was then that General Bradley described the difficult position of the 24th Division and reported that the 25th Division, also from Japan, stood ready to move to Korea but that shipping was critical in the Far East and that another week would pass before these reinforcements could reach the front lines.

The Vice-President asked if we knew how many North Koreans were in the operation, and General Bradley told him that our intelligence estimated that there were ninety thousand. Vice-President Barkley then inquired how many troops were now engaged on our side, and Bradley told him that there were now about ten thousand Americans and about twenty-five thousand ROK regulars. Bradley also mentioned a new type of bazooka that was being rushed to Korea to give

before they could go into combat under modern conditions.

I asked Acheson to bring up the matter the next day at a meeting with Defense Secretary Louis Johnson and the Joint Chiefs. The following morning I was still inclined to accept the Chinese offer. Frank Pace, the Secretary of the Army, telephoned me at five o clock in the morning. He said that he had just spoken to General Collins, who had had a long telecon conference with MacArthur. General MacArthur had asked for the conference immediately upon his return from a flying trip to the Korean front line. MacArthur said he was convinced that only American ground units could stop the North Korean advance. He had asked for permission to commit one regimental combat team at once and to build up to two divisions as rapidly as possible.

The Secretary of the Army asked for my instructions.

I told Pace to inform General MacArthur immediately that the use of one regimental combat team was approved.

At seven that morning a staff colonel from the Joint Chiefs office came over to brief me on the night's reports from Korea. As soon as he had finished, I called Pace and Johnson and told them to be prepared to discuss at a meeting at 8:30 A.M. MacArthur's request for authority to commit the two divisions and the offer of troops by Chiang Kai-shek.

At this meeting I had with me about the same group that met with me at Blair House the evening of my hurried return from Independence. I informed the meeting that I had already granted authority for the use of the one regimental combat team and that I now desired their advice on the additional troops to be employed. I asked if it would not be worth while to accept the Chinese offer, especially since Chiang Kai-shek said he could have his thirty-three thousand men ready for sailing within five days. Time was all-important.

At the same time I asked them to consider carefully places where trouble might break out. What, for instance, would Mao Tse-tung do? What might the Russians do in the Balkans, in Iran, in Germany?

Secretary Acheson suggested that if Chinese troops from Formosa appeared in Korea the Communists in Peiping might decide to enter that conflict in order to inflict damage on the Generalissimo's troops there and thus reduce his ability to defend himself whenever they might decide to try an invasion of Formosa.

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production, and as President, I always tried to listen to all sides before approving what I thought was the most balanced approach.

I did not lose sight of this approach when Korea broke on us. In Korea, the Communists challenged us, but they were capable of challenging us in a similar way in many places and, what was even more serious, they could, if they chose, plunge us and the world into another and far more terrible war. Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world. This meant that we should not do anything that would provide the excuse to the Soviets and plunge the free nations into full-scale all-out war. I could not agree with the tactics or approach of those who, like Chiang Kai-shek in a speech on July 3, 1950, wanted the U.N. to charge the Russians with the full responsibility for this Korean conflict and to demand that Moscow put an end to it. This kind of threat is certain to lead into an impossible dilemma. If these suggestions had been followed and the Soviets had ignored the order, as in all likelihood they would have done, either the United Nations would have stood convicted of weakness or World War III would have been on.

It was our policy to strengthen the weak spots in the defense of the free world. Iran, Greece, Berlin, and NATO all stand as landmarks in the fight against Communism. In the same way our increased aid to Indo-China and the Philippines and our move for the defense of Formosa by the Seventh Fleet were designed to reinforce areas exposed to Communist pressure. Yet every one of these steps had to be taken without losing sight of the many other places where trouble might break out or of the danger that might befall us if we hazarded too much in any one place.

Clement Attlee and his Cabinet had a similar world-wide view and we agreed early in July, at Attlee's suggestion, to hold British-American talks in Washington. I designated General Bradley and Ambassador Jessup to speak for us, and the British were represented by their Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, and Marshal of the R.A.F. Lord Tedder, chairman of their Joint Services Mission in Washington. In these discussions, all the world's danger spots were reviewed to determine what policies the two countries should pursue in common in case of further Communist aggressions. Our representatives stated that it was our policy to concentrate our attention on the main trend of Soviet intentions. Korea, in the

the troops there a weapon capable of stopping the heavy Russian-made tanks the North Koreans were using.

Navy Secretary Matthews asked about possible additional North Korean forces that might be brought in, and General Bradley said that intelligence from the Far East reported two more enemy divisions in North Korea that had not been committed, in addition to the possibility of elements, Korean or Chinese, that might be brought in from Manchuria.

In reply to a question from Secretary Snyder Bradley said that North Korean divisions were smaller than ours, running about ten thousand men, but Secretary Pace added that the estimate of the intelligence agencies was that there were two hundred thousand Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria.

Furthermore, he went on to say that all three service Secretaries felt strongly that we should re-examine our entire "military posture" for the days ahead. I agreed, adding that it was my understanding that Secretary Johnson had already set in motion the machinery for such a re-evaluation.

There is a deceiving simplicity in saying that "the military posture is re-examined." Many of our armchair strategists think of war as if it were simply a map maneuver

What a nation can do or must do begins with the willingness and the ability of its people to shoulder the burden. In 1945-46 the American people had chosen to scuttle their military might. I was against hasty and excessive demobilization at the time and stated publicly that I was, and General Eisenhower then Army Chief of Staff, spoke out against it also. The press and the Congress, however drowned us out.

Then there is the problem of what kind of military forces to maintain—within the limits of what Congress and the people are willing to support. Today's military leaders are almost all technical specialists, and it is only natural that each should feel that his particular specialty is the most important aspect of the national defense picture. The same goes for the geographic distribution of national strength. Each area commander feels that it is his duty to have his area interests taken care of first, often without consideration of what goes on elsewhere in the world.

I have always understood this kind of thinking. When I was in command of Battery D in World War I, that was the center of the whole war effort for me, and I could and did argue with the battalion staff for always more and better equipment and attention for my outfit. As senator my investigations had given me an insight into the constant contest between the war theaters for the lion s share of the war

reduction, and as President, I always tried to listen to all sides before approving what I thought was the most balanced approach.

I did not lose sight of this approach when Korea broke out. In Korea, the Communists challenged us, but they were capable of challenging us in a similar way in many places and, what was even more serious, they could, if they chose, plunge us and the world into another and far more terrible war. Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind, to prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world. This meant that we should not do anything that would provide the excuse to the Soviets and plunge the free nations into full-scale all-out war. I could not agree with the tactics or approach of those who, like Chiang Kai-shek in a speech on July 3, 1950, wanted the U.N. to charge the Russians with the full responsibility for this Korean conflict and to demand that Moscow put an end to it. This kind of threat is certain to lead into an impossible dilemma. If these suggestions had been followed and the Soviets had ignored the order, as in all likelihood they would have done, either the United Nations would have stood convicted of weakness or World War III would have been on.

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view of the conferees, had greatly increased the risk of total war. This reflected my own view as I had expressed it to Bradley and Jessup and to other leaders of the administration. If a second serious blow were to follow the one in Korea, it might well mean inescapable general war. It was in line with this policy that certain proposed flying photo-reconnaissance missions were not permitted. Some Air Force planners had proposed, on July 6, to fly some very high-level photo missions over Dairen, Port Arthur, Vladivostok, Karafuto, and the Kurile Islands. Fortunately, however, there were those on the Air Force staff who realized that political questions were involved and asked for State Department advice. Dean Acheson brought the matter to me. I told him that I took a most serious view of any such plan. I asked him to get in touch with Secretary of the Air Force Finletter and tell him that I wanted him to make it very plain to the Air Force commanders in the Far East that it was contrary to our policy to engage in activities that might give the Soviet Union a pretext to come into open conflict with us. All it would take would be for some of these photo-reconnaissance planes to be shot down by the Russians. This, of course, would create a new and more serious situation.

It was only natural for the Air Force commanders in the Far East to plan such reconnaissance missions. The information to be gained in this way would have been of help to their local situation. But there were over-all considerations that outweighed these local advantages, and the decision, therefore, had to be against the proposal.

This view was also taken by the agencies that prepared the studies on which I based my decisions.

General MacArthur was naturally preoccupied with Korea. Almost as soon as he was given the mission of aiding the South Koreans against the aggressors he had worked out a strategic plan and began then to call for the troops necessary to carry out his plan.

His request for additional troops deserved high priority. I gave approval to an immediate alert order for the 2d Infantry Division, in addition to the 1st Marine Division which was already preparing for the move to Korea, and instructed Secretary Johnson to call on Selective Service to furnish the armed forces with manpower needed to fill up the skeleton units and ships. I then directed that General Collins and General Vandenberg fly to Tokyo to confer with General MacArthur.

A few days earlier I had approved a proposal prepared

jointly by the Departments of State and Defense to introduce in the U.N. a resolution creating a unified command in Korea, asking us to name a commander and authorizing the use of the blue U.N. flag in Korea. This resolution was approved by the Security Council on July 7, and on the following day I named General MacArthur to the post of U.N. commander.

On July 12 Lieutenant General Walton Walker arrived in Korea and established headquarters there for his Eighth Army and took over the command of United Nations forces in Korea. Meanwhile, our forces were still fighting a rear guard action and were withdrawing steadily and doggedly toward the beachhead city of Pusan.

The American press made dramatic news out of this retreat. News stories spoke of entire units being wiped out and exaggerated the rout and confusion. Truth was that a small band of heroic youngsters led by a few remarkable generals was holding off a landslide so that the strength for the counterpunch could be mustered behind their thin curtain of resistance. The fact is that there was more panic among the civilians at home than among the soldiers in Korea.

By this time, however, General MacArthur had already conceived the basic plan for the counterattack. On July 7 the general had advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his basic operating plan would be to stop the enemy armies; to exploit fully the control of the sea and of the air and, by amphibious maneuvers, to strike behind the mass of the enemy ground forces.

These major plans were the topics which General Collins and General Vandenberg discussed with General MacArthur during their visit with him. They had also discussed the problem of meeting the needs of the Far East Command within the over-all requirements of national policy and the use of Allied troop elements in Korea.

General MacArthur agreed to the use of Allied troops within his command, even though he realized that an amalgamation of nationalities would make his job more difficult. He did, however, advise against accepting the offer of thirty-three thousand Chinese Nationalist troops made by Chiang Kai-shek. He offered the opinion that these troops would be of little effect in Korea; they were infantry, without artillery or other support elements, and of unknown quality. They would, he said, require extensive logistical support from us and, in fact, would be an albatross around our necks for months. Furthermore, it was his opinion that the diversion of this

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# CHAPTER 23

On July 31 General MacArthur undertook the flying trip to Formosa that he had discussed with General Collins and General Vandenberg when they had visited him in Tokyo.

Our policy toward Formosa had been one of the topics discussed in Washington on July 27 at a meeting of the National Security Council. There was a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs before the Council that we grant all-out aid to the Chinese Nationalists so as to enable them to defend themselves against a possible Communist attack on the island. Many other phases of the situation were discussed. I approved three specific proposals: the granting of extensive military aid to Nationalist China, a military survey by MacArthur's headquarters of the requirements of Chiang Kai-shek's forces, and the plan to carry out reconnaissance flights along the China coast to determine the imminence of attacks against Formosa.

These decisions were communicated to General MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 3, and on the same day I also informed him that I was sending Averell Harriman to Tokyo at once to discuss the Far Eastern political situation with him. Harriman's report to me on his meetings and conversations follows. (For reasons of brevity and for military security I have omitted portions of the Harriman memorandum.)

General MacArthur met me at Haneda Airport on our arrival at 9:45 A.M., August 6, 1950. He drove me to the guest house at the Embassy. As the window between the driver and his aide, and ourselves, was open, our conversation was general.

He described the satisfactory political development in Japan since my last visit. He spoke of the great quality of the Japanese; his desire to work, the satisfaction of the Japanese in work, his respect for the dignity of work. He

force from Formosa to Korea would leave a gap on the island that would invite attack. He suggested that he would himself go to Formosa and explain the situation to Chiang Kai-shek.

As for the plans for the counterattack, it seemed that General Collins had serious misgivings about it. The MacArthur plan was for two divisions to land by sea near Inchon, in the vicinity of Seoul, and for one regimental combat team to be air-dropped in the same area. At the same time, the forces in the Pusan beachhead would break out toward the north. It was a bold plan worthy of a master strategist.

To make this plan possible required, however, a considerable stepping up of the rebuilding of the armed forces, and almost every time he communicated with us the Far East commander asked for increased numbers of troops. The JCS would scrutinize these recommendations and then submit their proposals to the Secretary of Defense. Of course I was not asked to decide on each and every troop movement decision. Nevertheless, basic decisions which the law placed in my responsibility were often necessary. Thus, on July 31, I approved a recommendation that four National Guard divisions be called into active federal service.

Earlier, on July 19, I had asked Congress to remove the limitations on the size of the armed forces and had urged legislation to authorize the establishment of priorities and allocations of materials to prevent hoarding and requisitioning of necessary supplies. I then stated that it would be necessary to raise taxes and to restrict consumer credit, and that an additional ten billion dollars for defense would be needed.

An advance copy of this message was sent to General MacArthur to inform him of the approach that was being taken at home. He thanked me for this in a most courteous telegram.

## CHAPTER 23

On July 31 General MacArthur undertook the flying trip to Formosa that he had discussed with General Collins and General Vandenberg when they had visited him in Tokyo.

Our policy toward Formosa had been one of the topics discussed in Washington on July 27 at a meeting of the National Security Council. There was a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs before the Council that we grant all-out aid to the Chinese Nationalists so as to enable them to defend themselves against a possible Communist attack on the island. Many other phases of the situation were discussed. I approved three specific proposals: the granting of extensive military aid to Nationalist China, a military survey by MacArthur's headquarters of the requirements of Chiang Kai-shek's forces, and the plan to carry out reconnaissance flights along the China coast to determine the imminence of attacks against Formosa.

These decisions were communicated to General MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 3, and on the same day I also informed him that I was sending Averell Harriman to Tokyo at once to discuss the Far Eastern political situation with him. Harriman's report to me on his meetings and conversations follows. (For reasons of brevity and for military security I have omitted portions of the Harriman memorandum.)

> General MacArthur met me at Haneda Airport on our arrival at 9:45 A.M., August 6, 1950. He drove me to the guest house at the Embassy. As the window between the driver and his side, and ourselves, was open, our conversation was general.
>
> He described the satisfactory political development in Japan since my last visit. He spoke of the great quality of the Japanese, his desire to work, the satisfaction of the Japanese in work, his respect for the dignity of work. He

compared it unfavorably to the desire in the United States for more luxury and less work.

He considered Communist infiltration into Japanese life was in no sense a threat as Communist ideas did not appeal to the Japanese, but, more importantly it had the Russian label. The Japanese both feared and hated the Russians.

The reaction among the Japanese to our action in Korea was one of relief, as they interpreted it to mean that we would vigorously defend them against Russian invasion. They were not disturbed by our temporary difficulties, since they understood the military difficulties caused by the surprise attack. Their pride had been aroused by "his" confidence in them, shown by the withdrawal of most of the American troops. He could withdraw them all without any danger of disorder in Japan.

He arranged for me and the officers with me to attend the morning briefing at 10 30 at Headquarters, and that I should call on him at his office at 11 30

I had a 2½ hour talk with MacArthur in the morning lunch with him and Mrs. MacArthur for the entire party and then a further two-hour talk from 5.30 to 7 30 in the afternoon.

On Tuesday morning, after my return from Korea, we had a further four-hour talk before my departure.

The first 2½ hours included a military discussion at which Generals Ridgway and Norstad participated. General Almond also was present.

I will not attempt to divide the conversations chronologically but largely by subject.

Our first talk on Sunday morning covered the military situation as he saw it.

I explained to him that the President had asked me to tell him that he wanted to know what MacArthur wanted, and was prepared to support him as fully as possible. I asked MacArthur whether he had any doubts about the wisdom of the Korean decision. He replied, "absolutely none." The President's statement was magnificent. It was an historic decision which would save the world from communist domination, and would be so recorded in history The commitment of our ground forces was essential, and victory must be attained rapidly

MacArthur described his firm conviction that the North Korean forces must be destroyed as early as possible and could not wait for a slow build-up. He emphasized the political and military dangers of such a

course; the discouragement that would come among the United Nations including the United States; the effect on Oriental peoples as well as on the Chinese Communists and the Russians. He feared that Russia and the Chinese Communists would be able to greatly strengthen the North Korean forces and that time was of the essence, or grave difficulties, if not disaster were ahead.

He did not believe that the Russians had any present intention of intervening directly or becoming involved in a general war. He believed the same was true of the Chinese Communists. The Russians had organized and equipped the North Koreans, and had supplied some of the trained personnel from racial Koreans of the Soviet Union who had fought in the Red Army forces. The Chinese Communists had cooperated in the transfer of soldiers who had fought with the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria. These had not come over as units, but had been released in Manchuria, and reorganized into North Korean forces after they had been transported to North Korea. Their leadership was vigorous. A number of Russian officers were acting as observers but undoubtedly giving direction. Their tactics had been skillful, and they were as capable and tough as any army in his military experience.

He described the difference between the attitude towards death of Westerners and Orientals. We hate to die only face danger out of a sense of duty and through moral honor; whereas with Orientals, life begins with death. They die quietly "folding their arms as a dove folding his wings, relaxing, and dying.

MacArthur could not see why we could not quickly recruit experienced combat non-commissioned officers, so badly needed, among the many who had served in the last war. He thought we could get the fast ships and airplanes to transport the needed troops rapidly. To think that we might fail in this, he said, "makes me feel sick in my stomach. (Both of these things he said on Tuesday morning.)

MacArthur wants maximum UN ground forces possible, as many as 30,000 or 40,000. He will take battalions (1,000 men) just as fast as they can come, with only their small arms. Actually heavier artillery would be welcome, but the need is so great that he would take them with their small arms only. He feels the British should send a brigade from Hong Kong or Malaya, thinks it could be replaced from the United Kingdom. The French could send some forces from

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Indochina. A brigade from Pakistan and Turkey would be most welcome. Canada should send some troops. Although he recognized the value of Eastern troops, he wasn't sure the Phillippines could spare anything just now

He has no doubts of the political outcome, once there is victory Victory is a strong magnet in the East, and the Koreans want their freedom. When Syngman Rhee's government is reestablished in Seoul, the UN-supervised elections can be held within two months, and he has no doubt of an overwhelming victory for the non-communist parties. The North Koreans will also vote for a non-communist government when they are sure of no Russian or communist intervention. He said there was no need to change the Constitution, which now provides for 100 seats for the North. Korea can become a strong influence in stabilizing the non-communist movement in the East.

MacArthur thinks highly of Ambassador Muccio. He said they worked together fully and effectively

In my first talk with MacArthur I told him the President wanted me to tell him he must not permit Chiang to be the cause of starting a war with the Chinese communists on the mainland, the effect of which might drag us into a world war He answered that he would, as a soldier obey any orders that he received from the President. He said that he had discussed only military matters with the Generalissimo on his trip to Formosa. He had refused to discuss any political subjects whenever the Generalissimo attempted to do so. The Generalissimo had offered him command of the Chinese National troops. MacArthur had replied that that was not appropriate, but that he would be willing to give military advice if requested by the Generalissimo to do so

For reasons which are rather difficult to explain, I did not feel that we came to a full agreement on the way we believed things should be handled on Formosa and with the Generalissimo. He accepted the President's position and will act accordingly but without full conviction. He has a strange idea that we should back anybody who will fight communism, even though he could not give an argument why the Generalissimo's fighting communists would be a contribution towards the effective dealing with the communists in China. I pointed out to him the basic conflict of interest between the U.S. and the Generalissimo's position as to the future of Formosa,

merely the preventing of Formosa's falling into hostile hands. Perhaps the best way would be through the medium of the UN to establish an independent government. Chiang, on the other hand, had only one burning ambition, to use Formosa as a stepping-stone for his re-entry to the mainland. MacArthur recognized that this ambition could not be fulfilled, and yet thought it might be a good idea to let him land and get rid of him that way. He did not seem to consider the liability that our support of Chiang on such a move would be to us in the East. I explained in great detail why Chiang was a liability and the great danger of a split in the unity of the United Nations on the Chinese-Communist-Formosa policies; the attitude of the British, Nehru and such countries as Norway who, although staunch in their determination to resist Russian aggression, did not want to stir up trouble elsewhere. I pointed out the great importance of maintaining UN unity among the friendly countries, and the complications that might result from any missteps in dealing with China and Formosa.

MacArthur would never recognize the Chinese Communists, even to the use of the veto in seating the Communists. He believes it would only strengthen the prestige of Mao Tse-tung's government in China and destroy what he considers should be our objective; the splitting of the present supporters of Mao Tse-tung and the developing of strengthened resistance movements. He does not believe the Chinese want to come under Russian domination. They have historically opposed invasion from the North. We should be more aggressive than we have been so far in creating stronger dissension within China.

I explained the importance of getting evidence on the participation of the Chinese Communists in supporting the North Korean attack and present operations. There will be considerable support in seating the Chinese Communists at the next meeting of the Assembly. I explained that if we could obtain real evidence of direct support for the North Koreans, this might be the reason by which we could prevent the seating of the Communists on the moral issue involved.

In all, I cannot say that he recognizes fully the difficulties, both within the world and within the East, of whatever moves we make within China in our position with the Generalissimo on Formosa. He believes that our policies undermine the Generalissimo. He has confi-

dence that he can get the Generalissimo to do whatever he is asked to undertake; is prepared to deal with the political problems, but will conscientiously deal only with the military side, unless he is given further orders from the President.

He is satisfied that Chinese Communists will not attempt an invasion of Formosa at the present time. His intelligence and photographs show no undue concentration of forces, although they are building airstrips. He is convinced that the 7th Fleet plus the air jets from the Philippines and Okinawa, B-29's and other aircraft at his disposal, can destroy any attempt which may be made. He believes that the Chinese National troops can be organized to fight effectively and destroy any Communist troops which might get through. Should the Chinese Communists be so foolhardy as to make such an attempt, it would be the bloodiest victory in Far Eastern history and would strengthen favorably morale in the East.

He spoke about the problem of the island of Quemoy close to the mainland. The Generalissimo claims to have 70 000 men there which is important from the standpoint of eventually landing on the mainland, but has no value to the U.S. The Generalissimo considers Formosa part of China. MacArthur didn't see any evidence of a desire for independence so far even among the Formosans he talked to, but perhaps that was natural at this stage. There were no soldiers on the streets and no curfew no evidence to support the pessimistic reports that had come from the State Department.

MacArthur feels that we have not improved our position by kicking Chiang around and hoped that the President would do something to relieve the strain that existed between the State Department and the Generalissimo. He suggested the President might reiterate his previous statements by threatening the Chinese Communists that he would withdraw the inhibition to attack the airfields on the mainland if the Chinese continued to do this work or to build up their positions. I told him that if he wanted to make that recommendation to the President it was up to him, but I assured him that I would strongly recommend to the President against his doing so. I emphasized the overpowering importance of UN unity and that this would only give further trouble and give the Russians a chance to develop an entering wedge.

MacArthur strongly supports the development of

strong forces in Europe, and further believes we should be more vigorous in strengthening the military forces to resist Communism in the East. He believes the Chinese Communists will not move their own troops south, but will train Indochinese and Burmese, equip them, and attempt to create by infiltration and support by well-equipped local Communist troops dissension, with the eventual hope of taking over these areas. Nehru, he believes, is concerned over the threat of communism, but is acting wrongly in thinking he will get anywhere by appeasement. "We should fight the communists every place—fight them like hell!" He considers the Truman Doctrine "great. It should be carried out more vigorously. We should organize economic assistance in the East as we have been doing in the Marshall Plan in Europe. Large sums are not required. This assistance should be capably directed. We should see that it gets to the people and corruption is avoided.

When he saw me off at the airport, he said loudly so that all could hear: "the only fault of your trip was that it was too short."

Attached to Harriman's personal report was a memorandum of the military discussions as prepared by General Ridgway. This was a summary of a two-and-a-half-hour presentation in which General MacArthur had stated his need for additional combat ground forces, both American and Allied.

I had asked Harriman to visit MacArthur so that the general might be given a firsthand account of the political planning in Washington. There had been several of our top military leaders who had visited Tokyo and had discussed the strategy of the Far Eastern situation with MacArthur, but Harriman, who, of all my advisers, had the best knowledge of the economic recovery program, was particularly qualified to pass to MacArthur the views I held with regard to our over-all foreign policy.

General MacArthur's visit to Formosa on July 31 had raised much speculation in the world press. Chiang Kai-shek's aides let it be known that the Far East commander was in fullest agreement with their chief on the course of action to be taken. The implication was—and quite a few of our newspapers said so—that MacArthur rejected my policy of neutralizing Formosa and that he favored a more aggressive method.

After Harriman explained the administration's policy to MacArthur he had said that he would accept it as a good

dence that he can get the Generalissimo to do whatever he is asked to undertake' is prepared to deal with the political problems, but will conscientiously deal only with the military side, unless he is given further orders from the President.

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addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie.

The subject of Formosa had been placed before the Security Council by the Russian delegation, which charged us with act of aggression in our aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and I had approved a State Department proposal that we counter this charge with a declaration that we were entirely willing to have the United Nations investigate the Formosa situation. Mr. Malik, the Russian delegate, was trying to persuade the Security Council that our action in placing the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Strait amounted to the incorporation of Formosa within the American orbit. Austin's letter to Trygve Lie had made it plain that we had only one intention to reduce the area of conflict in the Far East. General MacArthur's message—which the world might mistake as an expression of American policy—contradicted this.

Of course, I would never deny General MacArthur or anyone else the right to differ with me in opinions. The official position of the United States, however is defined by decisions and declarations of the President. There can be only one voice in stating the position of this country in the field of foreign relations. This is of fundamental constitutional significance. General MacArthur in addition to being an important American commander was also the United Nations commander in Korea. He was, in fact, acting for and on behalf of the United Nations. That body was then debating the question of Formosa, and its members—even those outside the Soviet bloc—differed sharply in their views regarding Formosa. It was hardly proper for the U.N.'s agent to argue a case then under discussion by that body.

I realized that the damage had been done and that the MacArthur message was in the hands of the press.

I gave serious thought to relieving General MacArthur as our military field commander in the Far East and replacing him with General Bradley. I could keep MacArthur in command of the Japanese occupation taking Korea and Formosa out of his hands. But after weighing it carefully I decided against such a step. It would have been difficult to avoid the appearance of a demotion, and I had no desire to hurt General MacArthur personally. My only concern was to let the world know [illegible] statement was not official policy.

I had a [illegible] August [illegible] scheduled for that Saturday morning. Averell Har[illegible] Acheson, Louis Johnson, John Snyder [illegible] the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I read this group the MacAr[illegible] statement and asked each of them if he

soldier I was reassured. I told the press that the general and I saw eye to eye on Formosa policy

To make doubly sure on August 14 the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur with my approval, that the intent of the directive to him to defend Formosa was to limit United States action there to such support operations as would be practicable without committing any forces to the island itself. No commitments were to be made to the National Government for the basing of fighter squadrons on Formosa, and no United States forces of any kind were to be based ashore on Formosa except with the specific approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I assumed that this would be the last of it and that General MacArthur would accept the Formosa policy laid down by his Commander in Chief. But I was mistaken. Before the month ended—on August 26—the White House Press Room brought me a copy of a statement which General MacArthur had sent to the commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. This document was not to be read until August 28 but MacArthur's public relations office in Tokyo had handed it to the papers several days in advance and when I first heard about it, on the morning of August 6, a weekly magazine was already in the mails with the full text.

The substance of the long message was that, "in view of misconceptions being voiced concerning the relationship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific the general thought it desirable to put forth his own views on the subject. He argued that the oriental psychology required aggressive resolute and dynamic leadership," and "nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia. In other words, he called for a military policy of aggression based on Formosa's position The whole tenor of the message was critical of the very policy which he had so recently told Harriman he would support. There was no doubt in my mind that the world would read it that way and that it must have been intended that way

It was my opinion that this statement could only serve to confuse the world as to just what our Formosa policy was for it was at odds with my announcement of June [illegible] and it also contradicted what I had told the Congress Furthermore our policy had been reaffirmed only the day before in a letter which, on my instructions, Ambassador Austin had [illegible]

addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie.

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I had a meeting scheduled for that Saturday morning, August 26, with Dean Acheson, Louis Johnson, John Snyder, Averell Harriman, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I read this group the MacArthur statement and asked each of them if he

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the aggression against the Republic of Korea. Throughout the entire course of the proceedings you have represented this Government with great effectiveness and in full accordance with my directions.

"The letter which you addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations on August 25 on the subject of Formosa admirably sums up the fundamental position of this Government as it had been stated by me on June 27 and in my Message to the Congress on July 19. You have clearly set forth in that letter the heart and essence of the problem. You have faithfully set down my views as they were then and as they are now.

"To the end that there be no misunderstanding concerning the position of the Government of the United States with respect to Formosa, it may be useful to repeat here the seven fundamental points which you so clearly stated in your letter to Mr. Lie.

"1. The United States has not encroached on the territory of China, nor has the United States taken aggressive action against China.

"2. The action of the United States in regard to Formosa was taken at a time when that island was the scene of conflict with the mainland. More serious conflict was threatened by the public declaration of the Chinese Communist authorities. Such conflict would have threatened the security of the United Nations forces operating in Korea under the mandate of the Security Council to repel the aggression of the Republic of Korea. They threatened to extend the conflict through the Pacific area.

"3. The action of the United States was an impartial neutralizing action addressed both to the forces on Formosa and to those on the mainland. It was an action designed to keep the peace and was, therefore, in full accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. As President Truman has solidly declared, we have no designs on Formosa, and our action was not inspired by any desire to acquire a special position for the United States.

"4. The action of the United States was expressly to be without prejudice to the political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the

had had any advance knowledge of it. It was a surprise and a shock to all. I then instructed Secretary Johnson to send a personal message to MacArthur telling him that I wanted him to withdraw the statement. This, I knew would not prevent its distribution, but it would make clear that it had no official standing and that it had been taken back by the man who had written it.

On August 26, 1950 Secretary Johnson sent the following message to MacArthur

"The President of the United States directs that you withdraw your message for *National Encampment of Veterans of Foreign Wars*, because various features with respect to Formosa are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations."

General MacArthur complied with this directive at once, but I felt that I ought to supplement Secretary Johnson's telegram with a more detailed exposition of our policy A clear summary of our Formosa position was contained in the letter which Ambassador Austin had written to Trygve Lie, and I decided to call this letter to MacArthur's attention. I knew that a copy had been sent to his headquarters, but it might well have been misplaced among the many papers reaching there from Washington. A personal letter from me would make certain that it would be read, I thought. This is the letter I wrote General MacArthur

I am sending you for your information the text of a letter which I sent to Ambassador Austin dated August 27 I am sure that when you examine this letter and the letter which Ambassador Austin addressed to Trygve Lie on August 25 (a copy of which I am told was sent your headquarters that night) you will understand why my action of the 26th in directing the withdrawal of your message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was necessary

General Collins and Admiral Sherman have given me a comprehensive report of their conversation with you and of their visit to the United Nations forces now fight ing under your command in Korea. Their reports are most satisfactory and highly gratifying to me.

The text of the letter to Ambassador Austin referred to above follows

"As I told you on the telephone this morning, I want to congratulate you on your able presentation of the views of the United States Government in the Security Council of the United Nations from the first onset of

the aggression against the Republic of Korea. Throughout the entire course of the proceedings you have represented this Government with great effectiveness and in full accordance with my directions.

"The letter which you addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations on August 25 on the subject of Formosa admirably sums up the fundamental position of this Government as it had been stated by me on June 27 and in my Message to the Congress on July 19. You have clearly set forth in that letter the heart and essence of the problem. You have faithfully set down my views as they were then and as they are now.

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Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now

"5 The United States has a record through history of friendship for the Chinese people. We still feel the friendship and know that millions of Chinese reciprocate it. We took the lead with others in the last United Nations General Assembly to secure approval of a resolution on the integrity of China. Only the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites did not approve that resolution.

"6. The United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa. We would approve full United Nations investigation, here or on the spot. We believe that United Nations consideration would contribute to a peaceful, rather than a forceable solution of that problem.

"7 We do not believe that the Security Council need be, or will be, diverted from its consideration of the aggression against the Republic of Korea. There was a breach of the peace in Korea. The aggressor attacked, has been condemned, and the combined forces of the United Nations are now in battle to repel the aggression.

"Formosa is now at peace and will remain so unless someone resorts to force.

"If the Security Council wishes to study the question of Formosa, we shall support and assist that study. Meanwhile, the president of the Security Council should discharge the duties of his office and get on with the item on the agenda, which is the complaint of aggression against the Republic of Korea, and, specifically the recognition of the right of the Korean Ambassador to take his seat and the vote on the United States resolution for the localization of the Korean conflict.

"These seven points accurately record the position of the United States.

"In the forthcoming discussion of the problem in the Security Council you will continue to have my complete support.

"Sincerely yours,
"Harry S. Truman"

The visit to Japan and Korea by General Collins and Admiral Sherman, to which I referred in my letter to MacArthur marked an important phase in our effort in Korea. By early August our forces there had been built up to a ground strength of sixty-five thousand men, sufficient to hold the Pusan beachhead and enough to give encouragement to

Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now

"5 The United States has a record through history of friendship for the Chinese people. We still feel the friendship and know that millions of Chinese reciprocate it. We took the lead with others in the last United Nations General Assembly to secure approval of a resolution on the integrity of China. Only the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites did not approve that resolution.

"6. The United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa. We would approve full United Nations investigation, here or on the spot. We believe that United Nations consideration would contribute to a peaceful, rather than a forceable solution of that problem.

"7 We do not believe that the Security Council need be, or will be, diverted from its consideration of the aggression against the Republic of Korea. There was a breach of the peace in Korea. The aggressor attacked, has been condemned, and the combined forces of the United Nations are now in battle to repel the aggression.

"Formosa is now at peace and will remain so unless someone resorts to force.

"If the Security Council wishes to study the question of Formosa, we shall support and assist that study. Meanwhile, the president of the Security Council should discharge the duties of his office and get on with the item on the agenda, which is the complaint of aggression against the Republic of Korea, and, specifically the recognition of the right of the Korean Ambassador to take his seat and the vote on the United States resolution for the localization of the Korean conflict.

"These seven points accurately record the position of the United States.

"In the forthcoming discussion of the problem in the Security Council you will continue to have my complete support.

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The visit to Japan and Korea by General Collins and Admiral Sherman, to which I referred in my letter to MacArthur marked an important phase in our effort in Korea. By early August our forces there had been built up to a ground strength of sixty-five thousand men, sufficient to hold the Pusan beachhead and enough to give encouragement to

offensive planning, and on August 10 the Secretary of Defense informed me that it was planned to send nearly two more divisions to Korea before September 25. Naval and air forces had been similarly increased and further build-ups were in preparation.

To provide the forces General MacArthur had called for, we had drawn on troop units in the continental United States, in Puerto Rico, in Hawaii, and had even brought some marines back from duty with the fleet units in the Mediterranean.

General Collins and Admiral Sherman had left for Tokyo on August 19 for their detailed conference on General MacArthur's plans for an offensive, and on their return they placed these plans before me for my information and advised me that the Joint Chiefs had approved the plans. It was a daring strategic conception. I had the greatest confidence that it would succeed.

My confidence was expressed in a broadcast I made to the nation on September 1. "Two months ago," I said, "Communist imperialism turned from the familiar tactics of infiltration and subversion to brutal attack on the small Republic of Korea. The friendly nations of the world faced two possible courses: To limit their action to diplomatic protests while the Communist aggressors swallowed up their victim; or to meet military aggression with armed forces. The second course is the one which the free world chose. Thus, for the first time in all history men of many nations are fighting under a single banner to uphold the rule of law in the world. This is an inspiring fact."

I declared that our aims and intentions could be put down in eight points: 1. We believe in the United Nations and pledge ourselves to seek peace and security through that organization. 2. We believe that Koreans have a right to be free, independent, and united. 3. We do not want the fighting in Korea to spread into a general war; it will not spread unless Communist imperialism draws other armies and governments into the fight of the aggressors against the United Nations. 4. We hope in particular that the people of China will not be misled or forced into fighting against the United Nations and against the American people who have always been and still are their friends. 5. We do not want Formosa or any part of Asia for ourselves. 6. We believe in freedom for all of the nations of the Far East. 7. We do not believe in aggression or in preventive war. 8. Our men are fighting for peace today in Korea; we are working constantly for peace in

the United Nations and in all the capitals of the world

The decision to take the offensive in Korea made it necessary to consider on a high policy level what our subsequent course of action should be. This was done in National Security Council discussions which finally resulted in a policy statement that I approved on September 11 1950.

The National Security Council recommended that our course of action would be influenced by three factors action by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, consultation with friendly members of the United Nations, and the risk of general war

General MacArthur was to conduct the necessary military operations either to force the North Koreans behind the 38th parallel or to destroy their forces. If there was no indication or threat of entry of Soviet or Chinese Communist elements in force, the National Security Council recommended that General MacArthur was to extend his operations north of the parallel and to make plans for the occupation of North Korea. However no ground operations were to take place north of the 38th parallel in the event of Soviet or Chinese Communist entry

A Joint Chiefs directive based on this recommendation, which I approved, was sent to General MacArthur on September 15

*September 15 was D-Day at Inchon. The 1st Marine Division* and the Army's 7th Infantry Division went ashore there and established a bridgehead. Then these two units, comprising the X Corps commanded by Major General Almond, moved toward Seoul in order to free the Korean capital of the enemy Resistance was fanatical but on September 28 the liberation of the city was complete, and on September 29 Syngman Rhee moved his government back. Earlier on September 26, a juncture had been effected between elements of the 1st Cavalry Division of the Eighth Army which had broken out of the Pusan perimeter and 7th Infantry Division troops from the Inchon area. The enemy was disorganized and badly shaken.

I sent a message of congratulations to General MacArthur

"I know that I speak for the entire American people when I send you my warmest congratulations on the victory which has been achieved under your leadership in Korea. Few operations in military history can match either the delaying action where you traded space for time in which to build up your forces, or the brilliant maneuver which has now resulted in the liberation of Seoul. I am particularly impressed by

he splendid cooperation of our Army, Navy and Air Force, and I wish you would extend my thanks and congratulations to the commanders of those services—Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Vice Admiral Charles T. Joy and Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer. The unification of our arms established by you and by them has set a shining example. My thanks and the thanks of the people of all the free nations go out to your gallant forces—soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen—from the United States and the other countries fighting for freedom under the United Nations banner. I salute you all, and say to all of you from all of us at home, 'Well and nobly done.' "

I had already given approval to new instructions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had transmitted to MacArthur on September 27 in which he was told that his military objective was "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces." In attaining this objective he was authorized to conduct military operations north of the 38th parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation there had had been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of an intended entry and no threat by Russian or Chinese Communists to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. He was also instructed that under no circumstances were any of his forces to cross the Manchuria or U.S.S.R. borders of Korea, and, as a matter of policy no non-Korean ground forces were to be used in the provinces bordering on the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border. Similarly support of his operations north or south of the 38th parallel by air or naval action against Manchuria or against U.S.S.R. territory was specifically ruled out.

The directive further instructed the Far East commander the action he should take in the event of Soviet entry into the conflict or entry by the Chinese Communists. It read

"In the event of the open or covert employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel, you should continue the action as long as action by your forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance.

In compliance with this directive, General MacArthur submitted his plan for operations north of the 38th parallel, the substance of which was an attack north along the western coastal corridor by the Eighth Army and an amphibious landing by the X Corps at Wonsan on the east coast of North Korea. The Joint Chiefs approved this plan on September 29

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week's cruise and work on the Potomac. I had learned that one of the hardest things for the President to do is to find time to take stock. I have always believed that the President's office ought to be open to as many citizens as he can find time to talk to that is part of the job to be available to the people, to listen to their troubles, to let them share the rich tradition of the White House. But it raises havoc with each day and even though I always got up early usually was at work ahead of the staff, and would take papers home with me at night to read, there always seemed to be more than I could do.

I do not know of any easy way to be President. It is more than a fulltime job and the relaxations are few I used the presidential yacht, as well as the Little White House at Key West, less for holiday uses than as hideaways, and they were very useful when I wanted to catch up on my work and needed an opportunity to consult with my staff without interruptions.

Even so, the daily press of paper work did not let up during such trips. If I went out on the *Williamsburg*, for instance, a plane would bring mail and newspapers every morning, usually around nine or nine-thirty Powerful radio equipment aboard enabled me to talk to anybody at the White House or through the White House switchboard to anyone who could be reached by telephone.

So when I went aboard the *Williamsburg* on September 30, I was in constant contact with what was going on. I was advised that on October 1 MacArthur had informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he wanted to issue a dramatic announcement on the occasion of the crossing of the 38th parallel but that the Chiefs had stopped him. They pointed out that such a statement would be unwise and instructed him to let operations proceed without calling special attention to the fact that his forces had entered North Korea.

On October 2 MacArthur reported that Republic of Korea Army units were operating north of the 38th parallel, that progress was rapid, and that there seemed little enemy resistance. On October 3 the State Department received a number of messages which all reported the same thing: The Chinese Communists were threatening to enter the Korean conflict. *Chou En-lai*, now the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist regime, had called in the Indian Ambassador to Peiping, K.M. Panikkar and had told him that if United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel China would send in troops to help the North Koreans. However this action would not

be taken if only South Koreans crossed the 38th parallel. This message was at once transmitted to General MacArthur.

Similar reports had been received from Moscow, Stockholm, and New Delhi. However, the problem that arose in connection with these reports was that Mr. Panikkar had in the past played the game of the Chinese Communists fairly regularly, so that his statement could not be taken as that of an impartial observer. It might very well be no more than a relay of Communist propaganda. There was also then pending in the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations a resolution recommending that all appropriate steps be taken to insure stability throughout all of Korea. This resolution, if adopted, would be a clear authorization for the United Nations commander to operate in North Korea. The key vote on the resolution was due the following day, and it appeared quite likely that Chou En-lai's "message" was a bald attempt to blackmail the United Nations by threats of intervention in Korea.

The possibility of Chinese intervention in Korea, however, could not be discounted, and I therefore instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a directive to General MacArthur to cover such an eventuality. The Joint Chiefs submitted their recommendation to me through the Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall, who had succeeded Louis Johnson on September 21, and I approved the following message to General MacArthur:

"In light of the possible intervention of Chinese Communist forces in North Korea the following amplification of our directive (of September 25) is forwarded for your guidance:

'Hereafter in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory.'"

This directive was sent to General MacArthur on October 9. In the meantime, however, I had reached another decision. I wanted to have a personal talk with the general.

The first and the simplest reason why I wanted to meet with General MacArthur was that we had never had any personal contacts at all, and I thought that he ought to know his Commander in Chief and that I ought to know the

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to confer with General MacArthur I wanted to get the
benefit of his firsthand information and judgment.

For a short time I thought of flying to Korea to pay our
troops there a brief visit. I realized that MacArthur would
feel that his place in those perilous days was near his forces
and that he would hesitate to make the long trip across the
ocean for what might be only a few hours talk. I suggested,
therefore, that we meet somewhere in the Pacific, and Wake
Island was agreed on as a good location.

I announced that I was going to meet General MacArthur
over the weekend of October 13-17 The reason I chose this
weekend was that I had agreed to speak on October 17 in
San Francisco, where a little over five years earlier I had
spoken at the signing of the United Nations Charter Then,
on October 24 I was scheduled to address the U.N General
Assembly in New York. Naturally I wanted to be able to
include in these speeches a firsthand account from the United
Nations commander and, in this sense, the journey I had in
mind would be taken on behalf of the United Nations as
well.

I left Washington aboard the presidential plane Independence on the afternoon of October 11 on the first leg of the
trip, which took us only as far as St. Louis. After an over
night stop there the flight was resumed at two-thirty in the
afternoon of the twelfth, and six and three quarters hours

later we landed at Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base in California.

The first portion of our long flight across the ocean began shortly after midnight that night, but I had gone aboard the plane about an hour earlier and was asleep before the take-off. I woke up around five o'clock in the morning—or at least my watch gave that time. I discovered when I went forward to the pilots' section, however, that by local time it was only three. I had breakfast and then went forward again and sat in the second pilot's seat as we approached the Hawaiian Islands. It was still dark, but at regular intervals the lights of ships could be seen below. These were the destroyers the Navy had stationed along my route—just in case a mishap occurred to the plane. Colonel Williams, the pilot, said that visibility was exceptionally fine that morning. In any case, I had a breath-taking view of the entire chain of islands rising slowly out of the western sky, tiny little dark points in a vastness of blue that I would not have believed if I had not seen it myself. Then slowly the specks of land took shape and were distinct islands. At last the plane passed Diamond Head, circled low over Pearl Harbor, and came in for a landing at Hickam Air Force Base.

I was welcomed by an official party headed by Governor Stainback, Admiral Radford, commander of the Pacific fleet, and other high officials, both military and civilian.

Later that morning Admiral Radford escorted me on a boat trip about Pearl Harbor. He showed me the remnants and reminders of the tragic day in 1941, and he also showed me the fine facilities that served as the base for our great Pacific fleet today. I had lunch at the Officers' Club at Pearl Harbor and made a brief speech to the guests. In the afternoon I visited Tripler General Hospital and talked to some of the wounded who were there from Korea. Between Pearl Harbor and the hospital I seemed to have passed from one epoch of history into another, and yet 1941 was less than ten years ago.

The Independence left Hickam Field a few minutes after midnight on Saturday, October 14. Again I had retired before the plane was airborne and slept most of the way. I was asleep when we passed the international dateline, and I did not know that favorable wind conditions had gotten us ahead of schedule so that the pilot had to cut speed in order not to get to Wake Island before the prearranged arrival time.

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Events since June had shown me that MacArthur had lost some of his contacts with the country and its people in the many years of his absence. He had been in the Orient for nearly fourteen years then, and all his thoughts were wrapped up in the East. I had made efforts through Harriman and others to let him see the world-wide picture as we saw it in Washington, but I felt that we had had little success. I thought he might adjust more easily if he heard it from me directly.

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In any case, Miss Anderson's note-taking became known later on, and the record of what was said in this larger meeting at Wake Island had been printed in the newspapers and in some books as well. I will therefore relate here only the high points of the discussion—those things that so impressed me at the time that I remember them even without notes.

General MacArthur stated his firm belief that all resistance would end, in both North and South Korea, by Thanksgiving. This, he said, would enable him to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas. He would leave two divisions and the detachments of the other United Nations in Korea until elections had been held there. He thought this might be done as early as January and that it would then be possible to take all non-Korean troops out of the country.

Quite a bit of discussion followed about the aid Korea would need for rehabilitation once the conflict had been concluded, and both General MacArthur and Ambassador Muccio answered questions which were put to them by me and other members of my party. When Secretary Pace asked General MacArthur what the Army or ECA could do to help him, the general said, without any hesitation, that he did not know of any commander in the history of war who had ever had more complete and adequate support than he had received from all agencies in Washington.

I remember that we talked about the prisoners our forces had taken, and the general said that they were the happiest Koreans in all Korea. They were well fed and clean, and though they had been captured as North Korean "Communists," they were really no different from other Koreans.

Then I gave MacArthur an opportunity to repeat to the larger group some of the things he had said to me in our private meeting.

"What are the chances," I asked, "for Chinese or Soviet interference?"

The general's answer was really in two parts. First he talked about the Chinese. He thought, he said, that there was very little chance that they would come in. At the most they might be able to get fifty or sixty thousand men into Korea, but, since they had no air force, "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter."

rolled to a halt on the Wake Island landing field. It wa dawn. By local time it was Sunday October 15

General MacArthur was at the ramp of the plane as I came down. His shirt was unbuttoned, and he was wearing a cap that had evidently seen a good deal of use.

We greeted each other cordially and after the photographers had finished their usual picture orgy we got into an old two-door sedan and drove to the office of the airline manager on the island.

We talked for more than an hour alone.

We discussed the Japanese and the Korean situations.

The general assured me that the victory was won in Korea. He also informed me that the Chinese Communists would not attack and that Japan was ready for a peace treaty

Then he brought up the subject of his statement about Formosa to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. He said that he was sorry if he had caused any embarrassment. I told him that I considered the incident closed. He said he wanted me to understand that he was not in politics in any way—that he had allowed the politicians to make a "chump" (his word) of him in 1948 and that it would not happen again.

I told him something of our plans for the strengthening of Europe, and he said he understood and that he was sure it would be possible to send one division from Korea to Europe in January 1951 He repeated that the Korean conflict was won and that there was little possibility of the Chinese Communists coming in.

The general seemed genuinely pleased at this opportunity to talk with me, and I found him a most stimulating and interesting person. Our conversation was very friendly—I might say much more so than I had expected.

A little after seven-thirty we went to another small building, where the other members of our parties had gathered. The others at this meeting, besides General MacArthur and myself, where Admiral Radford Ambassador Muccio Secretary of the Army Pace, General Bradley Philip Jessup and Dean Rusk from the State Department, Averell Harriman, and Colonel Hamblen of Bradley's staff.

It was not until much later that I learned that Miss Vernice Anderson, the secretary to Ambassador Jessup, was next door and, without instructions from anyone, took down stenographic notes. This fact later became known during the hearings following General MacArthur's recall, and there was a good deal of noise about it. I can say that neither I nor Mr Jessup nor anyone else had given Miss nderson instruc-

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Then he referred to the possibilities of Russian intervention. He referred to the Russian air strength, but he was certain that their planes and pilots were inferior to ours. He saw no way for the Russians to bring in any sizable number of ground troops before the onset of winter. This would leave the possibility of combined Chinese-Russian intervention, he observed, with Russian planes supporting Chinese ground units. This, he thought, would be no danger. "It just wouldn't work," he added, "with Chinese Communist ground and Russian air."

Most of the later discussion was given over to the subject of Japan. MacArthur expressed himself strongly in favor of a Japanese peace treaty and approved especially of the State Department draft. He also said, in reply to a question from me, that he thought a Pacific pact would be a good idea but that it would mean very little because the Asian nations had no military strength and therefore any agreement like that would be a one-way street, with the United States giving the Pacific nations a guarantee without getting much of anything in return. He thought a presidential statement would accomplish just as much as a pact in that area.

This formal conference ended at a little after nine o'clock. General MacArthur then had further discussions on technical matters with Secretary Pace and General Bradley while Ambassador Muccio talked with the State Department officials in the party.

General MacArthur was anxious to return to Tokyo, and we decided, therefore, to leave Wake Island before lunch. The time differential between Wake Island and Tokyo would have thrown the general's return into the night hours if we had stayed and had lunch together as I had planned.

I awarded General MacArthur a fourth Oak Leaf Cluster to his Distinguished Service Medal and also made an award to Ambassador Muccio. Then the general and I looked over the communiqué which General Bradley and Ambassador Jessup had drawn up, and MacArthur initialed it to indicate that it expressed his views.

As we returned to our planes I told MacArthur that I thought we had had a most satisfactory conference and that I hoped our next meeting would not be too long delayed. We shook hands, and he wished me "Happy landings" as I went aboard the Independence.

The return trip took us back across the international dateline on our way to Hawaii. It had been Sunday, October 15 when I left Wake Island, but it was Satu a October 14

once again when I disembarked from the plane at Hickam Air Force Base. In this manner, although I had just spent Sunday on Wake Island, it was Sunday again the next day.

Most of the day was given over to work on the speech I would deliver in San Francisco. We had a lunch at a beach reservation and a drive to some of the scenic spots on the island in the afternoon. The trip from Hawaii to San Francisco was made on Monday, October 16.

It was the following evening when I spoke in the San Francisco Opera House. I reported to the American people on the Wake Island meeting, and talked about Korea as a symbol of United Nations action.

"I have just returned from Wake Island," I said, "where I had a very satisfactory conference with General Douglas MacArthur.

"I understand that there has been speculation about why I made this trip. There is really no mystery about it. I went because I wanted to see and talk to General MacArthur. The best way to see him and talk to him is to meet him somewhere and talk to him.

"There is no substitute for personal conversation with the commander in the field who knows the problems there from first-hand experience. He has information at his fingertips which can be of help to all of us in deciding upon the right policies in these critical times.

"I went out to Wake Island to see General MacArthur because I did not want to take him far away from Korea, where he is conducting very important operations with great success. Events are moving swiftly over there now, and I did not feel that he should be away from his post too long.

"At the same time I believed my trip to Wake Island would give emphasis to the historic action taken by the United Nations in Korea. For Korea has become the symbol of the resistance of united humanity against aggression.

"I also felt that there was pressing need to make it perfectly [illegible] General MacArthur—that there is [illegible] and conduct of our foreign policy.

"I have [illegible] from this conference with increased [illegible] ability to maintain world peace.

"At Wake [illegible] talked over the Far Eastern situation and [illegible] the problem of world peace. I asked General MacArthur [illegible] ideas on the ways in which the United States [illegible] most effectively assist the United Nations in

Then he referred to the possibilities of Russian intervention. He referred to the Russian air strength, but he was certain that their planes and pilots were inferior to ours. He saw no way for the Russians to bring in any sizable number of ground troops before the onset of winter This would leave the possibility of combined Chinese-Russian intervention, he observed, with Russian planes supporting Chinese ground units. This, he thought, would be no danger "It just wouldn't work," he added, "with Chinese Communist ground and Russian air"

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"Our sole purpose in Korea is to establish peace and independence. Our troops will stay there only so long as they are needed by the United Nations for that purpose. We seek no territory or special privilege in Korea or anywhere else. We have no aggressive designs in Korea or in any other place in the Far East or elsewhere. And I want that to be perfectly clear to the whole world.

"No country in the world which really wants peace has any reason to fear the United States of America.

"The only victory we seek is the victory of peace.

"The United Nations forces in Korea are making spectacular progress. But the fighting there is not yet over. The North Korean communists still refuse to acknowledge the authority of the United Nations. They continue to put up stubborn, but futile, resistance.

"The United Nations forces are growing in strength and are now far superior to the forces which will oppose them. The power of the Korean communists to resist effectively will soon come to an end.

"Here, in San Francisco, five years ago, we hoped that the Soviet Union would cooperate in this effort to build a lasting peace.

"But Communist imperialism would not have it so. Instead of working with other governments in mutual respect and cooperation, the Soviet Union attempted to extend its control over other peoples. It embarked on a new colonialism—Soviet style. This new colonialism has already brought under its complete control and exploitation many countries which used to be free countries. Moreover, the Soviet Union has refused to cooperate and has not allowed its satellites to cooperate with those nations it could not control.

"In the United Nations, the Soviet Union has persisted in obstruction. It has refused to share in activities devoted to the great economic, social, and spiritual causes recognized in the United Nations Charter. For months on end, it even boycotted the Security Council.

"The Soviet Union and its colonial satellites are maintaining armed forces of great size and strength. In both Europe and Asia, their vast armies pose a constant threat to world peace. So long as they persist in maintaining these forces and in using them to intimidate other countries, the free men of the world have but one choice if they are to remain free. They must oppose strength with strength.

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promoting and maintaining peace and security throughout the Pacific area.

"We discussed Japan and the need for an early Japanese peace treaty. Both of us look forward with confidence to a new Japan which will be peaceful and prosperous.

"General MacArthur told me about the fighting in Korea. He described the magnificent achievements of all the United Nations forces serving under his command. Along with the soldiers of the Republic of Korea these forces have now turned back the tide of aggression. More fighting men are coming from free nations all over the world. I am confident that these forces will soon restore peace to the whole of Korea.

"We here at home in America naturally take special pride in the superb achievements of our own soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. They have written a glorious new page in military history. We can all be proud of them.

"It is also a source of pride to us that our country was asked to furnish the first commander of United Nations' troops. It is fortunate for the world that we had the right man for this purpose—a man who is a very great soldier—General Douglas MacArthur.

"Now I want Wake Island to be a symbol of our unity of purpose for world peace. I want to see world peace from Wake Island west all the way around and back again. I want to see world peace from Wake Island all the way east and back again—and we are going to get it!

"The United Nations action in Korea is of supreme importance for all the peoples of the world.

"For the first time in history the nations who want peace have taken up arms under the banner of an international organization to put down aggression. Under that banner the banner of the United Nations, they are succeeding. This is a tremendous step forward in the age-old struggle to establish the rule of law in the world.

"Today as a result of the Korean struggle the United Nations is stronger than it has ever been. We know now that the United Nations can create a system of international order with the authority to maintain peace.

"When I met with General MacArthur we discussed plans for completing the task of bringing peace to Korea. We talked about the plans for establishing a 'unified, independent, and democratic' government in that country in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

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"This is not a task for the United States alone. It is a task for the free nations to undertake together. And the free nations are undertaking it together

"In the United Nations, Secretary of State Dean Acheson has proposed a plan for 'Uniting For Peace, to make it possible for the General Assembly to act quickly and effectively in case of any further outbreak of aggression.

"Now the Soviet Union can change this situation. It has only to give concrete and positive proof of its intention to work for peace. If the Soviet Union really wants peace, it must prove it—not by glittering promises and false propaganda, but by living up to the principles of the United Nations Charter

"If the Soviet Union really wants peace, it can prove it—and could have proved it on any day since last June 25—by joining the rest of the United Nations in calling upon the North Koreans to lay down their arms at once.

"If the Soviet Union really wants peace, it can prove it by *lifting the Iron Curtain and permitting the free exchange* of information and ideas. If the Soviet Union really wants peace, it can prove it by joining in the efforts of the United Nations to establish a workable system of collective security—a system which will permit the elimination of the atomic bomb and the drastic reduction and regulation of all other arms and armed forces.

"But until the Soviet Union does these things, until it gives real proof of peaceful intentions we are determined to build up the common defensive strength of the free world. This is the choice we have made. We have made it firmly and resolutely *But it is not a choice we have made gladly We* are not a militaristic nation. We have no desire for conquest or military glory "

# CHAPTER 24

Throughout October the campaign in Korea made excellent progress. Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, was taken on October 19 and day after day MacArthur's forces were on the march.

These forces under his command had by now begun to take on a more and more international character. By mid-October there were in Korea, besides United States and Republic of Korea troops, ground units of Australia, Great Britain, and the Philippines. A Swedish hospital field unit was in action. Infantry from Thailand and Turkey were being disembarked at Korean ports, ready to join in the action. Naval assistance had come from Australia, Colombia, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway. Furthermore, Belgium, Colombia, Canada, Ethiopia, France, and Greece were preparing ground units for movement to Korea. With every passing day the "unified command" became more and more a United Nations army. All in all, considering monetary and supply contributions, forty-two nations had by then offered their aid to the United Nations.

I realized that such a multi-national army created new and hard problems for its commander. General MacArthur and his successors in command, General Ridgway and General Clark, deserve the highest credit for proving that it is possible to take fighting men from many nations and forge them into a successful army.

Among the many national elements, the Koreans themselves presented a problem. The Korean Army was green and inexperienced when the attack came. Its officers knew little of modern military techniques, and its top leaders lacked training and qualifications. General MacArthur did not have great confidence in the Korean Army at that time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had instructed MacArthur that in his advance north he should not place non-Korean elements near the Manchurian and Soviet borders. But in his order to his commander

the general provided for the drive to the north to be spear headed by American units. After the border was reached, South Koreans were to take their places "where feasible." The Joint Chiefs, expressing concern, asked MacArthur the reason for this change.

In his answer General MacArthur said that the ROK forces were not of sufficient strength to accomplish the initial security of North Korea and that he considered it essential to use more seasoned and experienced commanders. MacArthur said he saw no conflict in his orders and the directive given him which stated "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel. MacArthur added, "I am fully cognizant of the basic purpose and intent of your directive, and every possible precaution is being taken in the premises. The very reverse, however, would be fostered and tactical hazards might even result from other action than that which I have directed. This entire subject was covered in my conference at Wake Island."

While MacArthur's forces were moving north without too much opposition, there was considerable speculation about the likelihood of the Chinese Communists taking some action in North Korea. On October 20 the CIA delivered a memorandum to me which said that they had reports that the Chinese Communists would move in far enough to safeguard the Suiho electric plant and other installations along the Yalu River which provided them with power The State Department's reaction to this report was to suggest that General MacArthur issue a statement to the United Nations that he did not intend to interfere with the operations of the Suiho and other power plants. The Joint Chiefs said that such an announcement would be undesirable from a military point of view When the situation was placed before me, I instructed the Joint Chiefs to communicate the State Department's suggestion to MacArthur asking if he had any objection to the issuing of such a statement. General MacArthur felt, however that he did not wish his hands tied in such a manner and the statement was therefore not issued.

It is very doubtful that it would have made any difference anyhow As we were later to learn, the Chinese Communists had already started their move into North Korea, although it was not until October 31 that we gained evidence that they were in the battle area and actually fighting against the United Nations forces.

The first report came from the headquarters of the X Corps in the Wonsan sector of North Korea. Prisoners cap-

tured on October 26 and later days had been identified as Chinese and, on interrogation, proved to be members of organized Chinese units. The prisoners stated that their units had crossed the Yalu River on October 16, only one day after General MacArthur had assured me on Wake Island that if any Chinese were to enter Korea they would face certain disaster but that he did not expect them to try any thing that foolish. I asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to obtain an up-to-date estimate of the situation from General MacArthur. This was MacArthur's answer received on November 4

"It is impossible at this time to authoritatively appraise the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea. Various possibilities exist based upon the battle intelligence coming in from the front:

"First, that the Chinese Communist Government proposes to intervene with its full potential military forces, openly proclaiming such course at what it might determine as an appropriate time; second, that it will covertly render military assistance, but will, so far as possible, conceal the fact for diplomatic reasons; third, that it is *permitting and abetting* a flow of more or less voluntary personnel across the border to strengthen and assist the North Korean remnants in their struggle to retain a nominal foothold in Korea; fourth, that such intervention, as exists, has been in the belief that no UN forces would be committed in the extreme northern reaches of Korea except those of South Korea. A realization that such forces were insufficient for the purpose may well have furnished the concept of salvaging something from the wreckage.

"The first contingency would represent a momentous decision of the gravest international importance. While it is a distinct possibility and many foreign experts predict such action, there are many fundamental logical reasons against it and sufficient evidence has not yet come to hand to warrant its immediate acceptance.

"The last three contingencies, or a combination thereof, seem to be most likely condition at the present moment.

"I recommend against hasty conclusions which might be premature and believe that a final appraisement should await a more complete accumulation of military facts."

Thus General MacArthur warned against any hasty action and specifically discounted the possibility that the intervention of the Chinese Communists was a "new war." It came a

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something of a shock, therefore, when within two days he began to sound the alarm.

I was in Kansas City on November 6 It was the day before election, and as usual I planned to cast my ballot in Independence. That morning I received an urgent call from Dean Acheson. The Secretary of State was calling from a conference in Washington with the Under Secretary of Defense, Robert Lovett, and the matter before them was of such importance that they felt an immediate decision was necessary

This was the situation and developments as Acheson reported to me over the telephone. Under Secretary of Defense Lovett had come to his office, Acheson said, at ten o clock to tell him that a message had just been received from the Air Force commander in the Far East, Lieutenant General Stratemeyer MacArthur had ordered a bombing mission to take out the bridge across the Yalu River from Sinuiju (Korea) to Antung (Manchuria) Ninety B-29's were scheduled to take off at one o clock Washington time to take part in this mission. Lovett had told Acheson that from an operational standpoint he doubted whether the results to be achieved would be important enough to outweigh the danger of bombing Antung or other points on the Manchurian side of the river

Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out that we had a commitment with the British not to take action which might involve attacks on the Manchurian side of the river without consultation with them. He also told Mr Lovett that the State Department had presented MacArthur's report on Chinese Communist intervention to the United Nations and that an urgent meeting of the Security Council had been requested. At this meeting we would try to get a resolution adopted calling on the Chinese Communists to cease their activities in Korea, this was necessary in order to maintain U.N support for any further action to be taken. Mr Rusk also mentioned the danger of involving the Soviets, especially in light of the mutual-assistance treaty between Moscow and Peiping.

Acheson went on to say that Lovett and he had agreed that this air action ought to be postponed until we had more facts about the situation there. Lovett then called Marshall, who agreed that the attack was unwise unless there was some mass movement across the river which threatened the security of our troops. Then Lovett called the Air Force Secretary Mr Finletter and instructed him to tell the Joint Chiefs what Mr

Rusk had set forth and to tell them that he (Lovett) and Acheson both felt that this action should be postponed until they were able to get a decision from me.

I told Acheson that I would approve this bombing mission only if there was an immediate and serious threat to the security of our troops. Acheson said that nothing had been heard from MacArthur since his last report, and that report had contained no statement of any further movements across the river but had spoken only of reserves on the Chinese side. I told Acheson that we would have to find out why MacArthur suddenly found this action necessary and told him to have Lovett issue instructions accordingly.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff carried out my instructions in a message that went out at eleven-forty Washington time, only an hour and twenty minutes before the planes were to take off from their Japanese bases. In the message that was sent, MacArthur was advised that consideration was urgently being given to the Korean situation at the governmental level. He was informed that there was a commitment not to take action affecting Manchuria without consultation with the British, and that until further orders all bombing of targets within five miles of the Manchurian border should be postponed. Meanwhile, he should forward his estimate of the situation and his reasons for ordering the bombing of the Yalu River bridges.

This was MacArthur's reply:

> 6 November 50
>
> Men and material in large force are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command. The actual movement across the river can be accomplished under cover of darkness and the distance between the river and our lines is so short that the forces can be deployed against our troops without being seriously subjected to air interdiction. The only way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the destruction of these bridges and the subjection of all installations in the north area supporting the enemy advance to the maximum of our air destruction. Every hour that this is postponed will be paid for dearly in American and other United Nations blood. The main crossing at Sinuiju was to be hit within the next few hours and the mission is actually being mounted. Under the gravest protest that I can make, I am suspending this strike and carrying out your instructions. What I had ordered is entirely within

something of a shock, therefore, when within two days he began to sound the alarm.

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This was the situation and developments as Acheson reported to me over the telephone. Under Secretary of Defense Lovett had come to his office, Acheson said, at ten o clock to tell him that a message had just been received from the Air Force commander in the Far East, Lieutenant General Stratemeyer MacArthur had ordered a bombing mission to take out the bridge across the Yalu River from Sinuiju (Korea) to Antung (Manchuria) Ninety B-29 s were scheduled to take off at one o'clock Washington time to take part in this mission. Lovett had told Acheson that from an operational standpoint he doubted whether the results to be achieved would be important enough to outweigh the danger of bombing Antung or other points on the Manchurian side of the river

Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out that we had a commitment with the British not to take action which might involve attacks on the Manchurian side of the river without consultation with them. He also told Mr Lovett that the State Department had presented MacArthur's report on Chinese Communist intervention to the United Nations and that an urgent meeting of the Security Council had been requested. At this meeting we would try to get a resolution adopted calling on the Chinese Communists to cease their activities in Korea, this was necessary in order to maintain U.N support for any further action to be taken. Mr Rusk also mentioned the danger of involving the Soviets, especially in light of the mutual-assistance treaty between Moscow and Peiping.

Acheson went on to say that Lovett and he had agreed that this air action ought to be postponed until we had more facts about the situation there. Lovett then called Marshall who agreed that the attack was unwise unless there was some mass movement across the river which threatened the security of our troops. Then Lovett called the Air Force Secretary Mr Finletter and instructed him to tell the Joint Chiefs what Mr

the scope of the rules of war and the resolutions and directions which I have received from the United Nations and constitutes no slightest act of belligerency against Chinese territory in spite of the outrageous international lawlessness emanating therefrom. I cannot overemphasize the disastrous effect, both physical and psychological, that will result from the restrictions which you are imposing. I trust that the matter be immediately *brought to the attention of the President* as I believe your instructions may well result in a calamity of major proportion for which I cannot accept the responsibility without his personal and direct understanding of the situation. Time is so essential that I request immediate reconsideration of your decision pending which complete compliance will of course be given to your order.

General Bradley read this message to me over the phone. There were grave dangers involved in a mass bombing attack on a target so close to Manchuria and to Soviet soil. An overly eager pilot might easily bring about retaliatory moves; damaged planes might be forced to land in territory beyond our control. But since General MacArthur was on the scene and felt so strongly that this was of unusual urgency I told Bradley to give him the "go-ahead."

This was the message sent MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs: "The *situation depicted in your message (of November 6)* is considerably changed from that reported in last sentence your message (of November 4) which was our last report from you. We agree that the destruction of the Yalu bridges would contribute materially to the security of the forces under your command unless this action resulted in increased Chinese Communist effort and even Soviet contribution in response to what they might well construe as an attack on Manchuria. Such a result would not only endanger your forces but would enlarge the area of conflict and U.S. involvement to a most dangerous degree.

"However in view of first sentence your message (of November 6) you are authorized to go ahead with your planned bombing in Korea near the frontier including targets at Sinuiju and Korean end of Yalu bridges provided that at time of receipt of this message you still find such action essential to safety of your forces. The above does not authorize the bombing of *any dams or power plants on the Yalu River*

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ing in Korea it is important that extreme care be taken to avoid violation Manchurian territory and airspace and to report promptly hostile action from Manchuria.

"It is essential that we be kept informed of important changes in situation as they occur and that your estimate as requested in our [message of November 6] be submitted as soon as possible."

On this day, November 6, General MacArthur issued a communiqué in Tokyo in which he announced that his forces were now faced by a new and fresh army backed up by large reserves and adequate supplies within easy reach of the enemy but beyond the limits of the present sphere of military action.

The Central Intelligence Agency also now supplied me with an estimate of the situation based on their sources of information. It reported that there might be as many as two hundred thousand Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria and that their entry into Korea might stop the United Nations advance and actually force the United Nations forces to withdraw to defensive positions farther south. The estimate concluded by pointing to one inescapable fact. With their entry into Korea, the Chinese Communists had staked not only some of their forces but also their prestige in Asia. It had to be taken into account that they knew what risks they were taking, in other words, that they were ready for general war.

General MacArthur's estimate of the situation arrived in two messages on November 7. In the first of these messages MacArthur referred back to his initial appraisal (of November 4) of the Chinese intervention and concluded that he had been confirmed in his belief that this was not a full-scale intervention by the Chinese Communists. He conceded the possibility that the intervening forces might be reinforced to a point rendering our resumption of advance impossible and even forcing a movement in retrograde. He was planning, he said, again to assume the initiative in order to take "accurate measure   of enemy strength." And he went on to say: "I deem it essential to execute the bombing of the targets under discussion as the only resource left to me to prevent a potential buildup of enemy strength to a point threatening the safety of the command. This interdiction of enemy lines of advance within Korea is so plainly defensive that it is hard to conceive that it would cause an increase in the volume of local intervention or, of itself, provoke a general war.

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"The inviolability of Manchuria and Siberia has been a cardinal obligation of this headquarters from the beginning of hostilities and all verified hostile action therefrom is promptly reported. The destruction of hydroelectric installation has never been contemplated. Complete daily situation reports will continue to be furnished you as heretofore."

The second message from MacArthur read

7 November 50

Hostile planes are operating from bases west of the Yalu River against our forces in North Korea. These planes are appearing in increasing numbers. The distance from the Yalu to the main line of contact is so short that it is almost impossible to deal effectively with the hit and run tactics now being employed. The present restrictions imposed on my area of operation provide a complete sanctuary for hostile air immediately upon their crossing the Manchuria-North Korean border. The effect of this abnormal condition upon the morale and combat efficiency of both air and ground troops is major.

Unless corrective measures are promptly taken this factor can assume decisive proportions. Request instructions for dealing with this new and threatening development.

Every military commander and every civilian official in the government is, of course, entitled to his views. Indeed, we would have a poor government if we expected all our public servants to be of one mind and one mind alone. I valued the expression of MacArthur's opinions, and so did the Joint Chiefs. There was never any question about my high regard for MacArthur's military judgment. But as President I had to listen to more than military judgments, and my decisions had to be made on the basis of not just one theater of operations but of a much more comprehensive picture of our nation's place in the world.

We were in Korea in the name and on behalf of the United Nations. The "unified command" which I had entrusted to Douglas MacArthur was a United Nations command, and neither he nor I would have been justified if we had gone beyond the mission that the United Nations General Assembly had given us.

There was no doubt in my mind that we should not allow the action in Korea to extend into a general war. All-out military action against China had to be avoided, if for no other reason than because it was a gigantic booby trap.

The Central Intelligence Agency's estimate of the situation was that the Russians were not themselves willing to go to war but that they wanted to involve us as heavily as possible in Asia so that they might gain a free hand in Europe.

I asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give their views on the military significance of the Chinese Communists' intervention in Korea. This is what they recommended:

"1. Every effort should be expended as a matter of urgency to settle the problem of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea by political means, preferably through the United Nations, to include reassurances to the Chinese Communists with respect to our intent, direct negotiations through our Allies and the Interim Committee with the Chinese Communist Government, and by any other available means.

"2. Pending further clarification as to the military objectives of the Chinese Communists and the extent of their intended commitments, the missions assigned to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, should be kept under review but should not be changed.

"3. The United States should develop its plans and make its preparations on the basis that the risk of global war is increased."

General Marshall, as Secretary of Defense, concurred in these conclusions.

At a meeting on November 9 the National Security Council held a full discussion of these views of the Joint Chiefs and of the general problems created by the Chinese intervention. I was unable to attend this meeting but was given a report of the proceedings afterward.

General Bradley stated at this meeting that there were three possible intentions of the Chinese Communists with which we would have to reckon. First, it was possible that the Chinese desired only to set up a buffer area that would protect their interests in the power facilities along the Yalu River. If this were the case, then negotiations might be fruitful. Second, the Chinese Communists might wish to force us into a war of attrition that would commit our forces to the point where we might be in danger of losing if the Soviets decided to start a global war. Third, we had to consider in our planning that the Chinese might have it as their aim to drive us completely off the Korean peninsula. This last possibility, so the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought, would mean World War III, because the Chinese Communists would be unable to do it alone, and Soviet entry would inevitably extend the fighting to every point of contact between East and West.

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General Bradley said that in his opinion we should be able to hold in the general area of our present positions but that there would be an increasing question of how much pressure we could stand without attacking Manchurian bases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however were of the opinion that such an attack should be a United Nations decision, since it exceeded the terms of the resolution under which the U.N forces were operating.

General Bradley noted that General MacArthur seemed to think that the bombing of the bridges across the Yalu would stop the flow of Chinese Communist troops into Korea. Bradley himself, however thought that this was rather optimistic.

Secretary of Defense Marshall pointed out at this meeting of the National Security Council that our eastern front in Korea was widely dispersed and thinly spread and that this represented an added risk. General Bradley replied that of course General MacArthur had done this in order to carry out his directive that he was to occupy the whole country and hold elections.

General Bedell Smith of Central Intelligence said that the Yalu River would be frozen over in about fifteen to thirty days and would be passable, with or without the bridges.

Secretary Acheson asked General Bradley if there was any line that was better from a military point of view than the present one, and Bradley replied that from a purely military point of view the farther back the line was the easier it would be to maintain. He added, however that he realized that any backward movement of our forces would lose us support and might lose us the South Koreans will to fight.

Secretary Acheson expressed himself as feeling that the Russians were especially interested in the idea of defense in depth. He suggested, therefore, that a buffer area in Northeast Korea be established under a U.N commission, with a constabulary but no U.N armed forces. The Chinese, Acheson said, had two interests The first was to keep us involved, while the lesser interest was in the border and the power plants. He thought that we ought to explore privately the possibility of a twenty-mile demilitarized zone, ten miles on each side of the Yalu. He went on to say that the trouble with any such proposal, of course, would be that the Communists would insist on all foreign troops leaving Korea, and thus abandon Korea to the Communists.

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The month of November 1950 saw us, therefore, occupied in three moves, so far as Korea was concerned. One was to reassure our allies in Europe, especially the British and the French, that we had no intention of widening the conflict or of abandoning our commitments in Europe for new entanglements in Asia. The second was in the United Nations, where we sought the maximum support for our resistance against the Chinese intervention in Korea, without, however pushing the U.N toward military sanctions against Peiping—which would have meant war The third effort was directed toward ascertaining the strength and the direction and aim of the Chinese Communist effort.

General MacArthur started his Eighth Army on a major attack on November 24 He announced that it was a general offensive to end the war " and he told one of his commanders to tell the troops that they would be home by Christmas! Previously on November 6 and 7 he had sounded an alarm in his messages to Washington that seemed to portend impending disaster But now apparently the grave danger did not exist, since he announced victory even before the first men started marching.

Yet on the same day a national intelligence summary of the CIA had been made available to General MacArthur which stated that the Chinese Communists would "at a minimum" increase their operations in Korea, seek to immobilize our forces, subject them to prolonged attrition, and maintain the semblance of a North Korean state in being. It also stated that the Chinese possessed sufficient strength to force the U.N elements to withdraw to defensive positions.

The intelligence summary proved correct. By November 28 it was clear that the Eighth Army had run up against vastly larger forces and that the X Corps, on the east coast was in what the communiqué writers like to call a "fluid situation"—which is a public relations man's way of saying that he can't figure out what's going on!

Now no one is blaming General MacArthur and certainly I never did, for the failure of the November offensive. He is no more to be blamed for the fact that he was outnumbered than General Eisenhower could be charged with the heavy losses on the Battle of the Bulge. But—and herein lies the

ference between the Eisenhower of 1944 and the MacArthur of 1950—I do blame General MacArthur for the manner in which he tried to excuse his failure. In the first place, there was no need for him to proclaim this as an "end-the-war" offensive. If he knew that the forces opposing him were not so strong that they could stop him, then certainly his earlier message to the Chiefs of Staff had been wrong. But if he had been right earlier in November, then he could hardly have expected to score an easy victory now.

Perhaps these inconsistencies were to be expected. MacArthur had many times in World War II announced victory while his troops still faced the hardest part of the battle. But there was no excuse for the statements he began to make to certain people as soon as the offensive had failed. Within a matter of four days he found time to publicize in four different ways his view that the only reason for his troubles was the order from Washington to limit the hostilities to Korea. He talked about "extraordinary inhibitions without precedent in military history" and made it quite plain that no blame whatsoever attached to him or his staff.

The record shows, however, that General MacArthur himself reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on November 6 and 7 that the Chinese had intervened in Korea in strength. He had himself furnished us the information that there were sizable reserves across the Yalu River. He had requested—and been given—permission to bomb the bridges across which these reserves might flow into Korea.

Of course he had been denied authority to bomb bases in Manchuria and to engage in "hot pursuit" of enemy planes fleeing from Korea into Manchuria. The State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement that it would be desirable to have U.N. approval for such a policy and therefore, with my approval, inquiries were made of all United Nations countries that had forces in Korea. Without exception, they indicated strong opposition. Indeed, they also stressed their wish that no non-Korean units should be placed in the area immediately adjacent to the Yalu River if our offensive should carry us that far.

There was no doubt that we had reached a point where grave decisions had to be made. If we chose to extend the war to China, we had to expect retaliation. Peiping and Moscow were allies, ideologically as well as by treaty. If we began to attack Communist China, we had to anticipate Russian intervention. Of course we wanted no war on any scale. But neither did we or the world want Communist

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Perhaps these inconsistencies were to be expected. MacArthur had many times in World War II announced victory while his troops still faced the stiffest part of the battle. But there was no excuse for the statements he began to make to certain people as soon as the offensive had failed. Within a matter of four days he found time to publicize in four different ways his view that the only reason for his troubles was the order from Washington to limit the hostilities to Korea. He talked about "extraordinary inhibitions without precedent in military history" and made it quite plain that no blame whatsoever attached to him or his staff.

The record shows, however, that General MacArthur himself reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on November 6 and 7 that the Chinese had intervened in Korea in strength. He had himself furnished us the information that there were sizable reserves across the Yalu River. He had requested—and been given—permission to bomb the bridges across which these reserves might flow into Korea.

Of course he had been denied authority to bomb bases in Manchuria and to engage in "hot pursuit" of enemy planes fleeing from Korea into Manchuria. The State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement that it would be desirable to have U.N. approval for such a policy and therefore, with my approval, inquiries were made of all United Nations countries that had forces in Korea. Without exception, they indicated strong opposition. Indeed, they also stressed their wish that no non-Korean units should be placed in the area immediately adjacent to the Yalu River if our offensive should carry us that far.

There was no doubt that we had reached a point where grave decisions had to be made. If we chose to extend the war to China, we had to expect retaliation. Peiping and Moscow were allies, ideologically as well as by treaty. If we began to attack Communist China, we had to anticipate Russian intervention. Of course we wanted no war on any scale. But neither did we or the world want Communist

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friends abroad. During my presidency our policy was never dictated by any other nation, however friendly to us. We maintained a deep devotion to the ideal of peace—peace through the United Nations, peace by working with others who had shared our aims and our attitudes.

The month of November 1950 saw us, therefore, occupied in three moves, so far as Korea was concerned. One was to reassure our allies in Europe, especially the British and the French, that we had no intention of widening the conflict or of abandoning our commitments in Europe for new entanglements in Asia. The second was in the United Nations, where we sought the maximum support for our resistance against the Chinese intervention in Korea, without, however, pushing the U.N. toward military sanctions against Peiping—which would have meant war. The third effort was directed toward ascertaining the strength and the direction and aim of the Chinese Communist effort.

General MacArthur started his Eighth Army on a major attack on November 24. He announced that it was a "general offensive ... to end the war ..." and he told one of his commanders to tell the troops that they would be home by Christmas! Previously, on November 6 and 7, he had sounded an alarm in his messages to Washington that seemed to portend impending disaster. But now, apparently, the grave danger did not exist, since he announced victory even before the first men started marching.

Yet on the same day a national intelligence summary of the CIA had been made available to General MacArthur which stated that the Chinese Communists would "at a minimum" increase their operations in Korea, seek to immobilize our forces, subject them to prolonged attrition, and maintain the semblance of a North Korean state in being. It also stated that the Chinese possessed sufficient strength to force the U.N. elements to withdraw to defensive positions.

The intelligence summary proved correct. By November 28 it was clear that the Eighth Army had run up against vastly larger forces and that the X Corps, on the east coast, was in what the communiqué writers like to call a "fluid situation"—which is a public relations man's way of saying that he can't figure out what's going on.

Now no one is blaming General MacArthur, and certainly I never did, for the failure of the November offensive. He is no more to be blamed for the fact that he was outnumbered than General Eisenhower could be charged with the heavy losses on the Battle of the Bulge. But—and herein lies the

slavery And the question now was whether we had actually reached the point where this slavery so threatened us that we had to move to the destruction of cities and the killing of women and children.

I can only assume that General MacArthur thought so and that those who wanted his plans carried out thought so too. It was not improbable that Communist China would have moved into full-scale war after we bombed Manchurian bases. I believed Russia would have so moved also.

Yet repeated statements by MacArthur led many people abroad to believe that our government would change its policy We could not permit such confusion to continue. On December 5 therefore, I issued an order to all government agencies that "until further written notice from me no speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State." A second notice admonished "officials overseas, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States."

A few months earlier there had been one incident of a high official talking out of turn about foreign policy That was when Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews made a speech on August 25 Mr Matthews, speaking in Boston, said that we ought to fight a "preventive war" I have always been opposed even to the thought of such a war There is nothing more foolish than to think that war can be stopped by war You don't "prevent" anything by war except peace.

Mr Matthews, of course, was surrounded by admirals and other high Navy people, and he had not had much experience in dealing with men in that category He told me he had heard so many of them talk "preventive war" that he had repeated the phrase without realizing just how far it took him away from my policy He was very contrite and full of regrets when I talked to him and explained why I could not have members of my administration going around the country advocating a view that was so completely opposed to the official policy of the government.

General MacArthur was a more serious offender with his press interviews and communiqués in which he sometimes hinted and sometimes said that if only his advice had been followed all would have been well in Korea.

In the first place, of course, he was wrong. If his advice had been taken, then or later and if we had gone ahead and bombed the Manchurian bases, we would have been openly at war with Red China and, not improbably with Russia. World War III might very well have been on.

In the second place, General MacArthur himself had been the one who had said there was no danger of Chinese intervention. At Wake Island he had told me categorically that he had no evidence that a massed intervention was threatening. More important still, he had told me that he could easily cope with the Chinese Communists if they actually came in. He had said that if the Communists from China tried to retake Pyongyang they would be inviting slaughter

Even before he started his ill-fated offensive of November 24, he still talked as if he had the answer to all the questions. But when it turned out that it was not so, he let all the world know that he would have won except for the fact that we would not let him have his way

This was simply not true. General MacArthur had been given fullest information on the reasons for our policy. He had told numerous visitors to his Tokyo office, including Harriman, and he had told me at Wake Island that he understood these reasons although he did not believe in them. Of course every second lieutenant knows best what his platoon ought to be given to do, and he always thinks that the higher-ups are just blind when they don't see his way. But General MacArthur—and rightly too—would have court-martialed any second lieutenant who gave press interviews to express his disagreement.

I should have relieved General MacArthur then and there. The reason I did not was that I did not wish to have it appear as if he were being relieved because the offensive failed. I have never believed in going back on people when luck is against them, and I did not intend to do it now. Nor did I want to reprimand the general, but he had to be told that the kinds of public statements which he had been making were out of order

This was the background for the order of December 5

By that time a new point of disagreement had come up between General MacArthur and the defense chiefs. On November 28 General MacArthur had reported that he was changing his plans from the offensive to the defensive as provided for in the directives which he had been given. In his message on this subject he made the statement that "we face an entirely new war." His message said, "The resulting

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situation presents an entire new picture which broadens the potentialities to world embracing consideration beyond the sphere of decision by the theatre commander. This command has done everything humanly possible within its capabilities but is now faced with conditions beyond its control and its strength."

On the following day General MacArthur submitted a recommendation that we go back and take up the offer made seven months earlier by Chiang Kai-shek of thirty-three thousand Chinese Nationalist troops for Korea. At that time he *himself* had advised against using these troops. His recommendation now was, of course, in line with his view that the Korean action had become a war with Communist China. I instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after a lengthy conference in which State Department and Defense Department took part, to call MacArthur's attention to the international implication of his recommendation, and the following message was sent on November 29 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Your proposal is being considered. It involves world-wide consequences. We shall have to consider the possibility that it would disrupt the united position of the nations associated with us in the United Nations and have us isolated. It may be wholly unacceptable to the commonwealth countries to have their forces employed with Nationalist Chinese. It might extend hostilities to Formosa and other areas. Incidentally, our position of leadership in the Far East is being most seriously compromised in the United Nations. The utmost care will be necessary to avoid the disruption of the essential Allied line-up in that organization."

Of course the situation in Korea was the subject of many long and anxious discussions in my office. The future of our policy not only in Asia, but in Europe as well, was at stake, and we spent a good deal more time searching for the answers to the tremendous problems before us than merely worrying over General MacArthur's lack of discretion.

On November 28, when the bad news from Korea had changed from rumors of resistance into certainty of defeat, I called a special meeting of the National Security Council. My own first knowledge of the extent of damage that the Chinese were inflicting on our troops had come at six-fifteen that morning, when General Bradley had telephoned me a cable report from General MacArthur. General Bradley and the Chiefs of Staff had been in session all the day before, examining the situation, and they felt that while it was serious

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they were doubtful that it was as much a catastrophe as our newspapers were leading us to believe.

General Bradley however stressed the danger that might arise if the Communists decided to use their air potential. It was our information that there were at least three hundred bombers on fields in nearby Manchuria. These bombers could hurt us badly both by attacks on the airlift and by surprise raids on our closely jammed planes on Korean fields. Despite these facts, General Bradley said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that General MacArthur should be authorized to bomb airfields in Manchuria.

I asked if there was any way to lessen the damage we might suffer from a sudden air attack by the Chinese Communists, and General Vandenberg said there was none, short of moving our planes back to Japan. This, of course, would mean a *considerable slowing up of our own military operations.*

I asked Secretary of Defense Marshall for his comments on the situation, and he reported that the civilian heads of the services, too, had been in conference all day as a result of the developments in Korea. They had talked over what new requirements this would place on the procurement and supply of both men and matériel. A second military supplemental budget estimate was ready and it was Marshall's opinion, as he had made clear to me earlier that day that it ought to be sent over to Congress at once. I was therefore able to inform the meeting that the Budget Director had already been instructed by me on this point.

General Marshall then talked about the diplomatic aspects of the situation, saying he thought it essential for the United States to go along with the United Nations approach to the Korean question, even if going along with the United Nations meant some difficult problems for us. He said that he felt it essential for us to keep a unanimity of approach in the U.N. He was emphatic on one point, on which he said the three service Secretaries agreed as the most important, that we should not get ourselves involved either individually or with the United Nations in a general war with China. Marshall said he did not think it was likely that the U.N. would get us "in such a fix," but he thought we should recognize that there were some people at home who seemed to want all-out action against China.

Bradley said this reflected the Joint Chiefs thinking too. If we allowed ourselves to be pulled into a general war with China, it would be impossible to continue the build-up of

forces in Europe. Secretary Pace added that it was important that everyone in the room understand that we had only the 82nd Airborne Division available at home and that the National Guard units that had been called into federal service would not be ready for combat until the middle of March.

At this point Vice President Barkley broke in. The Vice-President did not often speak in these NSC meetings, and this was an indication of the worry and concern felt by the members of the Senate with whom he associated daily. What Barkley wanted to know was whether it was true that General MacArthur had made the statement that "the boys will be home by Christmas," adding that this seemed incredible. Did MacArthur know what was going on, he asked, and how could a man in his position be guilty of such an indiscretion?

Secretary Lovett and Secretary Pace explained that MacArthur had "officially" denied the statement but that there was no doubt that he had made it. Secretary Pace had heard him make a similar statement at Wake Island and so had General Bradley and Lovett said there was a stenographic transcript available. General MacArthur had said that he had been "misinterpreted," and General Bradley came to MacArthur's defense by saying that he thought the statement was designed for the consumption of the Chinese Communists to show them that we had no permanent designs on Korea and no intention of continuing the war

Barkley was still upset. "This is an incredible hoax," he exclaimed. I told him that, whatever we might think of the statement, we would have to be very careful not to pull the rug out from under the general We simply could not afford to damage MacArthur's prestige. But Barkley still felt deeply perturbed.

There was discussion then of the number of replacements MacArthur would need and what we might be able to send him. General Collins said he thought that a line could be held in Korea. The X Corps in the east was in a precarious position but probably could be pulled back to safety

I asked Dean Acheson then to comment on the situation from his point of view and the Secretary of State began with the statement that the events of the last few hours had moved us very much closer to the danger of general war There had always been evidence of some Chinese participation in Korea, of course, but now we had an open, powerful offensive attack. He said that we needed to bear in mind that the Soviet Union was behind every one of the Chinese and North Korean moves and that we had to think of all that

beyond in Korea as world matters. We should never lose sight of the fact that we were facing the Soviet Union all around the world.

Of course, Acheson continued, if we openly accused the Soviet Union of aggression, the United Nations would be demoralized. If we came out and pointed a finger at the Soviet Union, it would serve no purpose, because we could do nothing about it. To make the accusation, however, and then to do nothing about it would only weaken our world position. If we proposed action against the Kremlin, on the other hand, we might find ourselves alone, without allies.

As for the Chinese Communists, Acheson went on, we ought to draw a line and not try to walk both sides of the street. There was no use denying that they were fighting us, so we had better stir up trouble for them. There were a number of ways in which that could be done besides playing with Chiang.

As for the conflict in Korea, the Secretary of State was of the opinion that we should find some way to end it. If we went into Manchuria and bombed the airfields there with any degree of success, "Russia would cheerfully get in it." We had based our entire foreign policy on the idea of keeping Russia contained, and we had succeeded in repulsing her attempts to break out. If we allowed the Russians now to trap us inside their perimeter, however, we would run the risk of being sucked into a bottomless pit. There would be no end to it, and it would bleed us dry. The Russians had tried to lure us into traps time and again. This one differed only in being bigger than the earlier ones.

Averell Harriman, who took part in the meeting, said that we ought to give careful attention to the mood of the free world. We had to maintain our leadership, and the immediate appointment of a supreme commander for the NATO powers would prove that. The free nations would stick with us if they felt sure that we were going to stick with them.

I said that it would be easier to convince the free world if some of our press were not so anxious to prove the contrary. Three of our biggest publishers, I think, were dividing our people and leading the world to believe that the American people had no confidence in their government. The campaign of vilification and lies and distortion of facts in so many of our papers was the greatest asset the Soviets had.

I told the National Security Council that I had thought at first that I ought to go before Congress and address a special session but that I did not now think this would be right.

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"We have committed ourselves to the cause of a just and peaceful world order through the United Nations. We stand by that commitment.

"We shall meet the new situation in three ways. We shall continue to work in the United Nations for concerted action to halt this aggression in Korea. We shall intensify our efforts to help other free nations strengthen their defenses in order to meet the threat of aggression elsewhere. We shall rapidly increase our own military strength.

"In the United Nations, the first step is action by the Security Council to halt this aggression. Ambassador Warren is pressing for such action. We shall exert every effort to help bring the full influence of the United Nations to bear on the situation in Korea.

"Some had hoped that the normal peaceful process of discussion and negotiation, which is provided through the United Nations, could be successfully entered into with the present Chinese Communist delegation at Lake Success. There is, however, no indication that the representatives of Communist China are willing to engage in this process. Instead of discussing the real issues, they have been making violent and wholly false statements of the type which have often been used by the Soviet representatives in an effort to prevent the Security Council from acting.

"We hope that the Chinese people will not continue to be forced or deceived into serving the ends of Russian colonial policy in Asia. I am certain that, if the Chinese people now under the control of the Communists were free to speak for themselves, they would denounce this aggression against the United Nations.

"Because the new act of aggression in Korea is only a part of a world-wide pattern of danger to all the free nations of the world, it is more necessary than ever before for us to increase at a very rapid rate the combined military strength of the free nations. It is more necessary than ever that integrated forces in Europe under a Supreme Command be established at once.

"With respect to our own defense, I shall submit a supplemental request for appropriations needed immediately to increase the size and effectiveness of our armed forces. The request will include a substantial amount for the Atomic Energy Commission in addition to large amounts for the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

"I expect to confer tomorrow with Congressional leaders

Korea was a United Nations matter and our country should not make an individual approach to it.

The Cabinet met shortly after this meeting adjourned, and again Korea was discussed. The members of the Cabinet were briefed by General Bradley and by Dean Acheson on the most recent developments, and again we talked over the damage that had been done to the nation's international position by the reckless charges and the rumor-mongering of the recent political campaign.

A lot of hard work was put in during the next few days to re-evaluate our plans and programs and to prepare for the next steps that would have to be taken. Most of my occasional callers had to give way to a steady stream of the top officials of the government. At the press conference on Thursday November 30, I made a statement for publication that was intended to reflect our concern and also our determination.

"Recent developments in Korea," the prepared copies of this statement read, "confront the world with a serious crisis. The Chinese Communist leaders have sent their troops from Manchuria to launch a strong and well-organized attack against the United Nations forces in North Korea. This has been done despite prolonged and earnest efforts to bring home to the Communist leaders of China the plain fact that neither the United Nations nor the United States has any aggressive intentions toward China. Because of the historic friendship between the people of the United States and China, it is particularly shocking to us to think that Chinese are being forced into battle against our troops in the United Nations command.

"The Chinese attack was made in great force, and it still continues. It has resulted in the forced withdrawal of large parts of the United Nations command. The battlefield situation is uncertain at this time. We may suffer reverses as we have suffered them before. But the forces of the United Nations have no intention of abandoning their mission in Korea.

"The forces of the United Nations are in Korea to put down an aggression that threatens not only the whole fabric of the United Nations, but all human hopes of peace and justice. If the United Nations yields to the forces of aggression, no nation will be safe or secure. If aggression is successful in Korea, we can expect it to spread throughout Asia and Europe to this hemisphere. We are fighting in Korea for our own national security and survival.

"We have committed ourselves to the cause of a just and peaceful world order through the United Nations. We stand by that commitment.

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"With respect to our own defense, I shall submit a supplemental request for appropriations needed immediately to increase the size and effectiveness of our armed forces. The request will include a substantial amount for the Atomic Energy Commission in addition to large amounts for the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

"I expect to confer tomorrow with Congressional leaders

Korea was a *United Nations matter* and our country should not make an individual approach to it.

The Cabinet met shortly after this meeting adjourned, and again Korea was discussed. The members of the Cabinet were briefed by General Bradley and by Dean Acheson on the most recent developments, and again we talked over the damage that had been done to the nation's international position by the reckless charges and the rumor-mongering of the recent political campaign.

A lot of hard work was put in during the next few days to re-evaluate our plans and programs and to prepare for the next steps that would have to be taken. Most of my occasional callers had to give way to a steady stream of the top officials of the government. At the press conference on Thursday November 30, I made a statement for publication that was intended to reflect our concern and also our determination.

"Recent developments in Korea," the prepared copies of [illegible] front the world with a serious crisis. this statement read, "com[illegible]ders have sent their troops from The Chinese Communist le[illegible] and well-organized attack Manchuria to launch a stro[illegible] North Korea. This has against the United Nations forces in [illegible] efforts to [illegible] been done despite prolonged and earnest [illegible] home to the Communist leaders of China the plain fact that neither the United Nations nor the United States has any aggressive intentions toward China. Because of the historic friendship between the people of the United States and China, it is particularly shocking to us to think that Chinese are being forced into battle against our troops in the United Nations command.

"The Chinese attack was made in great force, and it still continues. It has resulted in the forced withdrawal of large parts of the United Nations command. The battlefield situation is uncertain at this time. We may suffer reverses as we have suffered them before. But the forces of the United Nations have no intention of abandoning their mission in Korea.

"The forces of the United Nations are in Korea to put down an aggression that threatens not only the whole fabric of the United Nations, but all human hopes of peace and justice. If the United Nations yields to the forces of aggression, no nation will be safe or secure. If aggression is successful in Korea, we can expect it to spread throughout Asia and Europe to this hemisphere. We are fighting in Korea for our own national security and survival.

"We have committed ourselves to the cause of a just and peaceful world order through the United Nations. We stand by that commitment.

"We shall meet the new situation in three ways. We shall continue to work in the United Nations for concerted action to halt this aggression in Korea. We shall intensify our efforts to help other free nations strengthen their defenses in order to meet the threat of aggression elsewhere. We shall rapidly increase our own military strength.

"In the United Nations, the first step is action by the Security Council to halt this aggression. Ambassador Warren Austin is pressing for such action. We shall exert every effort to help bring the full influence of the United Nations to bear on the situation in Korea.

"Some had hoped that the normal peaceful process of discussion and negotiation, which is provided through the United Nations, could be successfully entered into with the present Chinese Communist delegation at Lake Success. There is, however, no indication that the representatives of Communist China are willing to engage in this process. Instead of discussing the real issues, they have been making violent and wholly false statements of the type which have often been used by the Soviet representatives in an effort to prevent the Security Council from acting.

"We hope that the Chinese people will not continue to be forced or deceived into serving the ends of Russian colonial policy in Asia. I am certain that, if the Chinese people now under the control of the Communists were free to speak for themselves, they would denounce this aggression against the United Nations.

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the ROK military forces and providing further equipment for such forces would have to be postponed. Rhee was not happy but out of this very frank exchange there soon grew a training program that helped build an ROK army of considerable competence.

The most important development in Korea, however was the beginning of the truce negotiations.

The Chinese Communists' "spring offensive" had been thrown back late in May and United Nations forces held a line generally near the 38th parallel. There were further advances beyond the parallel in June, including the temporary capture of the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang, but generally fighting was light.

On June 1 Trygve Lie, the Secretary General of the United Nations, stated that a cease-fire "approximately along" the 38th parallel would fulfill the purpose of the United Nations namely to repulse the aggression against the Republic of Korea. On June 7 Secretary of State Dean Acheson made a similar statement, which was in line with the recommendation of the National Security Council which I had approved. We had first discussed a formulation of our objectives in Asia at a meeting of the NSC on May 2, and the discussion was continued and concluded on May 16. Regarding Korea we distinguished between the political aim—a unified, independent, democratic Korea—and the military aim of repelling the aggression and terminating the hostilities under an armistice agreement. With the fighting ended, the purpose would be to establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all of Korea south of a northern boundary line suitable for defense and administration and not substantially below the 38th parallel, to provide for the withdrawal of non-Korean armed forces from all of Korea, and to build up the ROK forces so as to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression.

This policy represented no change. Throughout the Korean affair it had always been my conviction that the United Nations would and should have to prove that aggressors would not be allowed to keep the fruits of their misdeeds. But I never allowed myself to forget that America's principal enemies were sitting in the Kremlin, or that we could not afford to squander our reawakening strength as long as that enemy was not committed in the field but only pulling the strings behind the scenes.

For these reasons, once the territory of the Republic of

Korea was virtually cleared of aggressor troops, our readiness for negotiations toward an armistice received new emphasis. At last, on June 23, Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative to the U.N. Security Council, in a speech over the U.N. radio, indicated that the Russian government believed discussions should be started between the belligerents in Korea. Two days later the Peiping newspaper, *People's Daily* said that the Chinese people endorsed Malik's peace proposals.

I was in Tennessee at the time, dedicating an aviation engineering development center at Tullahoma, and I used that occasion to give expression to some of my thoughts on the position of the United States in the world and on our foreign policy. Here are some of the things I said that afternoon.

"Since World War II we have done our best to build an international organization to keep the peace of the world. We have done that in the interest of the United States, because the only sure way to keep our own country safe and secure is to have world peace.

"Never before has an aggressor been confronted with such a series of positive measures to keep the peace. Never before in history have there been such deterrents to the outbreak of a world war.

"Of course, we cannot promise that there will not be a world war. The Kremlin has it in its power to bring about such a war if it desires. *It has a powerful military machine*, and its rulers are absolute tyrants.

"We cannot be sure what the Soviet rulers will do.

"But we can put ourselves in a position to say to them: Attack—and you will have the united resources of the free nations thrown against you. Attack—and you will be confronted by a war you cannot possibly win.

"The Kremlin is still trying to divide the free nations. The thing that the Kremlin fears most is the unity of the free world.

"The rulers of the Soviet Union have been trying to split up the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty. They have been trying to sow distrust between us and the other free countries. Their great objective is to strip us of our allies and to force us to 'go it alone.'

"If they could do that, they could go ahead with their plan of taking over the world, nation by nation.

"Unfortunately, it isn't only the Kremlin that has been trying to separate us from our allies. There are some people

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For these reasons, once the territory of the Republic of

As Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command I have been instructed to communicate to you the following:

"I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice.

"Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date at which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan Harbor.

"(Signed) M. B. Ridgway, General, U. S. Army
Commander in Chief
United Nations Command"

This message was followed by further instructions to General Ridgway concerning the conduct of any negotiations that might develop. This document was again prepared in cooperation by the State and Defense Departments. General Bradley brought a draft to the Williamsburg late at night on June 29 and I studied it there and approved it.

It read as follows:

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL RIDGWAY FROM JCS

1. This message cancels our previous directives regarding armistice terms and contains instructions regarding such terms for your guidance in any conversations which might develop between you and the Commander in Chief of the Communist forces in Korea. It is believed that the chance for a successful conclusion of such negotiation may depend upon secrecy in at least the opening stages; it is not, therefore, intended to make these instructions public.

2. General policy

a. Our principal military interest in this armistice lies in a cessation of hostilities in Korea, an assurance against the resumption of fighting and the protection of the security of United Nations forces.

b. We lack assurance either that the Soviet Union and Communist China are serious about concluding reasonable and acceptable armistice arrangements or that they are prepared to agree to an acceptable permanent settlement of the Korean problem. In considering an armistice, therefore, it is of the utmost importance to reach arrangements which would be acceptable to us over an

in this country too who have been trying to get us to go it alone.

"Partisan efforts to label our foreign policy as 'appeasement'—to tag it as a policy of 'fear' or 'timidity'—point to only one thing. They point to our going it alone, down the road to World War III.

"Is it a policy of fear to bring the free nations of the world together in a great unified movement to maintain peace? Is it a policy of appeasement to fight armed aggression and hurl it back in Korea?

"Of course it is not. Everybody with any common sense knows *it is not.*

"And look at the alternatives these critics have to present. Here is what they say Take a chance on spreading the conflict in Asia. Take a chance on losing our allies in Europe. Take a chance the Soviet Union won't fight in the Far East. Take a chance we won't have a third world war.

"They want us to play Russian roulette with the foreign policy of the United States—with all the chambers of the pistols loaded.

"In Korea and in the rest of the world we must be ready to take any steps which truly advance toward world peace. But we must avoid like the plague rash actions which would take unnecessary risks of world war or weak actions which would reward aggression."

In this same speech I also repeated that we were ready to join in a peaceful settlement in Korea, but that it would have to be a real settlement that would restore the peace and security of the people of Korea.

The State Department had meanwhile instructed Ambassador Kirk in Moscow to check with the Soviet government on Malik's statement, and the reply showed that Malik had expressed an official viewpoint.

There were a number of conferences in the State Department and between State and Defense officials. As a result of these I received a recommendation that our next step should be a statement by General Ridgway offering to meet the Communist commander I approved the text, and it was sent to the Far East commander on Friday June 29 with instructions to broadcast it at 6 P.M. Washington time that day

The President has directed that at *0600* Saturday Tokyo Daylight Saving Time you send following message by radio in clear addressed to Commander in Chief Communist Forces in Korea and *simultaneously release* to press

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extended period of time, even though no progress is made in reaching agreement on political and territorial questions.

c. Discussions between you and the commander of opposing forces should be severely restricted to military questions, you should specifically not enter into discussion of a final settlement in Korea or consideration of issues unrelated to Korea, such as Formosa and the Chinese seat in the United Nations; such questions must be dealt with at governmental level.

3 You are authorized to adopt, for negotiating purposes, initial positions more favorable to us than the minimum conditions set forth in these instructions. However great care should be used, in putting forward a negotiating position, not to allow talks to break down except in case of failure to accept our minimum terms, not to appear to overreach to an extent to cause world opinion to question our good faith and not so to engage U.S. prestige in a negotiating position as to make retreat to our minimum terms impossible. Our minimum position is essential to us but we must recognize that it will not be easy for opponents to accept, the difficulty of your negotiation is fully appreciated here.

4 Pursuant to the above, the armistice agreements

a. Shall be confined to Korea and strictly military matters therein, and shall not involve any political or territorial matters.

b Shall continue in effect until superseded by other arrangements.

The Communist commander's reply to Ridgway's message was broadcast from Peiping on July 1 He agreed to meet for "talks concerning cessation of military activities and establishment of peace" and suggested that the meeting place be at Kaesong, near the 38th parallel. Liaison officers met for the first time on July 7 and on July 10 the first meeting of the delegations was held.

From the first meeting on, the Communists proved that they were intending to stall and delay until they got things their way In the months that followed our negotiators, headed by Admiral Joy and later by General Harrison, showed outstanding patience and perseverance at their task. As had been the case with reports from the field of battle, I daily received full accounts of the proceedings in the truce tent. No major steps were taken without specific approval of the President, even to the wording of announcements made

by the Far East commander or the chief negotiator at crucial points.

Repeatedly I made it clear that if these truce talks failed it would have to be under conditions that would make it plain to the world that the failure was caused by the enemy not by our side.

The negotiations were complicated by frequent declarations from Syngman Rhee that he would not accept less than a united Korea, but substantial progress was made between November and January and before this period had passed it began to look as if agreement could be reached. Then new complications arose. Some of these were connected with such small points as what word should be used for Korea." The most stubborn issue, however, involved the repatriation of prisoners of war.

We were most anxious, of course, to bring our prisoners back home. There had been many stories and much evidence of inhuman treatment of prisoners taken by the Communists. The Communists, however, refused Red Cross inspection of prison camps, although they finally furnished our side with a list of prisoners' names. Still, this accounted for only about one tenth of the number of prisoners they themselves claimed to have captured, and, in turn, they charged that the list the United Nations Command had furnished was incomplete.

On January 1 1952, our side proposed that all prisoners of war who wished to be returned should be exchanged. It was here that the most serious wrangling began. It was here, also, that I insisted that we could not give ground.

Communism is a system that has no regard for human dignity or human freedom, and no right-thinking government can give its consent to the forcible return to such a system of men or women who would rather remain free. Just as I had always insisted that we could not abandon the South Koreans who had stood by us and freedom, so I now refused to agree to any solution that provided for the return against their will of prisoners of war to Communist domination. A public statement I made on May 7 1952, expressed my thoughts in official language, but there is one sentence in it that says exactly what was in my mind in words that mean what they say

"We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery

As far as I was concerned, this was not a point for bargaining!

Here is the full text of that statement:

"1 The United States fully approves and supports without qualification the proposal for reaching an armistice which General Ridgway has offered to the Communist aggressors in Korea.

"2. Last July the U.N forces had repulsed Communist aggression in Korea, had proved to the Communists that aggression cannot pay and had brought new hope for peace to free men around the world. The Soviet Union then indicated that Korean hostilities could be terminated by a military armistice. The U.N Command in good faith and in a sincere desire to find a basis for a peaceful settlement began armistice talks with the Communists in Korea.

"3 After many trying months of negotiation, in which each issue had been dealt with individually tentative agreement has been reached on all but three issues. It is now apparent that the three remaining issues cannot be resolved separately The U.N Command proposal offers a just and a real opportunity to resolve these three issues together and simultaneously The three-point proposal is.

"a. That there shall not be a forced repatriation of prisoners of war—as the Communists have insisted. To agree to forced repatriation would be unthinkable. It would be repugnant to the fundamental moral and humanitarian principles which underlie our action in Korea. To return these prisoners of war in our hands by force would result in misery and bloodshed to the eternal dishonor of the United States and of the U.N.

"We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery The U.N Command has observed the most extreme care in separating those prisoners who have said they would forcibly oppose return to Communist control. We have offered to submit to an impartial re-screening—after an armistice—of those persons we would hold in our custody Nothing could be fairer For the Communists to insist upon the forcible return to them of persons who wish to remain out of their control, is an amazing disclosure before the whole world of the operation of their system.

"b. That the U.N Command will not insist on prohibiting reconstruction or rehabilitation of airfields.

"c. That the neutral nations supervisory commission should comprise representatives of our countries Poland and Czechoslovakia, chosen by the Communists Sweden and Switzerland, chosen by the U N Command.

"4 The three parts of General Ridgway's proposal are all

part of a whole. They must be considered as an entity—not piecemeal. Our agreement is contingent upon acceptance of the whole proposal. This is our position. The Communists thus far have indicated only a willingness to withdraw their proposal that the U.S.S.R. be a member of the neutral inspection commission. This spurious issue was raised by them late in negotiations and its withdrawal is no real concession on their part.

"3. The patience and understanding shown by General Ridgway and the U.N. Command negotiators merit the highest praise. In spite of almost overwhelming provocation, they have made real progress in reaching agreement on many essential terms for an armistice. General Ridgway's proposal offers a sound and sensible way to settle the remaining issues all at once. It will have compelling appeal to those sincerely desiring peace."

The proposal to which this message referred was a three-point plan for the adjustment of the outstanding differences at the conference, which had been shifted in the fall of 1951 from Kaesong to Panmunjom.

The Communists, however, still refused to make any concessions on the prisoner-exchange issue. They wanted to swap all the prisoners they held for all the prisoners held by our side. I had made it very clear that I would not agree to any trade of prisoners that might result in forcibly returning non-Communists to Communist control. To have agreed would have been not only inhumane and tragic, but dishonorable as well, for our checks in the PW camps showed that the vast majority of the Chinese and North Koreans taken by our side preferred not to be returned under such conditions. We proposed, however, to exchange all who wanted to be exchanged.

Communist agents who had allowed themselves to be captured for the sole purpose of getting control of the prisoner stockades actually succeeded, in some instances, in establishing reigns of terror. This, however, did not change many minds among the prisoners. The riots that resulted, however, created additional problems for our commanders.

The Far East Command changed hands in May 1952, when I sent General Ridgway to Europe to take the place of General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. To replace Ridgway, the Defense Department recommended, and I approved, General Mark W. Clark, our wartime commander in Italy.

General Clark's job was not easy. Almost as soon as he

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I prayed that there might be some way other than swift military action to meet this Communist aggression, for I knew the awful sacrifices in life and suffering it would take to meet it. But there was only one choice facing us and the free world—resistance or capitulation to Communist imperialist military aggression. It was my belief that if this aggression in Korea went unchallenged, as the aggression in Manchuria in 1931 and in Ethiopia in 1934 had gone unchallenged, the world was certain to be plunged into another world war.

This was the same kind of challenge Hitler flaunted in the face of the rest of the world when he crossed the borders of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The free world failed then to meet that challenge, and World War II was the result. This time the free nations—the United Nations—were quick to sense the new danger to world peace. The United Nations was born out of the ashes of two world wars and organized for the very purpose of preventing or dealing with aggression wherever it threatened to break out or actually occurred.

That is why the United Nations responded with such spontaneity and swiftness. This was the first time in the history of the world that there was international machinery to deal with those who would resort to war as a means of imposing their will or their systems on other people.

At the very outset we knew that the United States would have to carry the major burden. That was inevitable because of our geographic position and our strength. Our allies were all rebuilding their shattered nations and binding the slowly healing wounds of their civilian populations. Most of them, too, faced possible aggression by the Communists on their own frontiers.

The Communist aggressors had on several earlier occasions sought to probe what we would do if they moved to conquer and expand. They learned in Iran and Greece and Turkey and in Berlin that we would not be intimidated or bluffed. But up until Korea they had confined their action to subversion, indirect aggression, intimidation, and revolution.

In Korea, however, the world faced a new and bold Communist challenge. Here for the first time since the end of World War II the Communists openly and defiantly embarked upon military force and invasion.

The Communists moved without warning and without excuse. They crossed the 38th parallel of Korea with tanks and planes in open warfare.

We could not stand idly by and allow the Communist

assumed command he was faced with a ticklish situation at the prison camp on Kojo Island, where Communist prisoners of war had managed to kidnap the American general in charge. The truce negotiations seemed completely stalled, but the Red spokesman, General Nam Il, insisted on continuing the meetings, at which he made long propaganda harangues. President Rhee, who was at odds with his National Assembly, proclaimed martial law and had a number of his political opponents arrested.

Meanwhile, Communist strength in North Korea had been building up and General Clark was forced to raise the question of additional troops. Apparently much had been done to improve the ROK Army since the spring of 1951 for Clark urged strongly that it be expanded, and he also brought up the matter of Chinese Nationalist aid once again, urging that Chiang Kai-shek be asked to contribute two divisions.

Our own military adviser on Formosa, Major General Chase, was not in favor of sending any of Chiang's units to Korea at that time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however examined the military advantages of such a move with care and advised the Secretary of Defense that it would be desirable, from their point of view to bring Chinese Nationalist units to Korea, and Secretary Lovett held full discussions with all his advisers on the matter informing me periodically of the progress of the talks.

The Secretary had a careful study made of the various alternatives by which some relief might be brought to the American troops who had furnished so much of the fighting strength in Korea for over two years. In the end it was found that there would be no advantages in the addition of Chinese Nationalist units that could not be gained by increasing the ROK forces. There was nothing to suggest that the two Chinese divisions that might have been sent from Formosa, partly trained as they were, would have made a significant difference in the Korean situation in 1952.

The issue with regard to our Korean policy however is not what might have been done but rather what had to be done.

I have gone into considerable detail in giving the facts about our action in Korea, for what we and our allies did about Korea will have a profound influence on the future peace of the world. This was the toughest d[illegible] I had to make as President. What we faced in the [illegible]
was the ominous threat of a third world wa[illegible]

# CHAPTER 29

On November 1 1951 the United Steelworkers of America announced that when their contracts with the steel manufacturers expired early in 195_ they would want improvements of some working conditions and a substantial wage increase. This was the beginning of a series of events that eventually made it necessary for the government to seize the nation's steel plants.

The demands of the steelworkers did not seem out of line to me. Korea and the need of the defense program had greatly increased the volume of business being done by the steel mills, and the steel companies' profits were rising. For the three years preceding the Korean emergency the average profit in the steel industry had been $6.59 per ton. For 1951, however, the first full year of Korean war requirements, the profit, after taxes, was $7.07 per ton. Furthermore, in the light of the huge orders the Defense Department had placed with them on the authorization of Congress as requested by the Executive, 195_ promised to be at least as good for the steel manufacturers, if not better.

We had this economic situation on our hands. The industry was making more money while the workers in the plants found that the increases in the cost of living had cut down the purchasing power of their pay. The cost of food and clothing and similar basic items had gone up.

Wages, however, were only one of the issues which the union wanted to negotiate. There had been a general worsening of relations between the union and some of the companies, especially United States Steel. The difficulty had arisen over company efforts to introduce an incentive-pay wage system. The workers charged, rightly or wrongly, that this system would treat them as if they were machines, and they resented it.

I believe many well-meaning citizens fail to realize that for the workingman the union is far more than a means of securing higher wages. In this age of the machine, the indi-

imperialists to assume that they were free to go into Korea or elsewhere. This challenge had to be met—and it was met. It had to be met without plunging the world into general war. This was done.

We have learned bitterly and tragically from two calamitous world wars that any other course would lead to yet another world war.

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On November 1, 1951, the United Steelworkers of America announced that when their contracts with the steel manufacturers expired early in 1952, they would want improvements of some working conditions and a substantial wage increase. This was the beginning of a series of events that eventually made it necessary for the government to seize the nation's steel plants.

The demands of the steelworkers did not seem out of line to me. Korea and the need of the defense program had greatly increased the volume of business being done by the steel mills, and the steel companies' profits were rising. For the three years preceding the Korean emergency the average profit in the steel industry had been $6.59 per ton. For 1951, however, the first full year of Korean war requirements, the profit, after taxes, was $7.07 per ton. Furthermore, in the light of the huge orders the Defense Department had placed with them on the authorization of Congress as requested by the Executive, 1952 promised to be at least as good for the steel manufacturers, if not better.

We had this economic situation on our hands: The industry was making more money, while the workers in the plants found that the increases in the cost of living had cut down the purchasing power of their pay. The cost of food and clothing and similar basic items had gone up.

Wages, however, were only one of the issues which the union wanted to negotiate. There had been a general worsening of relations between the union and some of the companies, especially United States Steel. The difficulty had arisen over company efforts to introduce an incentive-pay wage system. The workers charged, rightly or wrongly, that this system would treat them as if they were machines, and they resented it.

I believe many well-meaning citizens fail to realize that for the workingman the union is far more than a means of securing higher wages. In this age of the machine, the indi-

vidual worker does not get much of a chance to feel that what he is doing is important. The union worker like anyone else, wants to feel that he is achieving something, and through his unions he gets the sense of human dignity and of joining with others in doing something worth while. That is why he resists any tampering with unions.

There is such a long history of union suppression by employers, and the employer opposition to unions, that it should not be surprising that workers tend to think that most employers are out to kill the unions and that anything employers want by way of a change is intended to be the first nail in the union's coffin. One reason why unions object to incentive pay is that they see it as a means to deny them the right to act as bargaining agents for wages. To deprive them of this right would curtail or even destroy one of the most important functions of the unions.

Some of our more enlightened industries have understood this and have developed labor-management relations resulting in greater efficiency. Relations between management and labor on this basis bring about harmony and understanding profitable to both the workers and the company. But in some industries unionism has never been fully accepted.

In 1951 the steel industry said that it did not wish to discuss the union's demands for increased wages and changes in working conditions, and the union announced that the workers would strike on December 31. I had no way of knowing why the companies refused to negotiate with the union. Perhaps they thought this was an opportune time to get tough. Perhaps they believed that the urgent needs of the defense program would bring the government into the dispute and force continued production at unchanged contract conditions. Whatever the reasons, the officials of the Defense Department and of the defense production agencies viewed the impending strike with the gravest alarm. Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett had for months been pointing out to me that the national defense program would be endangered if a strike was allowed to halt production. All the members of the Cabinet agreed with Lovett that it would be harmful to the country and injurious to our campaign in Korea if our steel mills were allowed to close down. We were then not only trying to keep our forces in Korea, as well as elsewhere, fully equipped, but we had allies to whom we had promised arms and munitions and whose determination to resist Communism might depend on our ability to supply them the weapons they so badly needed. It was obvious that the best interests

of the nation would be seriously affected if a strike in the steel industry took place.

On December 22, I referred the dispute between the United Steelworkers and the steel companies to the Wage Stabilization Board for solution. The unions immediately responded to this action by agreeing to postpone the strike so that production would not be interrupted.

To put off the strike in the hope of negotiating a solution, I had a choice of two alternatives as provided by the Congress. The first was the Taft-Hartley Act, which had a provision for an eighty-day injunction. Contrary to the claims of some misinformed people, this is not a mandatory provision. On the contrary it provides in cases of strikes endangering national health and safety that the President may appoint a board of inquiry to determine the facts and to report to him. Upon receiving that report, the President may instruct the Department of Justice to ask for a court order to enjoin the strike for eighty days. During this period the board of inquiry attempts to bring about a settlement. At the end of eighty days, unless a solution is reached, the strike may legally proceed and the President must then report the facts to the Congress along with his recommendations.

There was the other alternative in the Defense Production Act of 1950 which declared that it was "the intent of Congress, in order to provide for effective price and wage stabilization and to maintain uninterrupted production, that there be effective procedures for the settlement of labor disputes affecting national defense. This authorized the President to provide for procedures similar to those that had existed in World War II with the War Labor Board.

Acting under a directive from Congress, I had set up a Wage Stabilization Board and had assigned to it the function of settling labor disputes affecting national defense. In 1951 Congress had received a full report on the record of how this Board operated as an alternative to the procedure laid down in the Taft-Hartley Act. A move had been attempted in the House of Representatives to deprive the WSB of the right to handle labor disputes. This move was defeated, however and Congress extended the Defense Production Act with full knowledge that it included an alternative method for the handling of labor disputes.

In deciding on a choice, then, between the two alternatives, I first considered the Taft-Hartley Act. But the Taft-Hartley Act had been designed primarily for peacetime labor problems. The Wage Stabilization Board, however had been

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established especially for defense labor disputes and had been reaffirmed by the Congress in this function within the year. The kind of situation we were facing caused me to turn to the Wage Stabilization Board.

From January 10 through February 26 1952, the Wage Stabilization Board held extensive hearings and discussions with the parties, and on March 20, it submitted its report to me. On the wage issue it recommended that the union be given an increase in three stages over an eighteen-month period, for a total increase of 26.4 cents per hour This was less than the union asked for On the other points, too, the Board pared down the union's requests. On some it recommended that the union's requests be rejected altogether. Weighing the result against the current and prospective earnings of the industry the proposal seemed to me to be fair and workable.

Charles E. Wilson, Director of Defense Mobilization, reported to me on March 24 that the companies would flatly reject the recommended settlement. He said that there would be an industry refusal followed by a prolonged strike and that the only thing that would prevent a shutdown of the mills would be to grant the price increase requested by the companies.

In order to prevent a national crisis, I would not object to a reasonable price increase that would meet the cost of the higher wage scale. When we had a steel strike in 1946, I had had a calculation made by the experts to show just how much the then proposed wage hike would drive production costs up and a price increase was based on that calculation. On the basis of the figures before me in the present case, however, I felt that the price increase the steel companies were demanding was entirely out of reason and that it had come at a bad time for the country

The industry wanted a flat increase, to be applied to all finished steel regardless of selling price. It is, of course a fact that the price of steel ranges widely from the cheap finish to the specialty and high-quality steels. To apply a flat dollar increase to existing prices would have the result of a proportionately greater hike in the prices for the lower grades, but it would hardly affect the price of steel produced to sell at top rates. I did not think that this was a fair method of spreading the increased cost.

The profits of the steel companies were constantly rising. The nation was drafting its men to serve on the field of battle, and I thought that the ammunition and arms manufacturers

and that raw-material producers ought not to use the emergency to load on extra profits. The attitude of the companies seemed wrong to me, since under the accelerated defense program the government was by far the biggest customer for steel and steel products. To hike the prices at this time meant charging the government more for the tools of defense.

I realized, of course, that any wage increase means adding cost to production, but I was not willing to commit myself to a flat figure to be applied across the board, without proof that it was made necessary by the wage increase.

Steel is of such importance in our highly mechanized economy that any rise in the price of steel is soon reflected in price increases of a large range of goods, from refrigerators and automobiles to tin cans and bobby pins. A disproportionate rise in the cost of steel would have an inflationary effect. Because of this I felt that I would be justified in agreeing to a steel-price increase only if the steel industry would carry more than its normal share of the production cost. In this case, however, the steel industry was actively seeking to get much more than its share of the profits, and at the expense of the government.

To my regret, Wilson interpreted my willingness to consider an adjustment to cover the actual added costs as a promise to meet the companies' full demands. When I corrected his interpretation and put him straight, he resigned.

It was now apparent that a settlement would be difficult to reach.

A long round of conferences and consultations began. Dr John Steelman, my assistant, whose specialty was labor problems, held meetings in his office with groups and individuals representing labor, management, and government. The conferees reported to me on their talks and asked my opinion or decision on some point, but no progress was being made. On April 7 the unions announced that they would go out on strike against the steel companies.

I again called in all my principal advisers to decide what steps to take to meet the emergency. Secretary of Defense Lovett said emphatically that any stoppage of steel production, for even a short time, would increase the risk we had taken in the "stretch-out" of the armament program. He also pointed out that our entire combat technique in all three services depended on the fullest use of our industrial facilities. Stressing the situation in Korea, he said that "we are holding the line with ammunition, and not with the lives of

All of this presented a very serious picture. The Congress was debating and doing a lot of talking about the steel crisis, and I would have welcomed any practical solution from it. But discussion was not enough. I had to act to prevent the stoppage of steel production, which would imperil the nation. Unless some last-minute effort brought peace and a settlement, I could see no alternative but to order the seizure of the steel mills by the government.

The expression "government seizure" sounds forbidding. Some people believe that seizure means confiscation or expropriation of private property. But what really happens is that the government merely assumes temporary custody of the properties. The very same people responsible for the management before seizure are kept on to continue the management of the mills and plants on behalf of the government. In this way the government can make sure that there is no interruption of production.

Neither management nor labor likes government seizure. They are not supposed to like it, any more than the government likes it, and they should not like it. It is much better for everyone for labor and management to work out their own problems without government interference. But when they reach an impasse that endangers the country, as they did in this case, seizure is an effective way to help bring them to a settlement.

During my occupation of the White House I had been frequently urged by department heads to seize an industry or a plant that was strikebound or threatened with a strike. But except in a few critical instances, I refused to do it. I have always considered seizure a last resort—something the President should turn to only when there appears to be no other way to prevent injury to the national interest, or when it is necessary to protect the whole country.

It was for that reason that I waited until the afternoon of the very last day before the strike was to begin before issuing the seizure order. I spent most of that last day with Dr. Steelman and with Secretary of Commerce Sawyer, whose job it would be to supervise the seized industry. Then, just a few hours before the mills were scheduled to be struck, I issued Executive Order No. 10340 to seize the steel mills, and later in the evening of that same day I addressed the nation by radio, explaining the reason for this action.

"If steel production stops," I explained, "we will have to stop making shells and bombs that are going directly to our soldiers at the front in Korea. If steel production stops, we

our troops." Any curtailment of steel production, he warned, would endanger the lives of our fighting men.

Gordon Dean, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, expressed grave concern over the delay which any lack of steel would mean for the major expansion of facilities for atomic weapons production. Henry H. Fowler Administrator of the National Production Authority told me that in addition to military equipment and atomic energy construction, power plants, railroad construction, shipbuilding, machine-tool manufacture, and the like, all would come to a halt if the steel mills closed down. He pointed out that it would depend on the inventory situation how soon the steel shortage would make itself felt in the manufacturing plants, and in certain types of ammunition there was virtually no inventory stock on hand.

Secretary of Commerce Sawyer briefed me on the effect a shutdown would have on the several transportation programs. His figures showed that a ten-day interruption of steel production would mean the loss of ninety-six thousand feet of bridge and fifteen hundred miles of highway He reported that in the event of a steel shutdown only twenty-one of the ninety-eight ships then under construction in American yards could be completed, and thirty-nine others would have to be abandoned entirely He informed me that the effect on airplane production would be such that Convair and Douglas, for instance, would have to halt their assembly lines within sixty days. There was a danger that some manufacturers would not await the onset of the shortage but would close down as soon as steel production ceased.

Oscar Chapman, Secretary of the Interior said that the maintenance and expansion of facilities in the petroleum, gas, and electric-power utility fields depended on steel materials. Coal mines and coke ovens require steel for any number of accessory but essential, uses.

With Dean Acheson I discussed the impact which this threatening paralysis of our defense economy might have on our relations with the rest of the world. Any failure on our part to deliver what we had promised to furnish our allies under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program would seriously undermine their faith in our ability to aid them in critical moments. Russia would be cheered by such evidence of a slowdown in our rearmament. We could not overlook even the possibility that Russia would believe us so weakened by an extended strike as to invite further aggression, and there might be other "Koreas."

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